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Abstract 
 
 
East African states in the 21
st
 century face the challenge of some of the highest 
rates of urban growth the world has ever seen. Cities are expanding despite low 
levels of industrialisation and formal employment, in contexts where states often 
struggle to fulfil basic functions. This thesis aims to bridge a gap between the 
literature on cities and urban development and scholarship pertaining to the role of 
the state in developing countries, to explain why responses to the urban challenge 
are producing widely diverging outcomes in the region. Through a comparative case 
study analysis of Kampala, Uganda and Kigali, Rwanda, it analyses why attempts to 
implement certain urban policies and regulations have been much more effective in 
the latter than the former. It explores this divergence in relation to four critical 
aspects of urban transformation: physical development (urban planning and 
development regulation), livelihoods in the informal economy (with a particular 
focus on petty trade), urban public transport, and urban local taxation.  
 
Most explanations for poor state performance focus on capacity, usually defined as 
bureaucratic competence. This study argues that this is inadequate, and that state 
effectiveness is highly dependent on the political context and the incentives for 
enforcement and compliance affecting state actors and urban social groups 
respectively. Through a process-tracing analysis drawing on six months of fieldwork, 
it highlights the importance of the credibility of government commitments, the 
sources of state legitimacy, the autonomy of different components of the state vis-
à-vis social forces, and ingrained social power relations. It argues that these factors 
affect the degree to which formal state institutions are supported by (rather than 
conflicting with) informal norms. These state-society dynamics proved far more 
important than bureaucratic capacity in accounting for divergent state effectiveness 
with regard to implementing urban policy in the two cities under consideration.  
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Prologue 
 
It is September 16th 2008 in Wandageya, a bustling neighbourhood in Kampala. 
Wandageya, a triangle of land between main roads, is a multi-purpose hub of 
commercial activity. Backing onto a fresh fruit and vegetable market, this triangle is 
also a transport terminal crammed with taxis and boda-boda motorcycle-taxi 
drivers idly awaiting customers. Vendors fringe the muddy, pot-holed space, selling 
goods from shoes to chicken roasting on the spit. Dotted between them are small 
kiosks selling mobile phone credit, sugar cane juice and electronic goods. The area is 
strewn with rubbish, and in the rainy season the area becomes swampy and 
waterlogged. At these times water infused with waste all too easily mingles with the 
chicken being turned just a few feet off the ground. To make matters worse, 
sometimes the sewage pipes coming from the neighbouring slum of Katanga burst, 
with raw sewage joining the rainwater. In recent years this has been thought to be 
the starting place of cholera outbreaks that plague the city. If the area was not 
almost entirely unplanned, resulting in the blocking and building over of drainage 
and other infrastructure, this might be avoided.  
 
On this day in September, a team of city law enforcers from Kampala City Council 
has arrived in Wandageya to remove the kiosks that have been built illegally in the 
road reserve. They have previously issued several warnings and the operation has 
been approved by the local police commander. At around 10am they descend, 
removing the kiosks and loading them onto a truck to ferry them away. However, at 
around 12.30pm the Inspector General of Police, Major General Kale Kayihura – the 
most senior policeman in Uganda – arrives at the scene in person. Kayihura orders 
the officers overseeing the procedure to stop immediately. He says that the 
operation is causing a traffic jam, demands that the removal exercise be halted and 
kiosks be put back. Some of the vendors weep before Kayihura in gratitude. Despite 
the subsequent protestations of the city government that their clean-up exercise 
has been completely undermined, life in Wandegeya continues as normal.  
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Some months later, a fight breaks out in a nearby neighbourhood between a group 
of City Law Enforcers attempting to remove illegal street vendors and a group of 
Traffic Police who intervene in the vendors’ defence. Initially the City Law Enforcers 
overcome the traffic officers, and speed off to escape in their vehicle. However, 
their path is soon blocked by a group of boda-boda drivers who form a barrier 
across the road. They have joined the cause of the vendors, as have a growing 
number of police officers arriving at the scene. The City Council men are soon 
outnumbered, and one of them is badly beaten by the policemen and boda-boda 
drivers, who are now acting in concert in an attempt to lynch him.1  
 
How does government in a city become so dysfunctional that the chief of police 
intervenes specifically to protect people breaking the law? How do the different 
arms of government become so mal-coordinated that two sets of law enforcers 
virtually kill one another? And how do police officers come to side with the city’s 
most notorious outlaws, the boda-bodas, against the Council’s law enforcers? These 
incidents, far from unusual in Kampala, illustrate that it is a city of what Ugandans 
call ‘untouchables’: people protected from the state by actors who are able to offer 
this protection by virtue of their own state authority. The question is why, and how, 
this situation came about. 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
It is 2003 in Nyarugenge, the heart of the Rwandan capital Kigali. The area around 
Nyarugenge central market is chaotic; the city population is bustling about on 
bicycles, taxi-motos (motorcycle-taxis) and matatus (minibuses). In the words of 
one observer it is as if the entire city population ‘decided to take to the street at the 
same time’. Rotting garbage lines the nearby streets, which are also thronged with 
vendors, beggars and orphans, the latter a reminder of the country’s terrible 
history. Those who cannot afford transport costs walk to work in and around the 
                                                          
1
 Sources for this account include: Interview, Sabiti Makara, Senior Lecturer in Political Science, 
Makerere University, Kampala, 23 September 2009; The New Vision, 17 September 2008; Daily 
Monitor, 26 September 2008; The New Vision, 16 February 2010.   
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market from the nearby slums such as Ubumwe, a shantytown crammed onto a 
hillside minutes from the Nyarugenge market.  
 
Fast-forward seven years to 2010. Urban growth has continued at an astonishing 
rate and the city’s population has more than doubled, now standing at over a 
million. Yet it no longer feels as if all its residents have taken to the streets. The city 
is described as one where relative calm prevails even on busy weekdays, and the 
‘chaotic matatu cacophony’ characteristic of most East African cities is absent. It has 
recently won a UN award due to achievements in relation to cleanliness and public 
order. In Nyarugenge, the marketplace has gone; in its place stands a multi-storey 
structure that will house 340 parking spaces and 420 shops. All the kiosks that once 
fringed the market have been removed. There are now virtually no vendors on the 
streets nearby, or indeed anywhere in the city.  
 
Any street hawkers that do remain are hunted relentlessly by the state’s law-
enforcers. The city authorities have tracked all illegal vendors and are encouraging 
them to form co-operatives and find legal outlets to sell their goods.  This is not 
easy now that Kigali’s formal marketplaces and shops are already oversubscribed. 
However, if the police catch you vending on Kigali’s streets, one vendor explains, 
they will confiscate your produce and may even imprison you. ‘We are trying to 
make a living…how will we survive?’, says another. Here, unlike in Kampala, no-one 
intervenes in their favour. On the contrary, they spend much of their day literally on 
the run from a tightly coordinated web of state authorities.  
 
Meanwhile, the Ubumwe slum that housed many of them has vanished. Bulldozers 
flatten the earth to make way for paved roads zig-zagging across the hillside, and 
modern infrastructure that had been entirely absent – electricity, sewerage, fibre-
optic cables – is being laid for a new central business district: the heart of the new 
city Master Plan. On the surrounding streets, bicycles have been banned and the 
taxi-motos are regimented in green helmets and uniforms stamped with their 
unique registration number. Far from being seen as outlaws like Kampala’s boda-
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bodas, they regularly plant trees, clean city streets and play a central role in 
maintaining Kigali’s low crime rate.2  
 
What kind of political circumstances fostered this transformation? Why are state 
actors implementing these new plans and regulations so rigorously and why is there 
no-one taking the side of groups disadvantaged by the change? In Kigali there 
appear to be no ‘untouchables’, and the state is not available as a tool for 
manipulation against itself. The question is: why not? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Sources for this account include: interview with street vendors, Kigali, 08.02.10; interviews with 
Rwandan officials and politicians, 2009-10; Fontline World, 7 March 2003; CoK 2007; The Standard 
(Kenya), 12 June 2010; The New Times, 24 June 2009;  interviews conducted by Marion Warnica, 
The Rwanda Initiative, http://www.rwandainitiative.ca/blog/?p=1529, accessed 10.06.12. 
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Chapter One 
Defining the research agenda 
  
Rapid urban growth is one of the greatest challenges Africa faces in the 21st 
Century. Because most of the continent is still predominantly rural, 
acknowledgement of current and (especially) future development problems linked 
to urban growth and urbanisation on the continent has been slow. East Africa in 
particular is the least urbanised region in the world, and many international donors 
and NGOs working there barely have an urban programme to speak of; yet it is 
urbanising rapidly and has the highest urban growth rates of any region in the world 
(UNPD 2009; UN-HABITAT 2011).3 The effective management of the urban 
transition is therefore more urgent here than anywhere else. Much of the urban 
growth is happening in the context of low levels of industrialisation, and cities are 
often unable to provide either jobs or basic services to their growing populations. 
Meanwhile global poverty itself is becoming increasingly urban (Ravallion et al. 
2007: 92) and the living conditions of poor urban-dwellers are often abysmal 
(Hardoy et al. 2001; Davis 2006). In short, while African cities have generally been 
seen as sites of privilege and ‘urban bias’ (Lipton 1977; Bates 1981) leading to an 
under-estimation of urban poverty in recent decades (Satterthwaite 2003b; Marcus 
and Asmorowati 2006; Beall and Fox 2009), they now indisputably constitute a 
major development concern. 
 
Governments are responding to this challenge in very different ways, producing 
starkly contrasting outcomes. The purpose of this study is to explain some of these 
differences. There has been a marked tendency to analyse African development 
issues in universalising terms that emphasise the ‘African’ dimensions of a problem, 
rather than looking at the differences in dynamics between similar countries (Booth 
                                                          
3
 The distinction between urban growth and urbanisation is an important one, the former referring 
to the increase in absolute numbers of urban-dwellers and the latter to an increase in the proportion 
of the population in urban versus rural areas (Dyson 2010). The former is proceeding at a globally 
unprecedented rate; the pace of the latter on the continent as a whole is more contested (Potts 
2009; Fox 2012; Potts 2012).  
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2011:3).4 Analysing difference is critical if we want to understand the range of 
possibility for the development of states and cities in low-income countries and 
provide insights into how future outcomes could be shaped. The overarching 
purpose of this study is therefore to analyse the causal mechanisms behind differing 
trajectories of urban development between two countries that share many 
demographic, historical and socio-economic similarities.  
 
Uganda has a higher percentage of slum-dwellers than all its neighbours according 
to some sources (SID 2008) and its capital has become renowned for shanty 
settlements prone to fatal flooding and cholera outbreaks (Mabasi 2009), as well as 
its pot-holed streets and crumbling infrastructure, crippling traffic congestion, 
public disorder and violent riots. One journalist captured the widespread despair at 
the state of the city when he wrote that ‘Kampala is a city in a mess – one sprawling 
garbage heap and slum.’5 Kigali, meanwhile, has become the envy of the region: 
increasingly immaculately planned, orderly and fêted internationally as a ‘model, 
modern city’ by UN-HABITAT in 2008.6 There is much to be critically interrogated in 
these depictions but they do correspond to some fundamental differences in the 
form urbanisation has been taking in two states at similar levels of both 
urbanisation and economic development, particularly since 2000. Indeed it was 
after the turn of the millennium that the sharp divergence between the two cities 
really emerged. Consequently, while historical dynamics are considered in some 
depth, the empirical core of this thesis is focused on the decade 2000-2010. 
 
These glaring differences cannot be explained by poverty or economic growth: GDP 
per capita is very similar in both countries (marginally higher in Uganda), and 
economic growth rates have likewise been similar in recent decades.7  Nor are these 
differences side-effects of major variance in economic structure: in both countries 
70-80% of the population work in agriculture, with services contributing around half 
                                                          
4
 A particularly notable example of this is Bates (2008), who goes so far in ‘continentalising’ the 
problems of African statehood that he writes as if all states in Africa have failed in recent years, and 
all for the same set of reasons.  
5
 ‘Victimising KCCA, Police’, The Independent (Uganda), 17.02.12. 
6
 http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=564&cid=5666, accessed 27.04.11. 
7
 World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/, accessed 24.03.12. 
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of GDP and industry just a quarter or less.8 By and large, official policies on tackling 
urban development issues are also similar in the two states. What the observable 
divergence between the two cities does reflect is dramatic differences in the extent 
to which policies are actually implemented. This study argues that the explanation 
for this lies above all in domestic politics: in the differing machinations of power and 
the strategies and tactics of political and social actors that exist between the lines of 
policy documents, laws and grand plans.  
 
A deeper understanding of how these cities are evolving – and indeed how all cities 
on the continent are evolving – therefore requires analyses of urban development 
that incorporate rigorous political analysis. Both now and in the future, dealing with 
urban development challenges will not simply be a matter of ensuring economic 
growth and ‘getting the policies right’. As spaces where large amounts of resources 
are accumulated, inequality is concentrated and civic difference is articulated, cities 
give rise to daily political struggles that condition how effective states are in relation 
to the policies they put in place to shape city development. It is well known that 
governments choose particular policies to serve political ends as well as 
developmental ones; but the extent to which they actually implement them can 
also be deeply political. This thesis is premised on the proposition that the politics 
of policy implementation and non-implementation is an important development 
issue in its own right.  
 
The overarching question posed in this study is as follows: Why is the 
implementation and enforcement of urban development policies and regulations 
more effective in Kigali than Kampala? There is no literature explicitly addressing 
this question. Searching for potential explanations in pre-existing scholarship 
therefore requires exploring what the broader literature on cities and states in the 
developing world has to offer. This chapter undertakes a review of certain key 
bodies of literature, and in so doing highlights gaps the research aims to fill. The 
following two sections consist of a historiography of development thinking on urban 
challenges in low-income countries, followed by a consideration of some of the 
                                                          
8
 World Bank indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator, accessed 07.06.12. 
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relevant literature on the state and on urban politics. These sections highlight how 
interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation is necessary to answer the central question (a 
task taken up in more detail in Chapter Two). This is followed by an outline of the 
general argument of the thesis, and how it will add value to the field of 
Development Studies. A final section presents the thesis structure, with brief 
summaries of each subsequent chapter. 
 
1.1   The political deficit in mainstream approaches to urban development 
 
Since the ‘development project’ began in the mid-20th Century,9 the role of cities in 
development has been by turns hotly debated and virtually ignored. After being the 
focus of early efforts at import-substitution industrialisation, cities basically fell out 
of favour with the international development community in the 1980s (Rakodi 
1997; Beall and Fox 2009). This was particularly evident in Africa, where structural 
adjustment and the increasing disillusionment with post-colonial states saw cities 
reframed as sites of privilege feeding off the countryside and impeding 
development, as theorised by Lipton (1977) and Bates (1981). Consequently the 
vast majority of development interventions since this time have been focused on 
rural areas, where most of the poor live in many developing countries.10 However, if 
the 1960s and 70s were indeed the ‘halcyon days’ of city life in Africa (Bryceson 
2006), by the 1980s this was dramatically changing (Amis 1989). Structural 
adjustment and the decimation of public formal employment represented a 
deliberate neglect of urban development and took a dramatic toll on cities 
(Mkandawire 2002; 2003; Potts 2007). Yet they continued to grow in Africa, fuelling 
concerns about ‘over-urbanisation’ on the continent (Fox 2012) and contributing to 
perceptions of urban crisis in the developing world more generally (Davis 2006). 
 
                                                          
9
 By this I mean the conscious effort to assist low-income countries through international 
development assistance in the wake of the second world war and decolonisation. 
10
 Agriculture was indeed neglected in the 1960s and 1970s, and this needed redressing. Yet the 
prescriptions emerging from the Bates critique, exemplified by the Berg report (World Bank 1981), 
largely failed to address agricultural underdevelopment in subsequent decades (Bezemer and 
Headey 2008), while at the same time actively promoting the neglect of cities (Beall and Fox 2009). 
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Despite a range of policy and academic approaches to the urban problem in recent 
decades, the literature reveals a surprising lack of political analysis in its treatment 
of urban development challenges. Moreover, the question of why many states have 
so severely failed to address these challenges remains largely unresolved and few 
analytical tools have been developed for explaining differences in development 
outcomes between cities in similar contexts. This section traces the evolution of 
urban development thinking over the past half-century, with a view to identifying 
what is missing in relation to answering the central research question.  
 
From planning to management 
 
Around the time of Africa’s ‘independence decade’ in the 1960s, urban planning 
was popular both among the governments of newly-independent countries and 
their international sponsors, reflecting a general faith in state planning globally at 
the time. Urban physical planning was seen as an integral part of the then-
esteemed practice of development planning (Gans 1963; Conyers and Hills 1984). 
From the 1950s to the 1970s it represented ‘the embodiment of the dream of a 
brave new world’, and the urban planning profession was ‘a magnet for the 
brightest and best of those involved in government’ (Taylor 2004: 4). However, in 
Africa as elsewhere city master planning consistently underestimated the pace of 
urban growth (Mabogunje 1990) and plans often took many years to produce. 
Consequently, they were ‘often out of date even before they were completed’ and 
in the context of post-independence economic and demographic change, ‘most of 
what was implemented had not been planned, and informal development 
overwhelmed the assumptions and projections of the plans’ (Taylor 2004: 4).11  
 
Part of the reason planning fell out of favour was therefore because it was deemed 
to be highly ineffective in developing countries. However, more ideological factors 
were also at play as the 1970s drew to a close.  As noted above, the development 
industry was shifting gear, and there was little interest on the part of donors in 
supporting urban planning or indeed supporting state planning more generally. 
                                                          
11
 Note that debates around urban planning will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
  
 21 
Planning was reconceptualised as a typical form of rent-seeking in light of analyses 
by influential figures such as Krueger (1991), to the extent that it came to be seen 
by many ‘as the devil incarnate';12 a perspective that in many respects reaches its 
apex in the work of Easterly (2006). In place of planning emerged a discourse of 
‘urban management’. While this concept had long existed as an administrative 
counterpart to physical planning (Wekwete 1997), the 1980s reframing of the term 
turned it on its head, envisaging a much slimmer role for government. The growing 
enchantment with all things non-state saw management as involving a broad range 
of civil society and private sector interests (Rakodi 1997; Wekwete 1997), with 
government acting as ‘enabler’.   
 
This was the environment in which the Urban Management Programme (UMP) – a 
collaborative programme involving the World Bank, UNDP and UN-HABITAT – 
emerged in 1986 (World Bank and UNHCS 1989; Farvacque and McAuslan 1992; 
Bernstein 1994; Jones and Ward 1994). The UMP was presented as ‘promoting new 
paradigms’ around partnership and the empowerment of local actors (Mehta 2005). 
Around the time of its emergence scholars were starting to recognise the crisis into 
which cities had been plunged (Stren and White 1989), partly as a consequence of 
structural adjustment (Mkandawire 2002). Ironically, however, this recognition of 
crisis further boosted the momentum behind neoliberal managerial approaches 
because of the hardening conception of the state as problem rather than solution.  
The idea was to ‘replace long-term physical planning, which had no real impact on 
city development, with daily action-oriented urban management’, and the influence 
of these ideas was such that ‘master planning disappeared progressively from the 
priorities of developing countries’ (Biau 2004: 8). Just as the emphasis shifted in 
practice, so it did in relation to academic discourses. To the extent that 
development literature dealt with cities, it moved away from a concern with 
regional and urban planning (Friedmann and Alonso 1975; Rondinelli 1975) and 
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 Susan Parnell, UCL public lecture, 17.01.12. 
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towards concern with defining the scope of urban management (Lee-Smith and 
Stren 1991; Mabogunje 1992; Stren 1993; Mattingly 1994; McGill 1998).13  
  
Two points regarding this shift away from a discourse of planning are particularly 
relevant to the question at hand. The first is that in the context of disillusionment 
with the state, planning was cast aside without adequate attention to the nature 
and causes of the failures of implementation that made it so unsatisfactory (Taylor 
2004). There was an ambiguity regarding how planning was viewed even within 
neoliberal circles. On the one hand it was rejected because of states’ seeming 
inability to implement; but on the other, the land-use and zoning regulations that 
accompany planning were often criticised on the grounds that they were 
implemented too harshly and rigidly, forcing the poor into illegality (De Soto 1989). 
Both problems were subsumed under generalised critiques of post-colonial states 
as being ineffectual, bloated and prone to corruption. Missing from this was 
analysis of the incentives causing differential implementation of different kinds of 
state policy, and the systematic disaggregation of state performance in relation to 
different urban development issues. 
 
Second, in moving from a discourse of planning to one of management, urban 
development issues were further depoliticised.14 While planning theory has itself 
been criticised for being politically ‘sanitised’ (Friedmann 1997), in practice planning 
is a highly political tool, reflecting power struggles and group relations, often in 
highly inequitable ways (Yiftachel 1998; Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; Harrison et al. 2008). 
Indeed, the close links between conventional planning and the interests of political 
elites partly account for the appeal of the new concept of urban management, and 
                                                          
13
 These shifts reflected changing attitudes towards city planning in the developed world (Ambrose 
1986) but also the more general reorientation away from  traditional conceptions of ‘public 
administration’ towards the ‘new public management’ (NPM) paradigm  (Gray and Jenkins 1995; 
Hood 1995). NPM approaches are acknowledged even by their proponents as being ill-suited to 
situations where corruption poses major threats to public service integrity and basic state 
organisations and institutions are weak (Dunleavy and Hood 1994). As such, the application of NPM 
to developing countries was always questionable. See Larbi (2006) for a discussion of NPM in 
developing country contexts.                                                       
14
 This is part of a more general problem of development discourses being depoliticised, a 
phenomenon widely recognised and discussed (Goldsworthy 1988; Ferguson 1994; Harriss 2001; 
Hickey 2005).  
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there was good reason to welcome greater attention to non-state actors, 
partnership and negotiation. Yet rather than addressing the power relations 
embodied in planning practice head-on, the discourse of managerialism simply 
removed politics and power from the debate. The ideal of partnership under an 
‘enabling’ state often obscured power inequalities rather than attempting to 
redress them.  
 
In sum, the paradigm of state planning had been too top-down, could not keep up 
with urban growth, and did not offer a sophisticated approach to implementation – 
the latter forming its greatest Achilles’ heel (Taylor 2004). However, the 
management discourse that replaced it lacked a concern with power and eschewed 
strategic engagement with the causes of urban development problems in favour of 
a focus on the day-to-day. Furthermore, it did little to address the planning 
paradigm’s weaknesses with respect to the implementation question, so provides 
few answers for this study. The recognition in the 1990s that management was ill-
equipped to deal with the scale of urban development challenges and was weak as 
an analytical concept (Stren 1993; Jones and Ward 1994) subsequently led to 
another shift to a concern with ‘urban governance’.  
 
From urban governance to ‘the right to the city’ 
 
The evolution of urban management into a new concept of urban governance was 
relatively subtle compared with the paradigm shift described above. As the extent 
of social dislocation in post-adjustment cities became increasingly clear, a less 
technocratic, more forward-looking and inclusive approach was sought as the 1990s 
wore on. This took shape in UN-HABITAT’s Global Campaign for Urban Governance 
from 1999. The concept of ‘governance’ comes closer to acknowledging the degree 
to which cities are contested spaces characterised by struggles for resources and 
control, and in theory focuses attention on more squarely on competing interests 
and the relationality of power (Healey 2004; Pieterse 2008). It more explicitly 
highlights the particular roles of civil society and the private sector in the governing 
of cities, and provides opportunities for thinking about integrating the poor and 
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marginalised (Beall 1996; Devas 2001; Devas et al. 2004). It also paralleled the shift 
from early New Public Management approaches in the 1980s to ‘second generation’ 
public sector reforms, with a greater focus on public-private partnerships for urban 
services (Crook and Ayee 2006).  
 
However, these approaches largely continued the trend by which government was 
reconceptualised as an organisation less concerned with ‘doing’ than ‘ensuring that 
things are done’ by (and in partnership with) other actors (Kaul 1997; Batley and 
Larbi 2004). The governance discourse was thus an evolution of new public 
management-influenced approaches rather than a qualitative break. As Doornbos 
(2001) notes, the concern with governance in developing countries originated not in 
academia but among donor organisations, epitomised by the work of Kaufmann and 
his colleagues at the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 1999). It also emerged almost 
simultaneously with the normative ‘good governance’ agenda and is often equated 
with it (Doornbos 2001: 93). UN-HABITAT’s conception of good urban governance 
involved a concern with ‘sustainability, subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency 
and accountability, civic engagement and citizenship, and security, which are all 
defined as interdependent and mutually reinforcing’ (Pieterse 2008: 66). The 
assumption that all these things would happily develop together left power 
‘unexplained and therefore unexposed’ (Pieterse 2008: 68), reflecting general 
wariness among donors about acknowledging the significance of messy processes of 
political struggle and coalition-building. Ironically, at the city level, where politics is 
an inescapable aspect of daily life, there has been a particularly strong tendency to 
frame ‘urban governance entirely in terms of urban management’ (Beall 1996: 3).  
 
Even work that sought to move beyond this managerial conception has arguably not 
managed fully to transcend donors’ depoliticising imprint on the concept of 
governance. For example Devas (Devas 2001) considers a multiplicity of urban 
actors in his analysis of governance but says little about the roles of political parties, 
factions, clientelistic relations and the political bargaining both among state actors 
and between state-and non-state actors that shapes urban political life and 
development outcomes. The difficulty in shaking off these prescriptive, managerial 
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associations is exacerbated by the fact that much development research is funded 
by the donor community, and some of the academics writing about urban 
governance – such as William Dillinger (1994) and Michael Cohen (2001) – are or 
were based at the World Bank. 
 
Despite all this, politics has not been entirely absent from discourses on cities in the 
developing world. Parallelling the conceptual shifts from planning to governance 
has been the emergence of discourses around active citizen participation in urban 
affairs, which over time have become more explicitly political. ‘Community 
participation’ was considered a ‘buzzword’ back in the 1980s when the 
management paradigm came in (Midgley et al. 1986), but by the following decade 
concerns were being raised about the extent to which the emphasis on participation 
was itself ‘depoliticising’, due to its failure to engage with the problem of power 
relations (White 1996; Cleaver 1999). Consequently, there have been efforts to ‘re-
politicise’ the participation discourse, resulting in conceptions of ‘empowered 
participation’ and ‘empowered deliberative democracy’ (Fung and Wright 2003a; 
Fung 2004).15 To a large degree these have been focused on urban areas, drawing 
inspiration in particular from the experience of participatory budgeting in Brazilian 
cities (Santos 1998; Baiocchi 2001). 
 
The idea that ‘participation must be political’ to be meaningful (White 1996: 1) 
gathered strength through a renaissance of Henri Lefebvre’s (Lefebvre 1968) idea of 
the ‘right to the city’. The radical underpinning of this idea that it is not national 
citizens but all those who inhabit a city – legal citizens or not – should have a say in 
decisions made either by the state or any other organisation that will affect urban 
space.  He conceives of the right to the city as not only a right to participation but 
the right to appropriation: ‘to be physically present in the space of the city’ and ‘to 
produce urban space so that it meets the needs of inhabitants’ (Purcell 2002: 103). 
The idea has proved powerful among those concerned more generally with the 
inequities of urban development, stimulating scholarship on the subject by eminent 
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 Note that this more or less coincided with a revival of interest in urban planning through the lens 
of ‘collaborative’, more participatory planning processes (Healey 1997).  
  
 26 
urban scholars from a range of disciplines including John Freidmann (1995), David 
Harvey (2003; 2012), Don Mitchell (2003) and AbdouMaliq Simone (2005). In the 
late 2000s its popularity was such that it was adopted as the theme for UN-
HABITATs fifth World Urban Forum in 2010 (UN-HABITAT 2010), where academics 
and community organisations such as Slum Dwellers International alike were 
touting the slogan.  
 
The continuing need for political analysis of urban development processes 
 
While discourses of empowered participation and the ‘right to the city’ cannot be 
accused of lacking attention to politics, they remain strongly normative rather than 
analytical, revealing little about why so many states in the developing world 
struggle to cope with the challenges of urbanisation. Poor service delivery in cities is 
assumed to reflect a lack of responsiveness to citizen needs and inadequate 
opportunities for participation. This, however, is only part of the picture. As the 
work of Patrick Heller (Heller 2000; 2001) and Harriss et al (2004) has shown, the 
role of political parties, social movements and trade unions has been central in 
cases of sustained improvements in local state performance. Citizen participation 
without robust institutions and organisations, which may take a long time to build, 
can be limited and ephemeral in its achievements. Moreover, in situations where 
states lack resources and are institutionally dysfunctional, demands for rights are 
often simply channelled into clientelistic relationships and populist vote-catching 
tactics that do little to enhance state responsiveness or effectiveness. While a 
concern with rights and citizen involvement has a vital role to play in development, 
its counterpart must be an analysis of what urban politics actually looks like in the 
cities most in need of the realisation of these rights. Above all, an analysis of how 
states function in cities is needed if we are to understand the complex ways in 
which they respond to citizen demands in varying circumstances.  
 
Between these radical participative approaches and the more mainstream thinking 
on urban governance, there is therefore a gap in terms of political analysis. While 
the shift from a planning paradigm to a management one threw out the baby (the 
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state and politics) with the bathwater (inflexible top-down approaches to urban 
development), the governance approach has only partially rehabilitated political 
considerations. Meanwhile ‘right to the city’ discourses have been highly abstract 
and theoretical, and as such rather divorced from developing world urban realities, 
while governance research has exhibited the opposite tendency, lacking theory 
development. Indeed many writings on urban governance reflect the divide 
identified by Robinson (2006) whereby cities in developing countries are seen as 
sites for development intervention and not theory development. 
 
Admittedly this attention to palliative solutions in developing world cities reflects 
very valid concerns with urgent development challenges such as poor provision of 
water, sanitation and other basic urban services (Hardoy et al. 2001; Satterthwaite 
2003a). However, vital though it is to identify these problems and potential roles for 
development actors, a deficit nevertheless persists regarding political analysis and 
theorisation about how cities are actually governed in developing countries. 
Without this kind of analysis, normative conceptions of ‘better urban governance’ 
offer little by way of solutions (Beall and Fox 2009: 202). What is needed is a greater 
attention to the causal processes underpinning policy failure, which in turn requires 
a clearer focus on politics and the state.    
 
1.2   Politics and the state through an urban lens 
 
In seeking to address the question of effective policy implementation in cities, 
several bodies of literature outside those specifically concerned with urban 
development in low-income countries provide relevant insights. Some of this 
literature is discussed in detail in Chapter Two, which develops an analytical 
framework for this study. However, certain trends in the political economy and 
political science literature are discussed briefly here in the interests of providing a 
broad overview of the most relevant academic themes, while highlighting the 
contribution the study hopes to make at the interstices of these diverse areas of 
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scholarship. As well as being a study of cities, this is a study of states,16 and the 
literature on states is rich in ideas that can help make sense of why policy 
implementation is or is not effective. Yet just there remain gaps in the urban 
development literature that might be filled by a keener attention to politics, there 
are ways in which the literature on states could benefit from insights gleaned by a 
study of the socio-economic, political and spatial qualities of cities. Cities are, after 
all, where much state-building takes place (Tilly 1989; 2010).  
 
The state in developing countries: moving the debate beyond capacity and 
autonomy 
 
Two concepts have underpinned much of the literature on state performance in 
developing countries. The first and more straightforward is that of ‘state capacity’, 
which has obvious relevance given this study’s focus on policy implementation. 
Skocpol (1985) and Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) consider high levels of 
technical expertise, graduate skills and the ability to collect and deploy substantial 
revenues as fundamental indicators of state capacity; indeed bureaucratic 
competence or quality is often considered more or less synonymous with capacity 
(Haggard 1990; Geddes 1994). A second concept that recurs in the literature on 
states’ developmental performance is that of ‘autonomy’, defined by Skocpol as 
when states are able to ‘formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of 
the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society’ (Skocpol 1985: 9). 
Sometimes the term ‘relative autonomy’ is used (Trimberger 1978), reflecting the 
inability of states to act entirely independently of social forces; something that led 
Evans (1995) to famously reconceptualise the idea as ‘embedded autonomy’.  
 
The discourse of autonomy draws heavily on Weber’s argument about how modern 
public administration ‘segregates official activity from the sphere of private life’ 
(Weber 1922/1968: 987) and the attendant suggestion that a state’s 
‘developmental chances’ are enhanced to the degree that they can operate 
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 Note that definitional issues concerning the state and attendant concepts such as ‘state actors’ 
and ‘state action’ will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
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according to ‘an “autonomous” logic inherent in their technical structure’ (ibid: 
1002). Paralleling this Weberian strand in recent work on the state have been neo-
Weberian arguments about why African states specifically have often failed to 
develop. Weber argued that the separation of official and private life ‘stands in 
extreme contrast to the regulation of all relationships through individual privileges 
and bestowals of favour’, which he termed patrimonialism (ibid: 987-988). This 
argument is reflected in discourses on ‘neo-patrimonialism’ in Africa, in which 
scholars such as Hyden (1983) and Bayart (1993a) highlight the importance of 
‘affective’ networks through which leaders draw on charismatic rather than legal-
rational authority. Thus ‘autonomous’ states of the kind celebrated for bringing 
development to East Asia (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999) are 
contrasted with ‘lame leviathans’ commonly found in Africa (Callaghy 1987).17 
 
Both capacity and autonomy will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two’s 
analytical framework; at this stage it will suffice to say that they are both highly 
problematic with respect to solving the puzzle at hand. The states being studied 
here both score poorly on most indicators of capacity, and if anything the superior 
implementer – Rwanda – has the greater capacity deficit, as later chapters 
illustrate. Autonomy, meanwhile, suffers from serious conceptual problems, both 
because ‘complete isolation from social pressures is a myth’ (Mkandawire 2001: 
302) and because of the way it assumes that states are unified actors. Indeed 
neither capacity nor autonomy adequately accounts for the degree to which forces 
within the state itself can impede implementation.18 States are never monolithic 
and at the lowest levels of development state incoherence can be especially 
problematic. As Geddes (1994: 7) notes, it is critical to understand ‘the sources of 
the competing interests of different actors within the state’. This is where the 
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 These analyses are highly problematic, not least since the term ‘neo-patrimonialism’ has often 
been applied rather uncritically to virtually all African states ranging from the least to the most 
successful, as Crook (1989; 2010) notes. Recent work on ‘Developmental Patrimonialism’ has 
attempted to provide a more nuanced analysis that highlights important differences between forms 
of patrimonialism and can therefore account better for divergent development outcomes (Kelsall et 
al. 2010; Crook and Booth 2011; Kelsall 2011). 
18
 This is a point acknowledged in much of the policy studies literature, including classic studies such 
as Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), as will be discussed further in Chapter Two. Such insights have 
percolated surprisingly little into discussions of state capacity in developing countries.   
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literature drawing on traditions of political sociology and the ‘anthropology of the 
state’ provides important perspectives, and where I suggest that an urban focus 
offers particular advantages.  
 
Migdal (1994: 15) points out that states consist of far more than the top level elite, 
disaggregating multiple levels of state authority and how their roles shift and 
overlap in response to social forces. He distinguishes between ‘the trenches’ at the 
very bottom, ‘the dispersed field offices’ that decide on local resource allocation, 
‘the agency’s central offices’ based in the capital city and the ‘commanding heights’ 
of top executive leadership. Each of these levels faces a very different ‘calculus of 
pressures’ from various sectors of society (Migdal 1994: 16-17). The question for 
Migdal is therefore not whether a state can be autonomous but how different social 
forces exert themselves on various levels in the state hierarchy. The challenge of 
understanding how states work is to interpret ‘The cacophony of sounds from the 
wildly different arena in which components of the state and social forces interact’ 
(Migdal 1994: 17).  Developmental performance is therefore not only conditioned 
by ‘a certain kind of organization of the state and private sector’ (Wade 1990: 27) 
but by the extent to which the state itself is ‘an organization divided’ (Migdal 1997: 
231).  
 
Yet Migdal and other scholars concerned with state-society relations and 
development have generally not explored how in urban contexts these ideas can be 
pushed further. For example in capital cities all the levels of state to which Migdal 
refers – from the ‘trenches’ to the ‘commanding heights – are usually present 
simultaneously, often creating forms of gridlock in practice that are difficult to 
resolve through principles of subsidiarity. Moreover, the everyday ‘banal practices 
of bureaucracies’ through which people learn about the state (Corbridge et al. 2005; 
Sharma and Gupta 2006: 11) are far more prevalent in urban settings, as described 
in Lipsky’s classic studies of ‘street level bureaucrats’ who ‘implicitly mediate’ 
relations between cities and the state (Lipsky 1971; 1980). Here interactions with 
police officers, city officials, traffic authorities, building inspectors and local tax 
collectors take place constantly. The resultant ‘learning’ means that urban-dwellers 
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understand that the state is ‘a diverse entity with multiple layers…and centers’, 
some of which are sources of redress and others sources of grievance (Gupta 1995: 
331), and can target their needs and demands in ways that play one state agency 
off against another in search of a payoff. These issues of internal state coherence 
and coordination are both central to the implementation problem and particularly 
pertinent in developing country cities.19 The following section expands on these 
ideas through an examination of what conventional urban political science can offer 
this study.  
 
Urban political science and its limitations  
 
Cities are spaces where states are particularly incapable of acting autonomously. In 
large cities especially, the concentration of diverse, powerful and often organised 
interests means that to proceed effectively state actors have to form coalitions with 
multiple social forces. In the 1980s, after a period in the doldrums (Sapotichne et al. 
2007; Orr and Johnson 2008), Western urban political science gained a new lease of 
life exploring these issues through ‘urban regime theory’ (URT) (Fainstein and 
Fainstein 1983; Elkin 1985; Stone 1989; 1993; Ward 1996). This refocused attention 
away from stale debates on ‘elitism’ (Hunter 1953; Mills 1956) versus ‘pluralism’ 
(Dahl 1961), towards the formation of long-term informal coalitions at the urban 
level. It was spurred by a recognition that ‘to be effective, governments must blend 
their capacities with those of various non-governmental actors’, resulting in 
coalitions that are then carefully protected by all participants (Stone 1993: 6). Stone 
states his concern as being how political actors forge the ‘capacity to act and 
accomplish goals’ in cities, something he sees as being ‘fused’ through the highly 
contested process of forming of urban regimes (Stone 1989: 229). Unlike the 
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 These issues can be exacerbated by decentralisation, which central governments often embark on 
to create local clients and can effectively fragment the state, with dubious outcomes for 
development (Crook 2003; Green 2010). The broader literature on decentralisation is an obvious 
point of reference to the central question of this study, but one of its limitations in this context is 
that much of it is largely concerned with the relationship between decentralisation and rural 
development (see for example (Leonard and Marshall 1982; Conyers 1983; Parker 1995; Manor 
1997; Crook and Manor 1998; Johnson 2001; Bardhan 2002), though there are some exceptions 
(such as Dillinger (1994) and Faguet (2004)). Issues relating to decentralisation will, however, be 
addressed in several subsequent chapters.   
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discourses on urban management and governance applied to the developing world, 
this perspective has the merit of engaging directly with the power dynamics that 
constitute politics, highlighting the unevenness and struggle in regime formation 
process (Painter 2001). It is also highly pertinent to questions of policy 
implementation while recognising that autonomy is not an option.  
 
However, having been developed in relation to the United States, there are 
fundamental limitations regarding URT’s applicability in developing country settings. 
The idea of government having to ‘blend’ its capacities with other actors assumes 
that a clear division between private actors and the state exists to begin with 
(Fainstein and Fainstein 1983; Elkin 1985). This especially unclear in many 
developing country contexts, where economic and political elites have often been 
closely ‘fused’ since these states were created, rather than being distinct and 
independent bargaining partners. Complicating matters further, in developing 
country cities the state itself is pervaded with informal relationships and rule 
systems to a particularly high degree (Beall 2007). Thus while Western urban 
political science is primarily concerned with how interests jostle to exert influence 
on the state, assuming that the state is fully institutionalised and functional, the 
state itself needs to be problematised in much more fundamental ways in the 
contexts being considered here.  
 
A parallel problem with theories from Western urban political science is that they 
tend to assume that interests in civil society politically organise and articulate their 
interests in a particular way. In the developing world, many interests are not 
organised along these lines, or not organised at all (Moore and Putzel 1999; Rakodi 
2001a). Instead of organising themselves politically as social movements or pressure 
groups vis-à-vis the state, city-dwellers often direct their demands towards 
individual political patrons (Walton 1998; Beall et al. 2011). The fact that so much 
economic activity in these cities is informal – as discussed in Chapter Five – also has 
a significant bearing on the kinds of institutional channels open for economic 
interests to participate in regime-formation. The kinds of organisation and 
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bargaining that would lead to the durable urban regimes theorised in URT do not 
really take place in these contexts.  
 
URT is therefore ill-equipped to act as a central theoretical foundation for thinking 
about politics in cities in low-income countries. However, it nevertheless usefully 
highlights some of the more universal dilemmas of governing cities. In high and low-
income countries alike, cities are sites of wealth accumulation, valuable land, and 
sizeable markets, thus rendering them highly ‘relevant territory’ (Putzel 2008) for 
the exercise of control even in states that completely neglect large proportions of 
the urban (and rural) populations. Consequently they are focal points for 
contestation between the state and other actors, necessitating constant bargaining 
among political and social forces. Despite its developed world biases, URT’s focus on 
the centrality of efforts by state actors to fuse their interests with those of non-
state groups highlights the critical importance of the nature of political bargains 
struck and coalitions formed.   
 
A focus on how relationships between state actors and urban social forces are 
negotiated can greatly enrich our understanding of policy implementation. While 
much of ‘implementation studies’ literature that emerged in the 1970s focuses on 
internal dynamics within state bureaucracies (Lipsky 1980; Barrett and Fudge 1981; 
Pressman and Wildavsky 1984), some more recent approaches that are more 
tailored towards developing countries engage explicitly with state-society relations 
as a central feature of the implementation problematic. In particular, Thomas and 
Grindle (1990) provide helpful insights here in their work regarding the different 
kinds of implementation difficulties encountered by different varieties of policy. 
Some policies, they argue, provoke resistance primarily in the bureaucratic arena, 
while others provoke it largely in the public arena. Urban development policies and 
regulations (while not something they explicitly discuss) are of the latter variety, 
because if implemented their costs are dispersed widely and swiftly among urban 
groups, invoking widespread public responses. This implies that such policies are 
likely to become highly politicised, and that the obstacles to implementing them are 
primarily political rather than bureaucratic in nature. Thomas and Grindle’s 
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framework does not address why different states would have such varying 
experiences in implementing the same kinds of policies; but its implication is that 
this would be due to differences in political resources available to each government. 
Put differently, the kinds of social forces that political actors can draw on to bolster 
themselves politically, and the way in which they do so, impact on the effectiveness 
of policy implementation. The validity of these ideas is further explored through the 
comparative perspective provided in this thesis. 
 
1.3    Contribution the literature on cities and states  
 
The aim of this study is to explain why and how policies aimed at shaping city 
development in Kampala and Kigali from 2000-2010 met with such differential 
outcomes. The literature on urban development in low-income countries has largely 
focused on immediate solutions to material challenges and is ill-equipped to answer 
this kind of comparative puzzle. Meanwhile potential explanations relating to state 
capacity and state autonomy have serious limitations. The study aims to cross-
fertilise and build on existing scholarship to explain state effectiveness in urban 
policy and planning implementation. A central premise is that this requires analysis 
of bargaining in the city both among political elites and between these and other 
key elite and popular groups. These patterns of political bargaining are seen as 
being conditioned by historical and structural factors that shape the political 
resources and incentives available to governments, but also by the agency of 
particular state actors charged with enforcing policies and social actors affected by 
them. By empirically examining these state-society interactions we can better 
understand the processes through which patterns of implementation and non-
implementation replay themselves on a daily basis in each city.   
 
It is argued that these bargaining processes determine the nature of political 
intervention20 in the arena of urban development, which may either serve to 
implement policies and regulations or actively undermine implementation. The 
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 This term is chosen instead of ‘state intervention’ to highlight the fact that political and 
bureaucratic actors within the state can often intervene in multiple conflicting ways. Political 
intervention is discussed further in Chapter Two. 
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capital city setting and its multiple overlapping arenas of state activity, alongside 
the intense contestation over urban space among rapidly growing urban social 
groups, provides constant opportunity for political actors to intervene as mediators, 
protectors and enforcers. Yet the mode of interaction between the agency of 
leaders and the historical-structural conditions in place in each of the two contexts 
has created highly differing intervention incentives. These condition who and what 
political actors intervene to protect or enforce and how they do so. The study 
identifies some of the conditions under which political actors are incentivised to 
intervene in ways that make the state more, as opposed to less, effective in 
realising stated policy goals.  
 
This research aims to make both an empirical and theoretical contribution. 
Empirically, it provides fresh data on city level politics and administration in 
Kampala and Kigali regarding how policies and regulations are understood, 
implemented, contested and obstructed at different levels of the state hierarchy 
and between state and societal actors. Theoretically, it aims to contribute in two 
respects: to the analysis of cities and urban development, and to the analysis of 
states in low-income countries. These will each briefly be addressed in turn.  
 
Contribution to the analysis of cities and urban development 
 
One aim of this study is to advance research on the particular roles of cities – 
settlements characterised by ‘urbanism’, which is defined in relation to population 
density, size, social heterogeneity and compressed inequality21 – in processes of 
development and change. This contribution is linked to a particular conception of 
‘urban development’; a term that is not used here as a blanket application of the 
highly contested concept of ‘development’ to urban areas, but to highlight certain 
domains of development-related activity that are specifically urban in nature. The 
four areas of activity this study focuses on are defined as physical development 
(planning and construction); livelihoods in the informal economy (with a particular 
                                                          
21
 This draws on the classic definition by Lewis Wirth (1938), as well as incorporating Tilly’s (2010) 
focus on inequality. 
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focus on petty trade); public transportation; and urban taxation. This does not 
reflect any holistic or normative conception of development and there is no 
pretence that this study will directly address such critical issues as economic 
growth, health, education, justice, gender relations or any of the other vital aspects 
of development more broadly conceived. The advantage of this parsimonious lens 
on urban development is that it allows a tight focus on a set of interrelated policy 
challenges with spatial implications that should form part of a government’s overall 
‘urban strategy’. 
 
The particular areas of urban development studied here are chosen because 
property, trade and transport constitute the economic lifeblood of many large 
cities.  In urban areas characterised by little industrialisation and a vast informal 
economy (as is the case in both the cities being researched and in most African 
cities), construction, petty trade and public transport comprise a substantial part of 
the urban economy and employ a large proportion of the population. These three 
sectors are thus central both to the lives of the urban poor and to government 
efforts to control how cities develop. Moreover, if not legislated for and regulated 
to some degree, they can result in severe negative externalities including 
environmental degradation, spatial segregation, traffic gridlock, soaring road 
fatalities, crime, black marketeering and many other ills with which developing 
country cities are often associated.  
 
The fourth area of study, urban taxation, is included for two reasons. First, because 
it intersects with the previous three: a large proportion of local municipal revenues 
in developing country cities derive from local taxes on property, trade and 
transport. Regulations pertaining to these sectors are often linked to state efforts to 
mobilise revenue from them. Second and related, a focus on local revenues 
provides further insights into the effectiveness of the state at city level. On the one 
hand, the ability to raise revenue can itself be seen as an indicator of state 
effectiveness; on the other, implementing other policies effectively may partially 
depend on the amount of resources mobilised at city level. Moreover, taxation 
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provides important insights into the nature of the bargains underpinning politics 
and development (Di John 2011).  
 
All four of these domains involve potentially very large sums of money, and thus are 
critical for elites. Consequently they have a tendency to be highly politicised, 
providing a particularly sharp lens on the different ways political elites manage 
priorities and potential conflict according to the pressures and incentives they face. 
They illustrate how elites mobilise particular popular constituencies, but also how 
urban social groups themselves attempt to shape their relations with political actors 
over key issues affecting their lives. Focusing on these domains therefore facilitates 
the political angle on urban development that is missing in much of the existing 
literature. It also facilitates a further academic contribution regarding how urban 
politics affect the development of states. As such it draws on the tradition, 
associated particularly with Charles Tilly (1989; 1992; 2010), of exploring the 
relationship between cities and state-making.  
 
Contribution to the analysis of states in the developing world 
 
Developments since 2000 have seen a growing preoccupation with concepts such as 
state failure and fragility on the one hand and state ‘effectiveness’ on the other, 
reflecting a shift from cold war debates around state-capitalist relations to concerns 
about the basic coherence of states in the twenty-first century. The new language 
has been enthusiastically adopted by the policy community but theorisation has not 
caught up with policy discourse. While research into the characteristics of state 
fragility and resilience has progressed substantially (Putzel and Di John 2011), the 
concept of state ‘effectiveness’ remains under-theorised and the inadequacies of 
the capacity/autonomy approach are increasingly apparent. Much of the neo-
Weberian and ‘developmental state’ literature, discussed further in Chapter Two, 
under-explores how degrees of autonomy and capacity relate to other factors such 
as legitimacy, credible commitment and social power relations. While these are 
admittedly complex concepts that are difficult to measure, they play important 
  
 38 
roles in the degree to which states are effective. This study attempts to address 
some of these problems by tackling the ‘state-effectiveness’ concept head-on.  
 
In so doing, it fills some critical gaps. Commenting on one of the weaknesses in 
academic inquiry on states, Geddes (1994: 14) rightly notes that:  
 
state capacity to translate preferences into actions has received surprisingly 
little attention in the explicitly statist literature […] To observers of less 
developed countries […] it is clear that the articulation of independent state 
preferences, difficult as that may be to achieve, cannot by itself accomplish 
anything. Preferences matter very little if officials cannot carry out the 
policies they choose.  
 
Yet Geddes too replicates some of the patterns of this literature by associating the 
ability to choose certain policy directions with politics (via the idea of autonomy) 
and the ability to implement them with technical factors (capacity). In fact, the 
separation between these two realms is much less clear cut, and political 
constraints impact not only on policy choice but also on implementation. As a way 
of moving beyond this autonomy-to-choose/capacity-to-implement divide, the 
present study explores questions of how forms of political intervention unrelated to 
technical capacity impact on policy implementation itself. It thus helps to address 
the misguided assumption that ‘politics surrounds decision-making activities while 
implementation is an administrative activity’ (Thomas and Grindle 1990: 1170). 
Moreover, while much of the state-focused literature tends to take a unitary 
approach towards ‘state intervention’, this study disaggregates the state and 
explores the incentives for different kinds of interventions by different actors within 
the state machinery, examining how these impact on the overall coherence and 
effectiveness of the state.  
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1.4   Structure of thesis  
 
The four domains of urban development outlined above form the basis for four 
empirical chapters (Four-Seven). Prior to this, issues of theoretical and 
methodological design, as well as historical and institutional context, are addressed. 
The chapters are arranged as follows.  
 
Chapter Two outlines an analytical framework and research design tailored 
specifically to making sense of the complex constellation of forces that impact on 
state effectiveness. It defines the key terms and highlights some relevant debates, 
before putting forward a number of theoretical propositions that the study aims to 
evaluate and further develop. It then goes on to consider how to combine analysis 
of historically-rooted causes with proximal ones and account for the role of path 
dependence, addressing issues of institutional structure and agency. This is 
followed by an account of the overall research design as a comparative case study 
with a focus on causal mechanisms and theory-guided process-tracing methods. 
There is no detailed discussion of methodology before the end of Chapter Two, due 
to the amount of theoretical literature on the state and institutions that this 
chapter seeks to engage with. Only when the conceptual scaffolding has been 
constructed are concrete issues of research method addressed in full.  
 
Chapter Three presents an analytical literature review that places the two case 
study cities in their national historical and institutional context and draws out some 
of the themes of the thesis in relation to existing literature. For each case it gives 
attention to the legacies of violent civil conflict, the role of the capital city in 
national history, and the institutional framework around decentralisation and land 
management, which are critical issues for any study of urban development. The 
question of institutional path dependence and how it can be factored into the 
analysis of contemporary policy implementation in each case is considered.  
 
Chapter Four is the first of four chapters rooted in the empirical field research, each 
of which follows a similar structure. This chapter is devoted to questions of urban 
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planning and urban development regulation. Beginning with a brief account of key 
concepts and dilemmas in the relevant literature, it then moves on to describe the 
formal institutional framework in each city. Noting the similarity between the 
formal mechanisms in place, it then discusses in depth the differential patterns of 
implementation regarding efforts to control the physical transformation of the two 
cities. It provides a number of examples of effective versus ineffective 
implementation in Kigali and Kampala and analyses the political and social 
relationships underpinning the political interventions driving these contrasting 
outcomes.  
 
Chapter Five explores efforts to implement regulations around urban livelihoods in 
the informal economy, with particular attention to market and street trading. After 
briefly examining some of the key concepts and issues in the informal economy 
literature, it provides contextual background on economic informalisation in each 
city and outlines the formal institutional frameworks pertaining to trade order. It 
then contrasts the successes and failures of the state in managing and redeveloping 
urban marketplaces, which have become virtually ungovernable spaces associated 
with explosive violence in Kampala but were radically transformed in Kigali. It then 
explores the enforcement of regulations concerning street trade and informal 
activity more generally. In so doing, linkages between political and social actors and 
the contrasting strategies of political elites are analysed.  
 
Chapter Six focuses on a critical aspect of urban informality that epitomises the 
contrast between the two cities: public transportation. After highlighting certain key 
issues relating to urban transport in Africa, it presents the formal institutions and 
policies with respect to transport management in each city. Following this, it 
explores the remarkable contrast in terms of regulation of urban informal transport, 
focusing in turn on the lucrative matatu minibus and motorcycle-taxi industries. The 
accounts of each of these sectors will analyse linkages between political elites and 
urban organisations, and the kinds of political intervention that have enabled or 
obstructed effective regulation in each case.  
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Chapter Seven turns to local state revenues. It begins with a brief discussion of 
issues and challenges associated with local (and specifically urban) taxation. Then 
the formal rules around fiscal decentralisation in each city are discussed, building on 
the discussion of decentralisation in Chapter Three. Following this it explores the 
main strengths and weaknesses in revenue collection in each city. Devoting 
particular attention to taxes associated with urban property, the chapter finds – 
unlike the preceding chapters – serious weaknesses of implementation in both 
cases. While Kampala’s experience reflects the same kind of populist interventions 
that hampered effectiveness in the sectors discussed in chapters Four to Six, Kigali’s 
reflects a mix of very effective and very ineffective implementation depending on 
the kind of local tax in question. This chapter thus illustrates the degree to which 
effectiveness is politically conditioned and dependent on the nature of specific 
activities and processes.  
  
Chapter Eight concludes. It begins by reflecting back on the empirical evidence 
collected in the previous four empirical chapters in relation to some overarching 
themes induced through the research process. It then returns to the theoretical 
propositions posited in Chapter Two, re-evaluating them in light of the evidence, 
before broadening out to a discussion of how political bargaining impacts on the 
relationship between formal and informal institutions and the significance of this 
for state effectiveness. Finally, it assesses the implications of the research for cities 
in the developing world and particularly the study of urban Africa.  
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Chapter Two 
Analytical framework and research strategy 
 
The literature on states in developing countries has become increasingly saturated 
with concepts for analysing state performance, as calls to ‘bring the state back in’ 
(Skocpol et al. 1985) have borne fruit. On the one hand, a concern with 
‘developmental states’ (Leftwich 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999) and a renewed interest 
in the Weberian characteristics of states both in terms of bureaucratisation (Evans 
and Rauch 1999; O’Dwyer 2006) and legitimacy (Englebert 2000; Gilley 2006) have 
become widespread. On the other, concerns with state weakness (Migdal 1988; 
Thies 2009), state fragility and ‘failed’ states (Herbst 1996; Rotberg 2004; Putzel 
2006) have precipitated a general concern with state-building (Spruyt 2002; 
Fukuyama 2004; Vu 2010).  
 
Amidst all the interest in these problems, key concepts have been subject to 
increasing strain, their meanings often becoming blurry or even being consciously 
‘stretched’ (Sartori 1970). Making sense of the overcrowded conceptual terrain to 
address questions of comparative state performance is a pressing concern not just 
academically but for policy-makers and practitioners, who use many of these 
concepts with increasing frequency and abandon (Gutiérrez et al. 2011). This 
chapter aims to cut a clear path through a dense web of theoretical material, 
specifying the particular attribute of states that is considered most pertinent to the 
subject under study – effectiveness – and how it can be conceptualised and 
observed.  
 
The first section of the chapter explores problems with existing usage of the term 
state effectiveness in various academic and donor discourses and proposes instead 
a simple and non-normative definition, before specifying the concept in detail and 
addressing a number of potential problems. Following this, a second section draws 
on a wide range of literature on states, institutions and state-society relations to 
make five overarching theoretical propositions about the drivers of state 
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effectiveness. The third section frames the problem of state effectiveness in 
relation to institutional debates, highlighting the importance of history and path 
dependence, the relationship between formal and informal institutions and the 
vexed question of structure and agency as they apply to state effectiveness. The 
fourth and final section deals with the more concrete aspects of research design 
and methodology, explaining the choice of a comparative case study approach and 
justifying the choice of cities, before discussing the research and analytical methods 
used. 
 
2.1    Clearing the ground: definitions and conceptual problems 
 
Amidst the many prominent terms relating to state performance, one notion that 
has gained currency in recent years is that of the ‘effective state’ (Unsworth 2005; 
Green 2008; Leftwich 2008a). An important point came in 1997 when the World 
Bank partially reversed its strongly anti-state stance since the 1981 Berg Report 
(World Bank 1981), claiming that ‘without an effective state, sustainable 
development, both economic and social, is impossible’ (World Bank 1997: 158). 
There is, however, a distinct absence of conceptual clarity in much of the literature 
about what exactly constitutes an effective state. Definitions often depend on the 
eye of the beholder: hence a research group concerned with citizenship defines an 
effective state as one that is ‘inclusive, democratic and just’ (Eyben and Ladbury 
2006: 1) while a political scientist interested in political organisation defines it in 
relation to the degree to which state bureaucracies are professionalised (O’Dwyer 
2006).  
 
Moreover, definitions tend to be highly normative and there is little consensus on 
which aspects of an idealised state are integral to effectiveness. To take one 
example, some authors see accountability as being a critical aspect of effectiveness 
(Maass and Mepham 2004) while others suggest that accountability exists in 
tension with effectiveness (Unsworth 2005: 2). A more rigorous analytical 
specification of ‘state effectiveness’ is desirable given the currency of the term and 
efforts to operationalise it. This necessitates a specific and limited definition, which 
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means accepting that effectiveness does not necessarily represent a package that 
includes accountability, democracy, developmentalism and all the other qualities 
one might want states to have.  
 
What is a state and what is a government?  
 
A first priority is to define the state itself. This article builds on Stepan’s definition of 
the state as being much more than just the government, comprising ‘the continuous 
administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems’ in a particular polity that 
aim to structure relationships between civil society and public authority (Stepan 
1978: xii). States constitute the entire apparatus through which government 
operates and are rarely coherent and unified actors (Migdal 1997). The government 
itself is an organisation consisting of a group of politicians who collectively 
constitute the executive authority in a state at a given point in time. ‘Government’ 
in this study will be taken to refer to the national government unless otherwise 
stated. Governments have a unique role within the state system (or more 
accurately, set of systems): to direct and co-ordinate it in the interests of enacting 
policies relating to the affairs of a particular territory and its relations with other 
territories. The government thus makes decisions and policies that state systems 
are supposed to implement.22   
 
In the interests of stripping states of their ‘myths of unity and omnipotence’ (Migdal 
1997: 222), further basic distinctions can also be made. The term ‘politicians’ is used 
in the thesis to refer collectively to people who hold or seek to hold political office 
(a position of authority in a public decision-making body) at some level within the 
state and may not be part of the government (the executive authority). They may be 
linked to the political organisation (such as a party) that dominates the government, 
                                                          
22
 A third and related concept is that of regime, which can be thought of as the form or mode of 
government. It is a broader concept than government in that it incorporates not only the actors 
comprising government but the institutions and rules through which they govern, but is narrower 
than ‘state’, which refers to the whole administrative ‘arena’ (Mann 1984). To avoid 
overcomplication, ‘regime’ is not used analytically in this study and only appears where common 
usage renders it appropriate or when referring to literature that does employ the term analytically.   
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or may be part of the political opposition. Either way they are to be firmly 
distinguished from bureaucrats or officials, who are recruited to local or national 
organisations of the state in order to implement the policies of governments 
through rule-bound processes, but who do not generally have a formal link to any 
particular political organisation. Politicians holding office are thus situated within 
the state but constitute just one aspect of it.  
 
An important point flowing from these definitions is that states themselves do not 
make decisions or have a ‘will’ of their own. It is therefore nonsensical to say, for 
example, that ‘states are fragile when state structures lack political will’ (OECD 
2007: 2). However, although states cannot have a will, they can – broadly speaking 
– be said to ‘act’: given that both bureaucrats and politicians are agents embedded 
within state structures, the actions of either can be construed as the ‘action’ of the 
state. So long as we recognise that states are not monolithic actors and often act in 
highly contradictory ways simultaneously, there is no problem with referring to 
‘state action’ (following Evans 1995) to describe what state actors (politicians and 
bureaucrats) do in their official capacities. Whether or not these actions or efforts 
are effective with respect to actually implementing official policies is a different 
issue, and one to which we now turn.  
 
What is state effectiveness?  
 
Every state is more effective at some things than others (Skocpol et al. 1985), and 
even some of the weakest states in Africa exhibit ‘islands’ or ‘pockets’ of 
effectiveness (Crook 2010; Leonard 2010). Hence rather than categorising states as 
definitively effective or ineffective, it makes sense to focus on particular instances 
of state effectiveness and the processes through which they are realised.23 Above 
all, for reasons noted above, a definition of state effectiveness needs to be 
analytically useful and specific rather than normative and broad. The non-normative 
                                                          
23
 This allows us to overcome the tendency to think in totalizing terms like ‘state strength’, which 
Fukuyama (2004: 7) defines as ‘the ability of states to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws 
cleanly and transparently’. This definition contains far too many different activities, requiring very 
different kinds of resources and circumstances, to be of much use.   
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definition used here specifies state effectiveness as being evident when the stated 
aims of government codified in policies, laws and regulations are translated into 
accomplishment. This understanding of state effectiveness bears close resemblance 
to the concept of implementation as defined in Pressman and Wildavsky’s classic 
study, in which to implement means ‘to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, 
complete’ a particular policy (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984: xxi). Lack of 
implementation, by contrast, ‘should not refer to failure to get going but to inability 
to follow through’ (ibid: xxii). Notwithstanding some of the problems of the way 
implementation has been conceptualised in the policy studies literature (see 
below), the usefulness of a focus on implementation when attempting to analyse 
the effectiveness of particular state policies – rather than define normatively what 
constitutes an ‘effective state’ – is difficult to deny (John 2012: 23).  
 
This approach to state effectiveness also echoes Crook (1989: 211), who proposes 
measuring the effectiveness of an institution in relation to ‘the degree to which it 
routinely fulfills its own stated goals or tasks’. Similar definitions also exist in the 
literature on bureaucratic effectiveness.24 However, it is important to outline 
several reasons why this study is framed in terms of state effectiveness rather than 
organisational, bureaucratic or administrative effectiveness, despite the breadth of 
existing literature on the latter.25 First, this study engages with a growing discourse 
around ‘effective states’ and seeks to answer questions about the effectiveness of 
the state as a whole in relation to specific goals. In some senses this is the inverse of 
the focus of the organisational literature, which tends to assess the effectiveness of 
particular state agencies in relation to their whole range of goals. Examining state 
effectiveness implies a rather different approach from assessing the effectiveness of 
a particular organisation, given the incoherence and organisational multiplicity of 
the state (Migdal 1997; North et al. 2009). Notwithstanding the methodological 
                                                          
24
 For example Rainey and Steinbauer (1999: 13) define a government agency as being effective 
when it ‘performs well in discharging the administrative and operational functions pursuant to the 
mission’. 
25
 See for example Scholz (2011); Hale (1996); Simon (1998); Rainey and Steinbauer (1999); Grindle 
(1997) Therkildsen and Tidemand (2007) and Uphoff (1994). In one review of just the more 
development-oriented strands of this literature Leonard (2010)  finds sixty-two hypotheses about 
what causes organisational effectiveness. 
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challenges this poses (see Section 2.4), the effectiveness of the state as a ‘set of 
systems’ is an important subject of study; especially because in relation to the 
policy issues of interest, several national ministries and local government 
authorities are sometimes involved simultaneously.   
 
Secondly, the focus in the bureaucratic/administrative literature on internal 
organisational dynamics means there is often little attention to state-society 
relations, power relations in society at large and questions of state legitimacy as 
they impact on effectiveness. As Leonard (2010) notes, many classic approaches to 
the effectiveness of particular agencies focus on managerial attributes and 
organisational functions, giving relatively little weight to political context.26 While 
these internal issues are crucial for organisational performance, for state 
effectiveness their importance relative to political economy factors may vary 
depending on the policy area in question. Many texts cited by Leonard (2010) as 
giving primacy to managerial explanations are explicitly concerned with 
implementing rural development programmes. There is reason to believe that some 
of the urban issues considered here, which relate to implementing planning, 
regulation and taxation in complex political environments, necessarily require an 
approach that goes beyond managerial/organisational explanations. Effectiveness 
in relation to these matters depends heavily both on public compliance and co-
ordination between multiple government agencies, as well as qualities internal to 
particular organisations.  
 
Another obvious port of call here is the literature that focuses not so much on the 
effectiveness of particular organisations as on how implementation is shaped 
through the interaction between different state organisations. It was in relation to 
such questions that ‘implementation studies’ flourished as a sub-discipline in the 
two decades from the early 1970s onwards (Barrett and Fudge 1981; Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1984; Sabatier 1991; Hill and Hupe 2002). For the purposes of the 
present study, this body of work fills some of the gaps identified in relation to the 
literature discussed thus far. It usefully highlights the degree to which 
                                                          
26
 See for example Esman and Uphoff (1984); Grindle (1997). 
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implementation is far from being a linear process starting with a decision that is 
then progressively translated into an outcome, highlighting instead the need for an 
approach that takes the range of actors involved in addressing a policy problem, 
and the ways in which they bargain and reshape policy on the ground, as a starting 
point for analysis (Barrett and Fudge 1981; Sabatier 1991; John 2012).  
 
However, while its attention to inter-organisational relations and ‘bottom-up’ as 
well as ‘top-down’ aspects of implementation is highly relevant, the focus of this 
literature is generally on processes of bargaining that take place in ‘implementation 
structures’ that consist of formally-constituted organisations within the state and 
private sector (Hjern and Porter 1981; Hill and Hupe 2002). In this regard, like Urban 
Regime Theory, it offers only limited potential for analysing processes that take 
place within the institutionally complex informal bargaining environment of cities in 
the developing world. More generally, the attempt to rigidly separate 
implementation from all other aspects of the policy process, creating a distinct field 
of study that aimed to formally model implementation in isolation from broader 
processes, is now generally considered to have ‘largely failed’ (John 2012: 23). 
 
The ‘state effectiveness’ approach adopted here instead encompasses the broader 
political economy in which states operate and how this impacts on effectiveness at 
a systemic level in contexts of states and societies with low levels of formal 
institutionalisation. This means accounting for factors that are ‘deeply rooted in 
social and economic structure’ and in a sense ‘far removed from the state’ (Leonard 
2010: 98), exploring the complex relationships between the state and ‘social forces’ 
(Migdal et al. 1994). With this in mind, the literatures on organisational 
effectiveness and policy implementation are here considered less suitable as an 
anchor for analysing state effectiveness in urban contexts than the literature on 
institutions, defined as both formal and – crucially here – informal rules and norms 
(see Section 2.3).  
 
There are many aspects of states’ roles in development that the above definition, 
focused narrowly on implementation (while recognising that this is a highly non-
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linear process) completely leaves out. This, however, is precisely the point. If ‘state 
effectiveness’ is to assume a meaningful role in the development lexicon amid the 
sea of other descriptive and analytical terms pertaining to states, then it needs 
limiting in scope. In particular, this definition deliberately excludes consideration of 
questions of responsiveness and the processes through which policies, laws and 
regulations are decided upon in the first place. Public decision-making – while 
critically important – is a separate issue from effectiveness. The assumption here is 
that once decisions are made and policies in place, effectiveness should be judged 
in relation to whether the state succeeds in realising those policies and decisions.27 
Before entering into further discussion of what drives state effectiveness, some 
further potential problems with, and implications of, the above definition will briefly 
be discussed.  
 
 
State effectiveness and development  
 
A first point of clarification relates to the question of how state effectiveness relates 
to development, which bears mentioning not least because of the salience of the 
‘developmental state’ paradigm. There are clear links between state effectiveness 
and development; after all, policies and initiatives that are not translated into 
accomplishments are unlikely to have much developmental impact. Yet the 
relationship is not straightforward, despite the fact that some observers equate the 
idea of an effective state with that of a developmental state (Green 2008: 12). This 
study cautions against collapsing these categories, following Leftwich (2008b) who 
argues that the developmental state is just one of four possible ‘ideal type’ models 
through which states have progressed in modern times,
28
 all of which require state 
                                                          
27
 There is of course an issue to consider here in that some policies (for example decentralisation 
policies) have responsiveness itself among their most important goals, and thus it is difficult to 
assess their effectiveness without assessing responsiveness. However, following Crook and Manor 
(1998), who make a distinction between effectiveness, responsiveness and process in their 
assessment of decentralised state agencies, there is good reason to consider responsiveness and 
effectiveness as distinct elements of state performance. The former is better thought of in terms of 
‘inputs’ fed into the state rather than the delivery of ‘outputs’. Effectiveness as defined here relates 
to the latter. While there are important relationships between the two, analysing these in detail is 
beyond the scope of this study.   
28
 The others being the Anglo-American model, social democratic model and Soviet model. 
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effectiveness in order to succeed. ‘Developmental states’ are usually described as 
featuring a ‘developmentally-oriented’ government with a strong nationalist 
ideology, a powerful bureaucracy, and state provision of certain normative goods 
(Johnson 1982; 1999; Leftwich 2000). None of these qualities is logically necessary 
for a state to be effective in achieving certain policy goals. However, there are clear 
reasons to believe that ‘developmentally-oriented’ governments will have an 
interest in pursuing state effectiveness, because without effective state institutions 
and organisations, their developmental inclination is unlikely to bear fruit.  
 
One can therefore make four logical propositions about the relationship between 
state effectiveness and development to clarify why it is better not to conflate 
‘developmental’ states with ‘effective’ ones, despite some obvious crossover. First, 
a) it is not necessary for a state to be developmental to be effective, but b) a 
developmental orientation incentivises the pursuit of effectively functioning state 
systems. Meanwhile, c) Effectiveness is necessary for developmental 
transformation, but d) Effectiveness is not sufficient to ensure development. The 
last point is important as a reminder that as defined here, effectiveness in and of 
itself has no normative content: it can be put to ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘developmental’ or 
‘anti-developmental’ uses.  State effectiveness is simply a descriptive tool relating 
to the degree to which decisions (however made) are brought into effect.  
 
State effectiveness and autocracy  
 
This raises the potential objection that state effectiveness simply means 
governments doing as they please, rendering it basically tantamount to 
dictatorship. This merits brief discussion, not least because certain state-led 
effective developmental transitions have happened under authoritarian regimes 
(Wade 1990; Kohli 2004; Leftwich 2005). The relationship between regime type and 
development is highly contested and the empirical evidence inconclusive 
(Przeworski et al. 2000; Mkandawire 2001; Khan 2005; Leftwich 2005; Ross 2006). 
However, the idea that a state might be more effective (as defined here) the freer it 
is from democratic constraints is intuitively reasonable and even tentatively 
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supported by the analyses of Kohli, Khan and Leftwich. It is clearly not necessary for 
states to be dictatorial to be effective even at low levels of development, as the 
recent experience of states such as Botswana and Mauritius testify (Carroll and 
Carroll 1999; Mkandawire 2001). Nevertheless, there is no sense in denying that 
authoritarian government and effectiveness do sometimes coincide – quite 
spectacularly in some cases. Few would dispute that the state in the Soviet Union 
was effective (even if not efficient) at bringing about the structural transformation 
of its economy, or that the Chinese state has been effective in achieving export-
driven economic growth.   
 
However, regime type can only go so far in accounting for effectiveness. The most 
critical differences between democracy and autocracy relate to how policy decisions 
are made: i.e. to responsiveness and accountability rather than to effectiveness in 
implementation. There are obvious affinities between democracy and 
responsiveness, but effectiveness can be shaped by a range of factors – explored in 
the following section – that do not easily map onto regime type. Under some 
circumstances (and in relation to certain policies) autocracies could be more 
effective due to a lack of democratic obstacles and checks on implementation 
procedures, but in other instances they may be less effective due to a lack of 
legitimacy, poor lines of accountability or lack of popular engagement with policies. 
    
Besides, it is clear that not all dictatorships are effective at much other than violent 
repression. For example, while Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda was comprehensively 
autocratic, it was rarely effective. It is true that some goals, for example the 
expulsion of the Asian community in 1972, were effectively accomplished. Yet 
militarily expelling a widely resented, prosperous minority in a poor country where 
the majority is excluded from economic rewards is relatively easy to effect.  Many 
other policies, such as comprehensive land reform, which the Amin regime passed 
into law in 1975, were barely implemented at all (Okuku 2006). Ultimately there is 
not likely to be any general relationship between effectiveness and regime type; 
just as the relationship between developmentalism and democracy is complex and 
contested, so too is that between regime type and effectiveness. To the extent that 
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regime type has an impact on effectiveness in individual cases this needs to be 
observed in more specific mechanisms in order to yield generalisable insights.  
 
State effectiveness and central-local relations  
 
When considering the effectiveness of policies and regulations implemented in a 
particular locality, it is clearly insufficient to focus on the national (or local) state 
alone. The vertical disaggregation of the state and analysis of inter-governmental 
relations between tiers is of great importance, especially under conditions of 
decentralisation.  Both the cases being studied here, and indeed the majority of 
states in the developing world, have undergone decentralisation in recent decades; 
writing in 1994, Dillinger noted that out of the 75 developing and transitional 
countries with populations over 5 million, ‘all but 12 claim to be embarked on some 
form of transfer of political power to local units of government’ (Dillinger 1994: vii). 
Donor organisations were active in promoting this, as ‘decentralisation fever’ 
gripped the international community from the 1980s onwards (Tendler 1997).  
 
The debate on decentralisation has generally been framed in terms of its benefits 
for both responsiveness and effectiveness or, more commonly, efficiency (Bardhan 
2002; Crook 2003). Advocates tend to consider central states as ‘inherently 
unresponsive’ (Dillinger 1994: 8) and that accountability is likely to be better at 
lower levels of government, an assumption vindicated by some studies (Faguet 
2004) but ‘assailed by experience from practice’ according to others (Tendler 1997; 
Craig and Porter 2006: 96). The picture is equally mixed with regard to effectiveness 
(Crook and Manor 1998). Decentralised authorities’ performance is highly context-
specific and depends on a range of factors, foremost among which are the 
motivations of the government undertaking decentralisation and the commitment 
of central authorities to the particular policy goals in question (Crook 2003). The 
extent of democratisation and, in particular, meaningful multiparty competition can 
also have important impacts on central-local coordination and the effectiveness of  
decentralised government in practice (Crook and Manor 1998; Crook 2003).  
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Recent decentralisation programmes are not, however, the only important 
influences on central-local relations. Historical differences in terms of both pre-
colonial and colonial structures of rule can also have important impacts on the 
nature of central-local government relations, with implications for state 
effectiveness (Mamdani 1996; Englebert 2000). Moreover, where highly centralised 
governments have well-organised systems of local agents this can sometimes 
outweigh some of the supposed advantages of decentralised local government 
(Bardhan 2002: 191). Relatedly, the degree to which decentralisation programmes 
actually involve deconcentration of central state organisations rather than 
delegation or full devolution – to use a classic tripartite distinction (Rondinelli et al. 
1989) – may be very significant in terms of overall effectiveness.   
  
The implications of decentralisation for the state in cities specifically is relatively 
under-researched, partly due to rural biases in the way decentralisation has been 
both designed and discussed in the development literature.29 Yet problems relating 
to central government interference with local government mandates are arguably 
particularly relevant in capital cities, where stakes are high and the tussle between 
overlapping tiers of government is particularly intense. Certain publications on 
decentralisation and development, such as Manor (1997), Tendler (1997) and 
Grindle (2007) discuss these problems in general but rarely their urban 
ramifications. Informal intervention by jealous central authorities in contexts where 
power has formally been decentralised is likely to have critical effects on the 
relationship between decentralisation and effectiveness in urban areas.  
 
In sum, as with regime type it is impossible to say categorically that state 
effectiveness is enhanced or undermined by decentralisation per se. Effectiveness 
depends ultimately on other factors, which may interact with decentralisation in 
significant ways. Having established the general contours of state effectiveness as 
conceptualised in this study, the following section presents a theoretical discussion 
of some of the main factors that drive it. 
 
                                                          
29
 See Chapter One, footnote 19. 
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2.2   Five theoretical propositions 
 
In seeking to understand state effectiveness with regard to particular policies and 
regulations, this study adopts what has been termed a theory-guided process-
tracing methodology (Falleti 2006), which will be discussed in greater detail in 
Section 2.4. In this I follow Hall’s (2003a) approach by beginning with a specified set 
of broad theoretical propositions that identify relevant causal factors about what 
might cause the outcome of interest. The whole comparative case study is thus 
rendered ‘theoretically explicit’ from the outset (Aminzade 1993), which facilitates 
the evaluation and development of the theoretical propositions through the case 
material (Mahoney 2010: 125).  
 
The propositions outlined here are broad because they aim to provide a logical 
background framework for analysing state effectiveness in general. In other words, 
they are not tailored from the outset to the cases at hand or to the urban policy 
issues under consideration, the aim being to begin with an analytical prism for the 
basic drivers of state effectiveness that can be applied to my cases but potentially 
also more broadly. There is clearly no single cause for effective state action, and a 
web of interacting causal elements is at play. The five propositions outlined below 
attempt to aggregate these under five concepts (two of which were already 
touched on in Chapter One). These are: capacity, autonomy, credible commitment, 
legitimacy and social power.  
 
Many accounts of state performance in the developing world attach supreme 
importance to bureaucratic capacity. Both political scientists and economists have 
analysed state performance in terms of capacity (Skocpol et al. 1985; Geddes 1994; 
Levy 2004; Besley and Persson 2009), often using the term more or less 
interchangeably with effectiveness; something this thesis strongly rejects.30 
                                                          
30
 In much development discourse the two are conflated or confused. Some donor approaches do 
appear to distinguish between capacity and state effectiveness, but in ways that are ultimately 
circular. For example, in a World Bank publication we are told that ‘lack of capacity for an effective 
state is a binding constraint’ (World Bank 2005: 1), but also that ‘Capacity development requires an 
effective state’ (ibid: 5). It is therefore unclear whether capacity is a prerequisite of building an 
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Following Putzel (2006), capacity is here defined more narrowly, referring to the 
skills (e.g. for budgeting and programming), institutional systems (e.g. regarding 
recruitment, policy formulation and financial management), number of educated 
personnel, and financial and technical resources within the state bureaucracy.31  It 
is towards these that ‘capacity building’ initiatives are generally targeted in 
developing countries. Other factors that have been highlighted in relation to state 
performance, such as administrative continuity and the presence of expatriate 
experts, can also be thought of as elements of capacity (Crook 1989). It is clear why 
all these factors should in theory enhance state effectiveness. Proposition one is 
therefore that states will be more effective at implementing policies and regulations 
the greater their bureaucratic capacity. 
 
There are, however, many reasons to believe that effectiveness in translating policy 
to accomplishment is a deeply political matter and therefore influenced by a far 
greater range of factors than these technical capacities alone. While some authors 
do acknowledge that lack of capacity can itself be politically driven (Geddes 1994; 
Levy 2004), it is also necessary to analyse the factors that facilitate or impede 
effective state action even when the necessary capacities are present.  The debate 
on the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state is important here. Already touched on in 
Chapter One, it has a long history dating back to Marx’s analysis of the ‘completely 
independent’ position of the state in France under Louis Bonaparte (Marx 
1852/1963) and Weber’s hugely influential contribution, discussed previously. 
Subsequently, mid-late twentieth century neo-Marxists such as Poulantzas (1973) 
                                                                                                                                                                    
effective state or outcome of it, and if building capacity is distinct from building an effective state, no 
clues are given as to what the latter actually involves.  
31
 The concept of capacity used here differs substantially from some of the broader (and more 
normative) conceptions in the academic literature on African statehood, such as that adopted by 
Englebert (2000). Englebert explicitly uses ‘capacity’ interchangeably with the idea of ‘developmental 
capacity’, which he measures for quantitative comparison by combining two indicators: the choice of 
policies governments make and the ‘quality of governance’ they provide (Englebert 2000: 25). While 
this may tell us something about development, it is clearly far removed from the narrow conception 
of ‘capacity’ employed here. There are also many other ways of defining capacity, particularly in the 
civil war literature (see Hendrix (2010) for an overview). Many of these, however, refer specifically to 
states’ capacity to resist insurgency and are rather tautological (Kocher 2010); they are also of little 
use as more generic conceptions of state capacity. Note that some authors effectively combine 
capacity with aspects of autonomy into a measure of ‘bureaucratic quality’ that takes account of 
insulation from political pressure (Knack 2001; de Rouen and Sobek 2004). This is a more normative 
perspective that goes beyond capacity as defined here. 
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worked with the concept, while from a completely different perspective Huntington 
argued that political institutionalisation comes about when states ‘have their own 
interests and values distinguishable from those of other institutions and social 
forces’ (Huntington 1968: 20). In the 1980s and 1990s, the idea of autonomy was 
central to renewed interest in the state’s role as an autonomous actor in spurring 
economic transformation in certain parts of the developing world (Rueschemeyer 
and Evans 1985; Geddes 1994; Leftwich 2000). 
 
As already noted, the concept is problematic; as North et al argue, the idea that 
economic and political systems can be independent ‘has deceived modern social 
science’ (2009: 269). Others have argued that most ‘developmental states’ actually 
had intimate relationships with private sector actors even as they disciplined them 
(Evans 1995; Johnson 1999; Doner et al. 2005; Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011). 
Nevertheless, even if deeply insufficient, the wealth of valuable literature on this 
issue cautions against entirely discarding the notion of autonomy in relation to 
particular issues.  For example Trimberger (1978: 4) offers important insights about 
successful ‘revolutions from above’ being led by military and civil bureaucrats who 
were autonomous in the sense that they were not recruited from and did not form 
close ties with the dominant landed classes in the societies in question. More 
generally, the nature of ties between the state and particular social forces is clearly 
important.  In fact, autonomy relative to dominant classes is often achieved by way 
of states becoming less autonomous relative to subordinate classes (Rueschemeyer 
and Evans 1985: 63).  
 
The idea is therefore useful insofar as we can talk of the autonomy of particular 
arms of the state vis-à-vis particular groups and in relation to specific goals. This is 
also relatively observable; it is possible to find evidence for institutional and 
organisational linkages between components of the state and social groups, while a 
generalised ‘autonomy’ is difficult to verify empirically. Proposition two is therefore 
that states will be more effective at implementing particular policies and 
regulations the more autonomous their agencies are vis-à-vis interest groups that 
may be negatively affected by those policies and regulations.  
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Many analyses of state performance look no further than capacity and autonomy, 
though some of the less scientific approaches may refer to the importance of 
‘political will’. This has been defined as the ‘slipperiest concept in the policy 
lexicon’, usually defined only by its absence (Hammergren 1998: 11). Questions 
about what it is, whose will is at issue and how it can be measured are rarely 
addressed; it is more of a rhetorical ‘black box’ than an analytical concept (ibid: 13). 
However, the commitment of governmental actors and organisations to policy goals 
is clearly relevant (Crook 1989; 2010), although genuine commitment is difficult to 
observe and verify. Also important (and more observable) are perceptions among 
social actors affected by a policy about whether the government is strongly 
committed to it, because compliance is more likely if there is a credible 
commitment to implement. Shepsle (1991) argues that credibility can be achieved 
in two main ways: a) because binding constitutional mechanisms disable discretion 
and coerce governments into acting in accordance with their commitments; and b) 
because the incentives that caused a particular commitment to be made remain in 
place, providing reason to believe the commitment will hold. In the latter case a 
commitment is ‘motivationally credible’ because it is ‘incentive-compatible and 
hence self-enforcing’ (Shepsle 1991: 247).  In developing countries political actors 
usually have considerable discretion, as the rule of law for elites is not yet fully 
established (North et al. 2009). The source of any commitment’s credibility is 
therefore likely to be motivational.  
 
Where the very survival of a political elite depends on them successfully developing 
the productive sectors of an economy, this kind of credible commitment plays a 
critical role (Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011). The investment of rents in long-term 
projects that yield relatively few immediate gains, something that has been 
identified with ‘developmental patrimonialism’ (Kelsall et al. 2010; Kelsall 2011), is 
likely to enhance motivational credibility. Credibility is further enhanced through 
cumulative actions, when rewards and punishments are consistently applied, giving 
credence to the idea they will continue to be in future and helping to create 
‘routinized compliance’ (Crook 1989: 490). Conversely, such compliance is 
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undermined when government commitments are not credible, because people are 
less likely to follow laws and regulations if they believe state actors will turn a blind 
eye on payment of bribes. Moreover, where government commitments are not 
credible to state actors themselves, formal organisational rules have less force; 
incentives for corruption and negligence are greater where people believe that 
government commitment to enforce a policy or regulation is weak. Proposition 
three is therefore that states will be more effective where government 
commitments are motivationally credible both to the social actors affected by them 
and the state officials supposed to implement them.  
 
A fourth factor proposed as being central to effectiveness is legitimacy and – 
crucially – the nature of a state’s sources of legitimacy. Legitimacy is another 
difficult and contested concept, thought its importance is difficult to deny.32 I follow 
Gilley’s proposition that ‘a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its 
citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power’ (Gilley 2006: 500), 
drawing on a long tradition emphasising the validity of subjective views in defining 
legitimacy (Weber 1922/1968; Lipset 1959; Merelman 1966).33 Logically, legitimacy 
should enhance state effectiveness due to a positive impact on compliance and 
acquiescence (Gilley 2009). Indeed, without some kind of implicit social contract 
‘state institutions themselves have difficulty functioning and surviving’ (Buzan 1991: 
64).    
 
Yet the nature of sources of legitimacy also matter profoundly (OECD 2010: 48). If a 
government is considered legitimate largely because of state performance – in 
other words because the state functions well and delivers core services – this 
provides incentives to maintain and enhance state effectiveness, producing a 
virtuous cycle. If instead governing elites garner much of their legitimacy through 
                                                          
32
 Huntington, for example, called it a ‘mushy concept that political analysts do well to avoid’ before 
going on to say that it was ‘essential’ to understanding late 20
th
 Century democratisations 
(Huntington 1991: 46). 
33
 Again this contrasts with Englebert’s argument that a state is legitimate ‘when its structures have 
evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of historical continuity to its 
institutions’ (2000: 4). In this view legitimacy is considered to be a ‘structural condition’ and the 
judgements of the population are irrelevant. 
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clientelistic relationships to supportive client groups, there is less incentive to make 
the broad delivery of services through the state more effective (Keefer and Vlaicu 
2008). Proposition four is therefore that states will be more effective where the 
sources of their legitimacy relate to state effectiveness itself, as opposed to 
clientelism or other bases of legitimacy. 
 
The final concept posited as important for state effectiveness relates to the even 
more complex and contested issue of power itself. Without delving into the 
protracted debates about how to define power, the point here is that ruling elites’ 
mechanisms of control ‘necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state’, which 
itself often operates ‘on the basis of other, already existing power relations’ 
(Foucault 1980: 122). Hence it is worth highlighting the importance of social power, 
which has been defined as the ability to produce effects not simply through 
coercion but through working to affect people’s perceptions, dispositions, and 
interests (Rummel 1976). Lukes famously argues the case for a ‘third dimension’ of 
power whereby the powerful can shape the actual preferences of the powerless so 
that the latter willingly consent to domination (Lukes 1974/2005: 28). In contrast, 
Scott (1990) maintains that such acquiescence is always accompanied by ‘hidden 
transcripts’ of internal rebellion. With or without such internal resistance, however, 
power relations that foster acquiescence are likely to reduce overt resistance to 
attempts by public authorities to implement policies, and therefore facilitate state 
effectiveness. 
 
In considering why social power relations are more conducive to acquiescence in 
some contexts than others, Michael Mann’s concept of ‘infrastructural power’ (as 
distinct from coercive power or military capacity) is helpful, referring to the state’s 
ability ‘to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions 
throughout the realm’ (Mann 1984: 113). This is distinct from state capacity as 
defined here, because the ability for the state to penetrate social life may have 
more to do with traditions of social control and patterns of communication than 
bureaucratic capacity. While difficult to measure, proxies for infrastructural power 
might involve deeply-embedded social norms that allow for the penetration of civil 
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society by state organisations and facilitate direct state involvement in social and 
economic organisation. It is this kind of power that facilitates effective surveillance, 
propaganda dissemination and the control of information more generally, all of 
which are conducive to exercising the ‘third dimension’ of power. Thus one can 
theorise that states with a greater degree of infrastructural power are more likely to 
achieve acquiescence. Proposition five is therefore that states will be more 
effective where they have a greater degree of infrastructural power.  
 
 
--------------------- 
 
The above propositions are not intended for operationalisation into a testable 
hypothesis, but for guiding iterative process-tracing to assess their validity, explore 
relationships between them and identify causal mechanisms that facilitate state 
effectiveness. Together they broadly encompass not only the technical capacities of 
states but the political resources available to governments and the incentives for 
enforcement and compliance affecting state actors and social groups respectively. 
As well as exploring the five propositions above, however, through an inductive 
approach to the case material this thesis develops a more integrative argument 
about the type of institutional environment that facilitates effective state action. In 
drawing together insights about the role of the above factors, the thesis will show 
they can come together to fundamentally shape the relationship between formal 
and informal institutions: a relationship that is at the heart of accounting for 
degrees of state effectiveness.  In order to provide a theoretical basis for thinking 
about how institutional environments evolve, the following section turns to 
questions of the relationship between historical and proximate causes in social 
scientific research, and between institutions and agency. 
 
2.3   History, institutional development and political agency  
 
This is not primarily a historical study; it aims to understand causal processes 
through which state effectiveness or ineffectiveness is produced in the 
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contemporary era. Nevertheless, history is incredibly important. The processes of 
bargaining, negotiation, enforcement, compliance and resistance that are studied 
empirically here take place in the context of formal and informal institutions, 
conceived as ‘humanly devised behavioural rules that govern and shape the 
interactions of human beings’ (Lin and Nugent 1995: 2306-7). The different ways in 
which formal institutions (such as laws or regulations) interact with informal ones 
(e.g. norms embodied in routinised, predictable patterns of behavior) are important 
areas of research about which relatively little is yet understood (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004). Moreover, institutions of all kinds cannot be adequately understood 
without attention to their evolution through processes of historical continuity and 
rupture. This section briefly explores theoretical perspectives on how institutions 
evolve and change, why this matters for analysing causal processes and how 
institutions and agency interact in everyday contemporary politics.   
 
Causality and path dependence 
 
This study does not seek to isolate individual causes in order to elevate one factor 
above all potential others, entering the ‘trap of infinite regress’ (Peters 1998; 
Mahoney 2000: 527). Rather it is predicated on the assumption that when faced 
with multiple causal factors in complex political environments it is often ‘the larger 
combination that generates the outcome’ of interest (Mahoney 2008: 418). There is 
a wide range of potential ‘obvious’ answers to the question of why state 
effectiveness is more prevalent in Rwanda than Uganda.34 The perspective adopted 
here, which accords with the principles of comparative historical explanation in the 
social sciences (Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003; Mahoney et al. 2009), is that 
understanding the critical interactions between factors is more important than 
separating them in pursuit of ‘ultimate primacy’ (Mann 1986: 3). Theory-guided 
process-tracing allows for the exploration of such interactions, and also for 
attention to specificity without sacrificing generalisability. Through exploring 
                                                          
34
 To name a few: the Rwandan government is more dictatorial; the nature of the colonial experience 
created different power relations in each country; the ethnic map is different; the Rwandan regime is 
less corrupt; the legacy of the Rwandan genocide facilitates obedience; the Rwandan government 
cares more about development. All of these are considered in various ways throughout the thesis. 
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theoretical propositions such as those already outlined, the study of specific 
contexts can yield generalisable insights.  
 
The range of causal elements at play does, however, raise questions about historical 
versus proximate causality and the role of each in the analysis. Here the idea of 
institutional path dependence is useful, because it highlights how certain patterns 
of behaviour that are self-reinforcing come into play as a result of contingent 
historical events. It therefore has great power for explaining differences between 
cases that one might otherwise expect to be similar. Simply put, path dependence is 
the idea that ‘once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of 
reversal are very high’ (Levi 1997: 28). ‘Increasing returns’ systems kick in;  in other 
words ‘the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible 
options increase over time’ (Pierson 2000: 252). Originating in the field of 
economics and the study of technological development (Arthur 1994), the 
importance of ‘increasing returns’ mechanisms for the development of institutions 
is now widely acknowledged (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). Moreover, these kinds 
of ‘self-reinforcing dynamics’ are arguably particularly intense regarding political 
issues pertaining to power relations and credible commitment (Pierson 2000). 
These theoretical developments have gone some way to redressing what Moore 
termed 'a widespread assumption in modern social science that social continuity 
requires no explanation’ (Moore 1966: 485). 
 
Not all institutions emerging out of historical experiences are ‘path dependent’; to 
use the term loosely renders it rather meaningless (Mahoney 2000). Some historical 
trajectories (the long history of monarchy in Rwanda and its implications for present 
day power relations, for example) demonstrate the ‘status-quo bias’ of political 
institutions (Pierson 2000: 257), but are not path dependent in the strict sense. 
Path-dependent explanations involve an identifiable contingent event – a ‘critical 
juncture’ or ‘branching point’ that has triggered a new institutional matrix that has 
become self-reinforcing through logic of its own (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). The 
combination of broader, persistent historical trajectories and more recent 
‘branching points’ shapes the institutional matrix we observe in particular contexts. 
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Yet while institutional origins are important, and are discussed in relation to each 
case in Chapter Three, so too are the mechanisms through which institutions are 
perpetuated.  
 
Sinchcombe’s (1968) distinction between ‘historical causes’ and ‘constant causes’ is 
helpful here, serving as a reminder that defining  the ‘original’ moment in which an 
institutional trajectory was generated can only be part of a causal explanation of 
contemporary behaviour. Equally important is to ‘explain continuity in activity in 
terms of the ongoing presence of a set of pressures and incentives’ (Ikenberry 1994: 
30). These pressures and incentives can be thought of as historically or structurally 
determined, yet they are reconstituted by the contemporary actions of human 
agents. Indeed the importance of retaining a focus on agency despite the 
‘institutional turn’ is starting to be emphasised (VonDoepp 2009; Leftwich 2010). 
Attention to agency is necessary with a view to further clarifying the approach to 
causality and the role of institutions adopted in this study.  
 
Institutions and agency: intervention and political bargaining  
 
On the whole, recent institutional theory has treated institutions as rules or norms 
that ‘structure’, ‘govern’ or ‘constrain’ human action (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Lin 
and Nugent 1995; North 1995; Hodgson 2006; North et al. 2009). Agency is 
considered in a secondary role; as being exercised against a prior institutional 
backdrop. The structure/agency distinction has often been restated as a divide 
between institutions (rules) and organisations (players) (North 1990; Lawson 1997). 
Elsewhere, engaging with agency has involved analysing how individuals navigate 
on the basis either of ‘calculus’ or ‘culture’ within institutional constraints, reflecting 
the biases of rational choice and sociological approaches respectively (Hall and 
Taylor 1996). All these approaches represent attempts to overcome the  classic 
‘dualism’ of twentieth century social theory, whereby philosophies of action 
evolved largely without attention to institutional context, while sociological 
approaches were overly structural (Giddens 1979). In many respects, however, they 
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reproduce it by neglecting to explore the ways in which structure and agency are 
mutually constitutive (Hay and Wincott 1998).  
 
The approach taken in this study accords with Giddens’ (Giddens 1979: 255) 
argument that ‘the reflexive monitoring of action both draws upon and 
reconstitutes the institutional organization of society’, a sentiment echoed in some 
‘new’ institutional debates (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 10; Hay and Wincott 1998: 
956). This implies a need to give more attention to social action as a factor in the 
reproduction of institutional matrices: ‘institutions do not just work ‘behind the 
backs’ of the social actors who produce and reproduce them’ (Giddens 1979: 71). In 
the context of this study, the core empirical research is focused on these agency 
factors and how they reproduce institutional patterns, with particular consequences 
for state effectiveness.  
 
If agency can be thought of as ‘Intervention in a potentially malleable object-world’ 
(Giddens 1979: 57) then political agency is intervention by political actors with 
potential to shape socio-political outcomes. The term ‘effective state action’ can be 
used to describe situations where political or bureaucratic agents act in ways that 
produce effective state policy implementation. Yet this, of course, is not the only 
type of political agency and can be contrasted with actions by political agents that 
work against state effectiveness (even if they are effective with respect to some 
other outcome). In sum, political agency consists of interventions that can either 
impede or facilitate effective state action.  
 
One form of intervention that may impede state effectiveness is when political 
agents actively seek to establish a direct relationship with certain groups of people, 
unhindered by formal institutions and organisations. Such interventions can be 
thought of as populist. In a rigorous discussion of the history of this much-contested 
concept, Weyland proposes a new definition of populism as: ‘A political strategy 
through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on 
direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalised support from large numbers of mostly 
unorganized followers’ (Weyland 2001: 14). Interventions that seek to build support 
  
 65 
in this way reflect a ‘weak commitment to substantive policies’ (Weyland 2001: 11), 
and are often predicated on deliberately undermining state institutions. They are 
often remarkably effective strategies for mobilising popular support (not least in 
urban Africa, as argued by Resnick (2012)). However, they can informally 
institutionalise patterns of behaviour that actively clash with the institutions of the 
state; as such there is a low level of what one might term, ‘institutional congruence’ 
between the formal and informal. 
 
In contrast, where institutional congruence is high because informal norms of 
behaviour perpetuated by political actors support formal institutions rather than 
undermining them, state effectiveness is likely to be enhanced. Institutional theory 
has explicitly highlighted the importance of informal norms for backing up laws and 
regulations to make them effective (Hodgson 2006; Khan 2010). It is often the 
informal norms that ‘do much of the enabling and constraining that we attribute to 
the formal rules’ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 734), and it makes intuitive sense that 
formal institutions work better where supportive behaviour is already informally 
normalised or incentivised. Populist behaviour by politicians is unlikely to further 
this end because it is a strategy based on building support through actively 
marginalising formal organisations and processes.  
 
Thinking in this way about political strategies and the tactical interventions that 
accompany them underscores the need to consider political agency in terms of 
individuals as well as organisations, despite the fact that much contemporary 
institutional theory is concerned with organisations as the key ‘players’ of interest.35 
While premised on an understanding of the pivotal role of political organisations in 
development, this study is more directly concerned with institutional relationships 
both within political organisations and between individual actors representing 
organisations and those outside them. These types of relationships can be thought 
of as ongoing processes of bargaining, which broadly speaking is of two varieties. 
The first relates to the (often informal) negotiation of pacts among political and 
other elites about how to use power in ways that ensure both rents and stability 
                                                          
35
 See the debate between North and Hodgson on this issue in Hodgson (2006).  
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(Putzel 2008; North et al. 2009). The second involves processes through which elites 
reach mutually agreeable understandings with popular interests in society (Beall 
2008; Di John and Putzel 2009),36 in ways that may or may not involve populist 
strategies and tactics. The outcomes of this bargaining process have been 
conceptualised in recent scholarship as embodying the ‘political settlement’ in a 
given state (Khan and S. 2000; Khan 2005; Di John and Putzel 2009; Khan 2010; 
Walton 2010). The political settlement can be defined as ‘the dynamic relationship 
between elite interests and the broader array of interests in the society’ (Parks and 
Cole 2010: viii).  
 
Rather than the settlement per se, the causal processes of interest here are 
embodied in the bargaining itself; after all, political settlements are dynamic and 
‘evolving all the time’ (Khan 2010: 22). Often associated with clientelism and 
corruption, habituated forms of political bargaining can feed into social norms, 
taking on an institutional quality of their own. Yet being informal and often 
dependent on the actions of individuals, these norms represent what Hodgson 
(2006) terms ‘agent-sensitive’ institutions, meaning that they are sensitive to 
change dependent on the types of ‘player’ and the personalities involved, such as 
the political organisation or individual leaders. This study interprets political 
bargaining as taking place at the nexus of structure and agency; as both influenced 
by and impacting on formal and (especially) informal rules that pertain in a given 
society. It is hard to observe bargaining per se, but what can be observed are the 
interventions of political agents and how these interact with the responses of social 
actors in terms of compliance, negotiation and resistance to policies and 
regulations. 
  
To conclude, the research undertaken in this project is concerned with both 
institutions and action. Institutions, Ikenberry suggests, ‘evolve in response to 
                                                          
36
 Drawing on Putzel and Di John (2009: 15), elites can be defined as major capitalists in possession 
of valued assets, people wielding substantial power over the allocation of property rights, those who 
possess authority to bargain on behalf of religious communities, and those who lead major political 
organisations.  
. 
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changing environmental conditions and ongoing political manoeuvring but in ways 
that are constrained by past trajectories’ (Ikenberry 1994: 387). In putting 
contemporary political bargaining and interventions – the political ‘manoeuvres’ in 
question – at the heart of the research but analysing them in an institutionally 
rooted way, this study moves beyond institutional explanations that take for 
granted the processes of institutional reproduction. It also highlights the 
importance of congruence between formal and informal institutions, something 
that both influences and is influenced by bargaining actions, with potentially 
important impacts on state effectiveness. The prism outlined in this chapter for 
understanding the processes impacting on state effectiveness is depicted in a 
simple stylised diagrammatic form in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Deconstructing state effectiveness 
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2.4    Research design and method 
  
The macro-design: comparative case study analysis 
 
The remainder of this chapter provides an account and justification of the particular 
research design chosen and some description of the more specific methods used. 
The research is framed as a comparative case study, due to the suitability of this 
form of research strategy for investigations that are ‘both historically interpretive 
and causally analytic’ (Ragin 1987: 35). Case studies offer unique insights into causal 
mechanisms, which are the central object of the study (Gerring 2007: 47), and are in 
many respects the classic method of generating new ideas that can subsequently be 
used to generate testable hypotheses (Gerring 2007: 39). Moreover, case studies 
are considered particularly appropriate for research on contemporary events, 
sharing many of the same techniques of history but adding ‘two sources of evidence 
not usually included in the historian’s repertoire: direct observation and systematic 
interviewing’ (Yin 1994: 8).  
 
A comparative case study approach is appropriate because the study seeks to 
generate insights that can be generalised to the level of theory (Yin 1994 37) and 
because state effectiveness is much more meaningful in comparative light. Two-
case comparisons have a distinguished history dating back to Mill (1843). The 
decision to use just two cases is also pragmatic, given the necessarily in-depth 
nature of case study research, which involves lengthy qualitative processes and the 
triangulation of findings through multiple methods of data collection (Cresswell 
1998; Silverman 2000). Structured, focused comparisons (George and Bennett 
2005) also allow scope for in-depth within-case as well as cross-case analysis and 
can trace multiple paths of causation, analysing the non-linearity of causal 
processes in a given case while still benefiting from comparative perspective 
(Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003). As this is not a hypothesis-testing study, many 
of the concerns about ‘small-N’ research raised by authors such as Geddes (2003), 
which relate to possibilities of spurious correlation, do not apply.  
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The decision to take cities as the primary unit of comparison is justified in relation 
to the research questions. All the policy areas of interest relate specifically to 
governing a bounded urban space and involve government functions that are 
formally decentralised to the level of city government in whole or part. Moreover, 
the particular nature of institutional configurations at city level make cities suitable 
units for comparative analysis (Macleod and Goodwin 1999).  In this study it is the 
fate of efforts to shape the city’s development as a whole that is of primary interest, 
and although all analysis ‘involves breaking wholes into parts’, in case study 
research (by contrast with variable-oriented research) ‘the whole predominates 
over the parts, shaping the understanding and interpretation of each separate 
element’ (Ragin 1987: 83). The broader national and international dynamics at play 
are of course crucial; we need therefore to understand cities in relation to dispersed 
activities and relationships at various scales (Robinson 2005; Ward 2010). However, 
the dependent variable (effective implementation of urban policy and planning) can 
only be observed in cities. Given a particular interest in the challenges facing large, 
‘core’ cities and the high level of urban primacy in both countries, the inclusion of 
any of the (much) smaller cities in either country in the research design would not 
have been appropriate.  
 
The selection of these two particular core cities out of a potentially very large 
universe of cases is justified on the following grounds. Africa is the region of 
particular interest, due to its large number of states considered weak, fragile or 
ineffective and its many fast-growing cities. Within its 53 states there are many core 
cities; but the location of government in a capital city has particular implications in 
terms of overlapping spheres of the state, so it is better to compare two capitals 
than a capital and a non-capital. Beyond this, the most problematic aspect of case 
selection is balancing similarity with difference. The approach taken is essentially 
based on Mill’s (1843) ‘method of difference’, whereby two cases with a large 
number of commonalities exhibit different outcomes in relation to a particular 
phenomenon (in this case the effective implementation of urban policies). In this 
design, research is aimed at exploring the causal factors that produce that 
difference in very similar cases (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Stated differently, it is 
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what Gerring (2007) terms a ‘diverse’ case study comparison or Tilly (1984) terms a 
‘variation-finding’ or ‘individualising’ comparison, because the two cases vary 
significantly on the particular outcome of interest, but are nevertheless highly 
comparable.  
 
It is obviously not possible to find two cases that have every circumstance in 
common save one, as posited in Mill’s ideal type. In comparative politics of any kind 
this can only be approximated by finding cases that share important similarities in 
relation to the question of interest. Kampala and Kigali are among the most 
comparable capital cities in Africa. Uganda and Rwanda are very similar in terms of 
their economies (largely agricultural, with little manufacturing industry), levels of 
poverty, population densities, levels of urbanisation and democratic 
institutionalisation. The political regimes in place also have a shared background: 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda literally formed inside the Ugandan 
National Resistance Movement (NRM), and both came to power through protracted 
guerrilla struggle after devastating periods of civil conflict (Waugh 2004; Green 
2011a).37 The cities themselves, too, are similar: Kampala is certainly larger, but by 
2010 both were cities of around 1-2 million inhabitants located in infrastructurally-
challenging terrain of hills and swamps, sharing similar tropical climates as well as 
having little by way of formal employment.38 
 
Sufficient similarity, then, is not in question. Neither is difference on the dependent 
variable, which can certainly be termed extreme and will be illustrated throughout 
the study. The usual concerns about selection bias do not pose problems with this 
kind of case study design. Arguments against ‘selection on the dependent variable’, 
made for example by Geddes (2003), are against selecting a number of cases that 
lack variation on the dependent variable and therefore cannot account for why the 
                                                          
37
 Important differences do of course exist between the countries: the experience of British versus 
Belgian colonialism and the unusual scale and trauma of the genocide in Rwanda being prominent 
among them. However, these countries are nevertheless much more comparable than most.  
38
 According to the most recent UN estimations, Kampala’s (night-time) population was 1,598,000 
and Kigali’s 939,000 (UN-HABITAT 2011). Daytime populations are probably considerably larger, and 
in any case all figures are approximations and differ considerably by source. The Rwandan 
government estimated that Kigali’s population already hit a million in 2006 (CoK website; 
http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw/spip.php?article9; accessed 10.06.12). 
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phenomenon of interest did not occur elsewhere.39 This study, however, has 
deliberately selected cases that vary widely on the dependent variable. These 
criticisms also have little relevance for studies concerned largely with causal 
mechanisms. In fact, in studies of this nature ‘selecting on the dependent variable 
might be a very reasonable thing to do’ (Peters 1998: 57). A more pertinent 
potential criticism might be that the variation in the dependent variable between 
the two cases is ‘truncated’ – in other words they do not exhibit the full range of 
variation (King et al. 1994: 130; Collier and Mahoney 1996). However, the cases vary 
about as much as is possible without introducing other biases that would be more 
damaging to the comparison.40 
 
Within-case design and methods 
 
The operationalisation of the project involves the selection of particular areas of 
urban activity, as already outlined in Chapter One. Accordingly, within each city case 
study there are four detailed studies that can be thought of as ‘cases within cases’.  
In each city there is study of a) urban planning and the regulation of construction, b) 
managing marketplaces and regulating petty trade, c) governing and regulating 
public transportation and c) generating local revenue through urban taxation.  The 
central research question is posed in relation to each of these: why is the 
implementation and enforcement of policies and regulations more effective in Kigali 
than Kampala? The idea of ‘effectiveness’ has already been discussed extensively. 
Now the remaining key terms in the question will be briefly outlined.  
 
The question makes a distinction between policies and regulations. Policies are 
defined here as proposed courses of action pursued by governments that may or 
                                                          
39
 For example Skocpol  (1979) is criticised on the grounds that by studying three states in which 
revolutions did occur and none in which they did not, she cannot draw valid conclusions about the 
causes of revolution. 
40
 There are surely states in more developed countries able to implement policies more effectively 
than in Kigali, but to compare states at very different levels of development would violate the 
principle of similarity central to the research design. Equally, there are core African cities, such as 
Kinshasa in the DRC for example, where the state is considerably less effective than in Kampala. 
However, Kinshasa is over five times the size of Kigali and the Congolese state is barely functional, 
which again would severely jeopardise the comparison.   
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may not have accompanying laws and regulations. A policy is an ‘explicit statement 
of a governance objective’ which ‘‘frames’ subsequent action’ (Healey 1997: 214). 
The important point is that policies reflect stated aims of governments with regard 
to particular issues even though they may not be codified in legislation.41 While 
policies are therefore stated aims, guiding principles and proposed plans of action, 
regulations are binding restrictions on behaviour, codified in laws, urban ordinances 
and other documents that specify punitive measures if broken. In other words, 
unlike policies they ‘change legally or administratively enforceable rights’ (Hopkins 
2001: 201). In the sphere of urban physical planning, zoning and other forms of land 
use and construction regulation are particularly important. For the various other 
aspects of urban development explored in this study, regulations pertaining to 
utilities such as public transport and economic activities such as market vending will 
also be under scrutiny.  
 
This conceptual distinction between policy and regulation relates to another 
distinction in the question: that between implementation and enforcement. So far 
the discussion has largely referred to implementation, the broader of the two terms 
which in this study is sometimes used as shorthand for both. Essentially, to 
implement is defined here as to put something into effect according to a definite 
procedure. When referring to policy as defined above this may mean to create the 
laws and regulations needed to translate stated aims into reality, or it may mean 
undertaking particular actions in accordance with the policy to bring something into 
effect. Enforcement is a specific aspect of implementation that refers to ensuring 
compliance to those rules that are already codified in laws and regulations. Strictly 
speaking we should write about the implementation of policy and the enforcement 
of regulations. The distinction is raised because state effectiveness entails both the 
translation of policy into laws and regulations, and the subsequent enforcement of 
those.  
 
                                                          
41
 Notwithstanding the differences in the way the terms ‘policy’ and ‘plan’ are sometimes used, there 
is no logical problem in this context with discussing urban plans as types of policy rather than as a 
separate category; indeed as Healey (1997: 218) points out, planning is ‘a style of governance within 
a policy-driven approach’ that in fact ‘could be equated with that approach’.  
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Focusing the research within each case also entailed a degree of geographic 
specificity. This is not so much because of the size of the cities as the number and 
complexity of local government structures within them, which themselves were 
central objects of research. In both countries, there are five tiers of local 
government, with the city government itself being the highest. In Kampala, the tier 
directly below City Hall is called the Division, of which there are five. Research 
focused on two of these: Central Division, which contains the central business 
district (CBD) and most valuable properties, and Kawempe Division, which contains 
some of the poorest parts of the city and largest slums, as well as some relatively 
wealthy areas. In Kigali, the level below the City is called the District, of which there 
are three. Again, two districts were chosen for similar reasons: Nyarugenge District, 
which is home to the CBD and some of the older upmarket areas, and Gasabo 
District which contains both low-income settlements and some of the newest and 
wealthiest neighbourhoods.  Where research was focused on the particular 
dimensions of interaction between tiers of government, or between the state in 
general and urban social groups, particular attention was given to these Divisions 
and Districts (see Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2. Kampala’s Divisions (left) and Kigali’s Districts (right) 
               
Source: created by the author from various sources 
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The specific research methods used were in keeping with common prescriptions 
about case study research and the need to pursue a range of approaches, 
triangulating findings with multiple data sources (Yin 1994; Cresswell 1998; Gerring 
2007). The most important method was interviewing, which encompassed local and 
national politicians, bureaucrats, business representatives, donor representatives, 
members of civic associations (for example associations of particular groups of 
urban workers), civil society organisations and individuals involved in the areas of 
urban activity under consideration. In total over 200 interviews were undertaken in 
six months of fieldwork, divided among several trips over a period of almost three 
years between January 2009 and December 2011, although the bulk of research 
took place from September 2009-February 2010.  
 
These interviews are detailed in Appendix 1. Where necessary, identities have been 
anonymised due to the sensitive nature of certain subjects or at the request of 
interviewees.42 Interviewees were selected through snowballing and purposively, in 
order to explore a wide range of opinions and perspectives on the issues in 
question, albeit within the confines of what was possible as a single researcher in 
the given period of time (Gaskell 2000). Interviews were semi-structured, based on 
topic guides for the issues being researched and question lists tailored to the 
particular roles of different interviewees. They ranged between around thirty 
minutes and two hours in length, with the average being about an hour. More 
uniformly structured interviews were not appropriate due to the range of issues 
under consideration and types of interviewees. The diversity of interviewees, 
encompassing not only voices from a range of positions within the state but those 
outside state systems wherever possible, was necessary given a conception of state 
effectiveness that is deeply rooted in political economy and urban state-society 
relations as well as the internal dynamics of state organisations. 
 
Alongside interviewing, archival research was undertaken in both city government 
and national archives, as well as an extensive review of relevant press coverage on 
                                                          
42
 A list identifying certain interviewees more clearly will be provided to the thesis examiners 
separately. 
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particular issues over a five-year period. This was supplemented by observation (for 
example of council meetings, new developments and infrastructure, the form of 
urban informal settlements, the character of urban informal activities and the 
interaction of urban-dwellers with authorities) and the collection of basic 
quantitative data with respect to local taxation. The selection of particular methods 
to address the core thesis questions and sub-questions pertaining to the various 
fields of inquiry is outlined in Appendix 2, in accordance with the guidance provided 
by Mason (2002). This appendix also provides some reflections on problems and 
challenges associated with the interview process, and a list of basic data that was 
sought in each city for the purposes of comparison. 
 
The analysis of data in this study is guided by a logic of process-tracing, an approach 
that is specifically tailored to the analysis of causal mechanisms (George and 
McKeown 1985; King et al. 1994; Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003; George and 
Bennett 2005). This involves gathering multiple forms of evidence and large 
numbers of different observations to construct a narrative with attention to 
sequences in causal chains, and is in many ways a natural correlate of case study 
research (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007). It is particularly well suited to 
this study given the definition of effectiveness employed, as it was designed 
specifically to ‘investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial 
conditions are translated into outcomes’ (George and McKeown 1985: 35). It also 
applies well to studies concerned with path dependence and how institutions are 
remade over time (Pierson and Skocpol 2002).  
 
Methodologically, process-tracing has a close affinity to elite interviewing, due to 
the suitability of the latter for analysing processes of political decision-making and 
important developments within government over time (Tansey 2007). This thesis 
has not, however, relied solely on interviews with elites, which would clearly have 
been insufficient to answer the questions posed. Because of the diversity in the 
nature of interviewees, the thesis aims to be as explicit as possible about interview 
sources throughout, notwithstanding the need to protect the identity of certain 
respondents. Multiple sources were always sought for any evidence that is 
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presented in support of particular facts, and where appropriate, if there is any 
reason to doubt the reliability of a particular source this is mentioned in the thesis. 
Where direct interview quotations are used, this is generally because their content 
is particularly interesting and appears to offer insight into wider trends. However, 
the thesis makes no claim that particular individuals quoted are necessarily 
representative of the groups in which they are a part, and aims to be explicit about 
the likely biases particular interviewees’ responses reflect.  
 
In the context of process-tracing, interview material is used alongside other sources 
to help piece together the events in causal chains, assess the causes and 
consequences of particular decisions taken and explore the ways in which the 
relationships between particular actors over time feed into particular outcomes. As 
such, the interview material is not used to encapsulate the opinions of whole 
categories of people or provide evidence of the prevalence of particular views and 
feelings. Consequently, while interviewees were categorised according to the 
specific issues being researched as outlined in Appendix 2a, they were not formally 
coded. Interview material was largely used to uncover and substantiate purported 
facts about particular events, decisions and relationships. Where the data on these 
purported facts conflicts in ways that are considered significant for establishing 
solid evidence, this is highlighted in the text.  
 
Moreover, depending on the nature of the issues in question, some parts of the 
thesis rely more on interview data than others. In cases where a particular event 
was some time in the past, for example, more weight might be given to newspaper 
articles, reports and other documentation from around that time due to a lack of 
access to people who were present at the event. Certain parts of the thesis that 
discuss the formal policy and regulatory framework, or analyse data such as that 
provided on taxation in Chapter Seven, are also less heavily dependent on 
interviews than those that are attempting to analyse complex practices within the 
informal economy. On the other hand, where certain data were difficult to acquire 
in ‘hard’ form – i.e. were not codified in official documents or records, due the 
largely informal or unregulated nature of the activities in question – it was 
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necessary to rely more on anecdotal interview evidence to substantiate particular 
facts. Data such as the exact proportion of land plots held under particular types of 
tenure, the number of public transport vehicles in the city, or the number of 
buildings constructed illegally – all of which were surprisingly hard to come by –  
would be typical examples. 
 
As noted previously, this study specifically adopts a theory-guided process-tracing 
approach (Falleti 2006), which can be thought of as a variant of process-tracing that 
involves presenting narratives based on empirical data against a backdrop of 
‘theoretical priors’ (Bennett 2006; Mahoney 2010). As Aminzade argues, ‘By making 
the theories that underpin our narratives more explicit, we avoid the danger of 
burying our explanatory principles in engaging stories’ (Aminzade 1993). Theoretical 
priors also facilitate the design and conduct of the case study research itself, 
allowing for the pursuit of data that can validate or invalidate particular theoretical 
propositions, as in In Hall’s (2003b) conception. This involves explicitly making 
theoretical propositions about causal processes and then collecting many and 
varied ‘causal process observations’ (Mahoney 2010: 124), enabling the researcher 
to assess the presence of patterns that can help determine which causal theories 
are most valid. The further development of theoretical propositions and hypotheses 
can then proceed inductively form the empirical case material.  
 
Process-tracing is not without its pitfalls, and its inferences can be very difficult to 
subject to strict tests (Geddes 2003; Gerring 2007). However, if used properly it can 
help bring rigour to qualitative case study research. Because of the number of 
‘noncomparable’ observations from diverse sources that it involves (Gerring 2007: 
173), allowing us to analyse which potential causal factors are actually ‘activated’ in 
a process and which are not, it ideally provides ‘more opportunities to refute a 
theory, not more opportunities to evade refutation.’ (King et al 228). It is therefore 
a key tool in the iterative process of building theory and generating hypotheses. 
When gathering and analysing data through process-tracing, one is repeatedly 
confronted with problematic questions, dead ends and challenges to the research 
design and the very premises on which the research is based. This should be seen as 
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positive (George and Bennett 2005), adding rigour to the research exercise and 
forcing the researcher to face up to difficulties and inconsistencies that may mean 
readjusting the analytical prism as research and analysis proceeds. This kind of 
iterative process certainly been the case with this study, and much of what has 
been presented in this chapter reflects this.   
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Chapter Three  
Kampala and Kigali in historical and institutional context  
 
This chapter examines the history of Uganda and Rwanda, some of their primary 
socio-economic, political and institutional characteristics and the role the capital 
cities play in these broader stories. The two case studies are taken in turn, with 
three main sections for each. The first of these provides a broad-brush historical 
background, outlining the pre-colonial and colonial origins of the state, the post-
independence period, political dynamics leading up to the present day and the 
experience and legacies of violent conflict. Attention is paid to historical continuities 
and institutional ‘branching points’. A second, shorter section discusses the role of 
the capital city in this history and the city’s most fundamental characteristics.  
 
The final section on each case study focuses on key institutional factors with 
particular relevance for this study. Chapter Two developed an analytical prism for 
thinking about state effectiveness in general. However, for a given policy issue there 
are also specific institutional factors that merit special attention, and for the issues 
explored in this study two institutional matrices are of special importance. The first 
pertains to decentralisation: the rules and practices governing relationships 
between different tiers of government, how these have evolved and how they are 
codified in law. The second relates to land, in terms of the codification of land rights 
and tenure systems. For each of these, the historical development and basic 
characteristics will briefly be outlined, with particular attention to how these formal 
institutions play out in the capital city. Other relevant policy frameworks, for 
example those relating to urban planning and regulating urban economic activity, 
are taken up in the relevant empirical chapters that follow.
43
 In most cases, they are 
dependent in various ways on the institutional architecture relating to land and 
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 In other words, the policies and institutions will be discussed as follows: urban planning and 
development regulation (Chapter Four); urban marketplaces and petty trade (Chapter Five); urban 
public transportation (Chapter Six); specifically fiscal decentralisation (Chapter Seven).  
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decentralisation, hence the need for a dedicated discussion of these two issues in 
this chapter.  
 
3.1   Uganda: historical context and legacies of conflict 
 
Uganda’s extraordinary history is well-documented, and doing justice to this 
complex and troubled history in a few pages is impossible. This section merely aims 
to highlight some of the historical trajectories most relevant to this study. Due to 
space constraints, the pre-colonial and colonial periods cannot be discussed in 
detail.  It is important to note, however, that Uganda is one of the world’s most 
ethnically fractionalised countries, comprising at least two hundred different 
entities prior to British colonialism (Jørgensen 1981). Crudely speaking, today the 
northern part of the country consists of Nilotic and Sudanic-speaking people 
organised into relatively small, segmentary communities while the south is 
characterised by historic Kingdoms of Bantu-speakers with historically high levels of 
social organisation (Karugire 1980; Mafeje 1998; Chrétien 2003). Among these is 
Buganda, which in the nineteenth century became particularly powerful (Mafeje 
1998). The Buganda Kingdom, led by the Kabaka (King) became the focal point for 
British indirect rule in the Uganda protectorate and was basically used to help 
colonise the surrounding areas (Twaddle 1993). Consequently, it was privileged in 
terms of government jobs, university places and control of economic resources, 
laying the foundations for subsequent ethnic animosity (Apter 1967; Kasfir 1976; 
Kasozi 1994; Hansen and Twaddle 1998; Chrétien 2003; Golooba-Mutebi 2008b).  
 
In the 1920s and the decades that followed, many Asians were brought in to build 
the Uganda Railway from Mombasa to Entebbe and settled in Kampala (the colonial 
capital in Buganda) forming a new middle class (Mamdani 1973: 15; Kabwegyere 
1995; Van Hear 1998). They reportedly controlled 97.5% of trade in Kampala by 
1953 (Makara 2009: 108). The first political parties were, however, dominated by 
indigenous Ugandans. By the early 1960s there were three main political players: 
the Protestant (and Northern)-dominated Uganda People’s Congress (UPC); the 
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Catholic, Baganda-dominated44 Democratic Party (DP); and Kabaka Yekka (KY - ‘the 
King Alone’), the party of the Protestant Baganda elite based at Mengo – the seat of 
the Buganda Kingdom now within the boundaries of Kampala (Karugire 1980; 
Mutibwa 2008).  The former two were moderate nationalist parties and the latter 
effectively a pressure group lobbying for the retention of Buganda’s privileges, 
hastily assembled by the monarchy after its failed bid to secede in the run-up to 
independence (Mutibwa 2008).  
  
From independence to the ‘Bush War’ 
 
As independence loomed, Kabaka Yekka entered into an improbable alliance with 
the UPC – the nationalist and progressive party which had largely formed to oppose 
Mengo’s demands and was led by a Northern Ugandan, Milton Obote (Mutibwa 
2008). This anti-Catholic ‘marriage of convenience’ won the elections at 
independence in 1962, and consequently Uganda entered independence on the 
back of a very fragile coalition, with Obote as its first Prime Minister and Kabaka 
Mutesa II as President. The monarchy secured federal status for Buganda under the 
independence constitution (Mukholi 1995), which papered over acute differences 
between the parties (Karugire 1980), and it was not long before the alliance 
unravelled. A political crisis in 1964 set Obote’s government on a collision course 
with Mengo and in 1966 Obote lost patience with Buganda’s monarchy altogether, 
unilaterally abrogated the independence constitution and assumed the role of 
president. When the Kabaka appealed to the UN for help, Obote sent out troops to 
occupy his palace, killing hundreds or possibly thousands in the ‘Battle of Mengo’ 
and sending the Kabaka into exile (Kasfir 1976; Kasozi 1994; Rubongoya 2007).  
 
These events precipitated two decades of dictatorship, instability and violence for 
which Uganda became infamous across the globe. In 1967 Obote introduced a new 
republican constitution, abolishing Kingdoms and vesting vast powers in the 
presidency, before banning opposition parties two years later (Mukholi 1995). 
Government dependence on the military grew and Obote’s ‘turn to the left’ from 
                                                          
44
 ‘Baganda’ is the collective term for people from Buganda; ‘Muganda’ is the singular. 
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1969 alienated his Western allies (Mamdani 1983). In January 1971 General Idi 
Amin took advantage of the President’s vulnerability and swept to power in a 
bloodless coup while Obote was abroad. Amin’s coup was greeted with 
acquiescence internationally and scenes of jubilation at home, particularly among 
the Baganda, who generally despised Obote (Mutibwa 1992; Golooba-Mutebi 
2008b).  
 
However, Amin’s rule involved blatant ethnic exclusion as he promoted ethnic 
kinsmen from the West Nile region to key posts in government and military 
(Lindemann 2010: 69) and purged Obote’s ethnic kin (Golooba-Mutebi 2008b: 10). 
As brutal killings proceeded throughout the 1970s, decision-making became a 
monopoly of the military establishment (Lindemann 2010: 73). In 1972 Amin 
launched his notorious ‘economic war’, expelling almost the entire Asian 
community – around 50,000 people (Van Hear 1998) – and  redistributing their 
assets among the mafutamingi, a class of corrupt businessmen linked to the military 
(Mamdani 1973; Muzrui 1975; Mamdani 1983). The economic consequences were 
catastrophic (Brett 2006), and the economy spiralled into magendo (the black 
market). 
 
This was a critical juncture in Uganda’s history, ushering in an institutional culture 
that amounted to ‘if you don’t get rich when you’re in power, you never get rich’.45 
Theft itself ‘gained respectability’; a way of life became normalised in which ‘any 
means of making money was acceptable provided it succeeded’ (Mamdani 1983: 
52, 54). Moreover, while the mafutamingi were closely linked to the seat of power, 
they operated outside formal state structures and were effectively an ‘economic 
rival to the state’ (Kasfir 1983: 95). These patterns of behaviour became self-
reinforcing given the opportunity cost of following formal rules and regulations 
under the circumstances, and the repercussions of the Amin years were severe and 
long-lasting. As Rubongoya (2007: 50) notes, ‘the social consequences of Amin’s 
regime have left generations of Ugandans without the normative structure vital for 
a normal functioning society.’  
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 Interview with Chairman of a civic organisation 30.09.09. 
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Amin was overthrown in 1979 by Obote and a new force led by Yoweri Museveni 
from Ankole in Western Uganda (Museveni 1997; Amaza 1998).  After a rapid 
succession of interim leaders, in 1980 an election that was widely believed to be 
rigged brought Obote back to power (Amaza 1998; Brett 2006). Museveni 
concluded that Obote could never be trusted and decided to resort to arms again, 
setting off for the bush with a handful of men and rifles to forge a guerrilla war 
(Museveni 1997). From 1981 Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) fought a 
five-year insurgency from central Buganda, as the Obote government (followed by 
the military junta of Tito and Bazillio Okello from 1985-6) ruled in an exclusionary 
and despotic manner (Rubongoya 2007; Lindemann 2010). Adhering to Nkrumah’s 
Clausewitzian dictum that ‘all military problems are political’, Museveni set out to 
gain power through ‘a protracted people’s struggle’ (Amaza 1998: 28), primarily by 
building relationships with Baganda and progressively incorporating them into the 
NRA (Museveni 1997; Amaza 1998: 30-35).  This rapport with Buganda culminated 
in an alleged wartime pact in 1985 between Kabaka Mutebi (exiled son of Mutesa II) 
and Museveni to restore the Buganda Kingdom when the NRA seized power (Oloka-
Onyango 1997; Kasfir 2005). This alliance subsequently caused Museveni problems 
like those identified by Trimberger (1978) regarding the danger of forming close ties 
with dominant landed classes before taking power.  
 
The National Resistance Movement period 
 
Museveni proved a master of clandestine political networking, becoming the first 
guerrilla leader to overthrow an African government (Southall 1988: 64). On January 
29th 1986 he was sworn in as President, promising ‘fundamental change’ rather 
than a mere ‘change of guard’ and a transformation of governance (Museveni 1997: 
172). Western allies were quick to emerge, and Museveni was willing to accept 
economic prescriptions from Washington provided that donors did not meddle in 
politics (Hansen and Twaddle 1998). This implicit deal was successful; privatisation 
and liberalisation proceeded apace while donors allowed Museveni to establish a 
‘no-party democracy’ under the aegis of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
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(Oloka-Onyango 2000; Carbone 2008). Meanwhile, the new government fought 
continuing insurgencies (Lindemann 2010), the most brutal and protracted being in 
Acholiland in the North.46 
 
For the first ten years of his rule, Museveni and the NRM were generally popular 
both with the war-weary population at home and abroad. His initial reconstruction 
programme – especially measures with respect to economic recovery,47 gender 
equality, education and HIV/AIDS48 – met with considerable success and approval, 
and he provided donors seeking an African success story with an intellectually 
sophisticated yet compliant partner (Hansen and Twaddle 1998; Kuteesa et al. 
2010; Tripp 2010). His decision to reinstitute most of the ancient Kingdoms in 1993 
(albeit in a purely ‘cultural’ role) also ensured support in Central and Western 
Uganda. However, the honeymoon period ended in the mid-1990s when discontent 
grew over the no-party system, land reform, and continuing instability in Northern 
Uganda. From 1996 onwards democratic accountability was waning, with NRM 
hegemony entrenched alongside corruption, clientelism and ethnic exclusion 
(Mwenda and Tangri 2005; Rubongoya 2007; Lindemann 2010; Tripp 2010). The 
manipulation of elections in 2001 precipitated further disillusionment, and even 
though multi-party politics was finally re-instated for the 2006 elections, Museveni’s 
decision to amend the Constitution so he could stand for a third term was for many 
the ultimate betrayal (Kobusingye 2010). He stood yet again in 2011 and was re-
elected by a landslide, with little pre-election violence; he therefore continues to 
enjoy widespread support, notwithstanding widespread accusations of rural ‘vote-
buying’ that may have helped secure this (Green 2011b; Mwenda 2011; Powell 
2011).49 
  
                                                          
46
 For more on the government’s war in the North against the Lord’s Resistance Army, see Allen 
(2006), Dolan (2009), Allen and Vlassenroot (2010). 
47
 Uganda’s growth since the NRM takeover has averaged 6.5%, resulting in a remarkable seven-fold 
increase in the size of Uganda’s economy over the period (Tripp 2010: 2). In 1993, Museveni invited 
the previously expelled Asians to return and reclaim their properties, providing a further boost to the 
economy (Rubongoya 2007). 
48
 On the HIV/AIDS reduction, see Putzel (2004). 
49
 On the violent upheavals that broke out some months after the 2011 election, see Goodfellow 
(2011). 
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Trajectories of continuity and change 
 
Transforming Ugandan society proved harder than Museveni anticipated. Some 
argue that the NRM cadres shared the same outlook as those they displaced (Amaza 
1998: 149), and many bureaucrats working in civil service after 1986 had been there 
since the Obote-Amin period, exacerbating resistance to change.50 While the 
mafutamingi mentality was resilient, NRM politicians layered onto it a new form of 
politics based on their experience of guerrilla struggle and the co-optation of other 
social groups. This ‘was to become a hallmark of the NRM-NRA administration, even 
in the civilian sector’ (Amaza 1998: 150). The combination of decades of socially 
legitimised black marketeering and ethnic clientelism with a new cadre of politicians 
adept in clandestine and tactical bargaining thus had a profound impact on 
Uganda’s political culture.  
 
Efforts to balance competing interests during the ‘bush war’ also had a self-
reinforcing legacy. These practices were critical to the NRM’s success in 
constructing a broad enough coalition to win power in a fractured country (Tripp 
2010), but then constrained its autonomy with respect to various groups, with 
implications for peacetime state effectiveness. Bargaining between groups with 
conflicting interests often caused contradictions in state policy and the tabling of 
laws to please one group that were politically difficult to implement due to the 
interests of another.51 Commitment to organisational goals was eroded during the 
Amin and war years (Makara 2009: 224), and reversing this trend was not foremost 
among the NRM’s many achievements. Not only was the mafutamingi culture 
persistent but the NRM’s political skills helped make it relatively sustainable. In 
other words, the politics of clientelism and self-interest became sources of 
government legitimacy among certain groups, as later chapters demonstrate.  
 
                                                          
50
 Interview with judge, 27.01.10. 
51
 See Goodfellow (2012) on the tactical uses of the law in contemporary Uganda. 
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Meanwhile, the pervasive influence of a ‘neoliberal moral code’, with its emphasis 
on maximising individual utility (Wiegratz 2010: 126), may have exacerbated these 
trends. In the 2000s, many officials and politicians were said to arrive in office 
asking ‘nfunila wa?’ (Where do I gain?), and literally demanding of constituents 
seeking services ‘ovakko ki?’ (what can you give me?).52 All of this fed a serious 
credible commitment problem. Trust in formal state institutions was very low,53 and 
Museveni’s populist efforts to connect personally with social groups led him to 
attack state agencies seeking to mediate his power (Carbone 2005: 8), often 
rendering them unable to fulfil their formal functions effectively.  
 
3.2    The role of Kampala  
 
Colonial Kampala originated in 1890 when Captain Lugard arrived at Mengo,
54
 the 
capital of the Buganda Kingdom thought to have been the most populous urban 
agglomeration in the East African interior in the 19
th
 Century (Fallers 1960), and 
built a fort on a nearby hill. Although the colonial authorities based their 
administrative capital at Entebbe, trade flourished around Lugard’s camp and 
Kampala rapidly became the Protectorate’s core city by the 1940s (Munger 1951: 
76). For most of the colonial period it remained a ‘dual city’; Mengo (the African 
settlement, also known as the Kibuga) and Kampala (the European/Asian residential 
areas and commercial centre), developing side by side (O’Connor 1983). The 
municipal boundaries of the latter excluded most African residential 
neighbourhoods and the seat of the Kingdom (Munger 1951: 31). Shanty towns 
soon developed around Mengo, prompting an incoming colonial town planner to 
remark on ‘this state of chaos and almost licensed breach of all reasonable 
development’.55  
 
                                                          
52
 Interview with KCC and Division officials, cited in Makara (2009: 254, 257).  
53
 This was particularly true in Kampala, where Afrobarometer data indicates that over half the 
population had little or no trust in local government, the ruling party or the police (Afrobarometer 
2010).  
54
 Note that in this section the term ‘Mengo’ is used to refer to the geographic area of that name, 
while in other sections it is used as shorthand for the Buganda Kingdom elite, whose headquarters 
are based in Mengo.  
55
 A. E. Mirams writing in 1931, quoted in Omolo-Okalebo et al (Omolo-Okalebo et al. 2010: 161).  
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The disparity between Mengo and Kampala is typified by the colonial government’s 
expenditure on the latter in 1954-5, which was two hundred times the amount 
spent by the Buganda Kingdom on Mengo in the same year (Makara 2009: 103).56  
By mid-century, Kampala and Mengo combined had 36,000 residents, including 
around 1,500 Europeans and 15,000 Asians in Kampala alongside some 20,000 
Africans in Mengo (Munger 1951: 17-19). Meanwhile, the founding of Makerere 
University rendered the city ‘the principal center of higher education in all of East 
Africa’ by the mid-twentieth century (Munger 1951: 12), contributing to fairly 
strong competences and bureaucratic capacity regarding healthcare and state 
administration by independence. Only in 1968 were the municipal boundaries of 
Kampala, by then the official capital, extended to include Mengo (Yahya 2007). 
Kampala City Council (KCC) thus took over the unplanned half of the city consisting 
mainly of private ‘mailo’ land owned by chiefs (see below) alongside the colonial, 
planned areas (Nkurunziza 2006; Nuwagaba 2006). Important elements of dualism 
remained with respect to land tenure as city growth spiralled after independence. 
Most slums proliferated in the mailo-dominated areas (Nuwagaba 2006).  
 
Kampala’s post-independence development was severely thwarted under Amin and 
during the war years, when many people retreated into subsistence in the 
hinterlands (Bryceson and Potts 2006) and even within Kampala urban farming 
became a primary source of food and income  (Amis 2006; Nuwagaba 2006). KCC’s 
capacity was decimated by war and neglect: having possessed 227 items of 
engineering equipment in 1970, it had only 44 in 1988 (KCC 1997). After 1986 
Kampala’s population began to expand again swiftly, reaching a million by the mid-
1990s and around 1.6 million by 201057 (UN-HABITAT 2011). It also continued to 
dominate Uganda economically: by 2008 over 80% of the country’s industrial and 
service sectors were based there and it generated over 50% of the entire country’s 
GDP (Giddings 2008). Liberalisation in the NRM period reinforced this trend towards 
                                                          
56
 Note that the native government consistently protested against colonial interference in Mengo 
itself (Nkurunziza 2006: 165). 
57
 These figures are approximations; the last census in Uganda was in 2002, which estimated the city 
population at 1.2 million (RoU 2005). All such official figures are based on night-time populations in 
any case, and Kampala’s daytime population is thought to increase to up to 3 million (Lambright 
2012: 6). 
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Kampala’s primacy, contrasting with efforts towards regional distribution of 
industrial activity in the 1960s (Makara 2009: 22).  
 
Despite being a hub of great wealth, a Participatory Poverty Assessment in 2000 
indicated insidious poverty in Kampala that Uganda’s celebrated macro-level 
indicators had not captured (Amis 2006). Income levels certainly increased in the 
NRM era, but factors such as disease burdens, environmental degradation, payment 
of regular bribes to authorities and inadequate infrastructure were perceived by 
many to have worsened their overall condition (ibid). Moreover, the urban farming 
mainstay of the 1970s-early 1990s was largely unavailable by the mid-2000s due to 
overcrowding and increasing land prices (ibid: 178-80). Infrastructure rebuilt early in 
the NRM period was decaying and the innumerable potholes in Kampala’s roads 
were notorious across the region, coming to symbolise government corruption and 
neglect.58 They combined with a traffic problem of similarly legendary proportions, 
poor driving and the prevalence of boda-boda motorcyclists to contribute to soaring 
traffic fatality rates.59 Sanitation and waste management were extremely poor; in 
2000 just 9% of Kampala’s population were served by a central sewer system 
(Makara 2009: 15). Tens of thousands of people each year suffered from intestinal 
infections and acute diahorrea, and cholera was on the rise.60 All these issues were 
central to public discourse and city politics, providing endless fuel for the passing of 
blame between the NRM and the opposition – particularly the Democratic Party, 
who provided a string of city Mayors. Woven into the fabric of Kampala’s politics 
are institutions relating to decentralisation and land, to which we now turn.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58
 One of many newspaper articles on this reported how trade nose-dived for several businesses due 
to a single pothole that has evolved into a ‘lake’ of 25 metres in length, deep enough to bring 
vehicles to a total standstill in the rainy season (The Monitor, 27.08.10).  
59
 Uganda has more accidents than Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Tanzania or Kenya. Accidents rose from 
5,674 in 1990 to 19,528 in 2006, and deaths from 778 to 2,034 annually over the same period (The 
New Vision, August 29, 2008). In Kampala alone, between 2000 and 2006 there were 66,498 
accidents reported with 2,059 fatalities. (The Monitor, May 27, 2009). 
60
 ‘Without planning, urban areas wallow in filth and disease’ Daily Monitor, 06.04.10. 
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3.3    Institutions for decentralised governance and land management in Uganda 
 
Decentralisation 
 
Decentralisation effectively began under colonialism with a series of ordinances 
empowering local governments under indirect rule (Mamdani 1996). This process, 
however, was derailed under Obote and came to a standstill under Amin (Katono 
2007: 74). After the NRM victory it was rekindled. Basic local government statutes 
appeared in 1987-1988 and pilot programmes in 1993-4, before Uganda’s 1995 
Constitution and 1997 Local Government Act (LGA) fully enshrined decentralised 
governance. To a considerable extent this decentralisation architecture originated 
in the Resistance Council (RC) system created during the NRM’s ‘Bush War’ from 
1980-86. The five tiers of RCs created in wartime were reconstituted for peacetime 
as Local Councils: LC1 (Village) to LC5 (District) (Makara 1998; Golooba-Mutebi 
1999). Peacetime decentralisation was therefore linked to the original NRA strategy 
for building local support and undermining the base of other political forces (Kauzya 
2007; Makara 2009). However, decentralisation also happily coincided with 
Uganda’s major donors’ policy preferences (Wadala 2007: 41).  
  
Districts were the highest level of local government. These proliferated rapidly over 
the NRM period: the original 22 in 1986 had multiplied to 112 by 2010 (Makara 
2010).61  Levels LC3-LC5 had formal governance roles while the lower levels served 
merely administrative purposes. In Kampala – the only officially-designated ‘city’ in 
Uganda, with only four tiers of government rather than the usual five – local 
government primarily involved KCC (equivalent to a District) and five City Divisions 
(Central, Kawempe, Makindye, Nakawa and Rubaga) below it. Each was headed by 
an elected Chairperson (the Mayor in the case of KCC), a directly elected council, 
and an administrative arm headed by an appointed Chief Administrative Officer 
                                                          
61
 Green (2010) analyses this ongoing process of district creation as a strategy of political patronage.  
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(CAO, or Town Clerk in the case of KCC).62 The total number of permanent 
bureaucratic staff in KCC (including the five city divisions and all units below) was 
1050 in 2009.63  
 
The NRM’s decentralisation programme was among the most radical and ambitious 
in Africa (Hansen and Twaddle 1998; Nsibambi 1998; Asiimwe and Musisi 2007). In 
Kampala specifically, 80% of services were devolved to KCC; everything in Kampala 
except national roads, secondary and tertiary education fell within its remit.64 
However, this impressive devolution on paper is misleading in certain ways. First, 
when it comes to finance, local authorities were rendered relatively impotent 
(Nsibambi 1998). While much of the budget was undeniably channelled through the 
LC system (Lindemann 2010: 104), control over finance was lacking because most of 
it consisted of transfers from central government that are ‘conditional’ in nature 
(Lambright 2011). Thus the centre was channelling money to Districts ‘but not 
power’ (Wadala 2007: 59).  While Districts do have the constitutional power to raise 
their own local revenue, in most rural areas only 5% of their resources were 
acquired this way (Ahmad et al. 2006: 11). The situation in Kampala was rather 
different but far from unproblematic, as Chapter Seven illustrates.  
 
There were also substantial problems of overlapping jurisdictions within districts 
between the Chairperson, the CAO and the Resident District Commissioner (RDC), 
whose duty was to ‘represent the President and Government in the District’ 
(Kabumba 2007: 30-31). All three had a mandate to ‘coordinate’ government 
functions in the district in various ways (LGA Articles 13, 64 & 71), but given that 
one was an elected politician answerable to the city population and the others were 
appointed officials, this was a major source of conflict.  In Kampala’s five Divisions a 
further source of confusion was the ‘double loyalty’ of Division officials who were 
supposed to answer both to the Division Council and the Kampala CAO, who often 
                                                          
62
 In 2011 the city governance structure changed radically, though this does not affect the period 
under discussion in this thesis. See epilogue for more information. See also Goodfellow and Titeca  
(2012). 
63
 Full spreadsheet of KCC staff obtained from KCC, January 2010. 
64
 Interview with local government official, 06.02.09. 
  
 91 
gave them starkly conflicting directives. Conflict between bureaucrats and 
politicians was a serious issue in the Divisions (Makara 2009: 252-4).   
 
Local autonomy was further hampered when central government reclaimed the 
(previously decentralised) power to appoint and dismiss CAOs, arguably the most 
powerful players in any district. Meanwhile, political decentralisation ‘reconstituted 
the district as the arena of competitive local politics’, with some perverse effects 
(Asiimwe and Katorobo 2007: 316). New layers of local democracy tended to fuel 
corruption, for example. The high costs of campaigning, for which there were few 
public resources, led local politicians to award tenders to themselves and to their 
financial sponsors (Makara 2009: 253), ‘a logic that is increasingly being accepted by 
the voters themselves’ (Wadala 2007: 53).  By the late 2000s decentralisation and 
its paradoxes seemed increasingly driven by the NRM’s overriding aim of retaining 
power in the face of electoral pressures. Decentralisation was employed to this end 
by fragmenting important geo-political areas (Crook 2003), building clientelistic 
networks locally (Green 2010; Tripp 2010), dispersing threats to the centre into the 
periphery (Green 2011a) and buying off ethnic groups excluded from the national 
‘elite bargain’ (Lindemann 2011).  
The situation in Kampala was particularly problematic because the design of 
decentralisation in Uganda was ‘clearly focused on rural areas’, reflecting the NRM’s 
‘populist rural focus’ (Makara 2009: 24). The tendency was to assign urban 
authorities responsibilities such as provision of basic services without attention to 
the enormous difference in infrastructural complexity and expense of providing 
these in urban vis-à-vis rural contexts (Makara 2009: 19-20; Yahya 2007). 
Meanwhile, the valuable land and lucrative assets at stake in the city inflamed the 
competition between the many competing tiers of government overlapping in one 
space (Lambright 2012). On top of all this, the donor-driven preoccupation with 
perfecting formal managerial processes in the City Council at the expense of 
actually improving outputs and outcomes did little to improve the Council’s capacity 
to deliver results on the ground (Stelman 2012).  
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The land question 
  
Institutions pertaining to land use and ownership are always critical for questions of 
urban development.  Uganda has a complex web of overlapping and unresolved 
land issues,65 but this section focuses only on Buganda, the region in which Kampala 
is situated and also the subject of the most contentious land debates. The origins of 
the Buganda land controversy date back to the 1900 ‘Buganda Agreement’, which 
provided the Kingdom’s ruling elite with large amounts of private land (Nkurunziza 
2006; Mutibwa 2008).66 The British believed that they were formalising individual 
land rights that already existed, but in fact they were instituting a fundamental shift 
(West 1972; Rugandya 1999; Okuku 2006: 7). The new form of private land tenure – 
which came to be known as mailo, due to the measurement of land allocations in 
square miles – had profound implications for Uganda’s future. It institutionalised 
legal inheritance of land and created a new hereditary ruling class (Richards 1963), 
which rapidly grew as plots were sold and subdivided (Troutt 1994: 20). Meanwhile, 
peasants occupying mailo land found themselves disenfranchised, their customary 
rights over land eradicated with the stroke of a pen. Further colonial laws ensured 
that peasant rights over land remained weak (Bazaara 1997; Okuku 2006). 
 
After independence, the 1966 crisis and subsequent Public Lands Act (1969) 
stripped the Buganda Land Board of the control over former Crown Land it had won 
four years earlier. Mailo was then formally abolished in 1975 by Amin’s Land 
Reform Decree, which nationalised all land in Uganda and converted mailo titles 
into 99-year leases (Okuku 2006; Batungi 2008). However, the decree was barely 
implemented and when Obote returned to power in 1980, land policy was in 
                                                          
65
 Uganda as a whole has a wide range of diverging systems of land tenure, and the search for a 
plausible way to harmonise them continues (see Batungi 2008). Reports were drafted in 2007 on the 
need for a harmonised National Land Policy for the whole country (RoU 2007b) but there was little 
evidence of moves to implementing this. 
66
 Of Buganda’s estimated 19,600 square miles, the Agreement gave the British control of 9,000, 
designated ‘Crown Land’, alongside some 1500 square miles of forest (Article 15). The remainder 
was to be granted as private freehold property to the Kabaka and around 3,700 local chiefs and 
royals (Englebert 2002: 352). For more on the Agreement and its contemporary implications for land 
politics, see Okuku (2006); Nkurunziza (2006); Green (2006). 
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considerable disarray (Okuku 2006: 11). Baganda landlords’ attachment to mailo 
was as strong as ever in the 1980s, and the system was still highly disadvantageous 
to the peasants occupying the land. This meant that the NRM – who while fighting 
their guerrilla war had allied themselves with both the Baganda peasants and 
Buganda landed elites (Oloka-Onyango 1997; McAuslan 1998; Kasfir 2005) – would 
inevitably face real difficulties resolving this thorny issue on their arrival in power. 
 
The NRM therefore faced a Catch-22 on land. A first priority was the need to visibly 
reverse the trend of the previous three decades whereby the state had 
progressively strengthened and often abused its powers over land.67 Second, and 
related, was the desire to keep the alliance with Baganda elite alive by officially 
reinstating mailo and protecting the interests of powerful landlords. A third priority, 
however, was to not alienate Baganda peasants by entrenching their position of 
virtual serfdom, especially as since 1986 returnee landlords had been vigorously 
evicting poor peasants in favour of those who could pay (Green 2006: 375). These 
aims did not sit happily together and in its efforts to balance them the relationship 
between the NRM government and the Buganda Kingdom became increasingly 
strained over time, particularly after the passing of the 1998 Land Act.  This aimed 
to bring greater tenure security for mailo occupants, who were legally protected 
from eviction on the simple condition that they paid an annual nominal rent of 
1,000 shillings (around $0.50).68 Resistance from Baganda landlords was fierce, and 
passing this act was one of the greatest political battles Museveni had faced since 
taking power (Green 2006: 377).  
 
The dispute worsened with the Land (Amendment) Bill, tabled in 2007, which 
further strengthened the rights of tenants on mailo against eviction and was passed 
into law amid acrimony at the end of 2009. Widely considered a ‘political bill’ rather 
than one aimed at serious changes, its passing was unlikely to change much in 
                                                          
67
 Interview with Robert Opiyo, KCC Registar of Land Titles, 22.01.10. 
68
 This was fixed at a very low rate in recognition of the fact that occupants had been deprived of 
land historically since 1900 (interview with Sarah Kulatwa Basangwa, Acting Commissioner for Land 
Registration, 18.01.10). 
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practice. 69  It also proposed nothing that would resolve the difficulty of enforcing 
urban development regulations on privately-owned land – or indeed on public land, 
as Chapter Four illustrates.  Nevertheless, these land disputes were significant for 
both Uganda’s and Kampala’s politics in the period under discussion.   
 
3.4    Rwanda: historical context and legacies of conflict 
 
Like Uganda, Rwanda has attracted a large scholarship. The genocide in particular 
resulted in an outpouring of literature in both Francophone and Anglophone 
academia. Again, there is no space to discuss history over the long durée in detail, 
and this section can do little more than highlight some of the historical trajectories 
of greatest relevance. Like Buganda, Rwanda was among the most powerful 
Kingdoms in the Great Lakes region of Africa by the time colonialism took hold 
(Chrétien 2003). Unlike Buganda, however, a division between agriculturalists and 
cattle-rearing pastoralists evolved over time. While smaller in number, the latter 
came to have certain advantages because ‘cattle, as mobile capital, provided the 
capability for exchange and influence’, especially in times of drought (Chrétien 
2003: 81). It was in the nineteenth century under the rule of mwami (King) 
Rwabugiri (1860-1895) that this distinction between Hutu (the agriculturalists) and 
Tutsi (the cattlekeepers) started to sharpen, particularly in the context of a new 
agricultural corvée forced labour system, uburetwa, that exacerbated the inequality 
between them (Newbury 1988; Chrétien 2003: 186-187; Erlebach 2006: 51). In this 
phase, ‘Hutu was constructed as a subject identity alongside Tutsi as an identity of 
power’ (Mamdani 2001: 102).70  
 
As with Buganda, the Kingdom’s high level of organisation made a deep impression 
on European explorers. Here the hierarchy was even more pronounced: under 
Rwabugiri a system of ‘cow chiefs’, ‘land chiefs’ and ‘hill chiefs’ exercised tight 
                                                          
69
 Interview with Erias Lukwago, Lawyer and MP for Kampala Central, 12.10.09. On the political 
struggles around this bill see Goodfellow and Lindemann (2010; 2013) and Goodfellow (2012).  
70
 Note, however, that the historiography of Rwanda in pre-colonial and colonial periods is highly 
contested, not least with respect to when the Hutu/Tutsi distinction was actually introduced 
(Chretien 2003; Vansina 2004).  
  
 95 
control over the population (Chrétien 2003: 175). As Britain established its authority 
in Buganda, Germany incorporated Rwanda and Burundi into German East Africa 
and instituted a sort of indirect rule (Louis 1963: 129). After Germany’s defeat in 
World War One, Belgium was granted a ‘colonial trusteeship’ over Rwanda and 
Burundi and governed them together as Ruanda-Urundi from the colonial capital 
Usumbura (now Bujumbura, capital of Burundi) (Dorsey 1994). They continued a 
policy of indirect rule, which served effectively to ‘intensify a system of political 
oppression’ (Newbury 1988: 207) with the Tutsi aristocracy acting as key 
intermediaries, implementing various forms of forced labour and taxation as well as 
playing key roles in local justice systems (Newbury 2000; Pottier 2002; Vansina 
2004; Erlebach 2006; Clark 2010a). Moreover, from 1926 to 1936 the colonial state 
was reorganised and racialised, making chiefship explicitly a Tutsi privilege 
underwritten in law and emphasising that Tutsis were a superior race from the Horn 
of Africa (Mamdani 2001: 105).  By 1959, every chief in Rwanda was Tutsi, as were 
all but ten of the 559 sub-chiefs (Straus 2006: 181).These developments were to 
prove fateful for post-colonial Rwanda.  
 
Meanwhile, the majority Hutu were mostly poor, landless, engaged in ever more 
forced labour and deeply resentful (Lemarchand 1982; Newbury 1988; Pottier 
2002). Conditions were ripe for social upheaval, especially since the colonial system 
introduced new educational opportunities and influences that allowed for the 
emergence of a radical Hutu counter-elite even as it simultaneously emiserated 
most of the Hutu population (Mamdani 2001: 105-6). By the late 1950s, with 
independence on the horizon, there were four main political players in Rwanda: the 
Belgian colonial authorities, who were starting to shift their support towards the 
Hutus; the emergent radical Hutu counter-elite; the Tutsi traditionalists linked to 
the monarchy; and the Tutsi and Hutu moderates who were calling for gradual 
change (Straus 2006: 177). The Hutu radicals were represented by two parties, the 
most militant being the Party of the Movement for Hutu Emancipation 
(PARMEHUTU). The Tutsi traditionalists and moderates were represented by the 
Rwandan National Union (UNAR) and Rwandan Democratic Assembly (RADER) 
respectively.  
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From the ‘Social Revolution’ to the outbreak of war  
 
All these parties were created in rapid succession in the second half of 1959 
(Mamdani 2001: 120-121), after the mwami died suddenly and unexpectedly while 
in Burundi. Fearing for the future of the Tutsi elite, the traditionalist UNAR resorted 
to violence, triggering counterattacks against Tutsi chiefs and a period of 
generalised violence in November 1959 in which hundreds were killed (Reyntjens 
1985; Mamdani 2001: 123). Belgium intervened and threw its weight decisively 
behind the Hutu majority as preparations for independence accelerated (Reyntjens 
1985: 268-272). This U-turn involved installing Hutu chiefs until they outnumbered 
the previously omnipresent Tutsi ones, as well as developing an embryonic Hutu-
dominated administration and armed force (Mamdani 2001: 124). In the summer of 
that year, national elections were held and PARMEHUTU won by a landslide. The 
following year the monarchy was abolished and the state declared a Republic, with 
PARMEHUTU leader Gregoire Kayibanda as its president. These events, termed ‘the 
Social Revolution’ by the new regime, were followed by independence from 
Belgium in 1962 (Mamdani 2001; Golooba-Mutebi 2008a). 
 
Many Tutsis fled Rwanda in the 1959 violence and soon elements of UNAR that 
sought to reclaim power were organising militarily abroad, resulting in a series of 
armed raids in 1962-1963. Within Rwanda, the new elite reacted by excluding and 
persecuting Tutsis, branding them all ‘allies’ of the inyenzi (cockroaches) conducting 
the raids (Mamdani 2001: 127-9). Many Tutsis were killed in ethnic massacres from 
1962, but worse was to come. Fearing that UNAR rebels abroad would link up with 
Tutsis within Rwanda, Kayibanda’s regime reacted with panic to a new round of 
raids in 1963-4, leading to state-sanctioned killings of anywhere between 5,000 and 
20,000 civilians (Straus 2006: 186-7; Mamdani 2001: 130). This precipitated the 
exodus of a further 200,000-300,000 Tutsis into exile, bringing the total number of 
Rwandese refugees in surrounding countries to almost half a million (Golooba-
Mutebi 2008a: 7). 
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By 1967, UNAR had renounced armed struggle and settled into life in exile 
(Semujanga 2003), ushering in a period of relative calm in Rwanda. However, this 
fragile stability was shattered in 1972, when a Hutu rebellion in Burundi led to the 
genocide of up to 200,000 Hutu by Burundi’s Tutsi-dominated military regime. In 
Rwanda, refugee inflow, elite anxiety and escalating violence manifested in tension 
between Hutu from the north of the country, who felt persistently excluded, and 
those from Kayibanda’s homeland in the South. In July 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana 
led a military clique from the north-west to power in a military coup (Straus 2006: 
191). Habyarimana initiated efforts towards reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi 
and a shift from racial language towards one of two ‘ethnicities’ destined to share 
Rwanda (Mamdani 2001: 140-1). Under his newly-formed party, the National 
Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), Habyarimana cultivated a 
discourse of national development and attracted large sums of international aid 
(Uvin 1998). Economic growth accelerated and from the mid-1970s Rwanda was 
considered an ‘oasis of price stability and strong economic growth’ in a poorly-
performing region (Nkuete 1990: 154), with real GDP growth of over 7% from 1977-
1985 (Nkuete 1990: 27).  
 
There was no major anti-Tutsi violence reported from 1973-1990 (Mamdani 2001: 
143), which contributed to donor perceptions that Rwanda’s troubles were over 
and that it increasingly represented a model of African development (Uvin 1998). 
However, this benign picture was deceptive. Rural development projects remained 
largely systems of spoils with profits channelled towards MRND ‘big men’ 
(Lemarchand 1982; Prunier 1995; Des Forges 1999: 40), and landlessness and 
inequality were actually growing (Erlebach 2006: 60-61). The refugee problem 
remained unresolved, worsening after Obote returned to power across the border 
and stepped up persecution of Tutsis living in Uganda (Waugh 2004: 20-24). 
Moreover, despite the lack of overt violence, Tutsis were excluded in virtually all 
walks of life inside Rwanda. While a system of quotas was supposed to govern 
appointments, the reality was very different. Out of 143 mayors in the country, 
none were Tutsi, and there was just one Tutsi officer in the army (Golooba-Mutebi 
2008a: 13).  
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By the late 1980s, land scarcity in Africa’s densest country was intensifying; some 
retrospectively view Rwanda as ‘caught in the Malthusian trap’ (André and Platteau 
1998: 1). Meanwhile, an economic crisis unfolded due to the global collapse in the 
price of coffee, followed by drought (Des Forges 1999: 41). Furthermore, in addition 
to donor pressures to both adjust the economy and liberalise (Mamdani 2001; 
Golooba-Mutebi 2008a), by 1990 new pressures were mounting from abroad: since 
Museveni’s victory in Uganda, Rwandese (mainly Tutsi) exiles who had fought 
alongside him in the NRA had been quietly forming their own force within its ranks. 
Denied citizenship rights in either Uganda or Rwanda, they were preparing to 
reclaim their rights in the latter by force, resolving the refugee problem once and 
for all (Prunier 1995; Otunnu 2000; Kinzer 2008). In October 1990, as Habyarimana’s 
domestic problems escalated, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) invaded from 
Uganda with Museveni’s tacit support (Waugh 2004: 45). 
 
Civil war and the 1994 genocide  
 
The October 1990 invasion was disastrous. The RPA’s opponent, the Rwandan 
Armed Forces (FAR), was assisted militarily by Belgium, France and Zaire and 
inflicted massive losses on the RPA in just a few days (Waugh 2004; Kinzer 2008). 
Major General Paul Kagame, an exiled Rwandese Tutsi who had previously been 
Museveni’s Chief of Military Intelligence, returned from a training exercise in the 
USA and took over the rebel force, leading them into the inhospitable Virunga 
Volcanoes on the Uganda/Rwanda border to regroup and re-train (Waugh 2004; 
Kinzer 2008). Andrew Mwenda describes how, having faced the strong fighting 
machine of the FAR and failed so dramatically, the RPF was forced to radically 
reorganise:  
 
‘For the RPA to survive, let alone prevail, required high levels of ability and 
organisational efficiency […] When Kagame arrives he finds a disaster. It is like the 
allied forces at Dunkirk. That was a learning process for Kagame. [In the Virunga 
volcanoes] the conditions were so harsh that anyone with a low level of 
commitment would run away, and anyone who was physically weak died […] the 
conditions were extremely tough, the population hostile. They had to attract 
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people who were physically strong, and had high commitment to the political 
objectives and were willing to make extraordinary sacrifices for the end. […] So 
those four years [1990-94] were the incubation period during which they went 
through a very strong furnace.’71  
 
 
Despite its failure, the RPA’s 1990 attack precipitated massacres of Tutsi in northern 
Rwanda alongside mass arrests of opposition. This worsened when RPA attacks 
resumed in early 1991 (Straus 2006: 192-3). By 1992 formal peace talks were 
underway (Des Forges 1999: 48) but insecurity empowered the hardliners in 
Rwanda’s regime who designated all Tutsis as enemies (Straus 2006). Their 
supporters funded a barrage of propaganda, and racist messages dominated print 
publications such as Kangura and the notorious Radio Télévision Libre des Mille 
Collines radio station. Particularly militant was a circle of influential people from 
Habyarimana’s home region known as the Akazu (‘little house’), co-ordinated 
primarily by his wife Agathe (Gourevitch 1998; Des Forges 1999). 
 
Throughout 1992, the MRND were training youth militias that came to be known as 
the interahamwe (‘those who fight together’) all around the country (Prunier 1995; 
Straus 2006). In February 1993, after another wave of anti-Tutsi pogroms, the RPA 
contravened the previous year’s cease-fire in a massive attack from the north, 
further eroding trust between the parties (Des Forges 1999: 87-88). The Arusha 
peace accords were signed that summer and a UN peacekeeping organisation was 
brought in to help implement them, but new coalitions were crystallising as distrust 
grew behind the scenes (Dallaire 2003). After the Hutu president of Burundi was 
assassinated by Tutsis in October 1993, the hard-line elements of the MRND and 
other newly-formed parties formed ‘Hutu Power’, a movement whose role in 
instigating genocide would be critical (Des Forges 1999; Dallaire 2003). 
 
Efforts to implement new power-sharing rules in early 1994 repeatedly stalled amid 
broken promises, clandestine civilian training, inflammatory racist radio 
propaganda, the drawing up of lists of Tutsi civilians, and warnings about vast 
supplies of machetes and further massacres that were leaked to Dallaire. As Des 
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 Interview with Andrew Mwenda, 20.01.10.  
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Forges (1999: 114) notes, ‘warnings of catastrophe were many and convincing’, but 
the UN retained strict limits on the mandate of its small force, constraining its 
ability to intervene (Dallaire 2003). On April 6th the aeroplane carrying President 
Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart was shot down near Kigali airport, 
probably by radical elements within Habyarimana’s own regime.72 By April 8th, 
hardliners had taken control of the government, the moderate Hutu Prime Minister 
had been brutally killed along with the ten Belgian peacekeepers sent to protect 
her, the RPA had resumed the war, and the genocide had begun.  
 
Much has been written on the horrific events that unfolded in Rwanda from April-
July 1994.73 At least 500,000 Tutsi civilians were slaughtered, along with around 
10,000 moderate Hutus; a further 25,000-60,000 Hutu leaders and civilians were 
killed by the RPA (Des Forges 1999; Straus 2006). Some sources put the total death 
toll at 800,000 or even a million. Debates continue on the extent to which the 
genocide was ‘meticulously planned’ in advance, as is suggested by Des Forges 
(1999) and Melvern (2000; 2004), or more contingent in nature (Straus 2006). There 
is, however, consensus among scholars that it was genocide (the fastest in recorded 
history), that around three-quarters of the pre-genocide Tutsi population in Rwanda 
were killed, that it was carried out by large numbers of civilians as well as 
interahamwe and formal government forces, and that elites were responsible for 
orchestrating it. The majority of the killing took place in the first two weeks (Straus 
2006: 60), though it was finally brought to an end only when the RPA took Kigali on 
July 8.  
 
                                                          
72
 While the shooting down of the plane has long been an issue of controversy, the Trévidic report of 
January 2012 supports the argument that the assassination was the work of MRND hardliners rather 
than the RPA. 
73
 The most authoritative account is probably Des Forges’ (1999) 600-page testimony, which 
documents the massacre in great detail. Prunier (1995) provides another influential account. The 
most scientific approach to providing an explanation of the genocide’s proximate causes is provided 
by Straus (2006). Mamdani (2001) is particularly strong on the historical evolution of the Hutu-Tutsi 
divide in the colonial and post-colonial periods. An important insider story from the UN perspective 
is given by Dallaire (2003), and a rich journalistic account from an outsider visiting in the wake of the 
horror is provided by Gourevitch (1998). A damning indictment of the international community’s role 
in Rwanda before the genocide is provided by Uvin (1998), and the failures of international 
intervention are painstakingly chronicled by Melvern (2000; 2004).  
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The Rwanda Patriotic Front period 
 
The remnants of the MRND having fled to Zaire by the time the war ended, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF – the political organisation derived from the RPA) 
formed a ‘Government of National Unity’ with other moderate opposition parties. 
Pasteur Bizimungu (an RPF Hutu) was sworn in as President, with Kagame as Vice 
President and Minister of Defence. Around 700,000 Tutsi exiles, finally able to 
return home, poured into the country from Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire 
(Newbury 2005: 277).  However, in the closing days of the war some two million 
Hutus had followed the previous government across the border, leading to a new 
refugee problem of colossal proportions in Eastern Zaire. International NGOs rushed 
to set up refugee camps, notoriously failing to demilitarise the remnants of Hutu 
Power in the process (Pottier 1996; Uvin 1998; Pottier 2002; Chrétien 2003; 
Rugumamu and Gbla 2003; Prunier 2008). The RPF was deeply concerned that 
almost a third of the country’s population were in camps abroad, and 
scaremongering among Hutu Power leaders in the camps militated against many 
refugees returning of their own volition (Gourevitch 1998). Consequently, the RPF 
decided to invade Zaire and pursue a strategy of forced repatriation on a massive 
scale in late 1996 (Newbury 2005; Pottier 2002), leading to the war that toppled 
Mobutu and turned Zaire into the DRC.  
 
The influx of over a million ‘new caseload’ refugees in 1996-7 was another tectonic 
shift in a deeply traumatised country shaken by political crises from the moment 
the RPF took control. Incursions from Zaire, internal security issues and the violent 
closure of refugee camps within Rwanda led to multiple ministerial sackings from 
1995 (Des Forges 1999; Reyntjens 2004; Prunier 2008). As the decade wore on, the 
government was ‘manifestly torn between two tendencies’: on the one hand it was 
attempting to rebuild the justice system, promote reconciliation and allow for the 
restitution of the properties of returnees, but on the other was so preoccupied with 
internal security that policing was violent and arrests arbitrary (Chrétien 2003: 338-
339; Des Forges 1999). In 2000 intra-governmental tensions culminated in a raft of 
resignations by frontline politicians including President Bizimungu (Reyntjens 2004: 
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181; Lemarchand 2007: 7). Kagame assumed the presidency and the power of the 
RPF inner circle was consolidated.   
 
By this time the RPF had solid alliances with donors including Britain and the US, 
who played very minor roles in pre-genocide Rwanda but for whom failure to 
prevent the bloodshed was a source of mounting guilt. Economic growth soon 
recovered to levels similar to those of the pre-crisis Habyarimana years and 
remained robust. In 2000, as the government consolidated itself politically, it also 
released its ambitious development blueprint, Rwanda Vision 2020. This outlined an 
agenda for the development of high value-added agriculture and a knowledge-
based economy, envisaging Rwanda as an ICT and logistics hub for the East/Central 
Africa region. As the first decade of the millennium progressed, impressive 
improvements in health, gender, education and corruption indicators cemented the 
government’s ‘donor darling’ status and levels of aid continued to rise, reaching 
almost $1bn annually in 2009 (OCED DAC 2010). Over a third of this was provided as 
General Budget Support, giving the government considerable leeway with 
expenditure priorities (Purcell et al. 2006: 14).  
 
However, the RPF government has been subject to fierce criticism since its 
inception. Reports of RPA killings of civilians during the civil war,74 massacres of 
refugees in Rwanda in 1995 and, above all, atrocities on an allegedly vast scale in 
the DRC from 1996 onwards constituted major sources of criticism (Prunier 2008). 
Even the early seminal accounts of the genocide by Prunier (1995) and Des Forges 
(1999) are critical of the RPF, and long-term observers of the region such as 
Mamdani (2001), Pottier (2002), Reyntjens (2004; 2011) and Lemarchand (2007) 
have lamented the government’s dictatorial tendencies, veiled ethnic exclusion and 
miscarriages of justice. A 2011 book bringing together the work of a large number 
of scholars working on contemporary Rwanda was also overwhelmingly critical of 
the exclusionary nature of Rwanda’s post-genocide development trajectory (Straus 
and Waldorf 2011). Meanwhile, Anglo-Saxon donor governments have hailed 
                                                          
74
 Shortly after the genocide a UNHCR Mission headed by Robert Gersony resulted in a report 
detailing RPF killings of tens of thousands of civilians during 1994. The report was suppressed by the 
UN for fear of destabilising the new regime (Des Forges 1999: 554-6). 
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Rwanda’s developmental progress, success in overcoming corruption and 
ethnically-based politics, and innovative transitional justice mechanisms.75 Some 
academic authors and other commentators also provide a less negative outlook on 
particular issues (Daly 2002; Baker 2007; Golooba-Mutebi 2008a; Kinzer 2008; Clark 
2010a; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011).76 
 
Trajectories of continuity and change 
 
The events of 1994 were certainly a critical juncture in Rwanda. At a formal 
organisational level they led to almost total decapitation and renewal of the state 
bureaucracy; levels of both ‘institutional memory’ and administrative and technical 
skills in the new government therefore were low,77 contrasting with the above-
noted bureaucratic continuity in post-1986 Uganda. The judicial infrastructure and 
legal profession was likewise decimated (Clark 2010a: 20). Moreover, the new 
political culture was deeply rooted in the military proclivities of the RPF (Dorsey 
2000) and patterns of upward accountability and strict discipline could cause 
hesitancy regarding decision-making at middle and lower levels of the state.78 This 
combined with the skills deficit, as well as the relatively weak colonial educational 
legacy and education indicators that remained substantially behind those in Uganda 
for most of the decade,79 to contribute to low levels of bureaucratic capacity as 
defined in this study. 
 
Meanwhile, important and interlinked trajectories relating to credible commitment, 
legitimacy and autonomy were born out of the genocide and circumstances of RPF 
victory. Crucially, the RPF, unlike the NRM, did not embed itself among the 
                                                          
75
 It is important to note, however, that the system of gacaca courts for trying genocide perpetrators 
has divided opinion among observers. For critiques see Kirkby (2006); Ingelaere (2007); Straus and 
Waldorf (2011), and for a thorough analysis of gacaca and competing perspectives on it see Clark 
(2010a). 
76
 The journalist Andrew Mwenda also provides stalwart support for Kagame in regular columns in 
The Independent (Uganda). 
77
 Interview with director of parastatal organisation, 11.18.09.  
78
 Interviews with foreign investors. 07.12.09; 11.12.09. 
79
 For example, primary school completion rates in Rwanda were substantially lower than those in 
Uganda at the beginning of the decade, lagging behind until 2009 when they actually surpassed 
those in Uganda (World Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do). 
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population of a particular region and build strong links with the rural population, 
which was viewed with some suspicion as it was predominantly Hutu (Prunier 1998; 
Mamdani 2001; Mkandawire 2002). After its victory, given its ‘systemic 
vulnerability’ (Doner et al. 2005) in potentially hostile terrain, the RPF was aware of 
the need to justify itself both domestically and internationally by delivering 
concrete security and development outcomes (Hayman 2007; Hayman 2009). This 
has important implications for ‘motivational’ credible commitment, as will be 
explored in subsequent chapters. Elite autonomy from certain interests is also 
worth reflecting on. RPF forces were largely comprised of Tutsi exiles who fought 
their way to power without forging major alliances with existing economic or 
landowning elites, by contrast with the NRM, and echoing Trimberger’s (1978) 
analysis. As earlier chapters have argued, the idea that states can be termed 
‘autonomous’ per se is highly problematic and in post-1994 Rwanda the state was 
deeply entagled with contemporary (even if not past) economic elites. Nevertheless 
the fact that it did not forge such a broad network of linkages in wartime still has 
implications for its ability to push through policies that might impact negatively in 
the short term on large groups of people. 
 
Thus, while capacity was low in post-1994 Rwanda, a number of factors facilitating 
state effectiveness were evident. Deeper historical trajectories are also significant; 
Rwanda has a long history of structured hierarchical power relations, as noted 
above. Increasing returns to these relationships over time arguably facilitate the 
‘third dimension’ of power (Lukes 1974/2005) because ‘positive feedback over time 
simultaneously increases power asymmetries and renders power relations less 
visible.’ (Pierson 2000: 259). The recent centrality of effective implementation to 
state legitimacy and credibility provided a particular impetus for the RPF to exploit 
these older power dynamics; indeed, as Doner et al (2005: 332) have argued in 
relation to East Asia, ‘systemic vulnerability’ incentivises governments to ‘take 
advantage of existing institutional endowments’. However, the ethnic question at 
the heart of the RPF’s vulnerability necessitated very careful and strategic uses of 
power, which led to strict limits on the discussion of ethnicity in public life, 
accompanied by constraints on political space (Beswick 2010). The longer historical 
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trajectory of power has therefore been utilised in particular ways by an elite 
dependent on power relations being less visible. A long history of power has thus 
combined with institutional dynamics of a particular nature stemming directly from 
1994. 
 
3.5    The role of Kigali 
 
While some authors argue that a settlement located at present-day Kigali existed 
500 years ago,80 its offical foundation dates to 1907 when the German Richard 
Kandt was appointed Resident of Rwanda. The site was chosen because, at the very 
centre of the country, it maximised potential both for broadcasting power and 
acting as a crossroads for national and regional trade. Under the Germans and 
during the initial period of Belgian rule Kigali remained a small colonial outpost, the 
capital for Ruanda-Urundi being at Usumbura (Bujumbura). It therefore grew 
relatively slowly, even as the Belgians embarked on a road-building programme 
linking Kigali to other towns and the neighbouring colonies through hundreds of 
kilometres of roads by the mid 1920s.  Despite the growth of the cassiterite trade in 
the wider area from the 1930s (Dorsey 1994), by the middle of the century its 
population was still only around 6,00081 – much smaller than Kampala around the 
same time.  
 
With independence in 1962, Rwanda and Burundi became separate republics and 
Rwanda’s national ministries and diplomatic embassies were located in Kigali, 
fuelling its growth (Oz Architecture 2007a: 17). City growth rates of 5-8% from the 
1950s led to a population of over 200,000 by the early 1990s (Oz Architecture 
2007a; UNPD 2009). Aside from the old colonial core at Nyarugenge, the 
government area in Kimihurura and later the industrial area South-east of the city 
centre, the city’s growth was largely unplanned under Kayibanda and Habyarimana. 
Plans for extensive high-rise residential development, intended to address the 
problem of low-density development that characterised Kigali’s evolution and 
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 See Mukarutabana (2007) for a discussion of this history and for further bibliographical references.  
81
 CoK website; http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw/spip.php?article9; accessed 10.06.12. 
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posed challenges for infrastructure and transport (RoR 1974; 1990), were never 
realised. Instead, the city densified through unplanned shanty settlements and by 
the mid-1980s the population density in Kigali was higher than at any other point 
since independence (See Table 3.1).82  
 
Table 3.1: Growth of Kigali since Independence 
 
1962 1984 1999
Urban population 6,000 160,173 354,273
Built-up area (square km) 3 15.9 45.13
Average density (persons/hectare) 20 105 79  
Source: Oz Architecture (2007a: 19) 
 
Evidence of a strong rural-urban divide was apparent in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Jefremovas 2002: 125) and urban primacy was extreme, with 57% of Rwanda’s 
urban population living in Kigali by 1990 (UNPD 2009).This was a tiny proportion 
(3%) of the population as a whole, given Rwanda’s low level of urbanisation, 
exacerbating perceptions of a disjuncture between the capital and the masses. 
Despite this, Kigali was also home to sprawling and completely unplanned low-rise 
slum settlements, and there were few buildings larger than the now-famous Hotel 
de Milles Collines. With retrospect, people now often speak of Kigali before 1994 as 
being ‘really like a big village’.83 
 
This was the backdrop against which the horrific events of 1994 unfolded in the 
capital. Its abandonment by the Hutu population, urged to flee by radio broadcasts, 
meant that when the RPF took Kigali they found a devastated wasteland. Rose 
Kabuye, a senior RPA officer who became Kigali’s mayor immediately after they 
took control, explains that ‘the city was deserted. When Kigali fell the streets were 
empty. The houses were empty apart from the survivors and the bodies and the 
dogs.’84 The emptiness did not last long; survivors emerged and many incoming 
Tutsi refugees based themselves in Kigali. They arrived within weeks, occupying 
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 Note that the massive growth of the city after the genocide resulted in further sprawl, bringing 
density down again and reproducing some of the problems of the 1970s, particularly in relation to 
transport (See Chapter Six). 
83
 Interview with Rose Kabuye, 12.02.10. This sentiment was reflected in numerous other interviews.  
84
 Interview with Rose Kabuye. 
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empty houses they found: ‘it was random settlement. People would just open a 
house and go in, and stay in. Because there was nowhere else you could put 
them.’85  
 
Two years later, with the return of the ‘new caseload’ refugees from DRC, the city 
felt the strain of post-conflict urbanisation under the most extreme circumstances 
imaginable. While the RPF attempted to discourage ‘new caseload’ refugees from 
overwhelming Kigali given its acute housing shortage,86 many headed there due to 
the relative anonymity of the large city context.87 The government did not prevent 
people from returning to properties they rightfully owned, even though these were 
now being inhabited by other people – often genocide survivors. The latter were 
‘very bitter’ about government efforts to implement rules on the restitution of 
properties for returnees: 
 
‘They were saying ‘these people killed us, destroyed our property, and you are 
telling me to get out of his house?’ Those were some of the arguments, and the 
arguments were pertinent – but for the government, we had to sort it out…and it 
was very difficult. It took 3-5 years to completely sort it out. This was a bad period 
for Rwanda.’
88
 
 
In some cases perpetrators and survivors even shared the same property.89 Crimes 
relating to ongoing property disputes were bitter and plentiful, and prevalent in the 
1996-98 period was the practice of throwing stones incessantly onto the tin roof of 
a neighbour’s house as a way of hounding them out – something perpetrated 
against both Hutus and Tutsis.
90
 The RPF struggled to consolidate its hold on power 
with a range of informal policing mechanisms in Kigali’s burgeoning informal 
settlements (Baker 2007).The growth of the city in this period spiralled out of 
government control, surpassing even its soaring growth in the 1980s, with an 
average urban population growth rate of 18% from 1995-2000, something virtually 
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 Interview with Rose Kabuye. 
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 Interview with Rose Kabuye; see also Prunier (2008). 
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 Interviews with local officials, 17-18.02.09. 
88
 Interview with Rose Kabuye. 
89
 Interview with Rose Kabuye. 
90
 Informal conversation with a researcher, February 2010. This became such a problem that very 
strict sentences were introduced for this practice, and it eventually died out.  
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unprecedented anywhere in the world in the last sixty years.91 It was not only 
returning refugees that boosted these rates: internal migration within Rwanda was 
overwhelmingly to Kigali and its surrounding areas (‘Kigali Ngali’), as Figure 3.1 
demonstrates. 
 
Figure 3.1: Internal Migration in Rwanda  
 
 
Source: (RoR 2002: 40)
92
 
 
Despite this extremely difficult period, the government managed to stabilise Kigali 
and in the new millennium it gained a reputation as a site of remarkable security 
and order.93 Alongside these developments, the sense that was emerging under 
Habyarimana of Kigali as a place of elites divided from the rural masses (Rumiya 
1985) persisted and even increased. Levels of poverty in the city were certainly 
much lower than for the country’s other four provinces (RoR 2007). However, as 
with Kampala, macro-level figures are skewed by the presence of most of the 
country’s wealthy elite in the city and also mask dynamics of urban poverty not 
covered by income measures, including transport costs, high prices and 
environmental hazards (KIST 2001b). Moreover, as subsequent chapters 
demonstrate, the government’s effectiveness in transforming the city has 
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 According to UN statistics, the only time a (marginally) higher growth rate has been seen 
anywhere since 1950 was in Western Sahara in the late 1970s (UNPD 2009).  
92
 This data is based on surveys undertaken in 1999-2000. 
93
 See Goodfellow & Smith (2013 forthcoming). 
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sometimes been very problematic for poorer residents, and there are unresolved 
tensions inherent in its strategy for a more urbanised society.  
 
3.6    Institutions for decentralised governance and land management in Rwanda 
 
Decentralisation 
 
As in Buganda, pre-colonial institutions and indirect colonial rule provided a 
foundation for later decentralisation in Rwanda. Under the first post-independence 
regimes large sums of development aid and training were channelled to commune-
level authorities, which were perceived to be central to processes of local 
development. However, despite Habyarimana’s rhetoric about empowering 
communes, during his regime so-called ‘communal development projects’ largely 
served to facilitate control of the population by local burgomasters (Uvin 1998: 41-
43). Decentralisation under the RPF has been explicitly framed in contrast with this, 
as a deliberate move away from the centralisation and what is often termed a 
‘culture of obedience’ prevalent under the previous regime.94  
 
The RPF’s decentralisation programme was designed as a three-phase project, laid 
out in the 2000 Decentralisation Policy. The first phase (2000-2005) established 
basic structures for decentralised governance, with phases two (2006-2010) and 
three (2011-2015) targeted towards increasing capacity at ever-lower levels of 
government and enhancing government responsiveness locally (MINALOC 2007: 7-
8). Phase Two began with a re-districting exercise. Prior to this point Rwanda had 
consisted of 106 districts in 12 provinces, two of which were ‘Kigali City’ and ‘Kigali 
Ngali’ (Kigali Rural). Since 2006 Rwanda has had just thirty districts and five 
provinces, one of which is the City of Kigali (CoK) (see Figure 3.2). Below the districts 
are 416 sectors, 2,146 cells and 14,876 imidugudu95 (villages) the lowest formal level 
of government consisting of around 100 households (Purdeková 2011: 477). In the 
City of Kigali there are three districts (Nyarugenge, Kicukiro and Gasabo), which are 
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 Interview with Fred Mufulukye, Ministry of Local Government, 19.02.09.  
95
 Imidugudu is the plural and umudugudu the singular.  
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divided into 32 sectors, 161 cells, and 1,061 imidugudu.96 An even lower 
administrative unit called nyambakumi (consisting of just ten households) also 
existed formally until 2006 (Purdeková 2011: 477) and despite being abolished in 
that year was reportedly still functioning in 2010.97 The approximate number of 
permanent bureaucratic staff within CoK, its three districts and all subsidiary levels 
of government was around 800 in 2010.98 This amounted to 0.08 local government 
staff per capita, a figure very similar to that in Kampala (0.07 per capita).99  
 
Figure 3.2: Rwanda provinces before and after the 2006 redistricting exercise 
   
Source: created by author from various sources 
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 Kigali City website, CoK. 2009. Kigali City Website: http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw. Accessed 
06.05.11. 
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 Interview with Kigali resident A, 05.02.10. 
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 Interview with John Karera, finance and human resources official, CoK, 25.11.09. 75 of these staff 
worked in the central CoK office, with the rest being based in the Districts and below. 
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 These figures must be considered very approximate given the dearth of reliable, up-to-date 
population for either city. To calculate these per capita figures I have used population data from 
(UNPD 2009) in both cases, for uniformity. It is also important to note that the slightly higher 
number of staff at the city level in Kigali does not mean that bureaucratic capacity per se was higher 
than in Kampala. The implementation of the kinds of policy discussed in this thesis involved more 
than just the city government and the tiers below it, and there is reason to believe that by many 
conventional indicators of state capacity Uganda scored more highly. While recent figures on total 
numbers of civil servants are elusive, a 1997 IMF report documented that Uganda had on average 
1.16 civil servants per 100 citizens to Rwanda’s 0.47 in recent decades (Mkandawire 2010). Indeed, 
despite a reduction in government employment in Uganda from the mid 1980-mid 1990s, 
government employment grew substantially from the mid-1990s onwards, and spending on 
government salaries soared (Therkildsen 2006: 59-60). The legacy of higher numbers of university 
students per capita in Uganda up till 2005 (World Development Indicators, 
http://databank.worldbank.org) also suggests a more educated bureaucracy, and most local 
government staff in Kampala did have diplomas and degrees (though unfortunately similar 
information on educational attainment of staff in Kigali was not obtained).  
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This second phase was accompanied by a number of new laws including the ‘Law 
determining the structure, organisation and functioning of the City of Kigali’ (Law 
No. 10/2006),100 which devolved some responsibilities previously located at the city 
level to its three districts. The City Council’s roles were thereafter largely confined 
to overseeing and monitoring the activities of the three districts and the sectors 
below. Local tax collection became exclusively the responsibility of the districts; CoK 
itself retained only a small budget and raised no revenue (See Chapter Seven). 
Much development aid flowed from national ministries to districts, which were 
responsible for issues such as primary education, strengthening health 
infrastructure and maintaining healthcare centres, the maintenance of prisons, 
secondary education, human resources for healthcare, and land management and 
planning (MINECOFIN 2007).   
 
In tandem with decentralisation, imihigo (a system of ‘traditional’ contracts) was 
used extensively after 2006 as a tool for accountability and the target-setting at all 
governmental levels right down to the umudugudu. Imihigo consisted of 
agreements through which local governments pledge to implement measures 
outlined in annual plans. Imihigo, in the government’s words, ‘has a strong focus on 
results which makes it an invaluable tool in the planning, accountability and 
monitoring and evaluation processes (RoR 2010: 1). Thus while the decentralisation 
programme formally transferred resources and powers downwards, giving 
administrative structures a new legitimacy (not least with donors), it was 
paradoxical in its effects. In reality the country’s unusually tightly structured and 
hierarchical society meant that higher authorities were far better placed to 
capitalise on the top-down aspects of decentralisation than the lower rungs were to 
feed decisions upwards. Indeed, imihigo can be seen as leading to ‘deeper 
permeation of society by the state’, representing ‘a very localised public pledge of 
compliance with national policies’. By the late 2000s imihigo was even being 
extended down to the level of the family (Purdeková 2011: 484).  
 
This intense societal penetration was also reflected in umuganda, the monthly 
                                                          
100
 See Appendix 3 for a further discussion of these laws. 
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community works day from 8am-12pm on the last Saturday of every month. 
Nominally ‘voluntary’ but very strongly encouraged, this consisted of activities such 
as building houses for genocide survivors or cleaning public spaces, followed by a 
local community meeting. Through activities such as imihigo monitoring and 
umuganda meetings, information was certainly passed upwards through the 
political system, in line with the government’s claims about a two-way 
decentralisation process. However, this reflected mechanisms of upward 
accountability more than decision-making from below (see Appendices 2b-2e). 
Some observers even suggest that ‘the effects are the exact opposite of the 
discourse’ and that the activities conceptualised as being part of decentralisation 
have ‘directly strengthened authoritarian rule’ (Purdeková 2011: 486). 
 
It is therefore questionable whether the decentralisation programme was 
empowering local authorities and communities, particularly given that the formal 
decentralisation framework moved considerably faster than capacity development 
at local levels (Putzel and Golooba-Mutebi 2010). In contrast with claims of 
increased local autonomy, even local officials regularly made statements about how 
Rwanda’s progress ‘all comes from high office’, ‘when government decides, we 
follow’ and ‘if they say, you obey’.101 Moreover, regarding Kigali specifically, the Law 
No. 10/2006 effectively re-established the CoK as an arm of the central state at the 
city level, co-ordinating the three districts within it rather than forming a distinct 
decentralised tier in its own right.102 Kigali’s mayor was given particularly strong 
powers in relation to implementing the city Master Plan, itself vested with 
considerable authority backed by central government (see below and Chapter 
Four).  
 
Politically, decentralisation probably strengthened the RPF, particularly given 
restrictions on local level campaigning by political parties. The 2003 Constitution 
states that political organisations are not allowed to campaign in elections at district 
level and below. Ostensibly motivated by concerns about local politics becoming 
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 Interviews with local officials, 16-17.02.09. 
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 Interviews with finance officials, 23-24.11.09. 
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ethnically confrontational, this meant people could only stand for election as 
individuals, recalling Uganda’s ‘no-party democracy’. In reality most, if not all, local 
leaders were RPF members even if not campaigning as such.103 The prohibition of 
local party campaigning was formally lifted in 2007, but most opposition parties 
lacked funds to set up local offices (EOM 2008: 236) and the legacy of RPF 
hegemony both nationally and locally defined the kind of politics that is really 
possible locally, posing persistent barriers to local party activity (Beswick 2010: 
236). Informally, the ban seems to have effectively remained in place; some 
interviewees in 2009 seemed unaware that it had even been lifted.104 Others noted 
that ‘officially we have many parties; but really there is one’.105  
  
In conclusion, while the devolution of functions and revenue collection proceeded 
rapidly in post-2000 Rwanda, in 2010 power seemed to rest as surely as ever with 
the centre. However, the paradoxes of Rwandan decentralisation differed 
substantially from those in Uganda. In both cases, the local authorities were largely 
dependent on transfers from the centre, but Rwandan District autonomy was 
curtailed by weak local state capacity, an ingrained sense of hierarchy and hesitancy 
towards decision-making, and the overwhelming dominance of the RPF. This 
contrasted with Uganda, where districts were arenas for competitive politics, 
overlapping jurisdictions and split loyalties, and the revoking of previously-devolved 
powers by the centre was a recurrent feature (Lambright 2011; 2012). In Rwanda, 
and Kigali specifically, the local governments were so closely steered by the centre 
that such interference was unnecessary.  
 
The land question 
 
For most of Rwanda’s history the vast majority of land was governed by customary 
law: it was collectively owned but families enjoyed usufruct rights over land they 
occupied (RoR 2004). With the onset of colonialism, the only areas not governed by 
customary law were urban areas and some areas under the jurisdiction of the 
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 Informal conversation with a researcher, 02.02.10. Interview with Kigali resident A, 05.02.10. 
104
 Interviews with local officials, 16-17.02.09; See also Beswick (2010: 234). 
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 Interview with independent Rwandese development consultant, 17.02.09. 
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church. Thus formal land laws applied only to ‘foreigners and religious missions’ 
(Barriére 1997: 10) and were of little relevance to most Rwandans (Pottier 2002: 
181). There was nothing like the 1900 Agreement in Buganda transforming the 
relationship between peasants and the land on which they lived and worked. 
Customary law involved subdividing plots through systems of father-to-son 
inheritance, which given Rwanda’s population pressure resulted in increasing 
numbers of tiny parcels of land (RoR 2004). Immediately at independence, 
legislation attempted to change the system but to little effect: few people 
registered their transactions, and regulations were easily circumvented (Pottier 
2002: 181). Habyarimana was very critical of the fragmentation of farming land, 
arguing that it ‘blocks the development of the countryside’ (quoted in Nezehose 
1990: 38). A radical law in 1976 thus shifted ownership of land from ‘the 
community’ to the state; but this too made little difference in practice (Sagashya 
and English 2009: 3). When economic crisis hit in the late 1980s, panic sales of plots 
through the informal land market precipitated an escalation of land conflicts in the 
run-up to the genocide (André and Platteau 1998).  
 
After 1994 and especially after the ‘new caseload’ refugees returned in 1996, a 
further land crisis ensued, paralleling Kigali’s housing crisis outlined above. This 
prompted the government to launch its controversial imidugudu villagisation 
campaign in December 1996 to reverse the problem of dispersed settlement and 
low agricultural productivity.106 Meanwhile, numerous reports argued for the 
rationalisation and privatisation of land ownership (Clay et al. 1995; Karake 1997; 
Republic Rwandaise 1998, cited in Pottier 2002).107 After some years in the making, 
the 2004 National Land Policy set out the aims of consolidating land plots for 
sustainable agriculture, ensuring equal access to land regardless of gender or 
‘origin’, and establishing mechanisms for land registration and tenure regularisation 
(RoR 2004). The urgency of these issues in Rwanda merits repeating: ongoing (inter 
and intra-family) land disputes, extreme population pressures and growing 
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 For critiques of this programme, particularly in relation to its impacts on inequality and rural 
poverty, see Van Leeuwen (2001), Pottier (2002) and Ansoms (2008). 
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 The urgency of the need for land reform at this time, and the problems and challenges of 
addressing it, are discussed by Van Hoyweghen (1999).  
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landlessness, refugee return and an extraordinary level of land fragmentation were 
critical issues (RoR 2009b). In 2008 there were an estimated 7.9 million land parcels 
in Rwanda, with average land parcel size being just 0.35 hectares (Sagashya and 
English 2009: 12, 1).108   
   
The 2005 Organic Land Law (OLL) set the new policy in stone, creating one unified 
legal and administrative system for land ownership. However, under the new 
system important distinctions exist. Those who held land under customary law (i.e. 
most rural landowners) were entitled to a documentary title in the form of a 
renewable lease for a term of 3 to 99 years; but those who ‘invest in Rwanda by 
carrying out works of a residential, industrial, commercial or similar character on 
land’ (i.e. investors mostly in urban land) were granted freehold title (OLL, Article 6). 
In addition to these two forms of individual ownership, there was land officially 
vested in the national and local state. This was further broken down into state 
public land (including lakes, rivers, national parks, state roads, etc.) and state 
private land, which was not public but owned either by the national state, districts 
or by the City of Kigali. Ministerial and presidential orders followed the OLL to 
establish a new structure for land governance. Land administration, planning and 
surveying were relocated to a National Land Centre, below which sat the Office of 
the Registrar of Land Titles, District Land Bureaux, and Land Committees at the 
Sector and Cell level (Sagashya and English 2009: 8-9). The government has also 
embarked on a major Land Tenure Reform (LTR) programme in order to implement 
the OLL, with considerable support from DFID (Sagashya & English 2009). 
 
The government took the ‘urban question’ more seriously than most African 
governments (DFID 2007), recognising the benefits of urbanisation, and 
incorporating this into its overall framework for land reform (ICAS 2010). Its 
development plans envisaged the country’s level of urbanisation increasing from 
17% to 30% by 2020, and the land tenure reform programme evolved to reflect this 
(RoR 2009b). However, there were underlying problems regarding the form of 
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 By November 2011 this figure had increased to around 10 million. This huge number of plots was 
almost equivalent to the number of people in Rwanda; on average, every household had at least 
three plots (interview with land official 09.12.11). 
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urbanisation envisaged and the ability of ordinary Rwandans to meet the requisite 
standards of urban development. The emergence of the Kigali Conceptual Master 
Plan, with its strong emphasis on attracting investment and promoting a particular 
vision of urban form,109 left large sections of the population vulnerable to 
expropriation. As Chapter Four demonstrates, the plan was vested with great 
authority – indeed with the force of law (DFID 2007: 26) – but many rules and 
regulations to mitigate its impact upon the urban population were not in place at 
the time of the plan’s completion, a source of concern to some observers (DFID 
2007: 11; Ilberg 2008; Kairaba 2008). Thus while the OLL was aimed at increasing 
tenure security, other aspects of the government’s urban development vision risked 
undermining this. 
 
Despite the emphasis on individual land ownership, the state retained ‘rights to 
expropriation due to public interest, settlement and general land management 
through procedures provided by law and prior to appropriate compensation’ (OLL, 
Article 3). The 2007 Expropriation Law established that ‘public interest’ covered a 
flexible range of activities including 22 types of public interest acts but also ‘any 
other activities aimed at public interest which are not indicated on this list that are 
approved by an Order of the Minister in charge of expropriation’ (Law 18/2007, 
Article 5). This has been interpreted in a way that includes private investments for 
commercial purposes that fit broadly with the Master Plan (DFID 2007: 26). 
Investors therefore have incentives to persuade the government to consider their 
projects as ‘public interest’, because if they succeed the government will manage 
the messy business of expropriation on their behalf.110 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter has highlighted some of the contextual issues most relevant for the 
empirical chapters that follow. It provided a brief and necessarily selective history 
of each case study country, drawing out some historical antecedents central to 
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 See Goodfellow and Smith (forthcoming). 
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 Interview with government adviser, 14.02.10. See Goodfellow (2013 forthcoming) for a more 
detailed discussion of expropriations in Kigali. 
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questions of state effectiveness including the evolution of state-society relations in 
key periods of historical transition, legacies of conflict and the means by which 
contemporary ruling elites came to power. It also provided brief historical 
narratives of the two capital cities, which in both cases have been central to 
national economies and the development of the post-colonial states as well as sites 
of struggle over resources such as land and housing. Finally, it considered 
institutional development in relation to decentralisation and land, which are of 
particular relevance for the chapters that follow and for processes of urban 
development more generally.  
 
Answering the questions posed in this study requires a multi-scalar approach that 
simultaneously focuses on the national, metropolitan and local level. Much about 
why state effectiveness differs in the two cities is written into the national histories 
and institutional frameworks discussed here. This chapter has noted the 
fragmentary nature of the Ugandan polity since its inception, the difficulties in 
maintaining a coalition capable of governing the diverse and unruly post-colonial 
state of Uganda, and the current government’s relative successes in doing so by 
bargaining, forming alliances and playing groups off against one another. It has also 
considered Rwanda’s continued existence over hundreds of years as a unified 
kingdom, its unusual levels of hierarchy and the current government’s incentives to 
maintain legitimacy through delivering observable results.  
 
This big picture is necessary for understanding meso- and micro-level political 
interactions on specific issues of the kind examined in subsequent chapters. Yet, 
while necessary, it is not sufficient to explain them.  Recalling the discussion of state 
effectiveness in Chapter Two, this study makes no claim that either state is effective 
or ineffective per se. Regarding certain issues such as combating HIV/AIDS the 
Ugandan state has been remarkably effective (Putzel 2004), and regarding issues 
such as rural poverty-reduction and increased agricultural productivity some claim 
that the Rwandan state has been ineffective (Ansoms 2008; 2011; Newbury 2011). 
Explaining why, in relation to many questions of urban development, Rwanda has 
been much more effective than Uganda therefore requires examining how these 
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broader historical and institutional dynamics interact with local and specifically 
urban issues. In the four chapters that follow, this is undertaken through rigorous 
comparative research in accordance with a structured, focused comparative case 
study model laid out in Chapter Two. These chapters provide a cohesive body of 
new empirical evidence on the two countries, which at times problematises any 
simple account of differing effectiveness that might be easy to uphold based on this 
chapter’s review of existing literature. They therefore contribute to a deeper and 
more nuanced understanding of politics in the two countries, and of the 
mechanisms of state effectiveness more generally.  
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Chapter Four 
The challenge of urban development control: regulating construction 
(and destruction) 
 
This chapter explores the effectiveness of the state in the shaping cities at a very 
fundamental level: through institutionalised processes of urban planning and the 
regulation of land use and construction, which together I term ‘urban development 
control’.111 In Africa, many of today’s large cities were planned from the outset by 
colonial powers. However, despite this brief phase of colonial planning at a time 
when most African towns were still relatively small, after independence many of 
them grew at astonishing speed and with very little adherence to plans and 
regulations. This has certainly been the case for Kampala and Kigali, where only 
parts of the central and government districts bear evidence of concerted planning 
and where – in both cases – unplanned urban growth spiralled in the four decades 
between independence and the turn of the twenty-first century. It was only 
thereafter that the two cities radically diverged with respect to planning and 
construction regulation, with Kampala continuing on the same course of ‘laissez-
faire’ urbanisation but Kigali exhibiting the striking imprint of a new era of planning 
and regulation. It is in this field that the two cities exhibit some of the starkest of 
the contrasts motivating this study. 
 
The chapter begins with an introduction to the idea of urban development control, 
contemporary debates and some of the key challenges with regard to planning and 
regulation in Africa.  This is followed by a brief outline of the formal institutions 
pertaining to construction and land use regulation in the two case study cities. The 
chapter then explores empirically how urban development regulations are actually 
used in practice and the degree to which they are enforced in each city. This is 
followed by a section exploring cases of attempts to evict people from particular 
settlements and demolish them in the interests of implementing major 
transformative urban plans. Finally, conclusions are presented about the differential 
effectiveness of urban development control in the two cities.   
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4.1    Urban development control: concepts, issues and challenges 
 
The spread of modern practices associated with planning and regulating the 
development of cities is thought to have originated in Europe and the United States 
in the late nineteenth century, in response to congestion in overcrowded, disease-
ridden urban slums (Hall 2002). Plans can be thought of as sets of agendas, visions, 
policies, designs and strategies for physical development (Hopkins 2001), 
encapsulated  in a ‘two-dimensional layout of the physical form of the city’ 
(Neuman 1998). Urban development regulations – in the form of zoning ordinances, 
land use regulations and building codes for example112 – are clear rules concerning 
‘what is built, where it is built, and when and how it is built’ (Kaiser et al. 1995). 
Historically, in many cases regulations preceded formal ‘comprehensive’, ‘master’ 
or ‘structure’ plans, with the consequence that the latter had to defer to existing 
zoning on any potential issues of legal dispute (Sullivan and Michel 2003). In the 
United States for example, from where much planning theory and practice 
emanates, it is generally the case that: 
 
Zoning ordinances (rules governing the use and intensity of use of land) […] are 
municipal laws. No development can occur without conforming to these laws. In 
contrast, the “master plan” is advisory, has no force of law…the city council 
consults the plan but is not bound by it. (Birch 2008: 142).  
 
While the relationship between planning and the law has been a source of 
controversy at times,113 there has also been a wider debate over the past half-
century about whether ‘comprehensive’ plans designed by technical experts 
according to rational principles are desirable at all (Allmendinger 2002). Jane Jacobs 
threw a literary grenade into the field of planning with her explicit critique of the 
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 There is some crossover in the use of these terms and their exact meaning depends on context. 
However, in general land use regulations refer to the ‘user purpose’ assigned to different parts of a 
city (e.g. commercial, high-density residential, industrial, etc). Zoning can be thought of as a method 
of land use regulation that specifies not only land use in a given area but details such as maximum 
plot size, setbacks from the road and building height. These specifications are often contained in 
local ordinances, passed in accordance with whatever comprehensive/master plan is in place. Other 
forms of building regulations (e.g. regarding materials, health and safety standards) may also 
accompany these.  
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 See for example Sullivan and Michel (2003); Haar (1955). 
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profession, ‘The Death and Life of the Great American Cities’ (Jacobs 1961). Jacobs 
claimed that planning practice was fundamentally opposed to how cities actually 
worked, building on her earlier argument that ‘There is no logic that can be 
superimposed on the city’ (Jacobs 1958: 127). Some prominent urban scholars 
immediately criticised her for encouraging unplanned urban development, eroding 
the state’s role in relation to comprehensive infrastructure and improved housing 
(Mumford 1962).  
 
Echoes of these debates can be found in contemporary discourses on competing 
approaches to planning,114 and Mumford’s critique resonates in relation to 
developing countries where the adoption of policies minimising state planning led 
to ‘laissez-faire’ urbanisation on an enormous scale (Beall et al. 2010). As Chapter 
One noted, the turn against planning in the 1980s meant that it ‘almost passed 
away’ (Biau 2004: 7), exacerbating trends towards unplanned growth in Africa. 
Since the turn of the millennium there has been something of a revival in urban 
planning; the fragmentation of urban infrastructure and increasing intra-urban 
spatial inequality (Graham and Marvin 2001) precipitated ‘recognition that planning 
is a much-needed integrative mechanism’ (Taylor 2004). However, the extent of 
unplanned urbanisation in the developing world today reflects not only the bias 
against planning in the 1980s and 1990s but ongoing failures of implementation 
even when comprehensive plans have been in place. So long as serious problems of 
state effectiveness in relation to planning remain, the resurgence of interest in it is 
unlikely to yield many results. 
 
Even during the attack on planning, land use and construction regulations largely 
remained in place, although with planning authorities emasculated after the 1980s, 
implementing them became even more difficult.115 Moreover, when effectively 
enforced, regulations often came under attack for restricting livelihood and shelter 
options, forcing exit from the formal sector and stifling urban economies (Rakodi 
2001b; Brown and Lloyd-Jones 2002). The resurgence of interest in planning since 
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2000 is therefore still dogged by numerous unresolved issues. Some authors argue 
that the earlier discrediting of urban development control was justifiable, and that 
resources should not be directed towards it (Rakodi 2001a). 
 
Yet while planning and regulation can clearly be problematic if poorly or harshly 
implemented, and it is important to be aware of the potential ‘dark side’ of urban 
planning as a tool of social control (Yiftachel 1998; Flyvbjerg et al. 2002), this does 
not mean they should be rejected altogether. Engaging with vital questions of urban 
service provision, health and safety, drainage, transport and vulnerability to natural 
hazards requires some framework of urban development control. The growing 
acknowledgement that urban populations are particularly vulnerable to disasters 
associated with climate change (Pelling 2003; Dodman and Satterthwaite 2008; 
Pelling and Wisner 2009) strengthens the case for planning. The question of the 
relative merits of different models and theories of planning is beyond the scope of 
this study. This chapter instead focuses on the equally critical issue of why and how 
plans are effectively implemented in some cases but not others. This chapter 
illustrates how similar institutions for planning and development control in Kampala 
and Kigali yielded sharply contrasting outcomes, primarily because of the 
divergence between informal institutions that lay behind the apparently similar 
laws and regulations. The formal framework in each city will now briefly be 
outlined. 
 
4.2    Institutional framework for planning and regulation 
 
Uganda 
 
The national framework for planning and development control in Uganda is a 
combination of laws from the colonial and early independence periods and those 
instituted since the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1995. The ruling 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) adjusted the legislation impacting on urban 
planning and development control only sporadically and gradually, often in line with 
its celebrated decentralisation programme. The resulting framework was therefore 
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a mixture of old and new legislation as well as national laws and local ordinances. 
Nationally, it is rooted in provisions in the following pieces of legislation: the Town 
and Country Planning Act (1951; revised 1964); the Public Health Act (1969); the 
Constitution (1995); the National Environment Statute (1995); the Local 
Government Act (LGA, 1997); the Land Act (1998); the Land Regulations (2004); and 
the Physical Planning Act (2010) and the Kampala Capital City Act (2010).116 Also in 
in preparation during the period of writing up was a new Building Control Bill. In 
terms of urban plans, the 1994 Kampala Structure Plan was still theoretically 
operational, though its 10-year remit was over. Urban development regulations 
were laid out in annexes to the Structure Plan but being repackaged under a 
forthcoming Building Control Bill, and a new Master Plan was also in the pipeline.117  
 
Formal procedures for gaining permission to build mostly involved decentralised 
authorities, which in Kampala meant KCC and the five city Divisions. Following the 
laws listed above, urban development control was specified as taking place through 
the following six steps. First, developers who wanted to build had to obtain 
clearance with regard to the registered ownership of the land. Once cleared, they 
then had to obtain the relevant forms and pay a fee to KCC to allow them to apply 
for planning permission. Third, they applied for approval of their building plans to 
the Building Inspector or Plans Clerk at the city Division in which they were hoping 
to construct. At the Division, applications were scrutinised by a planner, health 
inspector and building inspector who had to ensure that they fit with the Structure 
Plan and did not contravene the Public Health Act or any other relevant local 
regulations and zoning ordinances.118 If considered likely to have any effect on the 
environment, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) would be required in 
accordance with the National Environment Statute.119 
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 This latter was passed in the period of writing up, and was not in force in the 2000-2010 period 
under discussion, so will not be discussed here.   
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 For a detailed discussion of this legal framework see Appendix 3. 
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 With respect to land use regulations, public land always had a pre-specified land use attached to 
it. However, on private land – which formed the vast majority of land in the city – there was no pre-
existing land-use specification and it was up to individual planners whether or not they approved the 
land use requested on the building application (Interview with physical planning official, 13.10.09).  
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 ‘How to put up a safe building’ (no date), Infoseries 2, KCC. 
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Fourth, once the Division was satisfied with the application it was sent to KCC, 
where technical recommendations were made by a technical officers’ committee 
involving officers from all five Divisions. Fifth, the building application was passed to 
the Works Committee in KCC, which was composed of elected politicians rather 
than technocrats who assessed the technocrats’ recommendations and made some 
of their own. Any decision to reallocate land use (e.g. from residential to 
commercial) had to be taken by this committee (though if considered ‘major’ 
changes they would need to go to the National Physical Planning Board).120 This 
committee met three times monthly. Sixth and finally, the plans were passed to the 
full Council, which sat at least once every two months, for the final say and full 
approval.121 When the plans were approved, the developer was required to allow 
KCC engineers to inspect the development at every stage of the construction 
process. Once completed, a final inspection took place by the KCC technical team 
after which, if they were satisfied that the building conformed to plans, the KCC 
Chief Town Planner issued an occupation permit.  
 
Rwanda 
 
On coming to power in 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) found a virtual 
vacuum of legislation pertaining to cities. What little there was they considered to 
be deeply insufficient and outdated (MININFRA 2008: 19). As noted in Chapter 
Three, government priorities in the mid to late 1990s were security and 
resettlement on a massive scale. Consequently the more general question of how to 
manage and plan cities was not really addressed until the turn of the millennium, 
after which a raft of policy documents and new legislation appeared in rapid 
succession. Particularly relevant here are Rwanda Vision 2020 (2000); the National 
Decentralisation Policy (2001); the National Land Policy (2004); the Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2007); and the National Urban 
Housing Policy (2008). Central pieces of legislation include the Organic Land Law 
(2005); the Kigali City Law (2005); and the Expropriation Law (2007). Also vital is the 
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Kigali Conceptual Master Plan, published in 2007 and officially launched in February 
2009, and the Rwanda Building Control Regulations (2009).122  
 
As in Kampala, against this institutional backdrop there was a complex 
decentralised process for obtaining a building permit. A person interested in 
obtaining a permit needed to submit their documents to District office for 
whichever of Kigali’s Districts they hoped to build in, along with a project proposal 
and plans for their building that had to conform to an extensive checklist. They 
were required to include detailed architectural drawings, identify suitable certified 
construction and supervision companies and, in the case of storied or public 
buildings, obtain an Environmental Impact Assessment from a company certified by 
the Rwanda Environmental Management Authority (REMA) (MININFRA 2009). 
 
At the District, the plans were scrutinised in relation to the laws and regulations, 
and the District Land Bureau was supposed either to provide a building permit or 
inform the client why it could not be issued within 30 days (Ibid: 7). In areas that 
had not yet been formally zoned in detail you would not be given a permit to build 
anything new at all, and could only apply to rehabilitate existing buildings.123 As in 
Kampala, after completion it was necessary to obtain an occupation permit before 
the building could be utilised. It was again the responsibility of the District Land 
Bureau to issue an occupation permit (or provide a reason for not issuing one) 
within 30 days, after having received a report showing that the building was 
constructed following the approved plans.  After this point, no-one was allowed to 
renovate or change the building’s original design or structure without permission 
from the Bureau (MININFRA 2009).  
 
The institutions for urban development control in the two case study cities exhibit 
remarkable similarities, despite the fact that the evolution took place over a longer 
period and in a more piecemeal fashion in Uganda. In both cases, there were still 
gaps and grey areas; but it is nevertheless clear that if urban development control 
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was lacking in Kampala vis-à-vis Kigali, this was not due to the absence of laws, 
regulations or formal procedures in the former. It was a question of 
implementation.  
 
4.3    Failures of enforcement in Kampala: ‘everybody does whatever he wants’ 
 
In Kampala from 2000-2010, planning was barely implemented and the procedures 
described above were constantly undermined. A government Commissioner for 
Land Use Regulation and Compliance pointed out that ‘Almost everybody who has 
eyes can see that there is a problem’.124 For some observers, the principal reason 
for this was that private land ownership was so widespread in the city – particularly 
in the form of mailo land (RoU 1992; MoLG 2006). Around half of the land in 
Kampala was thought to be composed of mailo.125 However, while it was true that 
in the colonial period these areas were largely ignored by British planning efforts, to 
attribute a lack of urban development control early in the twenty-first century to 
the prevalence of private land is unsatisfactory for the following reasons. 
 
First, in terms of planning, it was well within the power of government to 
expropriate private land when building, for example, a road or other public facility. 
The Constitution states that a person’s private property may be appropriated by the 
state ‘where it is necessary for public use and in the interest of defence, public 
safety, order, morality or health’ (Article 26). Even stronger provisions appear in the 
Town and Country Planning Act and Land Acquisition Act, and were reiterated in the 
                                                          
124
 Interview with Vincent Byandaimira, Commissioner for Land Use Regulation and Compliance, 
Ministry of Lands, Kampala, 28.01.10. 
125
 Reliable figures on the proportion of land held under different tenure systems in Kampala are 
very difficult to come by.  According to one source, 45% of land in the city is mailo, 27% is controlled 
by the Buganda kingdom under the Kabakaship, 3% is freehold, and the remaining 25% constitutes 
public land, of which 15% is controlled directly by KCC and 10% by the Kampala district Land Board 
‘on behalf of the people’ (The Independent, 02.04.12). While some other sources (e.g. Nkurunziza 
2006) concur with the 45% mailo figure, another report on land in Kampala states that ‘more than 
52%’ of land in the city is mailo, with 30% administered to KCC but leased to private interests, 8% 
held by the government and 7% held under freehold and ‘by institutions’ (which presumably would 
include the Kabakaship land) (Giddings 2008: 13). The latter assessment is considered more realistic 
and compatible with what anecdotal evidence suggests about the amount of land in the city held by 
the Kabaka. Some sources even suggest figures as high as 75% for the amount of mailo land in the 
city (Nuwugaba 2006). The chairperson of Kampala’s District Land Board admitted in 2012 that the 
city authority had ‘no up-to-date inventory’ of land in the city (The Independent, 02.04.12). 
  
 127
Kampala Capital City Act. Therefore the nature of land tenure should not prevent 
the government from implementing plans. Second, urban development regulations 
applied to all land, regardless of ownership, tenure system or means of acquisition. 
Private land did pose certain difficulties because landowners could themselves 
specify the land use subject to approval by the planners (see footnote 118). When 
landowners were powerful there was little that weak planning authorities could do 
to ensure the chosen use accorded with existing regulations.126 However it was also 
the case that powerful individuals leasing public land (and most public land in the 
city is privately leased)127 could simply have the land use reallocated, or get away 
with blatantly contravening the pre-specified use.  In fact, as will be shown below, 
many of the starkest examples of failure to implement land use and zoning 
regulations were on public land.  
 
The problem in contemporary Kampala was therefore a failure of regulatory 
enforcement on all land, private and public; something affirmed by several 
interviewees. For the former Chairman of Kampala Central Division, for example, 
‘the land issue is not a problem, but the problem is lack of enforcement of 
policies…everybody does whatever he wants…the city is just developing.’128 There 
were ‘adequate laws in this country to help proper planning’, explained one official 
from the Ministry of Local Government, ‘but the problem is enforcement and lack of 
will’.129 Rather than being about the legal framework, there are reasons to believe 
that politicians and bureaucrats often had interests in not enforcing policy. To get to 
the root of why the ‘will’ was not there and the interests that were at play, we need 
to look in detail at some particular cases of failed urban development control, which 
were not in short supply.  
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The impotence of land use regulation in the ‘scramble for remaining open spaces’ 
130
  
 
‘Kampala’, a local politician explained, ‘basically is a swamp, apart from the elevated 
areas’.131 The enforcement of land use regulations takes on particular importance 
under these topographical conditions. Yet the blatant contravention of land use 
regulations posed enormous challenges as city growth spiralled, particularly since 
the turn of the century. The approval of certain developments over others bore 
little relation to the rules above. For example a damning report on KCC’s practices 
published by the Ministry of Local Government in 2006 notes that ‘In the Lugogo 
drainage basin and the Kazinga Channel, commercial developments of a dubious 
nature have been approved. Yet the Kyadondo Rugby Club proposal which is 
keeping with the land use has been blocked.’ (MoLG 2006: 22). In fact, even as KCC 
was refusing the environmentally sound proposal for a 49-year lease submitted by 
the Rugby Club, they were selling off parts of the rugby pitch to other developers 
for projects in breach of the zoning and land use regulations.132 Meanwhile, some of 
the most striking examples of ‘dubious’ construction in the city’s remaining open 
spaces were beginning to unfold.  
 
Centenary Park, located close to the city’s commercial centre, was Kampala’s only 
public park. By the middle of the 2000s it long had been neglected and was 
considered a dangerous hideout for criminals. In 2005, Sarah Kizito – wife of a city 
Councillor from the NRM, Godfrey Nyakana – was given a 10-year lease by KCC to 
manage the park, with the specific remit to plant trees and flowers and install public 
washrooms.133 The beautification of the park was supposed to take place in 
accordance with a set of strict environmental regulations, one of which was that no 
permanent buildings were to be erected other than the washrooms.134 In marked 
contrast to the plans that were approved, Kizito fenced off the park and proceeded 
to bring in builders to construct permanent buildings. ‘All those structures on 
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Centenary Park were built contrary to our consent’, one local planning source 
affirmed. ‘The only park we have in Kampala has been eaten up.’135 Several 
attempts were made to halt construction, but ‘of course intimidation was used’, 
and KCC found itself unsupported in its efforts. In the end, KCC attempted to take 
Kizito to court, but the case was withdrawn ‘on instruction from His Excellency the 
President.’136 Others confirmed that Nyakana – with Museveni’s support – directed 
that the court case be halted.137 After the construction work finished it was no 
longer a park at all but a complex of semi-outdoor restaurants and bars popular 
with the elite and growing middle class.  
 
While Centenery Park was Kampala’s only major park, there was also just one 
dedicated children’s playground north of the city centre that was also quietly sold 
off, and without passing through any of the planning or regulatory channels was by 
2009 being developed into shops. The developers in this case were mostly veteran 
soldiers. More generally, veterans were said to have ‘taken most of the open 
spaces. They come and sit on them, construct their makeshift buildings…they build 
markets there, shops, which are not approved of council…without any guided 
development control whatever’. As former soldiers, these people were 
‘untouchable’, with ‘blessing from high authorities’.138 The bond between army 
veterans and top NRM cadres was very strong even after years of peace and 
demobilisation. Veterans claimed to be ‘strange squatters of the ruling party’, and 
whenever there was open space publicly owned by KCC ‘these people grab it.’ Were 
it not for the blessing from above, ‘it would be easy’ to remove them.139  
 
Meanwhile wetland areas, which had been gazetted as ‘inalienable environmental 
zones’ in 1995 (Nkurunziza 2006: 178) were also being developed. The Nakivubo 
channel, a vital artery running through the city, performing a vital drainage function 
and carrying stormwater and wastewater towards Lake Victoria, was progressively 
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encroached upon by hotels and industrial enterprises.  Local state actors overseeing 
planning tried in vain to stop the construction of a roofing manufacturer on the 
channel: ‘they are a big organisation with big personnel…so they went ahead and 
continued’.140 The problem of industries sited in wetlands and too close to housing 
was also widespread.141 Even when industries were not inappropriately sited they 
were said to ‘break all the rules’ on waste, often discharging it illegally into the 
wetland areas.142  
 
‘Men with guns’: developers versus construction regulation 
 
Even more prevalent than contravention of land use and zoning laws was the 
construction of buildings flouting other basic regulations such as those concerning 
height, distance from the road, connection to drainage and other infrastructure, 
provision of parking, fire escapes, and access for the disabled. The technical officer’s 
committee at KCC was generally rigorous; in October-November 2007 for example, 
51% of plans submitted were rejected on grounds such as land use inconsistencies, 
inadequate parking, inadequate provisions for sanitation, excessive plot coverage 
by buildings, encroachment onto road reserves, inadequate drainage plans, septic 
tanks too close to buildings, and failure to obtain clearance from NEMA.143 
However, the rigour of planners in terms of formal procedure made little difference 
given the informal processes that accompanied and followed them.  
 
Upmarket hotels, which proliferated in Kampala especially after the decision to host 
the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Uganda, were major 
culprits.  For example the construction of the Imperial Royale Hotel, one of a chain 
of hotels owned by the Asian property mogul Karim Hirji, a major NRM-
supporter,144 commenced despite the fact that its plans were rejected by KCC. Hirji’s 
architects ‘had proposed…several extensions protruding and going straight into the 
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road’, but although these were strongly rejected by the committee, ‘the developer 
was adamant’ because the high authorities ‘bless him whatever he is doing’. 
Consequently he just ‘started building without approval’. In the end, to get their 
occupation permit the developers ‘had to yield to some of the demands of the 
planners’; but these were minor victories for the state authorities and, in the words 
of a public works committee member, ‘if you look at that hotel it is more or less in 
the middle of the road.’ The hotel affected visibility of a central road junction to the 
extent that now ‘the junction is more or less dead and the would-be road that 
would be serving many people, they turned it more or less into the entrance to the 
hotel.’145 While this illegal construction was going on, inspectors’ access to the site 
was extremely difficult. The Division Building Inspector confirmed that the 
developer’s armed guards were under strict instruction not to ‘allow anyone to 
access the site without the client present’, which the client almost never was.146  
 
Another commonly breached set of regulations, particularly in Central Division, 
were those relating to the ‘skyline’: for example in the central business district 
(CBD) buildings were supposed to have at least eight floors. While all the approved 
plans for this area specifed at least this number, in practice most developers 
considered it a waste of resources to build that high as commercial enterprises 
were very reluctant to rent properties above the second or third floors. Given the 
absence of a law stating that buildings needed to be completed after a certain 
amount of time, developers often simply built as many floors as they chose and 
then stopped, maintaining that the building was still ‘in progress’ if examined. 
Around 30% of the buildings in the CBD contravened ‘skyline’ regulations. Even 
more common were failures to provide disablity access and lifts, the absence of the 
latter rendering the higher floors even more unappealing to business;147  indeed it 
was common to see several completely disused floors in central shopping malls.  
 
Most common of all was failure to provide parking space, with serious and long-
term consequences for the city. Kampala’s hilly topography, unplanned 
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development and population density rendered the widening of roads very 
problematic, and space was so tight that there was little room for parking behind 
buildings. Moreover, the already abysmal traffic situation crippling Kampala’s 
economy would be worsened by extending street parking. Parking in the basement 
of commercial enterprises was therefore considered a critical means of coping with 
urban growth; hence its central importance in construction regulation. Yet around 
90% of shopping arcades in the CBD put parking in their plans but neglected to 
create it, instead filling the basement area with shops (the basement being 
considered far too profitable to devote to parking). During construction this breach 
was hard to spot: ‘they raise the frame of the building and at this point you can’t tell 
they won’t put parking space in, so you can’t stop them.’ Then, however, ‘they 
partition it all and leave no parking’.148 
 
In early 2009 the Minister of Local Government, Kahinda Otafiire, performed an 
extraordinary U-turn that illustrates one of the ways in which the state is rendered 
so ineffective regarding these issues. In December 2008 he had publicly condemned 
KCC for allowing the construction of shopping arcades in breach of regulations, and 
announced that he was giving KCC until January to ensure the necessary alterations 
were made, or he would dismiss senior KCC staff.149 In response, on January 2nd KCC 
produced a list of 48 major commercial buildings they discovered were in breach of 
Building Rule 21 and Section 133 of the Public Health Act: each had failed to provide 
parking as well as contravening other rules (e.g. ‘The well for human lift has been 
converted into small shops’, ‘No fire alarm systems installed’).150 KCC then 
demanded that all these developers convert the relevant areas back into parking 
spaces or face closure and legal action, giving them a 28 day ultimatum. However, 
shortly after this announcement was made, Otafiire ordered that all action against 
these buildings be halted until a ‘harmonized position’ between the developers and 
KCC was reached. ‘Even before fourteen days had elapsed [he] came in and said 
“stop”’, recalls a KCC source. ‘That’s what I call political interference.’151  
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No further public explanation was made regarding Otafiire’s decision and as of a 
year later there was no progress towards a ‘harmonised position’; the subject 
appeared to be closed. When asked why this complete U-turn had come about, city 
planning officials responded in euphemisms, stating that the developers had 
‘persuaded’ Otafiire to change his mind’152, or that the developers managed to ‘get 
sympathy’ from central government politicians as often happens when issues of 
regulatory enforcement come to a head.153 One added that ‘once [politicians] 
defend those private developers they expect something in return’.154 As if the 
regulatory enforcement situation was not already bad enough, this event set a new 
precedent, one official explained. The Minister had claimed that he was making 
exceptions of these businesses, but ‘once they start talking of exceptions then the 
whole thing fails.’155  
 
Around 50% of the buildings in Kampala’s CBD were in breach of basic regulations, 
with more appearing all the time.156 According to virtually all sources interviewed, 
this was emphatically not because of a weak legal and regulatory framework. The 
overriding reason for these failures lay in the blockage of implementation by 
politicians. As a former Chief Town Planner explained:  
 
‘We have building codes, we have many regulations and urban bylaws, but they are 
flouted with impunity. Somewhere some politician, a councillor will come and say 
‘you leave that to me, I’ll handle it…and that’s the end of it…you’ll never get to stop 
it now. It gets worse and worse. You can go and stop construction on a building 
site, but the next day you’ll go back, you’ll find guards there, with guns.’
157
  
 
Political intervention – a word sometimes used in explicit contradistinction to 
‘interference’ both by politicians and the more wary of bureaucrats158 – was ‘like a 
                                                          
152
 Interview with planning official, 05.10.09 
153
 Interview with town planner, 11.02.09. 
154
 Interview with ex-planning offical, 11.02.09. 
155
 Interview with planning official, 13.10.09. 
156
 Interview with building inspector, 19.01.10. Other researchers have found that, specifically with 
regard to housing, 69.2% of survey respondents who had built houses in Kampala did so without 
approved plans (Makara 2009: 264).  
157
 Interview with ex-planning official, 11.02.09 
158
 Interview with Adolf Mwesigye, Minister of Local Government, 27.01.10; interview with town 
planner 11.02.09.  
  
 134
tradition’ in Kampala,159 and it often rendered the work of local officials virtually 
impossible. This is not to deny that corruption in the KCC bureaucracy was also a 
problem; it clearly was, often leading to the converse situation whereby developers 
connived with senior officials who were then able to block decisions by local 
political actors. The intervention could work both ways, as did the frustration: ‘You 
decide to do something and then the other arm comes in to oppose it’, explained 
Kampala’s Deputy Mayor with respect to political decisions being overturned by 
bureaucrats. KCC officials with authority bestowed on them by central government 
(for example the Town Clerk) could easily override local politicians – particularly 
when they were members of the opposition. However, the involvement of officials 
in regulatory failure was likely to happen at earlier stages in the process, and more 
invisibly, through kickbacks when plans were approved or construction began 
(MoLG 2006). The politicians would usually play their parts later in the process, 
when ongoing inspections revealed prior regulation breaches and political actors 
found it in their interests to assist developers by blocking the technical team’s 
efforts to move in and enforce the law.  
 
Rich man’s slum, poor man’s slum: Muyenga and Kawempe 
 
The failure to enforce construction and land use regulations also extended to 
residential areas – including very wealthy ones. In Kololo, an upmarket residential 
area in Central Division, around 50% of properties violated zoning rules in some 
way.160 Far worse was the situation in Muyenga, another wealthy neighbourhood 
that became known as the ‘rich man’s slum’. Desirable in part due to its views over 
the city and lake, Muyenga Hill was a spot favoured by the elite after 1986, when 
rapid and unplanned real estate development took off as the wealthy capitalised on 
the newfound security and economic growth. The rush to divide and develop real 
estate in Muyenga led to grand houses that could barely be reached by road, some 
of the roads having been built over and the remainder being narrow, zig-zagging 
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and erratic.161 Steep slopes combined with heavy erosion from poor drainage and 
excavations for further construction, resulting in ‘toppling’: the falling away of the 
hill’s earth and rocks. Residents and local politicians feared houses collapsing onto 
each other, and a major environmental shock would probably cause a 
catastrophe.162 The Chief Town Planner claimed that powerful local landowners 
thwarted efforts to build roads and control development, adding that ‘Yes, the law 
allows us to do our job irrespective of whether a road runs in one’s land. But 
practically, things are very different’.163 Given the situation in areas such as 
Muyenga, it comes as little surprise that in one study of African urban disasters 
from 2006-8, 30% of the major building collapses listed for the continent as a whole 
took place in Kampala, each killing 10-25 people (Pelling and Wisner 2009: 27). 
 
The absence of planning in the city’s many and vast low-income settlements was 
even more severe, and Kampala’s slums are renowned for their squalor (Amis 
2006). The absence of development control was unsurprising given that in 
Kawempe Division, for example, in 2010 there were just two people working on 
issues of planning and building control (which is decentralised to Divisions) for an 
area housing at least 200-300,000 people.164 Kawempe housed some of the city’s 
worst slums, including the notorious Bwaise (see Figure 4.1). The Division Chairman 
reported ‘huge problems of illegal construction of all kinds’, that he was powerless 
to control: ‘I feel guilty walking around here but there is nothing I can do’, he 
claimed, given the absence of both staff and resources from KCC. The lack of 
planning made infrastructure provision extremely challenging, and ‘people are still 
using water from contaminated wells’.165 Exacerbating the resource constraints, the 
lack of infrastructure caused widespread reluctance to pay local taxes, since people 
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felt they received nothing in return.166 This created a vicious cycle of chronically low 
local revenues and bad or absent city management.167  
 
Figure 4.1: Bwaise, Kampala 
 
Source: author’s photograph 
 
It was not only lack of resources that impeded development control in slum 
settlements: there was political bargaining at play here too. However, while the 
interventions that blocked regulatory enforcement in examples discussed 
previously mostly constituted behind-the-scenes bargaining between politicians and 
economic elites such as property developers, in the slums different kinds of 
arrangements were evident. These were more diffuse, longer-term, shifting and 
sometimes unspoken pacts between politicians and the urban poor.  A KCC planner 
speaking to researchers from Makerere University pointed out that ‘you look at 
these slum settlements, we are not lacking the capacity to demolish them, but 
these dilapidated housing structures belong to people you may find difficult to 
touch’. In response to this, the interviewer in question asked whether this was 
because the owners of these dwellings were politically connected. ‘No’, responded 
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the planner, ‘They belong to people who are powerful in their own way’ (Nawangwe 
and Nuwagaba 2002: 109, emphasis added). Whether they were the ethnic kin of 
political elites, former soldiers or just large groups of potential voters, it was thus 
possible for the poor as well as the wealthy to be ‘untouchable’, in the sense of 
being effectively exempt from regulations. This ‘power’ of the poor to remain 
beyond the state’s regulatory purview is a central aspect of issues discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six.  
  
4.4    Regulatory rule in Kigali: ‘we are all impaled on the Master Plan’ 
 
The 1990-94 conflict in Rwanda was shorter than Uganda’s long period of turmoil 
but its impact on the city was as great if not greater, as Chapter Three indicated. 
While urban planning between independence and 1994 was already minimal 
outside the government district, the majority of the city’s unplanned growth 
happened in the ten years following the genocide. Describing Kigali at the turn of 
the twenty-first century, interviewees depicted a city overwhelmed by garbage, 
poor planning and unenforced development regulation. ‘It was like Kampala’, a City 
Official noted.168  However around the year 2000 things began to change. With 
security established throughout the country and Rwanda Vision 2020 released, a 
new focus on urban order became apparent. The Kinyarwanda word kajagari, 
meaning disorder, gained currency. The implications of the term were broad-
ranging: in the words of a District Mayor, ‘Many people think kajagari is only slums 
but even renovation without authorization, no considerations of environment, is 
kajagari’.169 This attitude was combined with new mantras about the importance of 
keeping Kigali clean, as a city official recounts: 
 
‘In 2000 I saw the president talking to urban youth and that is when I finally understood 
why cleanliness is so important to him. I asked myself ‘come on Mr. President, of all the 
issues we are facing…cleanliness?? But the issue was not cleanliness per se, but the 
influence of cleanliness and orderliness in everything we do […] When you go into 
African cities what you see is the hustle, the dust, the chaos – his message was ‘can’t 
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we do this differently?’. It is about a mindset […] We have to be orderly, we have to be 
clean, we have to be modern. It is a new idea, a new identity.’
170
 
 
As noted in Section 4.2, around five years into the new millennium a raft of new 
policies and laws relating to urbanisation started to emerge, sometimes bearing 
striking resemblance to those in Uganda. Yet in Rwanda enforcement and 
behavioural norms also transformed to a remarkable extent. The Master Plan, in 
particular, was not taken lightly and was in constant use as a framework for action: 
‘We are all impaled on the Master Plan’, one development consultant observed.171 
Even government ministers wanting to build in the city reputedly consulted with, 
and took seriously, the CoK planning office.
172
 As well as finding a new zeal for 
urban planning, the government’s concern with building regulations was bolstered 
by a number of building collapses in the mid-2000s, one of which resulted in four 
deaths.
173
  
 
This is not to imply that illegal construction ceased entirely. Low levels of capacity at 
district level (along with local corruption, which had not been entirely eradicated, 
depite the government’s strict stance)
174
 meant that inappropriate building plans 
sometimes slipped through, and one source claimed that ‘the government is in 
denial about the amount of illegal housing being built’.
175
 However, evidence 
suggests two major differences from Kampala. First, illegal construction clearly was 
declining, both because of the government’s strictness and because the process of 
obtaining a building permit was streamlined, having previously been extremely 
long-winded. Even basic observations around the city underscored the plausibility 
of the claim that illegal construction had reduced ‘radically and abruptly’.
176
 Second, 
when illegal construction that did take place was subsequently discovered, 
corrective state action was the rule rather than the exception. A fixed procedure 
was in place: the planning office first wrote the developer a letter; if this failed they 
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issued a fine; and if fines were not paid and the contravention was substantial, they 
asked the developer to destroy the building, backed up by the threat of government 
demolition.177 Taking officials’ word that these procedures were followed would not 
provide sufficient evidence; but there were many clear examples and sources for 
triangulation, as the following sections testify.  
 
The power of land use regulation and the protection of open space 
 
If Kampala is a swamp set amid hills, Kigali is a deeper swamp amid higher hills. 
Given the terrain and climate in both cities, urban wetlands play critically important 
functions in relation, for example, to absorbing runoff water, improving water 
quality in situations of poor sanitation and attenuating floods. One of the sharpest 
contrasts between the two cities in 2000-2010 was the relative protection of major 
wetlands in Kigali vis-à-vis the encroachment and small-scale industrialisation 
documented in Kampala. In 2006, the Rwandan government commissioned a 
technical map of the city’s wetlands (subsequently incorporated into the Master 
Plan), showing ecologically sensitive zones and highlighting areas that been 
inappropriately converted. The new legal framework prohibited construction of any 
kind within twenty metres of designated wetlands, and government policy was to 
rehabilitate wetlands that had previously been converted to other uses. In 2008, 
many houses occupying Kigali’s wetland areas were demolished.178 Plans were also 
underway to move the city’s entire industrial area (containing 98 mostly small and 
medium-sized industries) from the wetland where it was built in the 1960s and 
1970s to a new industrial park on Kigali’s outskirts, which had been expropriated for 
this purpose and fitted with basic infrastructure by 2010.179  
 
New acquisitions of land in wetland areas still took place, and developers still 
applied to build there. However, REMA always rejected these plans. There were 
repeated efforts to try to block the rulings of Environmental Impact Assessments, 
                                                          
177
 Interview with Babas Edson, Building Inspector, Nyarugenge District, 09.12.09. 
178
 Interview with Dennis Rugege, REMA, 10.02.10. This was one of a series of expropriations around 
2007-8 that caused considerable controversy (see also below). 
179
 Interview with Alex Ruzibukira, Rwanda Development Board, 08.12.09. 
  
 140
with some people going ‘to the highest levels’, but REMA officials maintained that 
they had ‘not heard of any of these that have succeeded.’180 Since the new 
emphasis on controlling urban development, very few new structures had been 
built in the wetlands; the main problem was thus dealing with those built before 
new regulations came into place. The relative openness of the urban wetlands is 
striking (see Figure 4.2). In the words of a REMA official, it reflected ‘discipline in 
society’; the importance of orderly development and respect for open spaces had 
been emphasised so thoroughly that ‘society is beginning to internalise it…the 
message has gone through and it has been accepted’.181  
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Figure 4.2: Kigali’s Gisozi wetlands, fringed by informal settlements 
 
 
Source: author’s own photograph and Google Earth (© 2010 Google) 
 
Ironically, while REMA legally had very strong powers (including those to veto 
decisions made by CoK), those of its equivalent in Uganda (NEMA) were in some 
respects stronger. There were strict regulations and codes of practice for EIA 
practitioners in Uganda that Rwanda had not yet set in place.182 Yet in contrast to 
NEMA’s failure to act against encroachment or changes of land use whenever 
wealthy investors (or poor ‘untouchables’) were involved, REMA successfully 
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blocked multi-million dollar developments in Kigali on environmental grounds. One 
example involved a large open space next to the golf course in Kigali’s upmarket 
Nyarutarama area (Gasabo District). Proposals to  develop this into a luxury housing 
and hotel complex by Dubai World fell through due to the latter’s financial 
difficulties in 2008 and the cost of undertaking development in a landlocked country 
without locally-obtainable construction materials (a perennial problem in Rwanda). 
Subsequently, a Rwandese investor proposed an amusement park for the area, 
which CoK partnered and approved. However, as construction was beginning REMA 
stopped it, insisting that first an environmental clean-up operation was required 
due to the hazards of chemical waste from a nearby major hospital, hotel and 
informal settlement. REMA regulations stated that potential developers for this 
area would incur the (substantial) costs of this clean-up exercise themselves. With 
no developer yet willing to pay that price and no compromise on the government 
side on these conditions, the area lay abandoned in 2010.183 
 
Bulldozers and precedents: the state versus the hoteliers 
  
Kigali’s hotel industry, which was growing alongside increasing investment and 
international presence in the 2000s, tells a very different story from that described 
in relation to Kampala. Towards the end of the decade several new major hotels 
were partially demolished by the authorities due to regulatory breaches. One was 
the Manor Hotel, which eventually opened in 2010 after a saga of several years that 
began in 2005 when a British investor began building what was eventually marketed 
as Kigali’s first ‘boutique hotel’. In 2006, CoK discovered he was building a 
commercial property without a permit in a residential area, and stopped the 
construction. The investor protested that he was new to Rwanda and that the rules 
were not clear, after which the District authorities advised that he undertake an EIA 
and noise assessment (given the residential location) before construction could be 
resumed. The District scrutinised the assessments and eventually allowed 
construction to continue.184 Then, however, the developer began work on an 
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extension intended as a sauna and massage parlour that was not approved or even 
mentioned in the EIA, raising concerns about the increased people, noise, vehicles 
and demands on sewerage that would result.185 A new application was made for the 
extension, but the developer continued to build in the meantime, impatient with 
the long wait for a response. On discovering this, the District Authorities wrote to 
him in January 2009 requesting, in accordance with the official procedures, that the 
unapproved extension be destroyed. ‘We gave him the opportunity to destroy it 
himself’, explained the former mayor, ‘so he could do it carefully and recuperate 
the materials’.186  
 
The developer was adamant – perhaps even rather aggressive187 – and when he 
refused to take it down the District Mayor appeared in April with bulldozers in tow 
and demolished the entire extension. This was a remarkable turn of events, for 
several reasons. First, the hotelier was the single largest British private investor in 
Rwanda to date according to embassy records, with around £5m in investments in 
the hotel project at this point; and this was a time where the government was 
working very hard to attract investors.188 Second, the investor’s wife was Rwandese 
and very well connected. The developer ‘tried to use influence’, the District Mayor 
explained:  
‘He went to the office of the Prime Minister – the Prime Minister called me on his 
behalf but I explained what was happening. The hotel owner tried to use some 
relationships he had […] his wife is influential. But here if the law is not respected it 
is not respected…you cannot say ‘I am friends with the Prime Minister’, or even the 
Secretary General of the RPF – it doesn’t work.’
189
  
 
Those involved in the hotel project felt that the mayor was inflexible and the delays 
in granting permission inexcusably long.
190
 Even some city officials suggested that 
the Mayor ‘went too far’.
191
 On the other hand, at various points the regulations 
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and procedures were made explicit and, delays notwithstanding, the investor 
showed little respect for them, both changing the land usage and then building 
without a permit. Some observers suggested that this reflected an underlying 
arrogance and assumption that when doing business in Africa, rules and regulations 
are infinitely flexible. ‘They broke all the rules…they are very lucky the whole hotel 
wasn’t pulled down’, admits another investor who followed the hotel’s progress. ‘It 
was supposed to be a residential house…they were submitting plans after each 
change was made, building the hotel on an ad hoc basis’ as they obtained more 
funds. ‘What they did was build a section, then submit the plans […] the mayor 
went down about three times and warned them, and said “we have tolerated this 
so far”, this shouldn’t be here’.192 The point, from the former District Mayor’s 
perspective, was that ‘We need to not create a precedent for people to start to 
construct and then ask for a permit.’193  
 
It was clear that both politicians and officials and politicians at City and District level 
believed implementing plans and rigorously enforcing regulations was important 
not only for the city’s development but for their own survival. The story of the 
second hotel, Golden Hills, confirmed why this fear was well-founded. This 
Rwandese-owned hotel located in Kiyovu, Nyarugenge District, was demolished in 
November 2009 after it became apparent the owner had not obtained a permit to 
turn one of his two neighbouring plots into part of a hotel, having only obtained 
clearance for the first. This demolition came about not because the authorities had 
knowledge that the hotel violated particular construction regulations, but because 
having been built without inspection it was impossible to know whether it had or 
not (for example regarding the nature of its foundations).194 Despite ordering the 
demolition personally, the then Mayor of Nyarugenge was forced to resign because 
it later transpired that earlier in the year he had already known that unapproved 
developments were happening but turned a blind eye. Having previously 
demolished a residential house (worth around 100 million RWF (£100,000) and with 
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people ‘already living in it!’) on grounds of illegal construction, it was perceived to 
be inconsistent and suspicious that he did not order the hotel’s demolition 
sooner.195 People in the local authorities had certainly been dismissed for less; local 
officials explained that they were ‘training themselves’ to follow the law to the 
letter, given that ‘slight things can make you out of office’.196 
 
‘Zero tolerance’ and its discontents 
 
With the precedent set by the 2008 wetland demolitions, city officials claimed that 
in 2009-10 ‘the problem of building illegally has reduced or even gone to zero’, 
barring a few high-profile examples such as those above. For a city growing at such 
a rapid pace in a very poor country where little dedicated housing for low-income 
residents was being built, this raises questions about where the poorer urban 
residents were living, given the financial and regulatory obstacles to building legally. 
Finding a convincing answer to this question was difficult. Kigali’s population growth 
was in part accounted for by increasing settlement in ‘rural estates’ in the rural 
parts of the city, which actually comprised the majority of land within the official 
city boundaries drawn in 2006 (Oz Architecture 2007a). These estates were linked 
to the broader imidugudu villagisation programme.197 Other explanations for the 
whereabouts of the new urban population included increasing numbers of people 
crowding into existing informal housing.198 Some planned urban housing had been 
constructed for the poor, but only on a small scale and to house people evicted due 
to specific urban development projects (see below).199  
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There was of course some small-scale illegal construction to accommodate the 
burgeoning urban population. Yet the widespread unplanned construction through 
which most developing cities grow, and through which Kigali itself grew for most of 
its post-independence history, had certainly been minimalised. A local brick 
manufacturer and local land broker confirmed that even though the construction 
industry in Kigali was booming, it was necessary to build with permission and 
exactly in accordance with permits. ‘If you move to the left or to the right, that’s it’, 
he explained; ‘there are people who say it is like Europe’.200  In low-income areas, if 
people constructed anything illegally it was likely to be made of mud due to 
awareness of how soon it would be destroyed.201  
 
The strong hand of the state on illegal construction by the poor is something that 
has been witnessed historically time and again across the world, particularly as 
countries develop and urbanise (Payne 2001; Durrand-Lasserve and Royston 2002; 
Potts 2006). Yet the commitment to a policy of zero tolerance to illegal construction 
over a sustained period (rather than just sporadic crackdowns), paired with a strict 
approach to construction even for the wealthy, is more unusual. For the most part, 
enforcement of the rules applied to all, regardless of wealth and investment 
potential; something that made this commitment much more credible. For 
investors, buying land in Rwanda was complicated enough in itself, but as one 
pointed out obtaining permission to actually build was ‘far harder…because this is 
where they are really cracking down’. He continued:  
‘These are the things that I’ve been learning slowly….you can’t just go and buy a 
piece of land anywhere and build on it…it’s now the master plan designates that 
this will be here and here and here…interestingly [a Rwandese acquaintance] told 
me that his sister is selling [her land] because you can’t build there, they won’t 
allow her. She wants to build a small residential house and they are saying no…that 
area is designated hotels, apartments, high rise.’202  
 
Meanwhile, some people seeking to invest on a much larger scale in the new 
planned CBD pulled out because ‘they wanted to build high rise….and it’s not zoned 
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for that in the Master Plan, so we lost that investment.’203 However, while these 
examples show that even the wealthy and well-connected may not have been 
exempt, these developments all came towards the end of the decade, and even 
then there were likely to have been some exceptions. Some observers argued that 
Nyarutarama was heading the same way as Muyenga in Kampala, with ‘monstrous 
structures’ occupying 75% of the land plot and encroachment on road reserves.204 
Nyarutarama was indeed a parallel in terms of its emergence as a post-war 
boomtown for elites.205 Some critical voices within the bureaucracy argued that the 
city was following the path of Kampala in terms of unplanned development more 
generally.206 However, these perceptions were largely based on the unplanned 
development that undeniably characterised Kigali’s growth for many years until the 
second half of the 2000s, and it seems unquestionable that there was a major shift 
around 2007. Even if they are not sustained forever, the demolitions, wetland 
evictions and strictness with investors described above did not, as far as this 
research has discovered, take place in Kampala at any point between the NRM 
taking power and 2010. While Kigali’s post-war development may have paralleled 
that of Kampala for a decade or so after 1994, the government subsequently 
perceived a still-open window of opportunity to ‘do things differently’, and was 
concertedly attempting to move through it.   
 
A former Technical Advisor for the German Development Service, writing about 
planning practice in Kigali between 2005 and 2008, voiced serious doubts about the 
seriousness of the government with regard to urban planning. She noted that there 
was a considerable degree of ‘flexibility’ in the new urban planning tools, 
particularly as the new legal framework abolished old laws but arrived in piecemeal, 
leaving grey areas and missing decrees, and allowing CoK staff considerable 
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discretion (Ilberg 2008). Notwithstanding the importance of these observations, it is 
worth noting that for much of the period she observed the Master Plan, zoning 
rules and building regulations were not in place or were only just emerging. This 
may in part account for these observations, and the framework for urban 
development control was considerably fleshed out from 2007 onwards. However, 
this is not to imply that planning in Kigali was necessarily inclusive and pro-poor 
even after these developments. There were still important gaps in terms of 
procedure, and it was the manner of implementation rather than the lack of it that 
posed challenges as the decade came to a close. The enforcement of laws (for 
example the Expropriation Law) without the accompanying measures and 
procedures in place constituted a continuing problem,207 as the next section 
demonstrates. 
 
4.5    Transformative destruction: expropriation and eviction in the name of the 
Plan 
 
In urban contexts characterised by decades of unplanned growth, implementing 
transformative planning is as much about demolishing structures that currently 
exist as regulating what is built. The contrast between the two cities can be further 
highlighted in relation to two parallel attempts to evict communities in dilapidated 
areas of the city in order to redevelop them in line with urban plans.  These are 
briefly examined in turn. 
 
Kampala: political bargaining and the obstruction of transformative planning 
 
The aforementioned ‘power’ of ordinary people in Kampala to provoke political 
intervention in their favour was clearly illustrated in the story of an urban 
development project that required evicting a large community in order to build a 
planned modern residential neighbourhood. In theory, the project was 
straightforward, and nothing in the framework for land or planning (See Appendix 
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3) posed any obstacles. A dilapidated Kampala estate known as Nakawa-Naguru, 
built by the colonial government in the 1950s for African bureaucrats and itinerant 
labourers (Munger 1951: 17), was earmarked in the early 2000s for demolition and 
redevelopment (in accordance with the 1994 Structure Plan) as a ‘satellite town’ to 
draw congestion away from the city centre. After several years of delays, in 2007 a 
British company, Opecprime Properties Limited, finally signed a Public Private 
Partnership agreement with the government after winning the bid to undertake the 
redevelopment of the area. The $300m proposal involved developing 5,000 housing 
units including 1,747 affordable flats that the displaced tenants would have an 
option to purchase at subsidised prices.208  
 
In December 2007 the company was poised to begin, with the Minister of Local 
Government giving residents until the end of January 2008 to vacate the area, when 
the Inspector General of Government (IGG) intervened saying she wanted to 
investigate the tendering process after some tenants complained.209 The 
investigation was not forthcoming and six months later, the increasingly impatient 
Minister issued a ‘final and last’ warning to the residents of the dilapidated 
structures to vacate within one month or face forceful eviction. This was 
immediately followed by a notice from the IGG directing tenants to stay put until 
the investigation was finished.210 The outraged Minister responded with a 
declaration that the IGG could not ‘use her position to frustrate government 
projects. […] Nobody should act as if he or she is more powerful than the 
government’.211 Following this, with the IGG’s support, around 300 families (out of a 
total of over 7,000 in the estate) petitioned the High Court to halt the eviction. 
However, in October 2008, the Court ruled that the tenants were unjustifiably 
seeking to block the redevelopment and ordered that they pay costs of the suit to 
the Attorney General and Opecprime properties.212   
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After this point, the entire situation descended into a mess of mutual allegations of 
lying and malpractice, alongside fresh revelations that large parts of the land had 
been ‘quietly parcelled out’ and sold off to city businessmen during the hiatus.213 At 
the time field research was completed in early 2010, the situation was still in 
stalemate. One urban planning official declared the whole project ‘basically 
dead’.214 It was believed by observers that the president himself eventually weighed 
in on the side of the tenants. ‘Museveni blocked one of the biggest investments’ the 
city has seen in recent years because of the petition, one political commentator 
noted, adding that ‘when it comes to these mundane issues of evicting people and 
things like that he will become jittery….he has a fear of antagonising any 
constituency’ and ‘is unable to understand that he has to make trade-offs, [to] incur 
short-term costs for a long-term return’.215 Most observers agreed that the failure 
of the plan to go ahead was lamentable, and it would have been a positive 
development for the city.216 
 
Perhaps most extraordinary thing about the Nakawa-Naguru saga was that the 
estates sat entirely on government-owned land, rather than mailo or any other 
form of private land. Consequently there were no landowners involved, and no 
need for official expropriation of the land.217 The fact that these plans could not get 
off the ground for years gives the lie to ideas that Kampala’s failure to implement 
plans was simply due to private land ownership. Here was a project where land was 
already in the state’s hands, for which a ‘public interest’ argument could easily be 
made and which included reasonable terms for existing tenants. Despite this, it 
remained unrealised on the basis of 300 signatures in a saga that lasted most of a 
decade. It clearly illustrates the agency of the tenants in rallying politicians to 
repeatedly intervene on their behalf against the efforts of other state actors to 
implement a long-planned urban project.   
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Kigali: expropriating into the future   
 
Widespread eviction for the purposes of commercial development in Kigali had 
already been taking place on a major scale prior to the new legal framework on 
land, planning and expropriation,218 and in the absence of this guiding framework 
expropriation constituted ‘one of the most scandalous issues in Rwanda’ in the early 
years of the millennium.219 To some degree this changed with the 2005 Organic 
Land Law and 2007 Expropriation Law. However, while some aspects of the 
controversy were addressed, the emergence of the highly ambitious Master Plan 
shortly after these laws were passed meant that expropriations accelerated after 
2007, often justified in relation to the broadly-defined ‘public interest’ (see Chapter 
Three). The continuing lack of clarity over procedure did not prevent the Rwandan 
government from implementing controversial expropriation projects in the name of 
improving living conditions and the city’s commercial development, in sharp 
contrast with the experience in Kampala. Two particular incidences of expropriation 
by the government are briefly presented here: the case of Ubumwe, an informal 
settlement next to the city centre that was expropriated to make way for the new 
CBD in 2007-8 (see Figure 4.3); and the case of Gaculiro, a residential area in the 
North of the city expropriated in 2009.  
 
Ubumwe was characterised by particularly poor housing and infrastructure. The 
new desire to tackle the problem of kajagari along with the emerging plan for an 
entirely new CBD spurred Kigali Mayor Aisa Kirabo Kacyira, who took office in 2005, 
to propose this settlement for expropriation. In July 2007, after a site was identified 
on the fringes of the city (Batsinda, in Gasabo District) for the relocation of the 
people to be displaced,220 the city authorities began valuing all 336 properties in 
Ubumwe for the purposes of compensation, and asked the residents to relocate 
(RISD 2008). CoK itself did not have sufficient resources to build new houses for 
those expropriated, so entered into a partnership with Caisse Sociale Rwanda (CSR, 
the Rwandan Social Security Fund) who agreed to fund the construction of 250 low-
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cost housing units at Batsinda. In exchange, CSR was given ownership of the 
Ubumwe land to sell off to investors for the new CBD after fitting it with 
infrastructure. A third partner, the Rwanda Housing Bank (RHB), was brought on 
board with the task of providing loans to the former Ubumwe residents (the vast 
majority of whom were low-income) so that they could afford to purchase houses in 
Batsinda.221 
 
Of Ubumwe’s 336 households, 136 relocated to Batsinda, while over a hundred 
others moved elsewhere in the city or back to rural villages out of necessity or 
choice. Sixty-seven households resisted eviction altogether, mostly on the grounds 
that they were not happy with the level of compensation, though in other cases 
because they argued their livelihoods required them to be close to the city centre 
and they could only afford to move on foot.222  In response to their complaints, the 
city government invoked the Expropriation Law, explaining that the CBD was a 
project in the ‘public interest’, and in July 2008, bulldozers came in and forced the 
sixty-seven remaining families to leave.  Some of these residents who had resisted 
complained to the Ombudsman, and it appears that there was recognition that they 
were unfairly treated and the compensation was inadequate, which increased 
pressure for the refinement of expropriation procedures noted above.223 The 
particular controversy around this expropriation did not, however, prevent further 
expropriations from taking place – on the contrary, they further accelerated and 
progressed to a far larger scale. In mid-2009 the government expropriated the 
entire 140 hectare informal residential area of Gaculiro, consisting of 3,600 houses 
of varying sizes and standards, for the development of a new ‘satellite town’ 
containing both housing units and commercial facilities, much along the lines of the 
proposed Naguru-Nakawa project in Kampala.  
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Figure 4.3: Ubumwe before and after expropriation, and as envisaged in the 
Master Plan  
 
 
Source: Google Earth (© 2010 Google) and author’s own photographs 
 
The speed and seeming ease of the expropriation and eviction process in Gaculiro 
were remarkable.
224
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partly due to ‘sensitisation’ on the importance of planning.225 Participatory 
meetings found that ‘resettlement with compensation’ was even positively 
perceived by some (Ilberg 2008: 4). On the other hand, sheer force is likely to have 
played a substantial role in Gaculiro, as it did in Ubumwe, though it was more 
difficult to obtain information on the people expropriated in Gaculiro and the 
impact on their livelihoods. However, CSR staff admitted that the population was 
‘scattered’ and some ‘went very far from town’.226 Moreover, the kind of help 
offered by way of the Batsinda project and RHB loans was not offered to those in 
Gaculiro. It appears that many ended up in ‘rural estates’ outside the urban part of 
the city where they have fewer livelihood options, increased transport costs and 
may lack the skills necessary to earn a living.227 The government argued that while 
‘the transitional time is very hard…we have systems that absorb people 
economically and socially’, and after a few years people are happy with the 
change.228  
 
Whatever the impact of the expropriations, the point here is that the government 
moved to implement major projects embedded in the Master Plan through eviction 
at a pace that was inconceivable in Kampala, despite similar plans and the securing 
of a huge amount of investment in the latter.  For better or worse, the swift 
expropriations in Gaculiro, affecting tens of thousands of people and executed in 
just a few months, contrast starkly with the Naguru-Nakawa case in Kampala where 
a chain of conflicting interventions by political and social actors blocked a similar 
project was for much of the 2000s. In Kigali further waves of expropriation were 
under way in 2010, with 4,700 households on 150 hectares of land near the city 
centre already valued for expropriation.  
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 Interview with Vincent Karega, Rwandan Minister of Infrastructure, Kigali 09.12.09. 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explored some of the most striking contrasts in the effectiveness of 
the state in the two cities under scrutiny. In Kampala, many failures of urban 
development control were the consequence of reigning social norms through which 
ordinary urban-dwellers appealed to politicians to block the attempts of other state 
actors to regulate or evict them. Meanwhile, illicit deals between elite developers 
and those in positions of political or bureaucratic authority also prevailed over 
policy and law. The result was an environment in which more or less anyone whose 
interests were threatened in the short term by urban plans or regulations could find 
a supporter within a state agency with the power to aid their cause in exchange for 
financial or electoral support. As a Ugandan government official working on urban 
issues noted, with one eye on the comparison with Rwanda:  
‘In Kigali if the City Council has decided to something, that’s it – you’ll have 
nowhere to run to. But here in Uganda and in Kampala in particular, if a decision is 
made by Kampala City Council and somebody is implementing the contrary, and 
you try to stop it, they will run to another place for support. And they will get the 
support. KCC will be told ‘please wait. Leave that matter. We are investigating’. In 
the process, the developments are going on – the investigation report by that third 
party will never come out […] if it ever comes up, the project will be complete. So it 
defeats your reasoning and your energies of fighting.’
229
 
 
The urban political process could thus be viewed as a series of interventions in 
favour of people seeking a mutually beneficial bargain. The bargains involved 
politicians essentially generating institutional conflicts that obstructed the 
functionality of the state system; indeed the deliberate creation of ‘a degree of 
conflict’ by ‘individuals in high authorities’ was noted by some respondents.230 Thus 
politicians were often working against the state itself. When the exercise of state 
authority is prevented at a building site, for example, by men with guns, this 
constitutes a clear undermining of the state in a basic Weberian sense. 
Consequently, in contrast to the ‘pro-planning’ state interventions observed in 
Kigali, many decisive political interventions in Kampala took the form of ‘anti-
planning’ interventions, reminding the urban population that the government was 
                                                          
229
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happy to waive formal rules in their favour. This affected the credibility of the whole 
framework for urban development control, to the extent that even major 
developers in the city made little attempt to disguise their flagrant disregard for it. 
It also meant that politicians were increasingly seeking legitimacy with social groups 
through this kind of intervention, creating a self-reinforcing dynamic of state 
ineffectiveness. 
 
For the government in Rwanda, the determination to persevere with transformative 
but disruptive urban planning projects reflected elite perceptions of ‘a big danger if 
the future if the question [of urban settlements] is not addressed…the country may 
end up not being an organised country. There will be environmental hazards and 
there may be social, economic insecurity.’231 The expropriation of the Ubumwe 
settlement was partly justified by the CoK authorities on the grounds that ‘this 
community was becoming a security concern’ (Kairaba 2008). Managing 
urbanisation was thus seen, like so many other issues in Rwanda, as a security issue, 
and much of whatever support and legitimacy the RPF government had hinged on 
its credibility with regard to minimising insecurity. As such there was sufficient 
consensus within the elite – from the city’s mayor and local politicians to the 
President and national ministers, all of whom were members of the RPF – that 
implementation mattered.  
 
Bolstering this was the fact that alongside the domestic security agenda, the 
government also drew its international legitimacy from its push for results and strict 
stance on corruption; indeed its ongoing efforts to attract investment, which were 
crucial to its broader development agenda, depended on these factors. Kigali played 
a central role here: it was viewed by the government as somewhere that must ‘lead’ 
the rest of the country by example232 and as a critical site for Rwanda’s engagement 
with the international donor and investment community (Goodfellow and Smith 
2013 forthcoming). The close engagement between CoK and urban planners from 
the United States and Singapore (the latter representing a development success 
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story the Rwandan government aspired to above all others) was further evidence of 
this.233 Urban development in Kigali therefore largely took place through unilateral 
state interventions that supported plans and regulations. The ‘elite bargain’ 
embodied in the Master Plan thus looked very different from the elite collusion on 
display in Kampala, which reflected a generalised understanding that stimulating a 
degree of division and undermining institutional congruence could play into the 
hands of elites of all stripes. 
 
In short, disorganisation was perceived as an opportunity by elites in Kampala, but 
presented potentially grave threats in Kigali. Part of the pact underpinning the 
collective elite project in Rwanda was the unacceptability of visibly exposing 
disjunctures between the formal institutional framework and actual behaviour or 
breaking ranks more generally. On the domestic front, by publicly subjecting elites 
to rigorous standards of behaviour the government could potentially limit 
dangerous perceptions among the majority that elites were freely ‘eating’ at their 
expense. However, preparing Kigali as a ‘Singapore for Africa’ while simultaneously 
attempting to limit perceptions that the city was an elite playground was a difficult 
balance to strike, and resulted in slums and five star hotels being demolished in 
tandem.  
 
It was not only with regard to physical change, the bricks and mortar of 
development, that striking contrasts regarding effective policy implementation 
could be observed between Kampala and Kigali. In terms of the human element too 
– the lives and livelihoods of the urban majority seeking a living in the informal 
economy – efforts to regulate and shape development met with hugely varying 
outcomes. It is to this subject that Chapter Five now turns. 
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Chapter Five 
Governing the urban informal economy: petty trade and public order  
 
This chapter explores the degree of effectiveness with which the state regulated the 
economic activity of people engaged in petty trade in Kampala and Kigali during the 
first decade of the twenty-first century. In the context of low levels of 
industrialisation, small scale trading has historically been among the most 
important livelihood options in both cities, whether in the form of selling goods in 
legally gazetted marketplaces, running pavement kiosks or vending fruit on street 
corners.  Efforts by the state to control and tax these activities were multifarious 
and the links between state actors and petty traders dense and complex. As with 
physical planning, these efforts met very different outcomes in the two cities.  
 
This chapter explores the political economy of petty trade in Kigali and Kampala to 
assess why policies and regulations were implemented so much more effectively in 
the former. It begins with a discussion of the highly contested concept of the 
‘informal economy’ and its significance for this research. This is followed by a 
section describing the historical evolution of informality in general and petty trade 
in particular in the two cities, before outlining the relevant formal institutional 
framework. The chapter then turns to the core empirical material, first exploring 
how attempts to shape urban commercial activity unfolded in a critical urban space: 
the marketplace. Taking each city in turn, the politics of marketplace management 
and its effects on effective policy implementation is explored. Following this, the 
chapter turns to the question of how and why informal street vending and hawking 
outside the arena of the marketplace was so much more tightly controlled in Kigali 
than Kampala. Finally, the analysis is drawn together and conclusions are presented. 
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5.1    Urban informality and petty trade: concepts, issues and challenges  
 
The concept of the ‘informal economy’ 
 
Keith Hart first introduced the concept of the urban ‘informal sector’ in a 1971 
conference paper on Ghana, published in 1973 (Hart 1973). He argued against the 
Marxist-influenced notion that most urban-dwellers in developing country cities 
were an ‘unemployed’ labour reserve, instead presenting the activities of the urban 
poor as economically dynamic and ‘a means of salvation’ where wage labour is 
scarce (Hart 1973: 67). Far from being marginal, he argued, these workers provide 
‘many of the essential services on which life in the city is dependent’ (Hart 1973: 
68). Thus urban petty economic activity was recast from being a space of failure to 
one of opportunity and potential success. Hart basically defined the informal sector 
as work outside public or private sector waged employment, comprising a range of 
activity (both legal and illegal) from urban farming and beer manufacturing to street 
hawking. The International Labour Organisation embraced the concept in a 1972 
report but modified it, presenting it as a more rigid and universal structural feature 
of developing economies characterised among other things by ease of entry, small 
scale of operation, family ownership and unregulated markets (ILO 1972).  
 
From early on the concept was widely criticised in the academic community. 
Bromley (1978) argued that it reflected a crude, logically inconsistent dichotomy, 
providing no clear guidelines about how to classify most urban economic activities. 
Harriss (1978) and Moser (1978) likewise attacked the rigid dualism of the 
informal/formal distinction. Yet the concept’s popularity soared, enjoying a 
‘meteoric career in the world of policy’ (Peattie 1987). In the late 1980s De Soto 
published The Other Path, an ebullient celebration of informal activities in relation 
to housing, trade and transport in Peru (De Soto 1989). De Soto’s argument about 
what the ‘informals’ could achieve if laws and regulations were relaxed chimed with 
the ideological spirit of the times. His ideas were enthusiastically adopted by the 
World Bank, and Peattie’s criticism of the distinction as an ‘utterly fuzzy’ 
impediment to analysis (Peattie 1987: 851) fell largely on deaf ears. In the 1990s the 
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concept remained in constant currency, but the terminology began to change. 
References to the informal ‘economy’ were increasingly preferred to the more 
homogenising term ‘sector’ (Feige 1990; Makaria 1997). MacGaffey, meanwhile, 
adopted the term ‘second’ economy in preference to both ‘informal’ and terms 
such as ‘parallel’, which ignore the degree to which the two ‘economies’ intersect 
(MacGaffey 1991).  
  
Even among those who agreed that the concept was analytically valuable, opposing 
normative approaches were apparent by the 1990s. While de Soto (1989) and 
Chazan (1988) presented informality as assertiveness and dynamism on the part of 
civil society in the face of over-regulation, the ‘informalisation’ perspective 
developed by writers such as Castells and Portes (1989) and Meagher (1995) 
presented a different perspective. Far from being a form of ‘entrepreneurial 
triumph’, they posited growing informality as ‘a strategy on the part of dominant 
formal sector interest groups to defend their conditions of accumulation in the face 
of crisis’ by ensuring a flexible (and vulnerable) pool of informal labour (Meagher 
1995: 260). These perspectives reasserted the role of the state and elite interests in 
creating informal economies. 
 
Despite constant criticism, the concept has repeatedly been reinvented (Chen 2006; 
Meagher 2010). Following Lindell (2010: 5), this study accepts that the idea of 
informality has ‘modest analytical value’, and works with a broad definition based 
on a number of key characteristics. It classes as informal those activities that in 
some respects ‘lie beyond or circumvent state regulation’ (Lindell 2010: 5) and 
posits a continuum of formality-informality rather than a clear dichotomy. Despite 
rejecting oversimplistic definitions that view informality as virtually synonymous 
with tax evasion (Spiro 1997), the extent of taxation by the state and extent to 
which modes of tax collection conform to formal rules are here considered central 
to an activity’s position on that continuum. Equally important, however, is the 
extent to which working conditions are governed by policies and regulations that 
are implemented and enforced.  
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The sheer diversity of unregulated or partially-regulated economic activity makes it 
counter-productive to specify the concept further. The relationship between 
informal activity and the state is complex and politicians can be complicit in it: 
informal enterprises often enter what Tendler (2002) terms a ‘devil’s deal’ with 
politicians, whereby they are unofficially exempted from taxation and compliance 
with regulations in exchange for votes. This study concurs with Lindell’s (2010: 17) 
observation about how ‘the state may suspend the law and resort to the 'state of 
exception', which itself can be seen as a technique of power.'  Arguing that there is 
an ‘essential antithesis between state power and informality’ (Centeno 2006) thus 
oversimplifies reality, because some of the actors partaking in this political 
bargaining are part of the state. Yet sometimes the conflict between informal 
activities and state actors is very real, even while deals are simultaneously struck 
with other state actors. In this regard, distinctions between politicians and 
bureaucrats (see Chapter Two), as well as the national and local state, can be 
critical. Informality is therefore a sphere in which the relationship between an 
economic activity and the state is highly ambiguous. Turning to petty trade, these 
issues will be unpacked further.  
 
Petty trade and the state:  on the hazy boundary between formal and informal  
 
Informality proliferated in the wake of structural adjustment because the 
contraction of formal sector jobs left most city-dwellers little choice but to seek 
informal livelihoods (Meagher 1995; Cross 1998). Street vending was among the 
more appealing options, requiring only a minimal capital outlay. It burgeoned in 
African cities – particularly among women (Mitullah 2003), and in the poorest 
countries where access to finance was scarce and there was little industry; indeed 
Brown and Lyons (2010: 33) claim that 'Street traders are the largest groups in the 
informal economy, after home-based workers’. Despite this, in some ways petty 
trade sits oddly with the informality discourse. Urban traders are rarely ‘beyond’ 
state reach234 because their work is highly public, making it difficult to avoid 
taxation of some kind. When trading legal goods, they often pay some (usually 
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local) taxes but not other (often national) ones; but the degree to which they are 
actually subject to taxes can be highly arbitrary (Lourenço-Lindell 2002). Meanwhile, 
the belief that they generate rubbish, obstruct traffic and comprise a public 
nuisance underscores their perceived informality (Mitullah 2003), though this has 
little to do with conventional definitions of the informal economy.  
 
If the boundary between formality and informality has become increasingly blurred 
over time (Centeno 2006; Hart 2006), petty trade often straddles this boundary. 
However, due to their visibility, vendors occupy a special role in relation both to 
government discourses about ‘cracking down’ on informality and politicians’ 
populist efforts to boost urban support. By virtue of their visibility and numbers, 
they are paradoxically both vulnerable and, potentially, collectively powerful 
(Thulare 2004: 17). Relations between vendors and the state therefore tend to be 
characterised by both conflict and co-operation (Lindell 2008), but the form this 
conflict and co-operation takes can vary widely by context. This is not just a 
question of which regulations are in place. Focusing solely on the regulations 
themselves, as have De Soto, Trager (1987) and others, obscures critical issues in 
the political economy of informality regarding how those regulations are used and 
implemented. The prevailing assumption has been that the more ambitious the 
regulations, the more cause for escape and thus the more informality (Lomnitz 
1988: 54). However, in some contexts ambitious policies and regulation to reorder 
petty trade do effectively reduce informality (for better or worse) while in other 
cases they do not. This should be examined empirically.   
 
This chapter is not, therefore, about regulation versus non-regulation or good 
versus bad regulation. It instead addresses a neglected aspect of the informal 
economy debate: why similar regulations are implemented much more effectively 
in some contexts than others. Moreover, to understand fully the differential state 
effectiveness in the two cities with regard to managing petty trade, we should also 
look beyond regulatory frameworks. This means considering the broader policy 
context in terms of stated government agendas regarding the ‘modernisation’ of 
  
 163
commercial areas, and examining the relative degrees of success in meeting these 
policy goals.   
 
5.2    Contextual background and institutional framework for petty trade  
 
Uganda  
 
Uganda is a canonical case of economic informality, due to the development of its 
notorious magendo (black market) economy in the Idi Amin period (Kasfir 1983; 
Prunier 1983). In the context of Amin’s ‘economic war’, the formal sector 
contracted, government authorities were starved of revenues and the state was 
deblitated vis-à-vis informal networks (Kasfir 1983: 86). By 1980 two thirds of 
Uganda’s GDP consisted of magendo, a remarkable increase from the 3% estimated 
a decade earlier (Green 1981). In his classic study, Green argued that magendo 
created its own class structure, with up to 500 very wealthy mafutamingi at the top, 
some 2,500 magendoists in the middle and vast numbers of bayaye (basically 
meaning ‘thugs’) who comprised the labourers, drivers, street vendors and thieves 
at the bottom (Green 1981).  
 
Top-level magendo often involved informal production and smuggling, yet at the 
level of the bayaye, petty trade was a central livelihood strategy. The typical 
magendoist ‘distributed his stock to ‘his’ bayaye to retail at every nook and corner 
of the town at magendo prices’ (Mamdani 1983: 53-4). Petty trade was especially 
critical for urban women, for many of whom the Amin period was not a period of 
economic crisis but a time when females first came to have ‘a legitimate claim on 
the cash economy’ (Ahikire 2003: 28). Significantly, economic informalisation did 
not end with the ousting of Amin; the magendo system ‘became even more 
powerful after liberation’ (Kasfir 1983: 92).  While Obote’s second government 
expanded public sector employment, magendo reinvented itself in the context of 
salaries so low that even formal workers sought other ways to earn money in order 
to survive; incomes were falling fast in this period (Jamal 1991). Under Obote II the 
state grew ‘more porous’, enabling new linkages between informal activities and 
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state actors who either partook in them directly or took bribes to facilitate them 
(Kasfir 1983: 101).  
 
By the time Museveni took power in 1986, these patterns were thoroughly 
established. Moreover, while the NRM consolidated its power over the state, the 
‘streamlining’ of KCC in the context of structural adjustment and the lack of 
employment in other sectors led to increasing illegal trade that city officials would 
happily ignore for the right price (Gombay 1994: 88-9). An ILO study found that in 
Uganda 83.7% of urban employment in the 1990s was informal; significantly higher 
than neighbouring Tanzania (67%) and Kenya (58.1%) (Palmer 2004). Trade 
continued to play an enormous role in this; in Kampala alone there were fifty-five 
legally gazetted markets and perhaps as many as 150 ungazetted ones by 2010.235  
 
Like most governments, the NRM viewed vendors ‘as a problem that has to be 
controlled’ (Mitullah 2003: 10). National laws and urban ordinances were invoked 
to this end, foremost among which is the Markets Act. Its most fundamental 
premise is that ‘No person or authority other than (a) the administration of a 
district; (b) a municipal council or (c) a town council shall establish or maintain a 
market (Markets Act, Cap 94, Section 1). Under this act local authorities were 
entitled to make bylaws regarding issues such as the location of markets and fee-
setting. In terms of street trade, the 2010 Kampala Capital City Act reaffirmed 
provisions in earlier laws236 by specifying that it was the city authority’s role to 
‘Prohibit, restrict, regulate or license the sale or hawking of wares or the erection of 
stalls on any street’(Kampala Capital City Act, Third Schedule, Section 3a).  
 
More locally, KCC’s Markets Ordinance affirms its exclusive right to grant licenses 
for establishing markets, but allows for contractual arrangements between KCC and 
firms or individuals intending to invest in maintaining markets and contains a range 
of other regulations (KCC 2006b). While vendors in legal markets were generally 
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subject to some combination of monthly rent and daily dues (collectively termed 
empooza), street trade was regulated through permits. Itinerant hawkers were 
given legal recognition in some parts of the city and some were allocated permits, 
while stationary street vendors, considered to be the most obstructive and 
problematic form of petty trade, were wholly illegal (Akihire and Ampaire 2003: 18).  
 
There were also important policy developments in the Museveni period concerning 
how and by whom markets were to be owned and managed. A drive to privatise 
marketplaces by selling leases to entrepreneurs appeared around 2005. This 
decision followed the privatisation of market services such as revenue and waste 
collection, and caused a furore in Kampala. Privatising services was contentious 
enough (Lindell and Appelblad 2009), but the decision to actually sell off market 
land – first to private companies and, more recently, to vendors’ associations 
themselves – caused a legal, regulatory and political maelstrom in the city.  
 
Rwanda  
 
Even without the catalyst of Amin’s ‘economic war’, there are reasons to believe 
that Kigali was also a site of above average levels of informalisation from the 1970s 
onwards. From 1970 to 1990, Rwanda’s urban growth rates consistently outstripped 
the African average (UNPD 2009) even though there was very little by way of formal 
sector employment to absorb this population. A small industrial area was developed 
in Kigali from the 1970s, but industrialisation remained nascent partly due to the 
expense of importing materials to a landlocked, resource-poor country (Behuria 
2011). By the end of the 1970s only a fifth of the city population worked in industry, 
with the remainder in agriculture and (mostly informal) services (Munyaneza 1994). 
A report from 1990 confirmed that most inhabitants of Kigali worked in the fields or 
other ‘unregistered’ activities rather than the formal economy and suggested that a 
change of ‘mentality’ was needed. It also highlighted how urban unemployment 
was leading to ‘deliquency of all kinds’ (RoR 1990: 40). Yet with regard to petty 
trade, in the 1980s the city authorities did ‘everything in their power to organise 
markets’ (RoR 1990: 28). Informal activity on the streets was to some degree 
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controlled; this was perhaps best exemplified by the institution of a weekly ‘poor 
people’s day’, whereby poor people were allowed to come into the city on Fridays 
only and beg for money.237 
 
The most intense period of trade informalisation was therefore probably in the 
years immediately after 1994, which is unsurprising given the other priorities at the 
time (see Chapter Three). A 2001 study indicated that in areas outside the CBD up 
to 94% of businesses were unregistered (KIST 2001a: 28). In terms of petty trade, a 
city official noted that 1999-2000 was probably the apex of a ‘serious problem’ of 
street vending and pickpocketing238 and a 2000-1 survey classified 22.1% of Kigali’s 
population as traders and hawkers (RoR 2002: 74). Many interviewees noted that 
the streets in central Kigali were lined with informal kiosks, vendors and orphans 
begging in the early years of the millennium. There was a ‘rapid increase’ of street 
children after 1994 (KIST 2001: 34-5) and in 2001 an estimated 7,000 children were 
living on the streets in urban areas (HRW 2006: 3). Alongside trade, older youths 
would engage in informal service activities such as sitting on the street with 
typewriters to type up documents for people and providing telephones for use for a 
small fee.239 One source noted that, in contrast with 2009, ‘it was like a typical 
African city centre’.240  
 
This was the highly informalised environment the RPF sought to transform in the 
process of implementing its broader urban development vision from the early 
2000s. As far as marketplaces were concerned, the 2006 Law on the Functioning of 
Districts states that District Councils must approve where markets are built (Law No. 
08/2006: Article 20), while in Kigali specifically the decision to ‘fix’ or ‘remove’ a 
marketplace has also to be approved by the City Mayor and the Minister of Local 
Government (Law No. 10/2006: Article 236). Markets were addressed in further 
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detail through the five-year District Development Plans (DDPs).241 Street trade was 
decentralised to district governments in law (Law No. 10/2006: Article 157), and at 
the local level there were projects for working with and organising informal traders 
such as the 2007 Kigali City Hawker’s project (CoK 2007). 
 
Having provided some brief contextual background and outlined the formal 
framework for regulating petty trade in the two cities, the next sections turn to the 
reality of how the sector was governed in each. In Kampala, where managing 
marketplaces was cited by officials as one of the biggest challenges of the city’s 
development in the twenty-first century,242 many policies barely got off the ground 
and the regulatory framework was rendered largely impotent. In Kigali, by contrast, 
a plan to reorganise marketplaces ushered in a radical transformation of petty trade 
in the city. Each case is examined in turn. 
 
5.3    Kampala’s marketplaces: the politics of protest and populism 
 
‘[Markets] are everywhere, they are a mess. It’s politics, and nothing else.’
243
 
 
Critical to understanding how marketplaces became so problematic in Kampala in 
the early twenty-first century is the role of key players in the city who perceived the 
enormous benefits the informal economy could offer them politically and 
economically. These included President Museveni himself and Kampala’s mayor 
from 1998-9 and 2006-11, Nasser Ntege Ssebaggala; but also wealthy businessmen 
who became embroiled in city politics after purchasing leases to marketplaces with 
the stated intent of developing them into modern commercial centres. The state 
was highly ineffective in its engagement with marketplaces even before the turn of 
the century (Gombay 1994) but the decision to privatise markets in the 2000s, 
combined with the return to multi-party politics, rendered them sites of an intense 
scramble for control and influence that undermined state institutions even further. 
Moreover, a growing tendency for market vendors to resort to violence as a means 
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of expressing their discontent with state policies alarmed politicians, precipitating 
populist interventions that heightened policy confusion and perpetuated disregard 
for formal procedures. In what follows, I trace the evolution of the politics of 
Kampala’s marketplaces, with reference to three of the city’s largest, analysing the 
processes through which the state was persistently rendered ineffective. 
 
Owino market and the seeds of discontent 
 
Central to the marketplace ‘problem’ in Kampala was Owino market,244 which with 
a daytime population of some 50,000 people including 7,000 vendors was the 
largest market in East Africa.245 Its evolution illustrates some of the ways in which 
different arms of the state were implicated in the proliferation and fragmentation 
of organisations within marketplaces, compromising the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of KCC. Controversy began when Godfrey Kayongo, Owino’s Chairman 
since 1987, was accused in a 1997 report by the Inspector General of Government 
of grossly mismanaging funds issued for the development of the market under a 
World Bank project aimed at providing improved livelihoods for the urban poor 
(IGG 1997). Through deals struck with certain KCC officials, Kayongo made himself a 
major shareholder (in his daughter’s name) of the construction company awarded 
the tender to develop the market, which siphoned off funds and violated the 
approved construction plans (IGG 1997). He was further accused of massively 
under-reporting the number of market stalls in the market to KCC, enabling him to 
keep large proportions of the market dues he was responsible for collecting and 
passing to the city authorities.246 
 
While there was evidently informal collusion between Kayongo and people within 
KCC, the formal policies and institutions of the council were severely undermined: 
the World Bank-funded redevelopment was shambolic and city regulations and 
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taxes were enforced arbitrarily, if at all.247 Developments in the second half of the 
2000s, however, worsened the situation by layering factional rivalries on top of the 
already rampant corruption. In the context of the government’s drive after 2005 to 
sell off the leases to the marketplaces, Kayongo set up another company called the 
‘Stall and Lockup Owners Association’ (SLOA) to collect money from vendors and 
purchase the lease in their name.248 As a Limited Company with a maximum of 50 
shareholders, SLOA necessarily excluded most vendors from control over the 
market and its spoils – as some vendors soon realised, subsequently establishing 
their own rival group249 with the aim of mobilising vendors against Kayongo. They 
considered him an NRM ‘stooge’, claiming that he ‘treats the market as his own 
property’ and abolished marketplace elections in 1993 to make himself ‘a dictator – 
Chairman for life!’.250 On taking their grievances to Kayongo, his supporters 
reportedly beat them with sticks.251 Kayongo himself interpreted their activities as 
part of efforts by ‘tycoons’ to prevent vendors purchasing the lease through SLOA 
by co-opting and ‘spreading gossip’ among them.252   
 
This rivalry between the two groups resulted in continuing efforts by each to seek 
political patronage and scupper the other’s plans for greater control over the 
market, culminating in a violent clash in June 2009 when the Minister of Local 
Government came to the market to try and resolve the issues, only to be ‘whisked 
away’ amid the chaos.253 In 2010 the issue was still completely unresolved. Similar 
situations prevailed in several of Kampala’s other marketplaces. The decision to sell 
off the market leases at a time of opening political competition had tipped the 
sector into turmoil, and formal state policies and regulations were consigned to 
irrelevance as political figures waded in with illicit deals and populist gestures. This 
approach was personified above all in Ssebaggala, the city’s first directly elected 
mayor under decentralisation. 
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Nakasero Market, Ssebaggala and marketplace populism 
 
Ssebaggala was a Muslim Muganda closely linked to neither the Protestant 
Monarchy nor traditional Catholic Baganda elites, though he was associated with 
the dormant Democratic Party in the period when campaigning explicitly under a 
party-political ticket was formally outlawed (Lambright 2012: 4). He built his 
popular appeal around being the son of a vendor in Nakasero market in the city 
centre, with an agenda to empower vendors to take control of their own 
marketplaces. His catchphrase was ‘seya’, a local adaptation of the word ‘share’ 
used by the urban poor to denote camaraderie. This was Ssebaggala’s way of saying 
he was ‘one of them’,254 and ‘Seya’ subsequently became the nickname 
accompanying his slogan, ‘forward with the common man’s revolution.’255 As such, 
he exhibited the classic characteristics of populism as it manifests in urban areas, 
which Resnick (2012) defines with reference to anti-elitist discourse, policy 
messages oriented around social inclusion, and the profession of affinity with an 
underclass by a charismatic leader. 
 
Elected for the first time in 1998, Ssebaggala was forced to leave office the 
following year when he was arrested in the United States on fraud charges and 
imprisoned for 11 months.256 Remarkably, this only increased his popularity; he 
returned in 2000 to a hero’s welcome, though by this time had been replaced as 
mayor. His popularity was such that initially he decided to run for President of 
Uganda as an independent candidate for the 2006 election, but he subsequently 
tempered his ambitions and ran again for mayor instead, winning decisively in 2006. 
The markets were critical sites of support; it is estimated that 90% of Owino market 
vendors were DP supporters.257 However, despite a popular mandate rooted in 
promises to empower vendors, he almost immediately made a dramatic ‘U-turn’ 
and embraced his predecessor’s privatisation agenda, negotiating the 49-year lease 
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of some of Kampala’s largest markets to private companies with close links to 
political elites.258 Nakasero was one of several markets leased to a company owned 
by Hassan Basajjabalaba, a prominent funder of the NRM and Chair of its 
Entrepreneur’s League; Ssebaggala reportedly took a 10% bribe to award him this 
lease.259  
 
Anger at Ssebaggala’s perceived betrayal grew among vendors, bolstered by the 
fact that the supposed investors did nothing to improve conditions in the markets, 
even as they introduced increasingly exploitative revenue collection systems.260 The 
scale of vendor discontent was evident by early 2007 and Ssebaggala made another 
‘U-turn’ again to proclaim his support for vendors’ rights, saying he would halt the 
sale of Nakasero, although KCC had already taken the payment for it (as, 
presumably, had he).261 Perhaps sensing both a problem and an opportunity, 
Museveni then weighed in and usurped the Mayor’s role as the ‘saviour’ of market 
vendors, embracing a discourse of vendor empowerment that led to a surge of NRM 
support in the markets.262 In July 2007 he gave clearance to the vendors to 
redevelop Nakasero market themselves, something that bureaucrats privately 
admitted was probably unachievable.263 This set a critical precedent for presidential 
intervention in marketplace issues that were formally decentralised to the city 
authorities, as well as making redevelopment of the market even less likely. 
 
Kisekka market: violence, gridlock and state ineffectiveness 
 
Kisekka market provides a particularly illuminating example of how vendors 
provoked central government interventions in their favour through ongoing civil 
disturbance. It also illustrates how a lack of co-ordination between decrees from 
the centre and the actions of KCC resulted in gridlock, preventing anyone involved 
from undertaking the relatively simple task of the market’s redevelopment. Kisekka 
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was a large male-dominated marketplace of almost 6,000 registered members, 
devoted to the sale of mechanical goods and vehicle parts. In 2006, KCC and the 
leader of Kisekka’s marketplace association, Samuel Sekibenga, arranged to sell the 
lease to retired NRA Colonel John Mugyenyi.264 Mugyenyi had agreed that he would 
take control of 4 acres of the market for redevelopment, leaving 2.5 acres for the 
vendors to manage themselves. This allegedly transpired to be a ‘trick’ thought up 
as part of a deal between Mugyenyi and Sekibenga: the total area of the market 
was actually only 3.7 acres.265 On discovering this, a group of vendors set up a rival 
association led by Kasolo Kisembo and decided that all those implicated in the sale 
should leave. They forced Sekibenga’s group out of the market and took their 
complaint to KCC, who disregarded it. Kisembo’s group claimed that Mugyenyi had 
already bribed city bureaucrats to ignore the matter.266 
 
After KCC staff persistently turned them away, Kisembo’s group realised they ‘had 
no voice’ in relation to formal state organisations and resorted to riots.267 The first 
was in July 2007, with vendors burning tyres along the roads around the market and 
causing major disruption. This was soon quelled but the situation remained 
unchanged, prompting another three-day riot in September 2007. This was so 
violent that Uganda’s Inspector General of Police visited the market personally. The 
central government was rattled and invoked its new mantra that ‘sitting tenants’ 
should be given the first priority to develop their market, issuing a formal caveat 
preventing Mugyenyi from taking control of the market despite its earlier (if largely 
tacit) support for selling it to him. However, subsequently, KCC staff working closely 
with Mugyenyi allegedly forged Kisembo’s signature in a false statement to 
authorise lifting the caveat,268 which sparked three more days of riots in early 2008. 
Following this there was a formal investigation into the dispute that came out in the 
vendors’ favour.269 Yet again, however, entrenched interests found further ways to 
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stall the process of handing the lease over to the vendors, resulting in yet more riots 
in early 2009.  
 
Despite stalled progress, Ssebaggala remained unrepentant in the case of this 
market, insisting that allowing Mugyenyi to proceed was necessary for 
redevelopment in accordance with government policy.270 Museveni, however, was 
perturbed by the ongoing unrest and eventually persuaded Mugyenyi to renounce 
his lease after over two years of confusion.271 In the words of a city official, the 
vendors ‘made excessive noise until the president came to heed their cry’.272 This 
did not, however, lead to any palpable progress other than to leave government 
policy in further disarray. In January 2010 the vendors still had not gained 
possession of the lease and complained that ‘things are moving very slowly! It’s 
been three years already…we have been wondering why it was so quick for 
Mugyenyi but not for us!’.273 It was unclear how they would proceed beyond vague 
plans to ‘meet the president’.274 Kisekka remained an undeveloped marketplace 
and site of dissatisfaction and instability.275 
 
Each of Kampala’s major marketplaces had its own complicated narrative involving 
corruption, factional in-fighting and political intervention, resulting in the failure to 
implement proposed policies of market redevelopment. While bureaucrats clearly 
played an obstructive role due to collusion with developers, politicians were pivotal 
in engineering ineffectiveness as well. The repeated shifts in attitude towards 
marketplaces hindered the translation of any officially stated policy goals into 
accomplishment. Ssebaggala supported vendor empowerment to get elected, and 
then privatisation once he realised he was ‘going out of office soon and wanted to 
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make as much money as possible’,276 before going half-heartedly back to his original 
stance. Museveni’s involvement was equally problematic in terms of delivering a 
coherent outcome (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012). Ultimately, multipartyism, 
decentralisation and privatisation combined both to raise the stakes and fragment 
control. Ssebaggala himself summed this up candidly:   
 
‘This is a capital city, we are fighting with so many interests! So this causes 
[government] most of the time to break down…A minister says this, or the 
president says this…at the end of the day also we have our interests, because we all 
are fishing in the same lake’.277  
 
In the midst of all this, the formal institutions of the City Council, despite being 
legally charged with managing petty trade under the Markets Act, were increasingly 
insignificant. When asked about why the markets were so disorganised and poorly 
managed, a city official noted that ‘The vendors are strong because they have the 
vote [but] we [KCC] are on the low bargaining side’.278 Thus, while problems in the 
markets may have originated in corruption and incompetence on the part of 
individuals in the council, politicised central interventions compounded state 
ineffectiveness of the organisation still further.  
 
5.4    Kigali’s marketplaces: vendors, veterans and missing markets 
 
Efforts to reorganise marketplaces in Kigali tell a very different story, and in many 
respects a simpler one. When, in the early twenty-first century, the RPF turned its 
attention to managing urbanisation, addressing the question of market trade was a 
clear priority in light of the broader concern with kajagari (disorder). Kigali’s main 
market at the time was Nyarugenge, which was rehabilitated soon after the 
genocide by Kigali’s first post-1994 mayor, Rose Kabuye.279 It occupied a central 
location in the CBD and consisted of about 500 vendors, with many more in the 
surrounding streets. As in Kampala, there were concerns about dilapidated 
infrastructure and overcongestion of the area. Early in the new millennium it was 
decided that the site should be redeveloped as a multi-storey commercial shopping 
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centre;280 the plot was sold to Kigali Investment Group, a group of Rwandese 
investors close to the RPF regime,281 and existing market structures were 
demolished in 2006.282 
 
The government decided that all the city’s main vending markets should be located 
outside the city centre where congestion would be less problematic. For each of the 
city’s three districts there would be at least one main covered market, open seven 
days a week and owned by the District.283 Some markets were rehabilitated for this 
purpose and others were built entirely anew.284 In addition to the covered markets, 
each District was allowed a number of smaller peripheral open marketplaces, many 
of which operated just one day each week. All were formally approved by the 
District in accordance with the Master Plan and building regulations,285 and no 
trading was allowed outside these areas.  
 
When Nyarugenge Market closed, Kimironko Market (in Gasabo District), which was 
created by the government in 1999, was redeveloped to become the city’s largest, 
with one section reserved for people who had previously been vendors at 
Nyarugenge.286 There were inevitably conflicts because so many people wanted to 
secure a space at Kimironko. The District claims to have ensured transparency in the 
allocation process through a randomised ‘tombola’ system. Those who received 
larger ‘lock-ups’ paid higher market fees than those only allocated stalls.287 Once 
the market was considered ‘full’, no more vendors were admitted; in 2010 there 
were 1,265.288 While still owned by the district authorities, after 2008 the market 
was managed by the Kigali Veterans Co-operative Society (KVCS), a group of RPA 
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veterans, which won the tender to manage all the markets in Gasabo District.289 
Their main responsibility was to collect revenues from the market vendors and 
ensure security, and they were closely supervised by the District authorities.290  
 
On one level, the way in which the government dealt with the ‘problem’ of 
marketplaces in Kigali was similar to that in Kampala: selling off plots of prime land 
in the city centre to private investors linked to the regime and putting politically-
linked organisations in charge of collecting revenues. However, in terms of how 
these processes were implemented and what the outcomes were, the two could 
hardly have been more different. First, by contrast with markets such as Owino in 
Kampala, where incoming funds were mismanaged, construction regulations 
severely contravened and congestion exacerbated, Kimironko in Kigali was 
organised, relatively uncongested and fitted with adequate infrastructure. So too 
were new markets in neighbourhoods such as Remera.291  
 
Second, markets in Kigali were administered by District authorities de facto as well 
as de jure, rather than being torn between actors in the City Council, central 
government and private sector, as in Kampala. The Gasabo District authority, for 
example, was at the forefront of the market reorganisation in Kimironko and 
Remera.292  Third, the handing over of the management of all markets in one district 
to a single army veterans organisation (KVCS) clearly influenced the effectiveness 
with which markets were supervised and revenues collected. As noted in Chapter 
Four, deep bonds between army veterans and the government existed in Kampala 
as well as Kigali; however, in the former these were usually drawn on in a much 
more ad hoc fashion and resulted in undermining urban policies and regulations 
rather than enforcing them. In Kigali, by mobilising veterans into a co-operative to 
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manage multiple markets, the Rwandan government provided them with 
livelihoods and ensured relative efficiency and co-ordination in market 
management. As well as the market dues that KVCS collected from vendors on 
behalf of the District (10% of which was paid back to KVCS in the form of salaries), 
they collected from vendors smaller monthly contributions towards security and 
hygiene.  
 
None of this, however, is to say that the management of marketplaces was wholly 
effective in Kigali or to deny that the achievements noted above came at a price. A 
first important point is that while the government managed effectively to ‘clean up’ 
existing marketplaces and relocate many vendors from Nyarugenge market, the 
construction of new marketplaces seriously lagged behind. Government policy, as 
noted by interviewees and laid out in the District Development Plans,293 was to 
have not just one or two properly structured markets for each District in the city, 
but one for each Sector (there are around 10-12 sectors per district; 32 in the city 
overall). This was very far from being realised by 2010. While there were eighteen 
markets in Gasabo District, seventeen were very small and most only opened one or 
two days per week. For a District with a population of around 500,000 people 
spread over more than 300 square kilometres, most of which was rural (Oz 
Architecture 2007b: 60), this was not enough; something both current and former 
staff at the district admitted.294 
 
An independent Rwandese development consultant noted that this was highly 
problematic, because there were so few markets that people living outside the city 
centre often had to travel very far just to obtain basic goods.295 Regulations were so 
strictly enforced that the creation of spontaneous or unofficial trading centres was 
impossible even in the less densely populated rural parts of the city; in parts of 
Gasabo District one might have to travel three to four kilometres to find a market. 
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This was not the situation prior to the marketplace reorganisation and the issue was 
clearly controversial. The consultant was very hesitant to be drawn on why and how 
the marketplaces were reorganised, reiterating that it was a ‘big, big problem’ but 
not wanting to make further comment.296 Significantly, however, a participatory 
needs assessment undertaken as part of the Kigali Master Plan found that 
marketplaces received the second largest number of votes in response to questions 
about the most pressing land use needs of urban residents; this was slightly more 
than either education facilities or childcare centres (Oz Architecture 2007a: 31). The 
government was therefore considerably less effective in respect of building new 
markets than in reorganising existing ones and preventing their proliferation. The 
city authorities were planning to construct a Kigali Wholesale Market, a $41m 
project devoted to agricultural sales in Kicukiro District for which investment was 
apparently being secured at the time of research.297 However, at this point the state 
could only be said to be very effective with regard to certain aspects of the 
marketplace issue – ultimately those that involved the organisation of people rather 
than requiring large amounts of financial resources.  
 
Even in respect of those issues regarding which the government was highly 
effective, the approach was not unproblematic. There was little scope for vendors 
to mobilise into associations or unions independently of the state, and vendors 
consequently had little bargaining power in relation to issues such as the level of 
market fees. Fees collected for the District were a serious burden on vendors, 
forcing some out of business and limiting their ability to save and accumulate 
resources.298 This could be attributed in part to the demands of the imihigo-led local 
government culture and its attendant targets on revenues and infrastructure 
maintenance (see Appendix 4a, 4b and 4e). Moreover, the marketplace 
reorganisation only allowed for a very limited number of people to pursue a 
livelihood in market trading. This amounted to a serious limitation on the potential 
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for the urban poor to survive in the city, particularly given the lack of opportunities 
for making money informally on the city streets: a subject to which we now turn.  
 
5.5    City law enforcement, street trade and the livelihoods of the urban poor 
 
 
‘Street trade’ is defined here as encompassing three distinct activities: street 
vending (where vendors remain stationary, displaying their goods on the 
pavement), hawking (where vendors carry their goods and move around the city) 
and kiosks (where traders erect a ‘lock-up’ structure on the pavement or other open 
area). The distinctions are important because different regulations usually apply to 
each. People involved in these activities, particularly in the former two categories, 
are usually among the most reviled urban poor groups in any developing country, 
blamed by governments for congestion, disease, disorder and waste generation. 
How they fared in practice represented a particularly marked divergence between 
Kampala and Kigali in the early twenty-first century, because of the effectiveness 
with which the state implemented the regulatory framework outlined in section 5.2. 
 
 
Kampala: ‘We remove them, the politicians bring them back’
299
 
 
Observing Kampala in 2010, one would not think that the state had even attempted 
to regulate street trade. In fact, as the laws highlighted above illustrate, there were 
many regulations in place and KCC had at times taken drastic action to implement 
them. Such efforts were, however, always short-lived. Different legal statuses and 
regulations applied to the different forms of street trade: hawkers, commonly 
known as batembeyi, were legal if they had managed to secure a license, and if 
licensed, were obliged by bylaws constantly to keep moving. Street vendors (see 
Figure 5.1), with a few exceptions such as newspaper sellers, were entirely illegal. 
Kiosk-operators in permitted areas had to purchase annual trading licenses (similar 
to those required of small shopkeepers).300 
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Figure 5.1: Street vendors, central Kampala 
 
Source: author’s photograph 
 
As most markets in Kampala were informal (or ‘ungazetted’), street vending existed 
on a continuum with marketplaces rather than being fully distinct. The following 
quotation, worth citing at length, highlights this by explaining some of the ways in 
which street traders came to entrench themselves and thereby create informal 
markets. In so doing, it also illustrates how the engagement between traders and 
the state undermined not only regulations but infrastructural development and 
investment. The interviewee (an academic at Makerere University) was adopting 
the ‘voice’ of a state representative negotiating with a kiosk owner:  
 
‘You put a kiosk there on the roadside and then I come up and say you know what? 
According to the laws you are not supposed to have any kiosk in the road reserve. 
You need to have a trading licence, you need to have facilities a,b,c,d, which you do 
not have – so remove it […] maybe you earn 10,000 per day, you tell me, “ok I will 
give you 1,500 a day out of my profit, just to leave me to operate my business”. You 
get a second, a third [kiosk]. Now, that cumulative resource that I get makes me 
become a mafia, because I will not be operating alone. We will become a group of 
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people who offer you protection. In the meantime, that grows into a market. After 
some time it becomes difficult to handle because when anyone tells me that “you 
people are responsible for those things, you need to remove them”, I’ve got a 
group of people who have reached up to maybe 1,000, 2,000, whom I’ve got to 
displace, and […] I’ve taken money from them. I will not be able to displace them. 
[…] On the other hand, because these things are illegal you are not going to be able 
to provide them with proper services, they will be made of temporary materials, 
structures and so on, so any time they can move – no-one wants to make a serious 
investment in that kind of situation.
301
 
 
The responsibility for dealing with street traders lay with the City Law Officers, a 
team of 150 with the remit of enforcing urban ordinances (made by KCC) and 
bylaws (made by City Divisions).302 This was a small number in relation to the 
pervasiveness of street trade. Worse still, these officers were armed with ‘nothing 
but handcuffs’ and worked from 8am-5pm, which meant that when they succeeded 
in removing traders the latter usually returned and set up again after hours.303 This 
would not be so problematic if the police provided support for their activities; while 
the number of City Law enforcers was small, there was no shortage of police in 
Kampala.
304
 Yet while police were sometimes helpful in these matters, the Principal 
City Law Officer noted that ‘here in Uganda politics takes the upper hand […] so 
sometimes the police are ordered not to intervene’.
305
 At other times, police 
intervened on the side of the illegal vendors, as illustrated in the thesis prologue. 
On yet other occasions the City Law Officers themselves turned a blind eye for a 
bribe.
306
 
 
The non-enforcement of regulations was therefore not always attributable to the 
same factors. Notwithstanding the prevalence of economic corruption, it was 
sometimes clientelistic links with (often national) political actors, rather than bribes 
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to local officers, that entrenched traders on the streets. The example of the 
Inspector General of Police’s personal intervention to prevent KCC removing kiosks 
in Wandegeya (Kawempe Division), again described in the prologue, illustrates 
these kinds of links. One Ugandan academic argued that traders were sometimes 
‘state agents’, given protection in exchange for ‘informing’ on local activities; they 
might also be ‘poor relatives’ and ethnic kin of politicians, who installed them there 
to secure them some kind of livelihood.307 One official complained that ‘we remove 
them, the politicians bring them back’;308 another pointed out that in many of these 
instances politicians said ‘these are my people’ and commanded the police to leave 
them alone.309 This type of clientelism might also be combined with bribes to 
officials and police, so that basically ‘everyone protects them!’310 Kampala’s streets 
were thus teeming with people who, for one reason or another, had become 
‘untouchable’.311 There were sporadic crackdowns; particularly on street vendors, 
considered to be the greatest nuisance (Ahikire and Ampaire 2003). Most notably, 
in 2002 KCC undertook ‘Operation Clean the City’ to remove them, partly under 
pressure from retailers in small shops angered by illegal competition (Ahikire and 
Ampaire 2003: 45). Like other such moves, however, this did not last long. Such 
crackdowns seemed to fulfil the function of reminding ‘untouchables’ of why they 
should be grateful that they were usually tacitly permitted to operate illegally.  
 
Kigali: ‘Donors have been hunting to see where they are gone’  
 
The Rwandan government’s impetus to formalise the economy was fuelled by a 
2005 report from the Foreign Investment Advisory Service depicting the 
predominance of informality as the primary barrier to investment and economic 
growth.312 As well as motivating many changes to bureaucratic procedure,313 this 
                                                          
307
 Interview with Sabiti Makara, 23.09.11. 
308
 Interview with local official, 01.10.09. 
309
 Interview with Titus Odiogiu, Trade Development Officer, Kampala Central Division, 05.10.09. 
310
 Interview with Titus Odiogiu, 05.10.09. 
311
 This term, widespread in popular discourse in Kampala, will be further discussed in Chapter Six.  
312
 The report states that there are a 900,000 informal ‘firms’ in Rwanda, compared with 3000 formal 
ones. The vast majority of both are micro or small enterprises in the primary sector. It is not clear 
how ‘informality’ is being defined (FIAS 2005: 6). 
  
 183
also bolstered the emerging perception that Kigali should be reinvented as a clean, 
secure and modern-looking capital befitting an emerging investment hub 
(Goodfellow and Smith 2013 forthcoming). As the marketplaces were reorganised, 
there was a parallel major clean-up exercise underway, resulting in dramatic 
reductions in the street trading and begging that characterised the city early in the 
millennium. The very act of demolishing slums such as Ubumwe (see Chapter Four) 
and relocating the residents (who were mostly petty traders) to the fringes of the 
city made this exercise easier. Other vendors were relocated into buildings, often to 
the detriment of trade that depended largely on visibility and positioning.314 The 
kiosks that once lined streets in the city centre were likewise removed.315  
 
As part of this drive to organise urban informal workers, the government embraced 
the creation of particular types of urban association, ‘sensitising’ the population 
about the benefits of co-operatives for their own livelihoods and for development. 
This reorganisation was considered especially pressing given the huge proportion of 
youths in the city, who were ‘idle’, ‘dispersed’ and ‘needed something to do.’316 In 
2009 City Council sources estimated that 67% of the city’s population were youths 
(defined as under 35).317 This prevalence of young people, attributable in part to 
genocide and refugee return, combined with the fairly expansive definition of youth 
to render most of the population suitable for organisation into what CoK termed 
‘youth organisations’. There were 47 of these in Kigali in 2010, comprising groups 
from mobile phone ‘airtime’ vendors, forex traders, carpenters and hairdressers to 
minibus and motorcycle-taxi drivers.318  
 
That these organisations were ‘mobilised’ from the top down was undisputed; the 
Youth and Education Inspector who supervised them explained that ‘to fight 
unemployment here we had to organise [youth] so that they created a living rather 
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than getting involved in banditry’. From around 2008 the government promoted co-
operatives (rather than associations) as the desired organisational form, to enable 
profit-sharing and because ‘we are moving from mobilisation to development’.319 
The creation of associations and co-operatives transformed the remaining petty 
trade in the city but also aimed to move people out of it into other activities. For 
example, some former street traders evicted from Ubumwe and now living much 
less centrally in Batsinda were encouraged to form co-operatives and provided with 
training in activities such as basket-weaving, mushroom-growing and 
construction.320 The Youth Inspector explained that ‘we don’t want these sellers 
moving around the city. We want people to be in the same place as it is easy for 
leadership to find them and help them. […] So you won’t see people working 
individually’.321 Street hawkers (see Figure 5.2) were indeed a relatively rare sight in 
Kigali. 
 
Figure 5.2: A Kigali hawker tries her luck 
 
Source: author’s photograph 
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This shift from individual micro-enterprises to co-operatives served several 
purposes. As well as in theory increasing capacity to earn, share risk and facilitate 
savings and credit, all these organisations participated in voluntary ‘youth activities’ 
in the city, such as ‘cleaning and greening’ urban spaces in the spirit of 
umuganda.322 These were effectively turned into competitions whereby all 
associations and co-operatives were ranked, so ‘if they are lazy then they are 
ranked last and are shamed in public […]. If a leader does not perform well then he 
resigns’.323  Co-operatives also helped to render the urban poor more ‘legible’: 
organising them was ‘not only an economic issue but a security issue’.324  This was 
true both on a superficial level (‘if someone sells bananas on the street he can make 
an accident’325) and in terms of the deeper perceived ‘danger’, noted in Chapter 
Four, if urbanisation were to proceed in a disorderly fashion. All urban associations 
and co-operatives had security officers whose role was ‘to make sure everything is 
organised […] It is for their own safety really and the safety of Rwandans […] it is a 
mindset, an issue of perception.’326 
 
The virtual disappearance of informal activity from the streets was not 
uncontroversial, and cannot simply be accounted for by ‘reorganisation’. The 
government was aware that many youths were also effectively forced to leave the 
city due to lack of livelihood options, and painted this in a largely positive light. The 
following quotation from the Minister of Infrastructure, which vascillates between 
conceding that there was little space for the poor in the city and arguing that their 
situation in the city was being improved, illustrates some of the tensions and 
contradictions at play: 
 
‘Some young people decided to run away from Kigali because the rent is expensive, 
jobs are paying less, life is almost impossible for low earners in Kigali. There are no 
hawkers, there is nowhere you can buy cheap food. So they ran away, they are very 
upset with the city and the government. They go back to their village but because 
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they have been in town they know what is required here. […] A few years later they 
come back in a different shape. 
 
‘Donors have been hunting to see where they are gone. You don’t see them. In 
Nairobi the people who are left out from development in the urban area go and 
expand the slum of Kibera. In Rwanda those who are left out, you don’t see them 
[…] They are not even gone…they have changed mode of production. Those who 
were selling things in scattered manner are in co-operatives and sell in the 
marketplace or they sell in a shop. There are many to own one shop, so it’s like 
transforming their little little into one big asset [...] Some run away, some get 
organised and recycle in city activities […] but there is no ground in the whole 
republic where you find people who have been victim of all these processes of 
change and they are getting worse off. [Donors] think they are pushed in the rural 
area…but [donors] go to the rural area and they don’t see instability from those 
who are pushed from town […] they are pushed from selling on the street and they 
get help to sell in the marketplace where they sell more goods and get help to sell 
in a more organised way’.327  
 
The awkward juxtaposition of people being ‘left out’ from development and yet not 
worse off, being pushed from the streets and yet not pushed from the city, is very 
telling. The impressive story of mobilisation into co-operatives coexisted alongside 
another; as a civil society actor critical of the government explained, the idea that 
people were just working ‘in a more organised way’ was ‘partly true’. When ‘the so-
called reorganisation’ took place ‘around 40% of the people had their livelihoods 
moved in a planned way…the rest were just chased away.’328 Many former vendors 
who had been relocated from the central slums to Batsinda were not making a 
livelihood via such co-operatives and could not find work.329 Some did not consider 
agriculture an option; they owned no land and as lifelong city-dwellers ‘would have 
no idea what to do’.330 
 
Evictees such as those from Gaculiro who were relocated to rural estates in Kigali’s 
outskirts (see Chapter Four) were effectively ‘ruralised’, keeping cows or cultivating 
small crops on their plots.331 Either way, interviewees in both Batsinda and a rural 
estate noted that ‘most people’ were earning ‘less than before’ or ‘less than what 
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they earned when they were still living in town’.332 Many also had to commute into 
the city to make a kind of living and paid up to RWF 2000 (£2) per day on transport, 
an enormous financial burden.333 Other sources even suggested that people in rural 
parts of Kigali were worse off than in other rural provinces due to the costs of the 
city (including rent) and their limited scope for agriculture.334 
 
There was also a darker side to the absence of visible informality. Alongside the 
‘reorganisation’ noted above, people were regularly taken off the streets and 
detained at the Gikondo Detention Centre in the south of Kigali. Based in a 
warehouse previously belonging to Félicien Kabuga, a prominent pre-genocide 
businessman who in 2010 was one of the most wanted remaining genocide 
fugitives, this was first used by the police ‘secretly’ as an informal ‘transit centre’ 
from 2002 to 2005. After this it became widely known under the popular name ‘Kwa 
Kabuga’ (‘Kabuga’s Place).335 Street children, sex workers, suspected petty criminals 
and street vendors were taken – often straight from the street without any formal 
procedure – and kept for up to a month or, in the case of petty thieves, longer.336 In 
2006, Human Rights Watch published a report on the centre, which it claimed held 
600 people at a given time, and described its lack of legal status and formal 
procedure or budgetary allocation, severe overcrowding, lack of medical care and 
the fact that people had to pay for basic amenities including water (HRW 2006). The 
report recommended the centre’s immediate closure and the repeal of colonial-era 
regulations permitting detention for ‘vagrancy’ that were being used to justify 
taking people there (HRW 2006: 12). At the time Kigali’s Vice Mayor stated that the 
City Council planned to close the facility (HRW 2006: 3). 
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In 2009-10, however, Kwa Kabuga was still in operation and was central to ongoing 
efforts to eliminate street trade. Some government sources acknowledged the 
facility, referring to it as a ‘transit centre’ to help mobilise informal workers into co-
operatives and to ‘change their mindset’.337 A former detainee interviewed in the 
course of this research described it as having four separate compounds for street 
children, petty thieves, women (whose hair was cut off on entry), and vagrant men 
and street traders, with a meeting place in the centre.338 A fruit hawker also 
explained that she had friends who had been sent there ‘just for selling things in the 
street’.339 Other sources claimed that many died there due to the poor 
conditions.340 In 2009 the leading opposition newspaper Umuseso published an 
article on the centre, dubbing it ‘Rwanda’s Guantanamo’; by 2010 it was far from 
secret and had taken on legendary qualities, with taxi-moto (motorcycle-taxi) 
drivers able to recount second-hand stories of its alleged horrors.341 
 
Kigali’s police force was not large; in 2007 it numbered just 800 and had only twelve 
patrol vehicles (Baker 2007: 352) – remarkably small in fact for a city of over a 
million inhabitants in such a securitised environment, and, according to some 
sources, much less visible than at the start of the decade.342 It was, however, 
supported by Kigali’s District Defence Forces, which numbered around a thousand 
and supported the police to round up hawkers and guard Kwa Kabuga at night 
(HRW 2006: 4). This force had strictly limited powers – lacking for example the right 
to make arrests, and having to be accompanied by police to remove street 
vendors343 – and public regard for them was low in contrast to respect for the police 
(Baker 2007: 357). It is striking, however, that in Kigali such a force existed to 
support the police in their work (which included combating street trade), while in 
Kampala the inverse prevailed: a much smaller force was given dedicated 
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responsibility for street trade but rarely supported by the police, who were 
probably much more numerous than in Kigali.344  
 
The continued existence of Kwa Kabuga indicated the government’s sheer 
determination to eliminate street trade and informality as well as crime. It is hardly 
surprising in this context that ‘night hawkers’ gathered at transportation hubs at 
nightfall to try and make a living, though they frequently dispersed as the police 
were constantly on their heels.345 Government determination was such that in 2009 
the City Council passed a resolution to penalise the clients of street traders as well 
as traders themselves. The state was therefore attacking on all fronts, arguing that 
‘vendors have kept a deaf ear which is why we have decided to take another step by 
penalizing them and their clients and seizing their goods.’346 The ultimate irony of 
this clampdown on informality was that it was itself perpetuated through the highly 
informal procedures associated with Kwa Kabuga.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The material in this chapter is not presented to make a normative argument about 
the superiority of one government’s approach to managing petty trade vis-à-vis the 
other. As should be clear, major (albeit very different) problems pertained to both 
cases. The point is that in relation to goals of reducing informal activity and 
regulating petty trade the Rwandan state had, through a variety of mechanisms – 
some much more agreeable than others – proved much more effective. Its 
management of petty trade was not an unqualified success story even by the 
government’s own standards, clearly falling short in terms of targets to build 
sufficient numbers of markets and providing livelihoods more lucrative than street 
trade. However, the state was undeniably effective relative to efforts to regulate 
and reorganise petty trade in Kampala.  
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The question of whether this can simply be attributed to the Rwandan 
government’s dictatorial tendencies is inevitable. With regard to the clampdown on 
informality, disregard for due process in the suppression of street trade was ample. 
There are two problems, however, with presenting an analysis that hinges on 
‘regime type’ in this way. First, it implies that the government achieved all this 
through coercion alone. Despite authoritarian overtones in all the examples 
discussed above, there was not necessarily always active coercion, and nor did 
people necessarily feel they lacked a stake in these changes. Some civil society 
sources even maintained that ‘no-one complained’ when street trading was banned 
in the city.347 It was thus infrastructural power (deployed for example through 
‘sensitisation’ programmes) as much as coercive power that enabled the 
government to follow through on these agendas. Moreover, ingrained patterns 
both of ‘self-policing’ and ‘checking on your neighbour’,348 reinforced through 
processes such as umuganda, meant that ordinary Rwandans to some degree 
actively participated in urban socio-economic change, even if ‘participation’ was not 
necessarily of the normative democratic kind.349 Self-reinforcing dynamics were at 
play that gave the transformation of economic activity in the city a certain 
momentum of its own, and in which urban-dwellers were active agents.  
 
Acknowledgement of the government’s authoritarian tendencies and lack of 
democratic institutionalisation does not therefore mean that people were 
completely devoid of agency in Kigali. Comments from those relocated to Batsinda 
suggested that some of them did actually ‘buy in’ to government agendas regarding 
the benefits of an organised settlement.350 Relatedly, focusing on regime type 
obscures the extent to which the Rwandan state itself enjoyed considerable trust,351 
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an important source of government credibility and legitimacy without which ‘top-
down’ socio-economic transformation might have been much more difficult to 
achieve. While clearly relevant, the authoritarian nature of rule in Rwanda is far 
from being a sufficient explanation. After all, it was under one of the most notorious 
dictatorships in history that informality exploded in Kampala.  
 
Second, and even more important here, explaining the differences between 
Kampala and Kigali in terms of regime type suggests that the situation in Kampala 
can be explained by an absence of authoritarianism. While a tempting conclusion in 
some respects because of patterns of electoral clientelism discussed earlier, this 
would also be highly unsatisfactory. To begin with, not all clientelism in Uganda was 
dependent on vote-buying; as noted above, in many cases it related more to 
securing livelihoods for relatives and ethnic kin and retaining the goodwill of agents 
of various kinds throughout the city – patterns of behaviour that have little to do 
with democracy. Moreover, much of the failure to manage informal activity was 
due to economic corruption, which has no intrinsic link to regime type. Besides, 
Uganda is hardly a model of democracy. The kinds of political interventions 
described in this and other chapters were often taken with little or no consultation 
and flouted the law and the constitution; essentially, they were highly authoritarian.  
 
Drawing explicitly on Mann’s juxtaposition of infrastructural and despotic power, 
Centeno and Portes draw a distinction between ‘a despotic state which makes a lot 
of regulations and an effective state which is actually able to enforce them’, adding 
that ‘informal economies arise when there is a discrepancy between these two 
forms of state power’ (Centeno 2006: 32-33). While both states in question were at 
least semi-authoritarian in nature and both issued extensive regulation, Uganda was 
closer to the ‘despotic’ end of this spectrum and Rwanda the ‘effective’ end. 
Empirical analysis in this chapter reveals how approaches to managing urban 
informality interacted with historical and structural factors in ways that produced 
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very different forms of authoritarianism and, consequently, very different degrees 
of effectiveness.  
 
The different approaches to the ‘informality problem’ evident here can be 
considered as path dependent to an extent, even accounting for the importance of 
agency. The issues political agents prioritise cannot be separated from the 
structural constraints they face, and even the unique agency of leaders operates in 
the context of patterns of ‘self-reinforcing’ behaviour. The situation in Kampala 
illustrates how once a ‘Devil’s deal’ is made, it is ‘difficult for either side to get out 
of it’ (Tendler 2002: 3). The expectations of informal actors and the state actors 
they engaged with, which may ultimately have dated to a critical juncture back in 
the Amin years, created powerful informal incentive structures that undermined 
formal processes. Meanwhile the reorganisation of the informal economy in Kigali 
shows how when infrastructural power and credibility combine, the behavioural 
norms among the population as well as the actions of leadership can reinforce state 
effectiveness. In short, informal institutions worked to support state agendas in 
Kigali and undermine them in Kampala. Exploring this further, the next chapter 
turns to another key sector in the urban informal economy: public transportation. In 
these large, rapidly-growing cities where mobility is critical to people’s livelihoods, 
this sector is particularly revealing about the differential political economy of urban 
development in each city. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 193
Chapter Six 
Urban public transport: the politics of order and chaos 
 
‘If you neglect transport you neglect the whole economy…it is like cutting off your arm.’
352
 
 
The question of urban public transport (UPT) is critical for development (World 
Bank 2002; Adam Smith International 2005; Cervero and Golub 2007). Transport 
matters on both macro and micro levels: many developing economies lose an 
estimated 2-5% of GDP to road congestion (Lohani 2010: 3), and Africa suffers 
especially high transport costs (Naudé and Matthee 2007); meanwhile the urban 
poor often spend 25% or more of their income on public transport.
353
 Along with 
congestion and cost there are major challenges relating to how UPT serves the 
urban poor in marginalised areas, how transport infrastructure is maintained and 
integrated, and how environmental externalities are managed; all of which can only 
increase in importance given the pace of urban growth in the developing world. This 
chapter explores the state’s effectiveness in addressing the problems of UPT in 
Kampala and Kigali, which face particularly challenging circumstances in terms of 
their soaring rates of growth and difficult terrain of hills and swamps. 
 
The two cities were very similar regarding their dominant modes of transportation: 
in 2010 both had a negligible number of medium-sized and large buses while the 
vast majority of UPT was provided by minibus-taxis and motorcycle-taxis. Yet on a 
per capita basis there were over six times as many motorcycle-taxis and almost ten 
times as many minibus-taxis in Kampala than Kigali. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, this enormous difference in numbers, alongside accompanying 
differences in terms of regulation and modernisation, largely reflected differential 
state effectiveness with regard to efforts to regulate the sector. There were other 
important contributing factors, as will be highlighted. Overall, however, there is 
little doubt that in Kampala many concerted efforts by the state to regulate, tax and 
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bring some order to the sector met with failure, while similar initiatives in Kigali 
were relatively successful. One consequence was the explosion in numbers of UPT 
vehicles in the former and a contraction in the latter.  
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the challenges associated with UPT and its 
informalisation in Africa. Following this, the institutional framework for public 
transport in each city is briefly highlighted. The chapter then turns to the 
predominant form of transport in both cities – minibus-taxis – comparing and 
contrasting features of the sector in the two cities to examine why they differed so 
much in nature and scale. This is followed by an examination of the motorcycle-taxi 
sector, which became very important in both cities from the 1990s onwards. It is 
with regard to these, termed boda-bodas in Uganda and taxi-motos in Rwanda, that 
the undeniable effectiveness of state interventions in Kigali vis-à-vis Kampala was 
most evident. Finally, analytical conclusions are drawn.  
 
6.1    Informality and urban transport in Africa: concepts, issues and challenges 
  
The growth of urban centres across the developing world in recent decades was 
often met by the failure of formal urban public transport systems to meet the 
demands of the market (Cervero and Golub 2007). In Africa, as elsewhere, this was 
usually due to weak fiscal capacity and underfunded post-independence national 
transport authorities. There was usually an initial post-independence effort to 
maintain and develop an urban transit system; however, regulated fares were kept 
low for political reasons and investment was scarce, resulting in failure to maintain 
the public transport fleet and eventually putting many public companies out of 
business (Kumar and Barrett 2008). Rapid urban growth meant that demand was 
intensifying as supply was collapsing, particularly in the context of the deep 
economic crises engulfing the continent in the 1980s (Van de Walle 2001). In this 
context, informal ‘paratransit’ services in the form of minibuses, microbuses and 
motorcycles proved ‘consummate gap fillers’ (Cervero and Golub 2007: 456). They 
offered services that could respond quickly and flexibly to changing markets, had 
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relatively low costs and were able to enter cramped informal areas without 
adequate roads.  
 
In Africa, the importation of second hand minibuses as a central mode of public 
transport accelerated in the early 1990s, expanding by 11% per year in some cases 
(Kumar and Barrett 2008: 8). This process of informal privatisation of public 
transport rarely resulted from conscious decisions to deregulate; rather ‘it was an 
indigenous response to growing demand and commercial opportunity’ that 
operated in a ‘regulatory vacuum’ initially by default (Kumar and Barrett 2008: xi). 
However, liberalisation and deregulation of the sector was already being actively 
encouraged by the World Bank (1986) following the experience in the developed 
world (Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer 1993),354 and countries such as Uganda officially 
adopted this approach in the 1990s (Benmaamar et al. 2002).  
 
Liberalisation meant that some of the problems of heavy regulation that de Soto 
famously identified as having previously stifled urban transport in Peru (De Soto 
1989: 126-7) did not arise for minibus operators in Africa. However, the 
abandonment of any kind of regulation including both quality and quantity controls  
(Maunder and Mbara 1996) brought a host of new problems. These included erratic 
scheduling; oversupply and extreme competition resulting in overloading, 
congestion, speeding and traffic fatalities; labour abuses and worker exploitation; 
lack of accountability; inadequate investment and insurance; severe pollution; 
evasion of taxation and fees; long waiting times; ‘short-turning’ (where operators 
decide not to go the full distance to a remote area on the route) and ‘cream-
skinning’ (where small operators only operate during peak hours or in busy 
locations) (Maunder and Mbara 1996; Rizzo 2002; Cervero and Golub 2007; Kumar 
and Barrett 2008).  
 
Profound political challenges also characterise informal UPT. In many countries 
vehicle owners ‘are government officials, businessmen, or professionals for whom 
involvement in public transport provides a way to supplement income without 
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incurring much, if any, tax liability’ (Kumar and Barrett 2008: 8). The vested 
interests involved are therefore enormous. Associations or syndicates often 
organise the activities of the sector. By aggregating many elites with a stake in UPT 
under one banner, these can become extremely powerful (Kumar and Barrett 2008: 
9). In some cases, the result is ‘taxi wars’: in urban South Africa hundreds of deaths 
occurred every year in the 1990s as powerful syndicates fought for control of taxi 
routes (Dugard 2001: 13; Lomme 2008).  
 
Regulation is often undertaken by such organisations rather than the state, if at all. 
In fourteen major African cities examined in a World Bank-funded study, only 
Abidjan had legal restrictions on the entry of buses into the market. Instead, 
syndicates usually collected dues in exchange for permission to use the terminal 
facilities they managed (Kumar and Barrett 2008: 16). The widespread under-
regulation of the sector across Africa may make change inevitable. In the early post-
independence decades, a ‘tipping point’ was reached whereby state-run transport 
companies became financially unviable and informal actors filled the gap. However, 
a second tipping point may be looming in many countries, whereby the benefits 
that informal transport offered in recent decades come to be outweighed by the 
costs. As a Ugandan transport consultant put it: ‘‘We are heading for doom….if you 
spend two hours to get three kilometres, that is four hours wasted each day. It 
halves your working day.’355 Under these conditions state efforts to resume more 
active roles in the sector are probable; the problem is whether they can do so 
effectively given the interests involved. This is the backdrop against which we 
should consider the cases of Kampala and Kigali.  
 
6.2    Institutional framework for urban public transport  
 
As Kumar and Barrett (2008: 15) note, the regulatory framework for UPT typically 
comprises three main elements: control of entry into the market and the allocation 
of routes; licensing and the establishment of procedures for vehicle inspection; and 
passenger fares and tariff structures. The broader formal institutional framework 
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also comprises transport planning, laws pertaining to which entity of government is 
responsible for public transport, and contractual relations between transport 
organisations and the state. This section will briefly consider the most salient 
aspects of the formal institutional framework in each case study.  
 
Uganda 
 
Uganda in the first decade of the twenty-first century was among the more extreme 
cases of under-regulation of UPT in Africa, with no clear system for allocating 
routes, no legal restrictions on the entry of buses or minibuses into the market and 
no distinct entity responsible for vehicle inspection (Adam Smith International 2005: 
xv; Trans-Africa 2008). Since 1991 there had been no age limit on vehicles imported 
for UPT (ITSL 2008: 43). However, there was a limited legal framework contained 
within the 1998 Traffic and Road Safety Act. This specified, among other issues, the 
roles of the Transport Licensing Board (TLB) and the terms for vehicle registration 
(Clauses 10-14) and licensing (Clauses 15-17, 72-95); the role of the Minister of 
Transport in organising routes, which are not specified on the licenses (Clause 71); 
the prohibition of driving without a valid permit (Clause 35); strict prohibitions on 
touting (Clause 99); restrictions on how bicycles are used (Clause 172); and the 
powers of the police to demand the production of permits and examine vehicles 
(Clauses 146-151).  
 
Claims that public transport was ‘entirely deregulated’ (Benmaamar et al. 2002: 5) 
are therefore exaggerated. The system did, however, leave considerable room for 
discretion. The law states that to grant a public service vehicle (PSV) license, the TLB 
is supposed to consider the needs of the public, the co-ordination of transport 
within a given area and the interests of existing minibus operators (Clause 87). The 
law also aimed to lay foundations for the creation of many more regulations to ‘give 
full effect to the provisions of this Act’ (Clause 178), but for the most part this had 
not taken place. Overall, as will become evident, the public transport sector was 
characterised by a combination of very few regulations, non-enforcement of those 
that existed, and self-regulation by transport organisations.  
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Self-regulation came into play regarding fares and the allocation of routes, 
particularly in the most important component of Kampala’s transport sector: 
minibus-taxis or matatus. The sector was controlled by a monopolistic association, 
the Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA), established in 1982 
and legalised under the NRM in 1996 (Benmaamar et al. 2002: 6). To take part in 
the matatu business in Kampala was relatively easy; it basically involved acquiring a 
vehicle and a PSV, and then joining UTODA. Operating outside of UTODA was 
effectively impossible and membership could be violently enforced (Kumar and 
Barrett 2008: 71). Once members, drivers would be allocated a route and were 
required to pay various fees (discussed below) and comply with UTODA rules on 
fares, which the government played no part in regulating (Kumar and Barrett 2008: 
21-22; Trans-Africa 2008). 
 
Amid this loose regulatory framework, KCC had a limited role. It was responsible in 
theory for transport planning, and a Greater Kampala Transport Master Plan was 
produced by consultants in 2005 (TAHAL 2005: ES43).356 In the second half of the 
2000s, KCC played a part in developing policies for reforming bus transport, the fate 
of which will be explored in Section 6.3. It was also responsible for the city’s 
minibus-taxi parks, which occupied several sprawling sites of prime land in the CBD 
and were hubs of commercial activity at which matatus began and ended their 
journeys (see Figure 6.1). These taxi parks constituted important sources of revenue 
for KCC, through fees collected from each matatu for use of the parks. The 
collection of these fees was, however, contracted out to UTODA under a fee-based 
franchise contract (TAHAL 2005: D32). UTODA was contracted not only to collect 
fees but to provide ‘the service of managing and maintaining the taxi operation and 
taxi parks respectively in the District of Kampala’ on KCC’s behalf. (KCC/UTODA 
2005: 3).   
 
 
                                                          
356
 The government subsequently issued a position paper stating that the consultants’ proposals 
were unrealistic, suggesting instead some much more modest ones  (RoU 2006). Even steps towards 
these were not evident by 2010, when there was just one Transport Engineer working at KCC and no 
Transport Planners. 
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Figure 6.1: matatus in Kampala’s Old Taxi Park  
 
Source: author’s photograph 
 
Another area in which KCC had, in theory at least, an important role was with 
regard to the boda-bodas (motorcycle-taxis). At various points in the decade KCC 
introduced local permit and taxation systems for boda-boda drivers, who until then, 
being unlegislated for and not even mentioned in the Traffic and Road Safety Act, 
were not taxed or regulated in any way. In 2004 a regulation was also enacted on 
the use of helmets (ITSL 2008: 8) and KCC periodically developed other basic 
regulatory measures, from efforts to limit numbers to specifications about carrying 
extra helmets and reflective jackets. The fact that the boda-boda sector was 
effectively entirely unregulated does not, therefore, reflect the absence of any 
regulatory framework but a complete failure to implement the frameworks that 
were developed. This ‘rogue’ sector is explored in Section 6.5.  
 
Rwanda 
 
In some respects the institutional framework for public transport in Rwanda was 
rather similar. There were no legal restrictions on the number of buses in the 
market and the association of minibus-taxis created in 1992 – Association pour le 
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Transport en Commun (ATRACO) – exhibited many historical similarities to UTODA, 
though it did not possess the same monopolistic grip on the sector. The 
management and regulation of transport in Kigali was also spread among a wider 
range of organisations. Responsibility for urban transport planning was shared 
between MININFRA (the Ministry of Infrastructure), the City of Kigali (CoK) and the 
city’s three districts. Also playing a role, however, was the Office National de 
Transport en Commun (ONATRACOM), a public company dating back to 1978 that 
provided national transport services including twenty-two buses in Kigali.357 
ONATRACOM was also responsible for vehicle inspection (Kumar and Barrett 2008: 
73). The three District authorities in the city (overseen by CoK) managed taxi parks 
themselves, rather than contracting this out to ATRACO.  
 
Perhaps the most significant difference, however, was the presence of a 
government regulatory body – the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA) – 
created in 2001 and responsible for fares and licensing. RURA’s creation was 
intended ‘to protect users of utility services from the abuse of dominant service 
providers and other malpractices’ (RURA n.d.(a): 1). Its guidelines applied to public 
transport provided both by the public and private sector. All transport operators 
had to apply for authorisation with RURA, which involved submitting numerous 
documents and fees. The route each operator was authorised to operate would be 
inscribed on their RURA license, and they had to pay 1% of their annual turnover to 
the agency (RURA 2008). RURA applied a strict code of conduct to all operators and 
specified fares for all minibus operators, as well as larger buses and private taxis 
(RURA n.d.(b)).  
 
Like Kampala, Kigali also depended in part on motorcycle-taxis (taxi-motos) for 
transport. Since 1987, these were represented by the Association de l’Esperance de 
Taxi Motos au Rwanda (ASSETAMORWA), a confederation of 30 separate taxi-moto 
associations nationwide. In 2002 ASSETAMORWA was officially recognised by the 
Ministry of Local Government and had since worked closely with the Ministry and 
                                                          
357
 Figures on buses and minibuses acquired from Director of Transport at ONATRACOM, 25.02.09. 
There were many more buses in ONATRACOM’s fleet, financed largely by grants from the Japanese 
government since the early 1980s, but most were destroyed in 1994 (JICA 2007). 
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CoK to develop regulations including those that restricted the number of taxi-motos 
working in the city and required drivers to wear reflective uniforms and carry two 
helmets (one for the passenger).358 Section 6.6 examines how the government 
transformed this sector from one associated with crime, delinquency and insecurity 
into one of the most tightly-regulated and securitised urban groups in Kigali.  
 
6.3    Kampala’s matutu invasion: ‘it is not a transport system, it is thuggery’ 
 
Assessing the effectiveness of UPT policies and regulations in Kampala requires 
providing some detail on the evolution of the matatu sector and the powerful 
organisation at its heart. The common trajectory whereby public bus companies 
became unviable and were forced out of business by minibuses occurred relatively 
early in Uganda. The Uganda Transport Company, initially privately owned but 
nationalised in 1972, held an exclusive franchise to provide bus services in Kampala: 
in the early independence years it ran over 100 seventy-seat buses in the city.359 
However, under the chaos of the Amin and second Obote periods, investment in 
buses was destroyed and the market for urban transport flooded with informal 
minibus operators (Trans-Africa 2008: 60). Early entrants into the market earned 
high returns, which rapidly attracted further entrants (Adam Smith International 
2005: 103). The year the NRM came to power, taxi owners consolidated their 
organisational capacities and UTODA was formed, displacing the more loosely-
organised association that preceded it.360   
 
UTODA: ‘a highly mysterious entity’ 
 
No attempt was made to salvage the Uganda Transport Company: large buses were 
considered to be loss-making enterprises and were sold off.361 Meanwhile, the NRM 
realised early on the importance of UTODA both economically and strategically as 
they sought to stabilise the country: one observer described UTODA as ‘hijacked by 
                                                          
358
 Leaflet summarising ASSETAMORWA activities, acquired from ASSETAMORWA offices. 
359
 Interview with Ugandan transport consultant, 25.09.09. 
360
 1986 was the year given by Mr Ndyomugyeni, UTODA National Chairman (interviewed 30.09.09) 
and is the date given on UTODA’s official website. Other sources such as Kumar and Barrett (2008: 
71) cite the earlier date of 1982.  
361
 Interview with Mr Ndyomugyeni, UTODA National Chairman, 30.09.09. 
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the government because it is employing a lot of people and these people are 
radiating out, going to a lot of areas. So they were using it as a channel in spreading 
their political tentacles’.362 Thus the new government, composed of former 
guerrillas adept at societal infiltration, turned the matatu business to their interests 
and allowed it to flourish. UTODA, meanwhile, saw it as prudent early on to position 
itself as a supporter of the NRM cause.363  
 
By 2000, matatus accounted for 70% of road use in Kampala and UTODA comprised 
4,000 minibuses, mostly in the capital (Benmaamar et al. 2002). By 2005 this had 
increased to 6,400; by 2007 it was 8,400 and by 2009 at least 10,000.364 The number 
was so large that even according to considerably lower official figures used in a 14-
country study, Kampala had more minibuses per 1000 people (3.5) than any other 
city bar Lagos (Kumar and Barrett 2008: 2). As UTODA expanded in the 1990s it 
swiftly outgrew the 1,000-member legal limit for an association and, despite 
retaining the word ‘association’ in its name, transitioned into being a company 
limited by guarantee without share capital (TAHAL 2005: D32). Hence some 
observers termed it a ‘pseudo association’ serving wealthy elites.365 As its acronym 
suggests, UTODA comprised both ‘operators’ and drivers among its 30,000 
members in 2009.366 In reality, ‘operators’ meant the owners, by far the most 
powerful individuals in the organisation, whose interests often diverged strongly 
from those of the drivers.367 Conductors and touts were also integral to the industry 
(despite the fact that touting was illegal) but not formally part of the ‘association’ 
and therefore even more vulnerable to the powerful body of owners employing 
them.368  
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 Interview with independent planning consultant, 04.02.09. 
363
 ‘Utoda - the First Egg On Lord Mayor's Face’, Daily Monitor 28.06.11. 
364
 Interview with Bonnie Nsambu, Transport Engineer, KCC, 21.09.09. The matatus themselves are 
all of Japanese origin and second hand, usually being at least 10 years old at the point of import 
(Benmaamar et al 2002: 14). 
365
 Interview with independent planning consultant, 18.09.09. 
366
 This was the official figure given by Mr Ndyomugyeni, UTODA National Chairman, 30.09.09.  
367
 Local experts point out that the very concept of UTODA is problematic: ‘why have the taxi owners 
come into an association with the drivers? There should be one [association] for each’ (Interview 
with transport expert, Kampala 30.09.09). 
368
 Interview with Mr Ndyomugyeni, UTODA National Chairman, 30.09.09. 
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An analysis of the taxi ownership at the top is important for understanding UTODA 
and its relationship to the state which, as will be demonstrated, was inimical to 
effective state action in UPT.  However, ‘taxi ownership is highly secretive and 
UTODA is a highly mysterious entity’, to the extent that it was reputedly dangerous 
to attempt to profile the ownership.369 Their wealth was self-evident: the capital 
outlay of around $15,000 for a second hand Japanese minibus370 was far beyond the 
means of most people. Moreover, matatu ownership accrued rapid profits, enabling 
multiple purchases and progressive enrichment. Consequently, while many people 
owned only one matatu, the average was estimated at around five371 and some 
people reputedly own fleets of tens or even hundreds.372 One consultant with long-
term knowledge of the sector claimed some individuals owned as many as three 
hundred.373 While some owners were businessmen, the involvement of politicians 
was widely cited. According to one informant, ministers would ask wealthy 
businessmen seeking favours ‘to buy ten or twenty matatus for them as a 
bribe…they all started doing it, so now most owners happen to be politicians’.374 
Other sources likewise claim that matatu owners are ‘mostly’ national politicians.375  
 
However, the same sources admitted the difficulty of obtaining proof of the 
ownership profile, especially as the politicians who owned taxis were not formally 
members of UTODA: some noted that ‘you’ll never see the big guys. They are 
somewhere ‘up there’’,376 and are represented by ‘stooges’ who lead the 
organisation.377 Some observers claimed matatu ownership involved politicians 
from all parties,378 eager ‘to fund their political activities’, and even that ‘the NRM is 
trying to rebalance by buying up more matatus’.379 Others, however, suggested that 
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 Interview with independent planning consultant, 18.09.09. 
370
 Interview with Kampala bus company (A) director, 07.01.10. 
371
 Interview with Kampala bus company (A) director, 07.01.10. 
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 Interview with Bonnie Nsambu, 21.09.09. 
373
 Interview with Ugandan transport consultant, 25.09.09. 
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 Interview with independent planning consultant, 18.09.09. 
375
 Interview with Ugandan transport consultant, 25.09.09. Janet Museveni, the President’s wife, was 
rumoured to own hundreds. There is no way of verifying this. 
376
 Interview with local government official, 06.02.09. 
377
 Interview with Ugandan transport consultant, 25.09.09. 
378
 Interview with Chairman of a civic organisation, 30.09.09; interview with former local politician, 
29.09.09. 
379
 Interview with independent planning consultant, 18.09.09.  
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‘most or all are NRM’ because members of other parties would fear destruction of 
their property if they got involved.380 Either way, strong organisational links 
between UTODA and the NRM were undeniable. UTODA offices were reputedly 
used as NRM campaign offices prior to elections;381 it was ‘public knowledge that 
UTODA is one of the biggest funders of the NRM regime’382 and it was said that in 
every presidential campaign since 1996 ‘UTODA has been at the helm of providing 
free transport to NRM supporters’.383  
 
The amount of money passing through the hands of UTODA’s bosses gives some 
indication of their grip on the sector. Because of lack of data on exact numbers of 
matatus or informal payments, estimates are only approximate; but nevertheless, it 
is possible to present a picture of the scale of the enterprise. Officially, each matatu 
driver paid UGX 20,000 per month to UTODA for a sticker authorising them to 
operate, and a further 4,500 per day for use of the taxi parks.384 If a conservative 
estimate of 10,000 matatus in 2010 is used, this amounted to official payments of 
UGX 1.55bn ($775,000) from drivers to UTODA for a 30-day month.385 In addition, 
there were less transparent payments. First were the so-called ‘welfare fees’, 
unreceipted payments averaging 5,000 shillings per day,386 which amounts to 
another 1.5bn ($775,000) into UTODA coffers monthly. In addition, every time a 
matatu stopped, the conductor paid an unreceipted ‘loading fee’ to a UTODA 
representative stationed at that particular matatu ‘stage’, the amount of which 
varied by route but was ‘equivalent to the fare of three passengers’.387 Overall, Lord 
Mayor Erias Lukwago’s accusation in 2011 that UTODA collected a total of UGX 4bn 
($2m) monthly,388 despite paying only 392m monthly to KCC ($196,000), makes 
sense and may even be an under-estimate.   
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 Interview with Ugandan transport consultant, 25.09.09. 
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 Interview with former local politician, 29.09.09. 
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 Musisi, Lukwago feud could fail Kampala city’, The Observer, 10.07.11. 
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 ‘Buses for Kampala: Will Utoda Get On Board?’ The New Vision, 31.06.06. 
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 Various interviews with transport experts and KCC staff, September 2009-January 2010. 
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 The conversion into USD is based on the figure of UGX 2,000 per dollar, the approximate rate in 
2009-10.  
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 ‘Government stops extra UTODA charges’, New Vision 11.07.11. 
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 ‘Government stops extra UTODA charges’, New Vision 11.07.11. 
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 KCCA to conduct fresh taxi census’, Daily Monitor 26.07.11. 
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These unreceipted fees amounted to a severe burden of ‘double taxation’ 
(official/receipted and unofficial/unreceipted) on drivers and conductors,389 and 
very little is known about what happened to the 90% of UTODA’s $24m annual 
income not remitted to KCC. Many believed that much of it went ‘into somebody’s 
pocket, because if you go to UTODA and ask someone ‘can you give me the balance 
sheet of all your expenditures and incomes’…they don’t have anything. They can’t 
give you that.’390 In the 14-country study, Kampala again topped the league in terms 
of typical ‘indirect charges’ paid by minibus drivers to their ‘association’. Average 
payments in Kampala were over six times as high as those in Accra (Kumar and 
Barrett 2008: 9-10).  
 
All these payments to UTODA merely scratch the surface in terms of the amount of 
money concentrated in the industry. The owners as individuals reaped far more: 
many sources confirmed that most matatus were run according to a system 
whereby the driver paid UGX 60-80,000 ($30-40) per day to the owner for use of 
the vehicle. Most of what drivers made in excess of this they used for fuel, 
maintenance and the payment of UTODA fees; the remainder (usually about UGX 
15,000 each for the driver and conductor), they could keep.391 If we take a 
conservative figure of UGX 60,000 passed to the driver alongside the conservative 
figure of 10,000 matatus, this means that each day UGX 600m ($300,000) was 
passed by drivers to owners, in addition to fees paid to UTODA. Collectively, matatu 
owners therefore took around $9m per month, or $108m in a year. Put differently, 
an individual owning twenty matatus as a sideline could make over $250,000 
annually from the enterprise.392 This gives some indication of the economic 
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 Interview with former local politician, 29.09.09; ‘Government stops extra UTODA charges’, New 
Vision 11.07.11. 
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 Interview with independent planning consultant, 04.02.09.  
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 Interview with former matatu owner, 29.09.09; Interview with Bonnie Nsambu, KCC Transport 
Engineer, 21.09.09; interview with independent planning consultant 18.09.09; TAHAL 2005: ES 36. 
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 If we combine approximations of daily income to owners (60-80,000), UTODA (20,000), drivers 
and conductors (15,000 each = 30,000) with additional expense for fuel and maintenance, it seems 
reasonable to assume that each matatu must have been taking a daily net income in fares of around 
UGX 150,000 ($75). Multiplied by the number of matatus in the city and approximating for a full 
year, this amounts to total turnover in the sector of $250m annually – around 1.5% of (nominal) 
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interests involved. Given that many of those benefitting are both politicians and 
members of UTODA, it is unsurprising that effecting state action to rein in UTODA 
was deeply problematic. 
 
‘The City Council feels very timid’: the state and the UTODA stranglehold 
 
The fact that one association had such a grip on urban transport might not 
immediately appear relevant to state effectiveness, particularly given that the 
transport market was deliberately deregulated. However, while the government 
consciously relegated the sector to UTODA after 1986, the organisation’s role soon 
spiralled out of control. This sub-section demonstrates how UTODA became so large 
and powerful that more recent efforts by the state to impose order and claw back a 
degree of regulatory and revenue-raising power over the sector repeatedly met 
with failure and frustration. This had far-reaching consequences for the city and 
further illustrates the crippling of state effectiveness in Kampala.  
 
Transport competition in Kampala was ‘in-the-market’ rather than ‘for-the-
market’:393 thus anyone could partake, but all entrants had to join UTODA if 
operating matatus, and if trying to operate any other kind of bus would be in open 
competition with UTODA for all routes. From at least 2006 this was contrary to 
government policy, which was to re-introduce some regulation in the form of ‘for-
the-market’ competition. Mayor Ssebaggala came to power in 2005 with a 
manifesto initiative to reintroduce 400 large buses to the city, subsequently 
endorsed by the President.394 Private bus companies, a few of which already 
existed,  were to be granted particular urban corridors and large parts of the city 
centre, where matatus would not be allowed to operate.395 The proposals were 
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 Interview with Bonnie Nsambu, 21.09.09. These terms also appear in a World Bank report on 
urban transport in developing countries (Mitric 2008). Standard policy advice favours ‘for-the-
market’ competition, whereby specific sections of the urban transport market (i.e. particular routes) 
are allocated through competitive bidding procedures to one provider exclusively, over a competitive 
‘free-for-all’ throughout the entire city.  
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 Interview with Nasser Ntege Ssebaggala, 15.10.09. 
395
 Interview with Bonnie Nsambu, 21.09.09. 
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termed ‘a time bomb waiting to explode’ due to the threat they represented to 
UTODA’s interests.396 
 
Instead of an explosion, what occurred in the transport sector over the next five 
years was an almost total lack of progress. Ssebaggala’s plan was to grant many 
routes exclusively to the company Pioneer Easy Bus. The idea was to introduce a 
fleet of 200 by the end of 2008 and then scale up further, but instead Pioneer was 
still running only 13 as the decade closed.397 In 2009 they even had to sell two buses 
due to debt,398 which reflected the government’s failure to secure the promised 
investment.399 Meanwhile some KCC councillors actively stalled the process due to 
opposition to Ssebaggala’s plan to allocate so much of the market to one company 
without properly advertising the tender.400 The controversy continued into 2010 
and beyond (see epilogue), amid accusations of dubious deals between Pioneer and 
KCC and intimidation by various interests threatened by the possible transformation 
of the transport system.401  
 
There is little doubt that one organisation benefitted from chronically stalled 
progress: UTODA. Ssebaggala took them on by proposing to replace matatus in the 
city centre with buses, and essentially UTODA won the battle: Ssebaggala left office 
after five years without his five-year transport vision having even reached the 
starting line.402 While one can only speculate about what took place behind the 
scenes, UTODA’s obstruction was evident at the micro-level on a day-to-day basis. 
Pioneer was one of four companies whose small numbers of buses in the city were 
regularly subject to threats and harassment. The director of one company, which 
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began operating in 2007, described how initially his buses were ‘effectively 
hijacked’, commandeered by UTODA drivers and taken off the road.403 Another 
stated that ‘when we started it was open combat’, with physical attacks being 
commonplace.404 One had to temporarily flee the country after he angered UTODA 
by operating buses on a particularly lucrative urban corridor.405 Although this 
violence had reduced by 2010, bus companies were experiencing daily extortion of 
unreceipted payments by UTODA officials. For example UGX 7,000 of ‘welfare 
payment’ was charged to private bus operators every time they stopped at any bus 
stage in the city, even though they received no services from UTODA.406  
 
These payments constituted a major expense for private bus operators, who were 
already paying fees to the KCC.407 Dealing with harassment from UTODA had been 
‘a constant struggle’ and they often operated at a loss in the city, depending on 
profits from rural services.408 In the words of a local transport expert ‘it is not a 
transport system, it is thuggery’; an entire critical economic sector controlled by 
‘people who have no professional instinct or training’.409 The situation was 
hampering investment in UPT because donors including the World Bank, which had 
expressed considerable interest, would not disburse funds until the government 
had some grip on the situation.410  
 
It was not only by obstructing the competition that UTODA was implicated in state 
ineffectiveness. It also impeded effective local revenue collection, in several ways. 
First, it under-reported numbers to KCC (UTODA’s Chairman cited a figure 6,000 
matatus in 2009,411 when KCC’s estimate of the reality was 10,000), thereby 
keeping its monthly fees artificially low. Second, it often simply did not pay its fees. 
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In December 2008, KCC’s Director of Finance reported to council that UTODA owed 
KCC UGX 1.9bn (almost $1m), having paid no fees for over six months.412 UTODA 
thus repeatedly breached its financial contract with KCC in addition to its dismal 
record on maintaining the taxi parks, which by 2010 were in total disrepair, the 
concrete floor having long disintegrated into mud. On 20th January 2009, the Town 
Clerk’s office issued three months’ notice for the termination of UTODA’s contract 
to manage the city’s taxi parks.413 However, both Ssebaggala and Central Division 
Chairman Nyakana (of the NRM) stepped in to UTODA’s defence,414 as did a high 
court intervention blocking KCC’s action.415 ‘That tells you the problem of 
governance that we have in the city’, noted one government official. KCC ‘should 
have terminated [the contract] long ago’.416  
 
What accounts for UTODA’s persistently unassailable position? On the one hand, 
the commonly-held view that many matatu owners were senior NRM politicians 
suggests that members of the government effectively controlled UTODA. As one 
informant noted, ‘big fellows in the government own the taxis…they take a big cut 
and they are the ones who decide…[UTODA] is a front for their interests’.417 Other 
perspectives suggest a different interpretation, however, to the effect that UTODA 
was an independent and powerful group in its own right, a ‘strong mobilising 
force’418 benefitting from political patronage simply by virtue of being too large and 
influential for the government to risk alienating.419 The power dynamic between 
UTODA and government politicians was therefore complex and the direction of 
influence not always clear. In fact, one could argue that UTODA and the NRM were 
doubly bound together: the NRM government ‘hijacked’ UTODA when consolidating 
the Movement’s dominance of Ugandan territory, but as the matatu business grew 
and grew, UTODA increasingly ‘hijacked’ the government.  
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There are therefore certain respects in which UTODA had leverage over 
government, even while it was infused by individuals comprising the government. 
Politicians were not the only force on which UTODA’s official cadres could draw: 
most of the estimated 100,000 people in the matatu business420 were essentially 
‘bayaye’:421 drivers, conductors and touts who constituted both an important voting 
bloc and a potential source of violence, and could be mobilised if their livelihoods 
were threatened. UTODA’s official leaders thus played both sides of the game, 
fronting for government ‘big men’ while at the same time reminding the 
government of UTODA’s potential power of rebellion. As its Chairman noted in 
2009: 
 
‘In UTODA we have intellectuals, we have school drop-outs and we also have the 
third category which is the worst – the hard core criminals which we keep in the 
taxi industry to deter them from terrorizing the general public.’422 
 
This was no empty statement and further illustrates how UTODA’s relationship with 
politicians encompassed collusion alongside the threat of opposition if the state 
attempted to exert control over the industry. Indeed, if the relationship between 
UTODA and the government was complex, the relationship between UTODA and 
the state was much clearer: the latter, particularly as represented by bureaucrats at 
the city level tasked with implementing policies on urban transport, was once again 
on ‘the low bargaining side’.423 UTODA’s leverage in many respects constituted 
another example, like those in Chapter Four, of ‘politicians versus the state’: the 
role of ‘big big big fellows’ within UTODA meant that ‘the City Council feels very 
timid’ in its engagement with the industry.424 The double bind between UTODA and 
the NRM government saw politicians seeking to protect their personal matatu 
rents, while UTODA officials threatened to create instability for the government if 
UTODA’s market share was threatened. Both worked against state policy, and the 
result was doubly crippling for state effectiveness.  
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6.4    Kigali’s shrinking matatu sector amid urban growth 
 
Comparing the UPT sector in Kigali with that in Kampala reveals both important 
differences and uncanny similarities. By contrast with Uganda, the crisis of public 
bus companies came to Rwanda late. ONATRACOM, the public company supplying 
large buses since 1978, managed initially to survive liberalisation and the matatu 
invasion of the 1990s and 2000s. However, it went into slow decline and in 2009-10 
seventy out of its 178 buses nationwide were grounded due to technical 
problems.425 At this point the state intervened by renewing the organisation in a 
style typical of the RPF administration. Everyone in the previous team was sacked, 
and the new management included a former Captain responsible for army fleets 
and a Major previously working for the Ministry of Defence.426 ONATRACOM was in 
any case of limited relevance for the capital city, where it ran only 22 buses.427 In 
Kigali, as in Kampala, the state’s UPT agenda was to grant particular routes to 
various private bus companies.428 Like Kampala, the city’s major form of public 
transport was the matatu, operated by individual owners under the banner of 
ATRACO, formed in 1992. Again, a brief assessment of this organisation and its 
history will be useful before proceeding further to analyse the sector.   
 
ATRACO: UTODA’s little sister 
 
In the events of 1994, many taxi drivers died or fled, after which there were only 
around 300 matatus in the country; however as the national and urban populations 
were rapidly replenished by returning refugees, demand soared. Former soldiers 
were prominent among those benefitting from this by buying and operating 
matatus,
429
 and as in Uganda – where many such soldiers had fought – ATRACO’s 
post-1994 development had a security dimension, as will be discussed 
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subsequently. In another mirror image of Kampala, ATRACO paid a fixed monthly 
sum to the District for the use of the two main taxi parks.430 
 
ATRACO’s operations, however, were tiny compared to UTODA’s, even accounting 
for Kigali’s smaller size. ATRACO consisted of 3,000 members nationally: at most a 
tenth of UTODA’s membership.431 While some research undertaken in 2004-6 cites 
a figure of 2000 matatus in Kigali (Kumar and Barrett 2008), ONATRACOM records 
indicated 850 matatus in December 2007 and only 750 exactly one year later.432 
Moreover, another year later in December 2009, the Chairman of ATRACO cited a 
figure of just 700.433 While there may of course be inaccuracies, these figures taken 
together strongly suggest the number of matatus in the city actually substantially 
decreased as the decade wore on, despite continued urban growth. Other 
testimonies corroborate this, one source noting that there were ‘many more 
matatus here before 2002’.434 ATRACO’s role relative to the broader UPT arena was 
also dwindling by 2010, in contrast with UTODA’s continued dominance. It had 
never transformed into a company, remaining a not-for-profit organisation 
throughout the 2000s – something that its leaders felt limited it at a time when 
various for-profit companies were entering the market.435  While individual matatu 
owners were surely profiting from the enterprise, ATRACO as an organisation was 
therefore not creaming off profits from the sector in the same way as UTODA.  
 
However, ATRACO’s organisational issues cannot account for the small total number 
of buses and matatus in the city. In early 2008 there were 53 non-ATRACO 
minibuses or slightly larger 25-29-seater ‘coasters’ run by various small companies, 
increasing to 95 by 2009.436 While the market share of private companies was 
therefore increasing, they were nevertheless operating on a very small scale for a 
city of a million inhabitants. Moreover, combining the figures cited above indicates 
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that the absolute number of buses, coasters and minibuses taken together actually 
declined from 929 in 2008 to 865 in 2009, in a city growing at almost 4% annually 
(UNPD 2009).  Meanwhile in Kampala, where rates of urban growth were similar, 
the number of matatus was increasing by around 1000 annually. 
 
The trajectory of Kigali’s public transport from 2000-2010 is thus a puzzling one. 
ONATRACOM was in slow decline, and while ATRACO picked up some of the slack it 
then started to go into decline itself, despite soaring urban growth after 1994. 
Following this, small private companies started to fill the gap but, once again, not as 
much as would be expected. A positive governmental attitude towards private 
public transport provision, the relative absence of obstruction and harassment by 
ATRACO,437 rapid economic growth and a booming urban population would seem to 
suggest a wealth of opportunities for those seeking to invest in the sector. One 
obvious question is whether this surprising trajectory was driven by supply or 
demand factors. In one of the many paradoxes characterising Kigali’s development, 
there are reasons to believe it was both. 
 
Supply and demand on the streets of Kigali 
 
On one level there was evidence of ample demand for more public transport in the 
city, suggesting that the problem was undersupply. Kigali residents complained of 
insufficient numbers of coasters and matatus during rush hours,438 and physical 
fighting at bus stops was not uncommon because competition to board was so 
fierce.439 The problems were particularly acute for certain routes: operators plied 
shorter routes for easy money (although the shortest of all were often profitable – 
see below) while passengers for long routes queued for hours. Moreover, when the 
school year began the problems worsened because many operators entered 
arrangements with students, who they drove to school before engaging in normal 
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business, exacerbating undersupply during rush hour. In 2010 around 40% of 
minibuses were being used in this way.440  
 
There are various reasons why this demand was not being met. One was prohibitive 
vehicle import tariffs, which amounted to 40% of the price of a coaster in 2010. 
Without government incentives to counterbalance these, private bus companies 
argued that it was extremely hard to grow their businesses.441 Other rules and 
regulations similarly inhibited investors: for example the fares set by RURA were 
rigorously adhered to, creating difficulties for urban operators. In Kampala, UTODA 
set fares that allowed ‘abnormal profits’ in the city,442 while in some areas of Kigali 
demand was not met simply because the journeys were too short to be profitable 
without hiking fares. All of this was made worse by increasing petrol prices; only 
when petrol reached a very high price would RURA authorise an increase in fares.443  
 
While these supply-side factors explain the puzzle to some degree, there was more 
to the story of Kigali’s curiously small number of public transport vehicles. After all, 
some transport experts pointed out that demand for public transport in aggregate 
was actually ‘very low’ in Kigali.444 There were certain parts of the city, those where 
major settlements were expropriated and the populations evicted (see Chapter 
Four), which bus operators ‘did not serve as there is no-one there!’.445 Moreover, 
although Rwanda was a very poor country with relatively few vehicle owners, 
suggesting a strong demand for public transport, the majority of the wealthy were 
in Kigali – along with their private vehicles. Of 71,103 registered private vehicles in 
2009, 46,674 (or 66%) were registered to addresses in Kigali, despite the fact that 
only around 10% of the population lived there.446 Many of those using the capital’s 
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roads therefore did not need public transport.447 Meanwhile, the poorest city-
dwellers may have been unable to afford public transport at all, arguably to an even 
greater extent than in other African cities: Kigali’s sprawling geography meant that 
commutes into the centre were on average over twice as far as those travelled by 
commuters in Kampala and therefore considerably more expensive (Kumar and 
Barrett 2008: 28).448 
 
When viewed in the light of evidence from Chapters Four and Five about the flight 
of many poorer urban residents, willingly or otherwise, to surrounding rural areas, 
the fact that public transport was a small proportion of urban traffic starts to look 
like a function of low demand. The dual processes of eviction from the city centre 
and the contraction of informal urban livelihoods suggest that the poor were 
increasingly likely to walk to work if close enough or seek a living in the suburbs, as 
evictees relocated to Kigali’s periphery noted.449 The fact that increasing 
proportions of matatus were in rural rather than urban areas may therefore reflect 
changing dynamics of demand; bus operators note that ‘for quick money you go 
outside the city’.450  
 
Despite Kigali’s continued growth, the opportunities to make profits from public 
transport in the city were evidently limited, a seeming paradox that reflected a 
complex interplay of supply and demand factors. In some areas exhibiting high 
demand at particular times, the shortage of buses was attributable to supply-side 
constraints; however, relatively low demand at other times rendered even the 
existing number of vehicles superfluous to the extent that bus operators would ‘go 
home and rest’ until demand picked up again.451 The clampdown on informal 
economic activity also meant that a higher proportion of people using public 
transport were travelling at the beginning and end of the working day, so during 
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other periods demand dipped dramatically. It is clear that with all the rapid socio-
economic changes the city has been experiencing, the question of public transport 
was therefore in flux. Even those working in the industry admitted to not really 
knowing the size and shape of the market.452 
 
State effectiveness and the stunted public transport sector 
 
In many respects the above analysis suggests a mismanaged sector with little 
evidence of state effectiveness. From the perspective of efficient, affordable 
transport it left much to be desired. However, in relation to the government’s 
overriding political priorities, there is scope for a less negative assessment. Two 
main points will be made about the political economy of state effectiveness in this 
sector, one of which relates mainly to ATRACO as an organisation, and the other to 
the sector more broadly.   
 
Unlike in Kampala, Kigali’s matatu association could not hold the state to ransom. 
Instead, the government actively limited ATRACO’s role to where it was considered 
productive and supported state efforts to implement this at all levels. ATRACO 
collected no unreceipted fees: as a supplier of buses to the Rwandan sector noted, 
in Rwanda ‘you have a very similar organisation [to UTODA] but with complete 
accountability’.453 It did collect payments from drivers and occasionally they 
expressed discontent; these, however, were disciplinary fines rather than unofficial 
‘welfare’ and ‘loading’ fees. Thus ATRACO was actually assisting the state in 
implementing its strict regulations.454 ATRACO also largely fulfilled its 
responsibilities to maintain the taxi parks,455 although the city government rejected 
its proposal to physically redevelop the main taxi park.
456
 Again, this contrasted 
with Uganda, where (after lobbying parliament) UTODA was allocated the job of 
redeveloping Kampala’s Old Taxi Park in 2009, on the grounds that it was the ‘sitting 
tenant’, revoking an earlier commitment to more capable developers and despite 
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UTODA’s manifest failure to maintain the parks to date.457 Finally, far from 
pandering to ATRACO on fee payments, CoK refused to reduce ATRACO’s fees when 
the latter pleaded that they were too high.458 Politicians, therefore, supported the 
activities of state actors experiencing problems collecting revenues. 
 
The state’s bargaining power vis-à-vis ATRACO was probably always relatively 
strong, and the apparently similar conditions under which ATRACO and UTODA 
flourished are somewhat deceptive. Many ex-military joined Kigali’s matatu 
business after 1994, but this is not the same as the involvement of contemporary 
politicians. The Transport Officer at CoK maintained that he knew ‘of no MP who 
owns a matatu here. They are just businessmen.’459 This also needs to be 
interpreted in light of the fact that Rwanda’s relatively few MPs were arguably not 
very powerful political actors anyway, but there is also no evidence that powerful 
appointed government politicians (i.e. the executive) owned matatus. Instead, the 
military officers-turned-businessmen in ATRACO contributed to the government’s 
securitisation agenda while affording the state some autonomy from the 
association. In Kampala, by contrast, the prevalence of UTODA businessmen who 
were simultaneously government politicians undermined state autonomy and any 
credibility of commitments to deal with UTODA’s evident irresponsibility.   
 
The second point is that the Rwandan government essentially treated the matatu 
industry as a transitional phenomenon, reining in its influence and gradually 
regulating it out of business. Part of the reason for undersupply and economic 
inefficiency in Kigali was because the state was rather effective regarding other 
goals it valued more highly. Rwanda’s regulators believed that ‘if you don’t regulate 
transport there can be chaos’,460 and the issues of urban security and order, which 
unsurprisingly were priorities given the genocide legacy, were addressed rather 
effectively. So too was the explicit goal of phasing out matatus and the ‘matatu 
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mindset’ in favour of other forms of transport.461 While major constraints remained 
for private bus companies, they were growing faster than in Kampala and the 
transition to systems of fixed timetables and routes was gathering pace by 2010. 462 
A Kampala bus operator noted with envy that ‘in Kigali the market has already 
proven the big buses work – they are a step ahead.’463  
 
The effectiveness of the state in Kigali was evidently mixed in this sector. It was not 
very effective at providing sufficient amounts of UPT for people with diverse 
transport needs. However, analysing the situation in relation to other explicit 
government commitments and priorities pertaining to the reshaping of the 
transport sector, it was far more effective than the state in Kampala. Order, 
security, regulation, and the reduction of the role of matatus as a share of public 
transport were all being effected to some degree, in line with long-term strategic 
objectives.  
 
6.5    Kampala’s boda-boda phenomenon: the ‘untouchables’ 
 
Originating in the Uganda-Kenya border zone, hence their Ugandan name boda-
boda (border-to-border), motorcycle-taxis proliferated in Uganda with the arrival of 
motorised bicycles in large numbers in the 1990s (Bryceson et al. 2003: 52). Once 
again, however, the relationship between the state and motorcycle-taxis differed 
dramatically in the two cities. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that they 
were widely considered outlaws in Kampala while they were virtually an arm of the 
police in Kigali.  
 
Kampala’s increasing traffic gridlock as matatu numbers expanded meant that 
boda-bodas multiplied even more rapidly. For those willing to pay more (fares for a 
journey within Kampala were around three to four times more than a matatu), the 
proliferation of motorised vehicles able to bypass Kampala’s notorious traffic jams 
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was a welcome development.464 A nation-wide phenomenon, there were already 
70,000 boda-boda operators in Uganda by 2002 (Howe and Davis 2002)465 and the 
figure grew exponentially thereafter. In 2005-2006 alone, 84,098 motorcycles were 
imported into the country and annual imports grew from 12,564 in 2000 to 42,816 
in 2007 (ITSL 2008: 16). While not all were used as taxis, many were: motorcycle-
taxi numbers were growing at an estimated 58.7% per annum at that time (ibid). 
Most boda-bodas were not registered with the Transport Licensing Board,466 so 
estimates were based on surveys. One report found ‘more than 4,000’ in 2003 
(TAHAL 2005: D29), while a another reported 15,979 in November 2007 (ITSL 2008). 
The Chairman of one of Kampala’s boda-boda associations and various other 
sources put the figure at 40,000 in 2010 (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012), which 
accorded with the general consensus and the growth rate cited above. In 2009, 
growth was such that in Kawempe Division, which already accommodated around 
5,000, the number of boda-boda drivers expanded by 20-30 drivers every day (see 
Figure 6.2).467 
 
Figure 6.2: Boda-boda drivers wait for passengers in Kawempe, Kampala 
 
Source: author’s photograph 
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The benefits of boda-bodas for passengers were clear, while for operators the ready 
availability of low-powered, cheap Japanese motorcycles made the industry the 
ultimate in fast-return investment (TAHAL 2005: D32). It was also promoted as a 
means of alleviating poverty and unemployment:468 the government cultivated the 
sector, allocating funds to credit schemes for motorcycle purchase under 
programmes such as ‘Prosperity for All’ and persuading banks to provide loans to 
prospective boda-boda drivers (ITSL 2008: 18). Consequently many drivers, while 
poor, could own their motorcycle. Surveys found that 41-44% of drivers in Kampala 
owned the motorcycles they operated (Howe and Davis 2002; ITSL 2008).  
 
Drivers usually began by renting the motorcycle from the owner through a 
standardised hire-purchase scheme, paying UGX 10,000 per day to the owner for a 
fixed period. The price of new motorcycles was around UGX 2.2 million, but drivers 
commonly paid a total of UGX 3.6million (sometimes more) to the owner in 
instalments.469 The owner therefore made a profit of at least 60% of the purchase 
price. As with matatus, the business could therefore be very lucrative, particularly 
for those owning large numbers of boda-bodas. Some investors allegedly owned 
hundreds and rented them out in this way.470 Drivers would, on average, make 
around UGX 20-25,000 net each day. If not outright owners, then after paying rent 
to the owner and covering fuel and maintenance costs they might be left with 
under UGX 10,000 (around $5).471  
 
At the local level, boda-boda drivers were highly organised. Within each Division 
were around 200-300 ‘stages’472 at which particular groups waited to pick up 
customers, each of which had an elected or nominated Chairman, Secretary and 
Treasurer (ITSL 2008: 24). A Chairman was also elected for the Division level. Drivers 
paid a one-off fee for the use of a ‘portion’ in a particular stage, and in some stages 
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every driver also paid fixed daily contributions in case of accidents or bereavement 
costs incurred by a stage member.473 Despite this degree of local social 
organisation, city-level organisation was a very different story. No association with 
anything like the monopoly and political clout of UTODA was ever consolidated, 
arguably because the potential for extracting huge amounts of rent from each unit 
was smaller, and the ownership more fragmented. 
 
In 1993, the Uganda Association of Motorcycle and Bicycle Operators (UAMBO) was 
formed to try and create some order, but this disintegrated to be replaced by an 
organisation called the Real Boda-boda Association, which fell apart to be replaced 
by the National Federation for Boda-boda Operators (NAFEBO) in 2006 (ITSL 2008: 
4). By 2009, some officials were unaware of this organisation and often dealt with 
multiple rival groups all claiming to be the ‘real’ association.474 In October 2009 one 
locally powerful driver claimed to be the Chairman for all of Kampala under the 
aegis of a new post-NAFEBO association, the National Federation of Professional 
Cyclists Network Association (NFPC 2009). Meanwhile the NAFEBO Chairman 
claimed his organisation still existed and that all other Chairmen in the country, 
including the latter, were under his authority.475 Drivers further down the chain 
admitted that the organisations were in ‘chaos’.476  
 
Failures of regulation: ‘collecting ants in a cup’ 
 
The case for regulating the sector was clearly strong. Widespread consensus existed 
among both boda-boda leaders and city authorities that numbers urgently needed 
controlling,477 and the sheer danger to health and life posed by the industry was 
indisputable. Between 2005 and 2006, victims of serious traffic accidents rose from 
4000 annually to 5000, with deaths occurring in hundreds and motorcycle accidents 
as the fastest-growing subcategory (ITSL 2008: 9). Drivers were considered to be 
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illiterate ‘hooligans’ prone to criminality; the ‘worst group’ in society.478 People 
often referred to the uneducated urban underclass generally as ‘the boda-boda 
class’.479  
 
Early in the new millennium when their numbers reached new heights, the state 
(KCC in particular) attempted to implement a regulatory framework. In addition to 
helmet requirements, the realisation early in the millennium that many drivers did 
not have driving licenses prompted a series of regulations requiring drivers to carry 
documents including a license, PSV permit and third party insurance.480 A special 
motorcycle enforcement unit (Kuboka) was created around the same time, with the 
mandate of enforcing regulations and prohibiting carrying two passengers 
simultaneously. Kuboka consisted of drivers familiar with the ‘tricks of the trade’ 
trained by the police to act as plain clothes boda-boda policemen.481 It became 
associated with bribes and extortion, rather than effective regulation of the sector, 
and in any case was formally disbanded in 2007, ostensibly due to lack of resources 
(ITSL 2008: 30). 
 
The Kuboka debacle further destabilised the sector by contributing to organisational 
disarray. In 2009 some drivers believed Kuboka still covertly existed under the cover 
of other organisations,482 assisting the police in sporadic and ultimately ineffective 
‘crackdowns’ that characterised the sector after 2007.483  New guidelines were 
constantly issued by KCC, including a byelaw banning boda-bodas in the city centre, 
requirements about wearing reflective jackets484 and regulations about carrying an 
extra helmet for the passenger (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012). Yet the proliferation 
of rules without any control over the industry’s expansion only made the prospect 
of implementation more hopeless. Figure 6.3 illustrates the growth in number of 
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boda-bodas alongside the various short-lived and failed efforts to impose 
restrictions and order on the sector during the 2000s. 
 
In 2008, the Inspector General of Police issued a one-year deadline as a ‘last chance’ 
for drivers to conform to regulations, particularly regarding permits, PSVs and 
helmets.485 As the deadline was nearing, the 2009 ‘Buganda riots’ shook the capital; 
many boda-boda drivers were thought to have participated.486 Consequently there 
was a particularly fierce crackdown in September-October 2009. Police rounded up 
drivers at random and impounded their vehicles, demanding UGX 60-80,000 in fines 
for absent helmets and documents. However, if drivers had ready cash the police 
would often instead take a bribe of around 30,000 UGX and let them go. Some 
drivers felt that the police, chronically underpaid, were just ‘arresting because they 
need the money so much’ or were ‘using it for uniforms’.487 Another crackdown 
followed in February 2010, initially supported by Museveni. The following month he 
ordered the police to halt it.488 As one KCC official noted, the sporadic crackdowns 
have improved nothing: ‘it is like when you collect ants in a cup and then you 
release them to go’.489  
 
An irony of this ineffective regulation is that boda-boda leaders expressed deep 
enthusiasm for uniforms, order and restrictions on entry into the business.490 KCC 
officials admitted that these leaders ‘persistently desired to have an organised 
industry’ and deserved maximum support.491 Kampala’s RDC – the President’s 
representative in the city – argued that KCC was the problem, stating that city 
politicians complained of a lack of resources but failed to regulate primarily because 
they constantly took bribes.492 Yet while corruption in KCC was indeed a widely-
acknowledged problem, its lack of resources was genuine and was exacerbated by 
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the actions by the RDC and other players acting on Museveni’s behalf. Indeed the 
greatest failures of implementation concerned taxation and were caused by 
obstructions of a distinctly political nature.   
 
Figure 6.3: Growth in number of boda-bodas and failed government initiatives, 
2003-2010 
 
 
Failures of taxation: ‘the president spoiled the whole system’ 
 
There were several concerted attempts in the 2000s to tax boda-bodas, all of which 
resulted in abject failure.  As it became clear that the industry was mushrooming 
and becoming central to the urban economy, the case for taxation was undeniable. 
A first effort came in 2002-3, but drivers made a plea to the president, who at that 
time was celebrating the sector and initiating credit schemes. Although the 
President had not initially objected to the tax, this plea was successful: in June 2004 
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a Presidential Directive ordered KCC to stop collecting the tax on the grounds that it 
was resulting in the over-taxation of a new industry.493  
 
This further fuelled the sector’s growth (ITSL 2008: 18), and with an election 
looming in 2006 the boda-bodas were left untouched for some time by efforts 
towards taxation. However, KCC embarked on another attempt in 2006-7. The 
Division Chairmen and Mayor agreed on a new system, involving the payment of a 
monthly fee to the City Council in exchange for a display sticker.494 Of the UGX 9000 
paid per driver per month, 3000 went to KCC, 3000 to the Division and 3000 to 
NAFEBO, who collected it.495 The sticker scheme ran from December 2006 to June 
2007, and despite sometimes violent engagement between tax collectors and 
drivers was considered successful.496 The tax was small compared to just the official 
fees paid by matatu drivers and was around 3% of a boda-boda driver’s monthly 
earnings.497 Moreover, there was little evidence that the industry was collectively 
mobilising against it.498  
 
However, after seven months, tax collection abrubtly ended. Boda-boda leaders 
claimed that ‘NRM politicians came and disorganised us’,499 and drivers then ‘cried’ 
to Museveni that they needed to keep their money for permits and other costs.500 
In the context of a city turning towards the opposition, the temptation to sabotage 
the tax and cement the support of this core group and their dependants (amounting 
to approximately 100,000 people in 2007)501 proved irresistible. Thus despite 
evidence that the tax was working, there was a degree of deliberate destabilisation 
by the NRM to enable Museveni to come in with a populist response. The NRM 
government’s gain from this intervention was the state’s loss: in 2010, with 40,000 
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boda-bodas in the city, the amount of revenue lost by cancelling the sticker scheme 
would be around UGX 4.3bn (over $2m) every year.502  
 
The political origins of these failures are clear. The sector was always closely linked 
to the NRM: Museveni viewed it as a ‘consolidated group that he can use to support 
him during elections’, particularly in urban areas.503 During the 2001 elections, he 
symbolically rode a boda-boda through Kampala and State House created 
associations to distribute boda-bodas either as ‘soft loans’ or even for free 
throughout the decade (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012). There was, however, a 
deeper politicisation: as with matatus, the fact that boda-boda drivers ‘go very far 
and can talk to so many people’ meant they were useful tools for surveillance.504 
Many sources agreed that boda-boda stages often had state security agents 
working at them. One local Chairman claimed that spies ‘are everywhere’ in the 
industry;505 another noted that two plain-clothed ‘soldiers’ worked as boda-boda 
drivers on his stage.506  
 
Other political parties such as the DP also sought political capital in the sector, for 
example by distributing free fuel prior to elections.507 Moreover, the traditional 
loyalty of the sector to the NRM was called into question during the 2009 riots, as 
many drivers were ethnically Baganda and turned against the President during his 
stand-off with Kabaka Mutebi. However, it was the NRM, with both far more 
resources to allocate and potentially more to lose in the city, which largely won the 
battle for boda-boda hearts and minds over the long term.508 This was achieved by 
directly and repeatedly crippling state effectiveness with respect to regulating and 
taxing the sector. Some boda-boda drivers were acutely aware of this, noting that 
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‘we often fail to keep the law because the president spoiled the whole system’.509 In 
general, however, they were grateful to him.510 Through his tactical interventions 
Museveni constructed KCC as the would-be regulator and himself as the heroic 
saviour from an intervening state. Through this, boda-bodas became one of 
Kampala’s largest groups of ‘untouchables’. 
 
6.6    Kigali’s taxi-motos: an extraordinary transformation 
 
Like Kampala, Kigali attracted motorcycle-taxis (taxi-motos) in their thousands in 
the 1990s and 2000s, along with push-bike taxis. The city’s hills and relative sprawl 
– with many residential areas being far from the city centre – made urban transport 
in some respects more challenging than in Kampala, and as returnees poured in 
after 1994, cycle taxis of all forms became a critical part of the urban transport 
system. As in Kampala, despite the fact that the sector was largely ‘self-initiated’ 
the government was broadly supportive of it in the interests of tackling 
unemployment.511 Yet also like in Kampala, in the early 2000s the CoK became 
concerned about the safety of a sector they believed was getting out of hand, 
causing large numbers of accidents and fomenting ‘chaos’ in the city more 
generally.512 Regulations were in place, but were not really being enforced by the 
police.513 
 
Unlike in Kampala, however, a total reorganisation of the sector was achieved. The 
number of taxi-motos at the time the new regulations were introduced is difficult to 
establish, but is likely to have been roughly proportional to that in Kampala, with 
several thousand in the city by the early 2000s.514 CoK began by addressing the issue 
of push-bicycles, which were particularly accident-prone in the city centre. A first 
step was to restrict their operations to certain roads outside the CBD.515 However, 
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this was followed in 2005 by a decision to bar them from the city altogether, 
replacing them with a limited number of cheap, low-powered mopeds, known as 
‘mini-motos’. This left around 6,000 former cyclists without jobs, and despite some 
inevitable complaints the decision was implemented.516 
 
Considerably more problematic was the decision by CoK in 2006 to ban all forms of 
bicycle taxi – including motos – in the city. This was stimulated not only by a 
concern with accidents but by the belief that the industry was fomenting drug use, 
crime and ‘disorganisation’.517 For two weeks the ban was in place, but city-dwellers 
made ‘a lot of noise’, mainly through complaints to the city administration and calls 
into radio stations.518 Consequently, this decision was revoked. Unlike in Uganda, 
however, the government responded not because they feared alienating the 
constituency of moto drivers. In fact, there was not even any form of overt protest 
by this group.519 It was largely the users rather than the providers of the services 
who changed the government’s mind, along with arguments that removing all forms 
of cycle taxi without a good public transport system in place would be detrimental 
to development. Some of the most influential ‘noise’ came from the banks who 
provided the loans for moto drivers and from donors.520  
 
The city government reached a decision, in negotiation with ASSETAMORWA, that 
they would bring motos back to the city in a limited form, with a new set of 
regulations.521 Alongside CoK, which was engaging in its broader efforts to organise 
urban youth at this time (see Chapter Five), various arms of the state from the 
police to the Ministry of Youth joined the negotiations,522 and what emerged in 
2007 was a highly structured system of cycle taxis that remained in place and was 
quite unlike any other motorcycle-taxi sector in the world.523 Taxi-motos were 
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strictly limited to 3,700 in number (there were around 3,000-3,500 in 2009), with 
reflective jackets displaying their own personal identity code and green helmets 
(one for the passenger as well as the driver). This radically reduced body of motos 
was fully trained and licensed; those lacking permits ‘were of course chased out of 
the city’.524 Mini-motos were allowed to operate in suburbs only, and drivers were 
limited to 1,500 and wore blue helmets.  
 
The associational life of cycle taxis was further consolidated: all authorised motos 
paid daily fees of RWF 300 to ASSETAMORWA and a system was instituted of city 
‘sections’ (10 people), ‘parkings’ (up to 10 sections) and ‘zones’, (of which there 
were ten in the city). Each of these levels had an elected leader, and 
ASSETAMORWA elected a president every three years.525 Mini-motos had their own 
association, ATIMIMORWA, which was organised similarly. As in Uganda, rental 
systems were in place whereby relatively wealthy investors would purchase bikes526 
and loan them to drivers for a daily fee of RWF 4000, out of daily earnings averaging 
around 10,000.527 By 2009 70% already owned their own motos.528 Moreover, in the 
same year ASSETAMORWA and ATIMIMORWA moved towards becoming national 
federations of co-operatives to enable them to take out loans and share profits, in 
line with the city’s drive towards co-operativisation.529  
 
Development and security on two wheels: ‘we can identify exactly where he sleeps’ 
 
Like most of the city’s ‘youth’ associations, ASSETAMORWA and ATIMIMORWA 
were geared towards Kigali’s development in various ways. They were very active 
participants in community activities, signing agreements with CoK to clean, plant 
trees and construct houses for genocide orphans in particular areas of the city; 
indeed they were often proud winners of competitions between youth associations 
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undertaking this kind of activity (see Figure 6.4).530 Taxi-moto drivers were also 
leading taxpayers. Each ‘parking’ had a tax collector; in stark contrast to Kampala’s 
boda-bodas, drivers paid several taxes and fees including RWF 20,000 annually to 
RURA for their permit, 4,000 each year to the District for a patente (trading license) 
and around 70,000 each annually to the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) in income 
tax.531 With regard to the latter, taxi-moto drivers were exceptional; despite their 
small number they comprised almost 10% of Rwanda’s total number of registered 
taxpayers (40,500) in 2010 (DFID 2010: 11).  
Figure 6.4: Taxi-moto drivers riding en masse to plant trees in Kigali 
 
Source: obtained from a CoK official, December 2009 
 
Perhaps most significant of all, the moto reorganisation resulted in an elaborate 
internal security architecture. Part of the process of reorganising drivers was 
‘sensitising’ them on the importance of order, safety and security, so that they 
would become to a degree self-regulating and self-policing.532 The rationale was: ‘If 
you understand something then you will do it better than if someone was to police 
you’.533 To facilitate tight internal organisation and security, the codes displayed on 
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drivers’ jackets were incredibly detailed, making them immediately identifiable. A 
letter indicating which zone of the city they worked in was followed by a series of 
numbers, one indicating their ‘parking’, another denoting their ‘section’ and a third 
specifying their personal number within that section. Thus if any crime were 
committed by a driver, people could call up and give the number over the phone ‘so 
we can identify exactly where he sleeps’.534   
 
ASSETAMORWA’s security officer noted that the association was ‘under police 
control’. In fact motos are sometimes effectively used as an extension of the 
policing system: if police hear of a crime they sometimes call on ASSETAMORWA 
who then help track down the culprit.535 Due to the mobile nature of the job, both 
ASSETAMORWA and CoK were extremely concerned that criminal elements did not 
infiltrate the sector. Recruitment was extremely strict and requirements of at least 
one year’s experience driving in an urban area were combined with careful vetting 
by the association. Moreover, alongside official security officers for each section 
and parking area, other inspectors were ‘put among them so that they can be 
controlled’. These were drivers who act covertly as security and intelligence agents, 
recruited by the official security officers.536 
 
As with many of the city’s other associations, those in the taxi-moto industry 
fulfilled multiple functions after 2007: mobilising resources, instilling collective 
pride in the city and its development, shaping order out of an industry that had 
been characterised by ‘chaos’ and, relatedly, limiting the scope for conflict and 
crime in the city. The government turned a problematic industry to its advantage, 
incorporating motos into urban spatial development projects, surveillance 
mechanisms and ultimately the national unity agenda. Taxi-moto drivers were 
themselves aware of this, and fear of conflict impacted positively on their 
compliance; one noted that the regulation of the sector was about ‘solidarity and 
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security’, adding that a high level of organisation was important to ‘fight the 
thought’ of war and conflict.537 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explored why in Kampala basic improvements to urban public 
transport were ‘way beyond the city authority’
538
 while in Kigali the state was 
comparatively effective at implementing similar projects. Although Kigali’s transport 
system did not meet everyone’s needs in 2010, it averted the disorder and 
insecurity evident in Kampala, which was ultimately a higher priority for the RPF. By 
contrast, in Kampala both the matatu and boda-boda sectors were populated 
largely by ‘untouchables’, in the sense defined in Chapter Four. Consequently, for 
every 1000 members of the population there were 6.5 matatus and 26 boda-bodas 
in Kampala, compared with 0.7 and 3.9 respectively in Kigali. 
 
At first sight, one problem with analysing these sectors in terms of state 
effectiveness is the degree of deliberate deregulation in Kampala; regulations that 
do not exist cannot be implemented effectively. This chapter has shown, however, 
that from 2000-2010 the state frequently produced policies and regulations to re-
regulate the sector, but to no avail. Across both the matatu and boda-boda sectors 
interventions by politicians, particularly (though not exclusively) members of the 
NRM, consistently undermined the efforts of bureaucrats to implement state 
policies. In some cases there was a clear populist effort by Museveni to pit the NRM 
government (the ‘liberators’) against the state (the bureaucratic machinery that 
seeks to enforce regulations). 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the Ugandan government was arguably very 
successful in its engagement with the sector in certain ways; for example, the 
promotion of the boda-boda industry as a means of urban employment and for 
filling a transport gap, not to mention the use of the sector as a source of support. 
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Yet these developments had very little to do with the state being effective: they 
largely involved state withdrawal and later became linked to efforts to undermine 
the state. Kampala’s RDC argued that revoking the boda-boda tax was justified 
because drivers were already being ‘taxed’ enough through their associations.539 
This typifies how the debilitation of the state was actively pursued by government 
actors seeking political capital through the rhetoric of empowering social forces. 
After the undisguised dictatorships of Amin and Obote, Museveni and the NRM 
skilfully styled themselves as a government stepping back from interfering with 
ordinary people, despite the fact that in reality government politicians were deeply 
implicated in manipulating and extracting resources from the informal economy.    
 
Consequently, the infiltration of the transport sector in Kampala by security agents 
often oriented drivers against state organisations, while in Kigali such agents were 
used to the opposite effect: to underscore the credibility of government 
commitments to policing and state-enforced order. If the government in Uganda 
presented itself as the liberator from an interfering state, the Rwandan government 
constructed itself as the protector from potentially dangerous forces in society. In 
Rwanda the government’s intervention incentives involved consolidating the state’s 
bureaucratic coherence, minimising arbitrary intervention by politicians and 
emphasising the government’s ability to ensure security, all of which were central 
to RPF legitimacy both domestically and abroad. Securitising urban transport thus 
underscored the credibility of the state as a protector of the Rwandan people, and 
enhanced rather than undermined governmental autonomy vis-à-vis this sector. By 
contrast, in Uganda governmental legitimacy was often bolstered through the 
arbitrary actions of politicians to undermine state regulatory reach in a sector to 
which they had been deeply linked from the start. 
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Chapter Seven 
Taxing the city: the political economy of decentralised revenue 
mobilisation 
 
Because property, trade and transport are central to urban life, they are critical 
sources of local tax. A theme linking all the previous empirical chapters has been 
local state revenue: in Chapters Five and Six this was most explicit, yet the issues 
discussed in Chapter Four have implications for the potentially most lucrative of 
urban state revenues: property tax. In various ways these chapters have therefore 
illustrated how the challenge of raising urban taxes of any kind is deeply embedded 
in the political economy of urban development. This chapter further explores local 
taxation in Kampala and Kigali, which in both cases is an essential function of the 
city/district governments according to the decentralisation architecture discussed in 
Chapter Three. In so doing it expands on issues discussed in chapters Four to Six but 
also explores local revenue as a central domain of state effectiveness in its own 
right.  
 
Under conditions of fiscal decentralisation, the ability to raise local taxes specifically 
is critical for states to be effective in guiding most aspects of the urban 
development process. However, problems of circularity impinge upon the analysis 
of local revenue mobilisation and state effectiveness. Ineffective local revenue 
collection can be seen as a consequence of broader state ineffectiveness but may 
also be a cause of it, because low revenues weaken local state capacity. Either way, 
taxation is clearly a potent indicator of state effectiveness. While acknowledging the 
circularity of the relationship, this chapter focuses primarily on what explains 
effective or ineffective taxation, rather than the impacts of the latter on state-
building.
540
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In contrast with previous empirical chapters, the data presented here does not 
suggest a clear picture of effectiveness in Kigali relative to Kampala. Rather, the 
situation in both cities was marked by considerable ineffectiveness, something not 
fully anticipated prior to the field research itself. The nature and causes of this 
ineffectiveness differed substantially between the cases, however, and 
disaggregating the local taxation profile in each case substantially enriches the 
overall analysis. Understanding the differential character of the problem in each city 
helps both further to refine the concept of state effectiveness and build a more 
robust and compelling picture of why the cities are developing in such different 
ways.  
 
The chapter begins with an overview of some key issues regarding taxation, fiscal 
decentralisation and the problems of urban local taxation in particular. The next 
section builds on the discussion of the decentralisation architecture in Chapter 
Three, presenting the institutional frameworks for decentralised taxation. This is 
followed by two empirical sections for each city. The first provides overviews of the 
main local taxes actually collected, accompanied by analysis of the relative 
successes and failures of implementation of key sources of revenue. The second 
focuses specifically on taxes relating to property, which are potentially the most 
lucrative but were highly problematic in both cities and offer particular insights into 
patterns of political bargaining among elites. The final section concludes with a 
comparative discussion.  
   
7.1    Local tax in urban areas: concepts, issues and challenges 
 
The intimate relationship between taxation and state effectiveness 
 
The relevance of taxation for the study of the state was highlighted by Burke and 
von Stein in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, before Goldscheid and Schumpeter 
developed the field of ‘fiscal sociology’ in the early 20
th
 Century (Levi 1988; 
Lieberman 2002; Moore 2004). As well as providing the state with essential 
resources, taxation is central to building the relationship between state and society. 
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Through tax, ‘part of the individuals’ economic income is withdrawn from them and 
becomes the community’s economic income’ (Von Stein [1885] 1964: 28). Thus, 
unlike most other sources of government revenue, taxes are not linked to the 
‘provision or promise of any specific good or service in return for payment’ 
(Lieberman 2002: 91), contributing instead to building both citizenship and the state 
itself, as Tilly has illustrated with regard to European history (Tilly 1992; Tilly and 
Blockmans 1994). These insights have profound significance for the developing 
world, where many states are dependent on ‘unearned income’ in the form of aid 
and mineral rents, pre-empting the building of a ‘fiscal social contract’ and 
impeding the development of states (Moore 1998; 2004).  
 
Taxation is therefore a core state function (Di John 2011), but in many developing 
countries is highly under-developed. Effective taxation is about much more than 
‘capacity’ to tax, particularly when it comes to politically contentious direct taxes (Di 
John 2006; 2011). It is often argued that the primary problem of taxation is poor 
administration (Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher 1992; Kelly 2000a). This, however, 
begs important questions about why capacity remains weak and why taxation is 
much more ineffective in some low-capacity states than others (Di John 2006: 5). 
The former may be partially attributable to the fact that capacity is itself built 
through taxation (Bräutigam 2008), so where the state has other sources of income 
the incentive to build capacity is undermined (Moore 2008). The latter, however, 
indicates that capacity is not the only requirement. Levi’s focus on the state’s 
‘relative bargaining power’ as it impacts on ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ (Levi 1988: 
13) indicates how much more there is to effective taxation. This ‘bargaining power’ 
is likely to depend heavily on factors identified in this study such as whether 
government policy commitments are credible, the sources of state legitimacy and 
the power relations stemming for example from colonial legacies (Mkandawire 
2010). 
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The challenges of fiscal decentralisation and urban local taxation 
 
Decentralisation is often characterised as comprising three elements: 
administrative, political and fiscal, with the latter two often lagging behind (Dillinger 
1994). The principles and rationale for fiscal decentralisation were established by 
Oates (1972) and enthusiastically adopted by both donors and many developing 
countries, despite criticism from some quarters (Prud'homme 1995; Tanzi 2001). 
Even exponents agree that not all taxes are suitable for local government. Taxes 
affecting the government’s stabilisation functions, such as trade tariffs and VAT, 
should remain centralised as they are cyclical, and local governments require stable 
revenue inflows for core services (Smoke 2001; Fjeldstad 2001a; 2006). It is also 
argued that decentralising distributive taxes such as corporate income tax could 
result in the departure of the wealthy and influx of the poor into certain areas, 
exacerbating regional inequalities (Bahl 1999; Smoke 2001; Fjeldstad 2001a). A 
range of other taxes are, however, considered suitable for local administration; this 
includes distributive ones applied to immobile assets, minimising the above 
problem (Musgrave 2000; Smoke 2001; Bahl and Bird 2008: 9; Fjeldstad and 
Heggstad 2011). Land and property taxes are clear examples of this (Fjeldstad 2006: 
2; Di John 2011: 14). Various other forms of tax including local business taxes are 
also thought appropriate (Bahl 1999; Fjeldstad 2006; Bahl and Bird 2008). 
 
A further and relatively neglected question relates to which sorts of tax are most 
suitable for decentralising to urban vis-à-vis rural local authorities. Bahl (1999: 9-10) 
acknowledges the two require different systems, but highlights only the greater 
capability of urban governments to raise taxes, neglecting the vastly greater 
mandates for service delivery delegated to them. Awareness that despite their 
comparatively lucrative tax base city governments are often severely underfunded 
has, however, been growing (Devas 2003; Fjeldstad 2006). Many local authorities 
employ a pot-pourri of over-complicated revenue instruments to address this 
(Brosio 2000), often with perverse consequences (Smoke 2001: 23), but the most 
critical sources of urban revenue are usually property taxes, business licenses and 
‘user fees’ (Fjeldstad 2006; Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2011). The latter are 
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insignificant as a major revenue source in most low-income countries, so are not 
considered here.  
 
Urban property tax (PT) is ‘one of the most underutilised forms of taxation in LDCs’, 
as well as being among the most progressive (Di John 2011: 14-15). Yet while in 
developed countries PT accounts for up to 80% of local revenue and 3% of GDP, in 
Kenya it amounts to only 22% of local revenue and 0.3% of GDP (Kelly 2000b: 38).  
PT is underutilised partly because of resistance from residents dissatisfied with 
services (Smoke 2001: 23; Bahl and Bird 2008: 16), and its direct targeting of wealth 
also poses substantial political obstacles, as this chapter will demonstrate. It is also 
extremely challenging administratively, especially where informal construction, 
irregular street patterns and absent street names render cadastral systems 
unworkable (Fjeldstad 2006: 8). PT can also be inelastic despite increases in 
properties and property values, ‘because old valuations are not updated and new 
properties not identified’ (Brosio 2000: 22).  
 
There are a wide range of possible approaches to the valuation of property (Bahl 
and Linn 1992; Kelly 2000b) which ‘is an art, not a science’, leaving ‘much room for 
discretion’ (Bahl and Bird 2008: 15), and is administratively intense (Kelly 2000b: 
38). Yet valuation is only part of the PT problem. Kelly’s (2000a; 2000b) model 
involves five key variables: i) the tax base, which involves decisions about what to 
tax (for example: land, property, or both); ii) the tax rate, which is the specified 
amount per value of the property to be paid; iii) the coverage ratio, which refers to 
the amount of taxable property actually captured in the fiscal cadastre; iv) the 
valuation ratio, which is the value of the properties as specified on valuation rolls 
relative to the actual market value; and v) the collection ratio, which is the tax 
revenue actually collected relative to the total tax liability billed for that year. 
Among these critical factors there is ample scope for ineffectiveness.  
 
A second major source of local urban taxation is business licensing, which can either 
be based on fixed fees categorised in terms of business size, type and location or as 
a percentage of turnover. Both can be problematic for small businesses (Araujo-
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Bonjean and Chambas 2003: 14-15; Fjeldstad 2006: 9). Licenses are generally 
disliked by economists for their distortionary effects and rent-seeking overtones, 
but embraced by governments for whom they are lucrative and politically useful 
(Bird 2003). Meanwhile, in cities where informal activity dwarfs the formal business 
sector, a range of fees imposed on vendors, hawkers and other actors can be 
equally significant, notwithstanding the obvious difficulties involved in taxing these 
groups (Araujo-Bonjean and Chambas 2003). 
 
Local revenues are just one aspect of fiscal decentralisation. Most developing 
countries depend heavily on transfers (or grants)541 both in rural and urban areas; in 
the former because the tax base is so low, and the latter because service delivery 
mandates are so enormous. Transfer systems vary considerably, though a simple 
distinction is often made between three types of grant: i) unconditional (general 
transfers aimed at addressing ‘vertical imbalances’, or the mismatching of funding 
and functions); ii) conditional (grants carrying specific conditions); and iii) 
equalisation (redistributive grants used to address ‘horizontal imbalances’ between 
different local authorities) (Smoke 2001: 25-6; Fjeldstad 2001a: 10). While not 
considered in detail here, transfer systems constitute important contextual 
information.    
 
7.2    Institutional framework for fiscal decentralisation and urban local taxation  
 
Uganda 
 
Uganda’s 1995 Constitution laid the foundations for fiscal decentralisation, 
providing for unconditional, conditional and equalisation grants from Central 
Government (Articles 191-193). Unconditional grants were elaborated in the 1997 
Local Government Act (LGA) according to a specified formula.542 Conditional grants 
consisted of finance for development programmes mutually agreed between the 
Centre and local authorities. Equalisation grants were for inter-district 
redistribution (LGA Article 83). The LGA also specified key sources of local revenue 
                                                          
541
 For a detailed study of systems of fiscal transfers, see Boadway & Shah (2007).  
542
 These grants had both a wage and non-wage component. The former covered 65% of a District’s 
total wage bill, the rest being dependent on own revenues (Interview with Adam Babale, Local 
Government Finance Commission, 06.02.09). 
  
 240
including the two most important sources of District income: Graduated Tax and 
Property Tax (or ‘rates’). Graduated Tax (GT) was a form of local personal income 
tax with colonial origins, paid annually on the basis of a formal assessment of 
income (LGA Articles 3-6). After decentralisation in 1997 it was levied by Districts on 
males aged eighteen and above and females in the same age group engaged in ‘any 
gainful employment or business’ (Article 2). Unemployed men were therefore 
subject to the tax (albeit at a low rate), encouraging them to seek minimal 
employment to enable payment.543 GT was the most important source of income 
for all districts until its abolition in 2005 (the consequences of which will be 
discussed in Section 7.3).  
 
A second major source of income was Property Tax (PT), particularly for Kampala. 
According to rules in the Local Governments (Rating) Act (2005), the ‘rateable value’ 
of a property was determined either by a) its imputed market value or b) ‘mass 
valuation’ techniques based on general features of the properties in a particular 
area (Articles 8-13). Procedures for appealing against the outcome of surveyors’ 
valuations were provided (Articles 15-22), and exemptions were made for buildings 
such as places of worship, educational institutions and the official residences of 
traditional leaders (Second Schedule, Part I). 
 
Among other revenue sources specified in the LGA was income from the sale or 
lease of land (‘ground rent’). Much of Kampala was public land in 2010, so 
developers had to purchase leases before building on it, providing a significant 
source of local revenue.544 Among the other fees and licenses specified in the LGA 
(Fifth Schedule, Article 13), most significant for Kampala were market fees 
(empooza), trading licenses and street parking fees.545 Empooza were determined 
locally in accordance with the Markets Act, while trading licenses – for businesses 
ranging from street hawkers to wholesalers – were based on location (e.g. town, 
city or rural trading centre), size (square metres, estimated turnover and rent) and 
type of business (RoU 2007a: 46-50).   
                                                          
543
 Interview with Adam Babale, 24.09.09. 
544
 Interview with Richard Bamwira, Finance Officer, Kampala Central Division, 28.09.09. 
545
 Interview with Richard Bamwira, 28.09.09. 
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In 2005-6, several central government interventions affecting this institutional 
framework severely impacted on local revenues (see Sections 7.3 and 7.4). In the 
wake of these changes two new District taxes were developed by the Local 
Governments (Amendment) Act (2008). The first was a Local Service Tax levied on 
monthly incomes after the deduction of national PAYE tax. Unlike GT, this was solely 
for people ‘in gainful employment’ with incomes above a certain threshold. It 
explicitly exempted petty vendors, boda-boda cyclists and several other categories 
that probably amounted to the majority of Kampala’s population.546 The second 
new local tax brought into effect in July 2008 was the Hotel Tax, levied on hotels 
per occupied room and graded according to room rates charged by the hotel.547   
 
In Kampala, the five city Divisions were responsible for collecting all these revenues. 
Divisions were supposed to remit 50% of their total collection to KCC and retain the 
rest (LGA, Article 85). Then 30% of the half remitted to KCC was redistributed back 
among the Divisions according to a complex formula, for equalisation (Fifth 
Schedule, Article 14). In addition to these taxes and fees collected by the Divisions, 
one further important source of local revenue existed in Kampala that went directly 
to the City Council: the fees paid by UTODA for use of the city’s taxi parks (see 
Chapter Six).548 
 
Rwanda  
 
Formal taxation even at the national level was basic under Rwanda’s previous 
regimes. A 1964 law introduced corporate tax, income tax and a tax on turnover, all 
of which were collected centrally through a poorly organised system.
549
  With the 
introduction of the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) in 1997, national taxation 
became much more sophisticated (DFID 2010) and in 2001 VAT was introduced. The 
following year Law No. 17/2002 established basic principles for fiscal 
                                                          
546
 ‘Local Service Tax: Frequently Asked Questions’, Kampala City Council leaflet, 2008. 
547
 ‘Local Hotel Tax’, Kampala City Council leaflet, 2008. The power of the new Kampala Capital City 
Authority to levy all the usual taxes collected by districts as well as these two new taxes was codified 
in the Kampala Capital City Act (2010), Articles 50-53. 
548
 Interview with Musujja Bakka, Director of Finance, KCC, 22.09.09. 
549
 Interview with Celestin Bumbakare, Commissioner for Domestic Taxes, RRA, 06.12.11. 
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decentralisation. Three main types of central-local transfer were introduced. The 
first was a block grant, calculated according to a formula set out in the 2002 law 
and amended in 2005 and 2009 (RoR n.d.). Second were earmarked transfers for 
spending in particular sectors, tied to relevant national ministries (RoR 2006: 12). 
Third were transfers for development activities granted through the Common 
Development Fund (CDF). This fund provided capital financing for Districts’ 
proposed projects in line with specific criteria, posing challenges for institutionally 
weaker districts (RoR 2005: 40).  
 
Alongside transfers, the 2002 law decentralised three taxes previously collected by 
the Central Government: property tax, trading licence tax and rental income tax 
(Law No. 17/2002, Article 3). These thereafter formed, in theory, the bedrock of 
local revenue for Districts. All property owners with a freehold title were due to pay 
property tax, barring the usual exemptions for public/religious buildings (Article 
14). Properties were valued for taxation based on the structures in place (in terms 
of square metres, materials, number of stories etc.) rather than market or mass 
valuation techniques (Articles 12-16). Trading licenses were instituted as annual flat 
payments varying only in relation to business ‘type’, using a few broad 
categorisations (e.g. ‘vendors without shops’; ‘industries’; ‘banking, insurance and 
the like’), and whether the businesses were rural, urban or in Kigali specifically 
(Articles 47-50). In the event of non-payment for one year, the license fee was 
supposed to increase by 40% for the next year and increase in monthly increments 
thereafter if non-payment persisted.550  
 
In marked contrast to the above two taxes, the decision to decentralise rental 
income tax was highly unusual – even ‘unique’ – as well as being controversial.551  
The decision to decentralise this tax was taken because the RRA, in the first years of 
its existence, proved ineffective at taxing rent. The rationale was that ‘local 
government knows more about how much people are renting for’ and would 
                                                          
550
 Interview with government decentralisation official, 04.02.10. 
551
 Interview with taxation adviser B, 01.12.09. 
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therefore be more effective.552 The 2002 law states that the tax was to be 
determined each year based on net rental profits from the previous year, and was 
levied on 70% of gross rental income (after allowing 30% for maintenance) (Articles 
57-60). 
 
In addition to these taxes, various fees were assigned to districts, for ‘services 
rendered to the population by the Council’ (Article 67). They included fees for: 
street cleaning; procedures such as applying for building permits, licensing vehicles 
and transferring property; fines; and market dues.553 Initially districts could set their 
own fees, resulting in ‘wildly different’ levels between districts, but this was 
rectified by Presidential Orders No. 02/01 and 59/01 in 2008 and 2009. Ministerial 
instructions No 05/07 provided for the privatisation of revenue collection, including 
in marketplaces.554 A final important category of local revenue for Kigali was income 
from sales of district land.
555  
 
Local tax collection was exclusively the responsibility of the three Districts, but 30% 
of their revenue was passed up to CoK and 25% down to the sectors within that 
District (Law No. 10/2006, Article 241). As of 2009, some revenue collection 
functions were delegated to the Sector on behalf of the District, but Sectors had no 
financial autonomy, merely passing funds up to the Districts.556 The plan for the 
third phase of decentralisation from 2010-2015 was to further decentralise many 
fiscal functions fully to the sector level (RoR 2001: 39). However, in late 2009 
officials acknowledged that his was still ‘a long way off’.557  
 
Given the focus and constraints of this study, it is neither necessary nor possible to 
provide detailed accounts of the national taxation system in either country. Yet it is 
worth noting that both developed semi-autonomous revenue authorities with 
                                                          
552
 Interview with George Byamukama, Head of Decentralisation Support Unit, RRA, 23.11.09.  
553
 Interview with George Byamukama, 23.11.09. 
554
 Interview with District politician, 01.12.09. 
555
 Interview with Mahmoud Ntirenganya, Monitoring and Evaluation, CoK, 04.12.09. 
556
 Interview with government decentralisation official, 04.02.10. 
557
 Interview with Richard Mushabe, Decentralised finance official. 24.11.09; Interview with George 
Byamukama, 23.11.09. 
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extensive donor support (Therkildsen 2004; Fjeldstad and Moore 2009; DFID 2010; 
Di John 2010). Notwithstanding low tax/GDP ratios of around 12% in Uganda and 
13.5% in Rwanda,558 these authorities were reasonably effective at capturing 
certain taxes, particularly among large taxpayers. The Large Taxpayers Offices 
(LTOs) collected the majority of tax, and the number of such taxpayers was very 
few. In Rwanda for example, 60% of tax was collected by the LTO, which consisted 
of approximately 350 taxpayers out of a total of around 40,500 taxpayers.559 Levels 
of compliance were much lower among medium and especially small taxpayers 
(DFID 2010: 26), though RRA revenues from these were increasing through the 
formalisation drive (ActionAid 2011: 18). Moreover, the vast majority (around 310) 
of large taxpayers were based in Kigali, where 80-90% of Rwanda’s total tax revenue 
was collected.560 A similar, if less extreme, situation held in Uganda (Di John 2010). 
It is therefore important to regard the local taxation situation against a backdrop of 
reasonably effective national taxation of a small number of urban elites (especially 
in Rwanda), some of which came back to the city in the form of transfers. This 
dependence on elites for national taxes may be one reason why they often 
managed to evade local ones, as will be explored below.  
 
7.3    Kampala’s lost local revenues and the struggle to plug the gap 
  
The story of local revenue collection in Kampala in the 2000s is a dismal one. Table 
7.1 and Figure 7.1 illustrate the relatively slow growth of local revenue561 in the 
decade after decentralisation began and the extent to which government transfers 
increased to address this. While KCC unsurprisingly raised much more of its own 
revenue than most districts, local taxation came nowhere close to achieving its 
potential, and its overall share relative to central government transfers declined 
significantly over the decade. This section attempts to explain this poor record.  
 
 
                                                          
558
 http://www.economywatch.com/, accessed 20.01.12. 
559
 Interview with Celestin Bumbakare, 06.12.11. 
560
 Ibid. 
561
 The term ‘local revenues’ is to refer to Districts’ locally-raised revenues or ‘own revenues’, not 
counting government transfers or external funds (e.g. from donors). When transfers and other funds 
are included, the term ‘total gross revenue’ is used.  
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Table 7.1: Kampala District Revenues, 1998-2008 (millions of UGX) 
Financial year 
ending  
TOTAL GROSS 
REVENUE 
Central transfers 
& external funds Local revenue  
Local 
revenue 
as % of 
total 
         
1998 24,064 9,585 14,479 60% 
1999 23,848 8,941 14,906 63% 
2000 31,992 15,823 16,168 51% 
2001 35,011 13,747 21,264 61% 
2002 47,264 26,679 20,585 44% 
2003 45,274 23,074 22,200 49% 
2004 57,391 35,853 21,538 38% 
2005 65,579 41,364 24,275 37% 
2006 47,282 25,574 22,251 47% 
2007 47,212 22,911 24,302 51% 
2008 66,835 38,996 27,808 42% 
Source: KCC (2007; 2009) (KCC 2007; 2009)  
 
Figure 7.1: Kampala District Revenues, 1998-2008 (millions of UGX) 
 
Source: compiled from time series data in KCC (2007; 2009) 
 
Local revenues did not remain completely stagnant in the period under 
consideration, as Figure 7.1 illustrates. That would have been highly improbable 
under the circumstances: Kampala’s economy and population were booming. 
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However, while reliable data disaggregated to the city level are hard to come by, 
the national-level indicators in Figure 7.2 illustrate the failure of KCC’s local 
revenues to keep pace with a range of other indicators. In the 2001-2009 period, 
local revenue growth was less than half of GDP growth and only just over half the 
rate of inflation.  
 
Figure 7.2: Average annual growth rates various indicators, Uganda 2001-2009
562
 
 
Estimates of local revenue performance relative to potential in the city ranged from 
30%
563
 to a more optimistic 75%.
564
 In certain periods performance was particularly 
dire: from 2000/1 to 2005/6, predicted local revenue growth was 10% per year 
while actual annual increase averaged 0.78% annually (not even accounting for 
inflation) (KCC 2007: 13). KCC’s budget had to be revised dramatically downwards 
most years due to the constant underperformance of local revenue instruments 
(KCC 2007; 2009). To really account for this poor performance over the decade 
2000-2010 we need to disaggregate different forms of taxation and explore the 
relative performance of each.  
 
 
                                                          
562
 Data compiled from World Bank DataBank, CIA Factbook, UN-HABITAT UrbanInfo Database, and 
KCC (2009a). 
563
 Interview with Adolf Mwesigye, Minister of Local Government, 27.01.12. 
564
 Interview with Musjja Bakka, 22.09.09. 
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Figure 7.3: Kampala District local revenues in 1999 
 
Source: compiled from data in KCC (2007) 
 
As explained above, fiscal decentralisation in Uganda was to a large extent built 
around the Graduated Tax (GT). As Figure 7.3 illustrates, in 1999 GT was the largest 
source of local revenue even in Kampala (29%), which unlike most districts had 
considerable potential for raising other taxes. Probably the most important 
occurrence over the first decade of the twenty-first century was the abolition of GT 
in 2005, in the run-up to the 2006 presidential election. Pressure to abolish it 
intensified after Dr. Kizza Besigye, a former close ally of Museveni’s from the civil 
war period who turned against him in 1999 and became his principal opponent,565 
campaigned against GT in the 2001 elections (Ssewakiryanga 2005; Kjær 2010: 5). 
Controversy over the tax became so pronounced that the Local Government 
Finance Commission issued a report advising against its abolition, warning of the 
serious consequences if such a decision was taken (RoU 2001). Museveni initially 
responded by lowering the minimum baseline for the tax from UGX 5,000 to 3,000, 
which led some district administrations to simply implement a flat rate poll tax of 
UGX 3,000 for everyone, regardless of income (Kjær 2010: 5). This led GT into 
                                                          
565
 For a discussion of Besigye’s decision to campaign against Museveni and his subsequent 
experiences as opposition leader, see Kobusingye (2010). 
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decline: while in 1997 it amounted to UGX 80bn annually countrywide, it was 
around half this amount by 2005.566  
 
Towards the end of 2004, donors aired their own concerns about rumours of GT’s 
abolition, fearing serious consequences for local accountability and capacity given 
the lack of viable alternative taxes.567 However, with the shift to multipartyism in 
2005, its fate was sealed. The uncertain new political terrain induced Museveni to 
make various populist interventions overturning unpopular policies and laws, as 
previous chapters have demonstrated, and GT was an obvious target. The 
government initiated a system of GT compensation to allow for a period of 
introducing the new taxes outlined above. Compensation was included as part of 
central government transfers, but was significantly less than GT takings and 
declined steeply each year in order to phase it out over three years.568 Even in the 
first year (2004-5), GT compensation for KCC was under a tenth of what it had 
previously received through GT (Lambright 2012: 16). 
 
In Kampala, the loss of GT was partly mitigated by increases in property tax and 
ground rent (see Figure 7.4a). Property tax will be addressed in the following 
section. Removing property-related taxes from the equation it becomes apparent 
that the other main sources of local revenue performed very erratically over the 
decade, contributing to dips in total revenue in 2004 and 2006 (see Table 7.1), with 
some individual sources experiencing periods of substantial decline (see Table 7.2 
and Figure 7.4b). The trajectory of each of the three major sources of revenue 
depicted in Figure 7.4b (barring GT) will now be briefly analysed. 
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 Interview with Adam Babale, 24.09.09. 
567
 ‘Do not scrap graduated tax, donors tell government’, Daily Monitor, 16.11.04. 
568
 Interview with Adam Babale, 06.02.09. 
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Table 7.2: Main sources of local revenue in Kampala, 1999-2009 (millions of 
UGX)
569
 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Graduated 
Tax 3,862 3,636 3,199 3,293 2,001 4,091 3,520
Property tax
2,752 3,137 7,389 3,499 2,427 3,769 4,521 5,201 7,445 7,490 10,711
Ground rent
353 442 598 814 864 931 1,683 2,465 2,557 2,329 2,560
Trading 
licenses 1,516 1,821 1,782 2,841 3,189 4,066 3,862 3,572 3,798 4,980 3,876
Vehicle parks
2,319 1,955 1,749 2,211 3,196 3,948 3,549 3,834 2,313 2,685 4,187
Markets 
691 829 1,149 1,456 2,379 1,163 1,049 1,064 1,849 1,552 1,065  
Source: KCC (2007; 2009). 
 
Figure 7.4a: Main sources of local revenue in Kampala, 1999-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
569
 The 2001 spike in property rates was due to the government’s repayment of arrears on 
government buildings, having not paid for four years (interview with Samuel Ali, KCC finance official, 
15.12.11). 
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Figure 7.4b: Main sources of local revenue (minus property-related taxes), 1999-
2009 
 
Source: data compiled from KCC District Annual Budgets KCC (2007; 2009) 
 
Fluctuating perfomance with regard to market fees and vehicle parks is no surprise 
given the discussion in Chapters Five and Six. The vast majority (around 80% for 
most years) of revenues described as being for ‘vehicle parks’ are the fees from 
UTODA (KCC 2007). The hiatus in the UTODA’s fee payments is clearly reflected in 
the 2007-2008 dip. Even the overall increase (approximately a doubling) in the 
amount collected annually from vehicle parks between 2000 and 2009 is 
unimpressive given that the number of matatus more than doubled in that period 
and average inflation was 6-7%. The poor performance of this revenue instrument 
was clearly not because of failure to collect fees from drivers – as Chapter Six 
demonstrated, there was ample evidence that UTODA was very rigourous in 
collecting these. The problem was less to do with lack of capacity to collect revenue 
than UTODA’s withholding of it: political and economic interests were bound 
together through a monopolistic organisation with an enormous amount of 
leverage, against which bureacracy was unable to exert much control regardless of 
its technical capacities.   
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It was not only UTODA that refused to hand over fees to KCC; a similar problem 
occurred with respect to markets. The performance of market dues as a local 
revenue instrument was even worse: quite astonishingly given the growth of 
market trading in the city over the decade, less revenue was collected from markets 
in 2009 than 2001, and periods of significant market revenue growth were the 
exception rather than the rule. The reasons for this are multifarious. First, while 
market dues were on an upward trajectory in the early 2000s, Museveni – seeking 
to recapture some urban support between the 2001 and 2006 elections – 
intervened to abolish daily empooza payable on entry to the market (linked to the 
value of particular produce being sold). These were replaced with a ‘flatter’ monthly 
fee, a change that resulted in a substantial drop in revenues from marketplaces 
even as they continued to expand.570   
 
Moreover, the struggles over market ownership and management discussed in 
Chapter Five led to situations in which many markets generated no tax at all for 
long periods of time. In September 2009, Central Division had collected no revenue 
whatsoever from Nakasero Market for almost a year, despite a formal arrangement 
to collect UGX 24m annually from the market.571 Mayor Ssebaggala had informally 
rendered this arrangment effectively null, publicly stating that Central Division was 
'harrassing the vendors’. Similar situations resulted in lost revenue from other 
markets (including Owino and Kisekka) in 2007 and 2008, though the individual 
intervening in vendors’ favour varied between Ssebaggala, Museveni and Central 
Division Chairman Godfrey Nyakaana. These interventions were generally arbitrary, 
often coming in the form of casual announcements while campaigning.572 
Moreover, sometimes the private companies contracted in to collect the dues on 
behalf of KCC after 2006 would begin defaulting but KCC found it hard to terminate 
their contracts because of their claims to have ‘developed’ the marketplaces.573  
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 Interview with Richard Bamwira, 28.09.09. 
571
 Interview with Richard Bamwira, 28.09.09. 
572
 Interview with Richard Bamwira, 28.09.09. 
573
 Interview with Isa Gumonye, 08.10.09. 
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Trading licenses for urban businesses, another key revenue stream, performed 
better but nevertheless quite poorly; around 80% of the expected amount was 
collected in 2007-8, falling to around 60% in 2008-9 (KCC 2007; 2009). Even this 
conceals the low levels of collection in certain Divisions: for example Rubaga 
Division collected only a quarter of the amount expected in 2008-9 (KCC 2009). 
Moreover, by 2009 the fixed fees payable by different types of business (e.g. UGX 
60,000-100,000 for wholesalers, UGX 20,000-35,000 for retailers) had not been 
revised for 14 years.574 In April of that year KCC revised license fees in line with 
inflation and economic growth. New fees ranging from UGX 200,000 to UGX 
950,000575 were agreed by a range of stakeholders including Ssebaggala and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, and were codified in a formal legal amendment.576 
However, a U-turn by Ssebaggala, who subsequently denounced the new rates, 
made implementation virtually impossible. By the end of the year bureaucrats were 
adopting a ‘voluntary approach’ to license fees, not enforcing the official new rates 
for fear of ‘massive demonstrations’.577  
 
From 2008-9 the two new taxes intended to replace GT – the Local Service Tax (LST) 
and Hotel Tax – came into being. Unsurprisingly, they underperformed: LST 
collected 65% of its expected amount; Hotel Tax performed better at 90%, but was 
a miniscule revenue stream even in Kampala, amounting to around 1% of local 
revenue. As Figure 7.5 illustrates, together they accounted for just 6% of KCC’s local 
revenue, far from the 29% comprised by GT in 1999.  Even the absolute sum they 
generated in 2008-9 amounted to around half of GT’s contributions ten years 
earlier. The aim was to generate UGX 60bn annually countrywide through LST to 
match previous GT revenues, but in 2008-9 it took just UGX 5bn.  
 
Meanwhile, Division financial officers sought to increase revenue through 
innovations and improvements relating to minor revenue instruments such as 
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 Interview with Richard Bamwira, 28.09.09. 
575
 ‘Traders must pay new tax, Otafiire insists’, The New Vision, 21.05.09. 
576
 Interview with Musujja Bakka, 22.09.09. 
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 Interview with Richard Bamwira, 28.09.09. 
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advertising and fees for administrative services.578 Some efforts fared better than 
others, but none were substantial. The ill-fated boda-boda tax (see Chapter Six) 
made a brief appearance in revenue accounts for 2006-7 and (misguidedly) in the 
projected budget for 2007-8, before vanishing. In 2007, KCC withheld UGX 4bn 
(around $2m) from Central Division due to a quarrel with its Chairman, leading the 
Division to then withhold the 50% of its revenues it was supposed to pass up to KCC. 
Nakawa Division also failed to remit its 50% to KCC that year.579 Inevitably, such 
disputes (which apparently were not at all uncommon) sent expenditure plans into 
disarray.580 
 
Figure 7.5: Kampala District local revenues in 2009 
 
Source: compiled from data in KCC (2009) 
 
7.4    Property tax in Kampala: immense potential undermined  
 
In one sense the changing composition of local revenues over the decade could be 
interpreted as rather progressive, given the increasing share taken by property tax 
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 Interview with Richard Bamwira, 28.09.09. 
579
 ‘Inquiry into KCC reveals disorder, abuse of law’, The New Vision, 08.11.07; interview with 
Godfrey Nyakaana, Central Division Chairman, 28.09.09. 
580
 Interview with Isa Gumonye, 08.10.09; Interview with Tony Kyeemba, Kawempe Division 
Economist, 15.01.10. Stelman (2012) also documents battles over disbursement of funds between 
KCC and Nakawa and Makindye Divisions.  
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(PT) in place of the less progressive GT. However, while PT did increase rapidly in 
the last few years of the decade, a closer examination reveals that the amount 
collected after 2005 would have been much higher if not for certain political 
interventions. Realising that property values on the official valuation rolls were very 
out of date (mostly dating from 1992),581 in 2004-5 the government committed to a 
major revaluation exercise in line with the 2005 Local Governments (Rating) Act. 
The Act provided for valuation by certified private surveying firms (Article 8), of 
which there were around 20 in Uganda by 2010.582 Updated values were to be 
posted publicly for a 30-day period during which owners were entitled to object and 
take their claim to a valuation court, which would settle a final figure (Articles 14-
24). The tax rate itself was fixed at 6% of the rateable value (which was 78% of the 
gross annual imputed rental value, allowing for a 22% deduction for maintenance 
costs).583  
 
The 2005 revaluation process accounts for the fairly steep rise in property tax 
revenues in the second half of the decade. However, something took place soon 
afterwards to dramatically hamper the potential of the newly reinvigorated PT 
regime. In 2005, heated debates were taking place about PT as well as GT.584 On the 
one hand, PT was accused of impeding poverty reduction, but on the other, the 
revaluation also saw huge increases in the value of large properties, enervating 
elites. With an election looming, Museveni decided to ‘suspend’ the payment of PT 
by owner-occupiers, so that only those renting out properties had to pay.585 After 
the election, this exemption was retained and codified in Law through the Local 
Governments (Rating) Amendment Act (2006). 
 
                                                          
581
 Interview with Henry Kizito, Economist, Central Division, 15.10.09. Given that land rent paid by 
businesses in the CBD had increased from an average of UGX 200,000 per month to UGX 3,000,000 
between 2000 and 2009 (interview with Richard Bamwira, 28.09.09), the average scale of likely 
increases in property values between 1992 and 2005 is likely to be as great or greater. Indeed 
increases in PT as a result of the revaluation in some cases were extraordinary: for example the 
Sheraton Hotel went from paying UGX 3m annually to UGX 177m (interview with Henry Kizito, 
15.10.09). To partially compensate for these huge increases, the tax rate itself was reduced from 10-
12% to 6% in 2005 (Interview with judge, 27.01.10). 
582
 Interview with property valuer A, 11.01.10. 
583
 Interview with property valuer B, 14.01.10. 
584
 Interview with judge, 27.01.10. 
585
 Ibid. 
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The exemption of certain clearly-defined categories of owner-occupiers is not in 
itself particularly unusual or problematic. The problem in Kampala was the 
categorical exemption of all people living in their houses and the sudden nature of 
the decision, with barely any research or preparation.586 The amendment was 
accompanied by pervasive failure to identify real owner-occupiers. A respondent 
with detailed knowledge of this issue pointed out that many people renting out 
houses in Kampala claimed to be living in them, on the grounds that it was the 
‘house of their mistress’ where they frequently slept. Others were renting out their 
garage or parts of their house while claiming owner-occupier status.587 Not only did 
the exemption massively decrease the tax base, but it exacerbated the problem of 
default.588 In 2006-7, the gross arrears in terms of unpaid PT were around five times 
the amount actually collected in that year (KCC 2007: 15).  
 
Most local officials agreed that the exemption was a disaster for local taxation. The 
PT base was more than halved: of the 110,000 properties listed on KCC’s database, 
only 45,000 were billed after 2006.589 It also arguably made the system more 
regressive: one official pointed out that poorer people renting out properties for 
commercial ventures effectively paid to maintain the infrastructure for the rich 
sitting in huge houses in Kololo, Kampala’s wealthiest neighbourhood.590 The impact 
on the poor was, however, ambiguous; in some low-income areas the majority of 
residents were owner-occupiers, so the exemption raised serious questions about 
how to fund development and infrastructure maintenance in those areas given that 
waste collection, roads, street lighting and sanitation were supposed to be funded 
by PT.591 The owner-occupier rule was a particularly serious blow to Kawempe 
Division, the worst tax performer of all Kampala’s Divisions (KCC 2007; 2009) where 
infrastructure and services were so poor that people had long resisted paying the 
tax anyway as they received so little in return.592  
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 Interview with Henry Kizito, 15.10.09. 
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 Interview with local finance official A, 13.01.10. 
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 Interview with local finance official B, 05.01.10; Interview with local finance official A, 22.01.10. 
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 Interview with judge, 27.01.10. 
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 Interview with Grace Binaisa, 15.10.09. 
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Without the owner-occupier exemption, property tax would have raised an 
estimated UGX 20bn annually, as compared with the 5-10 billion actually 
collected.593 Meanwhile, however, other factors also impeded PT performance, 
including the likely undervaluation of some of the city’s most valuable properties. 
There is evidence that elites were able to significantly ‘correct’ the values of their 
properties on the official rolls produced in 2005. These rolls revealed that many 
properties ended up with values far lower than those listed after the official 
revaluation exercise – in some cases less than a quarter of the listed value (See 
Table 7.3). This meant they were paying less than a quarter of the amount of PT 
that would have been payable under the original valuation.  
 
Table 7.3: Properties in Kampala CBD with wide disparity between original and 
‘corrected’ valuation on official rolls 
 
Address 
Owner (firm/ 
individual) 
Original 
value, UGX, 
millions 
Amended value  
UGX, millions 
12 Luwum St Hassan Basajjabalaba 1,018 570 
5 George St Amamu Ltd 984 492 
Imperial Estates Karim Hirji 926 426 
17 Market St Hassan Basajjabalaba 884 570 
160 Market St Hassan Basajjabalaba 884 510 
Grand Imperial Hotel Karim Hirji 850 490 
38 Kampala Rd Meera Investments 780 264 
Kampala Road Meera Investments 780 264 
30 Kampala Rd Karim Hirji 771 355 
7/9 Buganda Rd Executive 
Investments 
677 375 
17/19 Luwum St Meera Investments 542 241 
9 Market St Meera Investments 482 136 
Market Street Meera Investments 482 136 
1 Parliament Ave Meera Investments 464 100 
Farmer’s House Meera Investments 464 100 
Ben Kiwanuka St Tom Kitandwe 407 188 
Speke Hotel  Sudhir Ruparelia 379 157 
 
Many of these properties were owned by Uganda’s best known magnates including 
Sudhir Ruparelia (a super-rich Asian businessman), Karim Harji (an Asian Hotelier) 
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 Interview with local finance official A, 13.01.10. 
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and Hassan Basajjabalaba (see Chapter Five) – all of whom were thought to be 
closely associated with and/or funders of the NRM. Most strikingly, 90% of the 
properties owned by Ruparelia in the CBD (usually under the banner of his 
company, Meera Investments) had their values reduced.  It was unclear whether 
there was legitimate cause for appeal and what procedures were undertaken. The 
new values were simply hand-written onto the rolls and while the actions of the 
valuation courts are supposed to be documented, records for the Nakasero area 
(where all the properties listed above were located) were missing at the time of 
research, with an official stating that ‘no-one knows where they are’.  He did, 
however, note that for very wealthy property owners ‘sometimes there is a bias’ 
reflected in the valuation rolls.594 When asked about whether this kind of 
revaluation was normal, one private property valuer replied ‘it’s not professional, 
put it that way […] I would be very interested to know why such dramatic property 
devaluations took place’.595 Other sources suggested that KCC should really have 
appealed given the scale of these reductions.596 
 
Compounding all the above problems was the weak system of penalties for non-
payment, facilitated by vagueness within the law and capitalised on by politicians 
cultivating urban support. One official noted that ‘if people refuse to pay property 
tax we don’t take any serious action. In every law they put clear penalties, but not 
this one!’.597 To conclude, lack of capacity was only one among many constraints on 
PT, and probably not the most important. The valuation profession was fairly well-
developed, the number of registered properties high and the cadastres relatively 
up-to-date. This is not to say there were no capacity problems; simply that in the 
case of Kampala the common assertion that ‘administration is the crucial problem 
of property taxation’ (Brosio 2000: 22) misses some of the most fundamental 
dynamics underpinning poor revenue performance.  
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 Interview with local finance official C, 25.01.10. 
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 Interview with property valuer A, 11.01.10. 
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 Interview with judge, 27.01.10. 
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 Interview with local finance official A, 22.01.10. There is a clear contrast here with neighbouring 
Tanzania, where if you do not pay your property tax the government approaches your employer to 
deduct it from your salary (interview with judge, 27.01.10). 
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7.5    Kigali’s rising revenues: more fees, less tax?  
 
All local revenue collection in Kigali was undertaken by the city’s three Districts. 
Although some of this was transferred to CoK in accordance with the formula laid 
out above, most revenue information was kept at the District level; consequently 
city-wide data on revenues was not readily available as it was in Kampala.
598
 This 
section therefore concentrates instead on information available from the Districts – 
Nyarugenge (encompassing the CBD and thus broadly comparable to Kampala’s 
Central Division), Gasabo (containing both high-end residential areas and low-
income neighbourhoods) and Kicukiro (containing a range of middle-class and low-
income neighbourhoods). There are some problems comparing information 
between these due to the fact that they had not all fully converted to new reporting 
systems evolving at the time of research and were sometimes using the system in 
different ways. As such the weak capacity in terms of aggregating and analysing 
revenue data at the local level was palpable. 
 
A related challenge in making comparisons with Kampala is the fact that 
decentralisation in Rwanda did not begin until 2002 and changed substantially in 
2006 (indeed before 2006 the three Districts in question did not exist). 
Consequently, internally consistent time series data like that in Kampala was not 
available. In addition, the shift to new information systems and reporting methods 
from around 2007 made data before that difficult to come by. The fact that the local 
revenue systems were very new, in flux and lacking in capacity was very evident, 
notwithstanding the impressive achievements of the RRA nationally (DFID 2010). 
Despite these constraints, however, sufficient information was available on local 
revenues from 2006/7 onwards to allow for a detailed picture of local taxation 
towards the end of the decade and facilitate comparative insights.  
 
As in Kampala, Kigali’s districts remained dependent on transfers from central 
government, which generally made up more than half of their gross revenue (see 
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 A trip in 2011 revealed that this was due to change, with a centralised CoK revenue office in the 
pipeline. 
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Figures 7.6 and 7.7). Local revenues were evidently growing fairly consistently in the 
city, but unlike in Kampala were also becoming larger as a proportion of total 
district budgets (see Figure 7.7a and 7.7b). The absolute amounts of revenue 
collected were actually very similar to those in Kampala: total local revenues in 
Kigali in 2008 amounted to RWF 7.5bn, around $14m, or approximately $14 per 
capita, while in Kampala the local revenue for 2008 amounted to $16.4m, or $11 
per capita.599 However, the per capita figures do suggest marginally better 
performance in Kigali, where local revenues in aggregate were also performing 
relatively well against the targets specified in district budgets, generally achieving 
around 85% (MINALOC 2009).600 The conclusion at first glance is thus that there was 
not a huge difference in effectiveness with regard to local tax collection between 
the two cities, but it in Kigali it was somewhat higher and (unlike in Kampala) 
appeared to be moving in the right direction.  
 
Figure 7.6: Local revenues and central transfers, Kigali Districts (RWF) 
 
 
Source: compiled from data collected from District finance offices 
 
 
                                                          
599
 These figures are approximations calculated using historical exchange rates of around RWF 535 
and UGX 1700 to the dollar in 2008 (www.gocurrency.com; accessed 09.02.12), and estimated night-
time population figures (see footnote 38). 
600
 ‘District revenues performance’ powerpoint.  
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Figure 7.7: Local revenues and transfers, Kigali’s Districts combined 
a) Absolute figures (RWF)   b) As a percentage of total  
 
Source: compiled from data collected from District finance offices 
 
However, there were serious problems regarding local revenue generation in Kigali 
that this brief overview misses. A Kicukiro District official explained that around 
RWF 58m per month was needed just to cover salaries and health insurance for 
district staff, but in some months local revenue did not even cover this, amounting 
to as little as RWF 54m.
601
 Local revenue collection was also much more impressive 
for some forms of tax than others. The three taxes conceived as the bedrock of 
fiscal decentralisation – trading licences (TLs), property tax (PT) and rental income 
tax (RIT) – composed a remarkably small proportion of local revenue, as illustrated 
in Figure 7.8 (a-c).  
 
The remarkably low levels of PT will be discussed in the following sub-section, as 
will RIT, the fastest growing of the three but a highly unconventional and 
problematic source of local revenue. TLs were the one conventional local revenue 
instrument performing well relative to potential (see below). Yet the majority of 
                                                          
601
 Interview with district finance officer, 10.12.09. 
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locally-generated revenues came from various administrative fees, rent on plots 
(discussed below), and ‘other revenues’ that were frequently not attributed or 
disaggregated in budget statements. In fact, the latter consisted of further fines and 
fees, the vast majority of which were paid by businesses to the District for the 
cleaning and beautifying of city streets.602 Businesses paid around 3,000-10,000 
RWF per month for cleaning services in their area; this accounts for the high 
proportion of ‘other’ revenues/income evident in Figure 7.8, and the ‘autres 
recettes’ listed for Nyarugenge District in Table 7.4.603 In some cases ‘other 
revenues’ also includes the sale of District assets.604  
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 Interview with Kigali local finance official, 06.12.11. 
603
 Only from 2010 were such fees listed explicitly as ‘cleaning fees’ in budget statements. It is also 
important to note that these cleaning fees were separate from the more informal local payments 
that all residents made to the umudugudu level of government for cleaning, which remain very 
localised and were not listed in District budgets (Interview with Kigali local finance official, 06.12.11; 
conversations with various Kigali residents, December 2011). 
604
 Interview with district finance officer, 10.12.09. 
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Figure 7.8: The composition of local revenues in Kigali’s three Districts 
a) Nyarugenge District (2008) 
 
b) Gasabo District (2008) 
 
c) Kicukiro District (Jan-Sep 2009) 
 
Source: compiled from data collected from district finance offices 
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The range of revenue instruments employed was considerable. Table 7.4 shows a 
partially disaggregated list and illustrates the extent to which many of the revenue 
sources used were highly unstable year-on-year, making them problematic for 
funding local services. Perhaps the most striking feature of the distribution of 
revenue was, however, the high degree of dependence on sources that were not 
really taxes. Taxes are usually considered qualitatively different from fees; and as 
noted above, rather than being tied to specific services or activities they play 
broader roles that feed into accountability, state-building and ‘social contracts’. 
(Lieberman 2002; Moore 2004; 2008; Von Stein [1885] 1964). ‘Rent on plots’ (listed 
in Table 7.4 as ‘location parcelle’) was neither a tax proper nor a sustainable 
revenue source, but a land contract fee linked to a system of progressive acquisition 
of land titles. Under this system, once a landowner converted their lease into a 
freehold title under the new arrangements discussed in Chapter Three (by paying 
ten years’ worth of ‘location parcelle’ and developing their land in accordance with 
approved plans) they no longer paid this fee, and instead paid property tax.605 Given 
the serious problems with property taxation discussed below, this could amount to 
diminishing revenues from land and property over time. 
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 Interview with government decentralisation official, 04.02.10; Interview with land official, 
09.12.11. 
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Table 7.4: Type of revenue, absolute figures and as a % of previous year, 
Nyarugenge District 2007-2009 
 
TYPE OF REVENUE 2007 2008 2009 2008/2007 2009/2008
Property Tax/Impot sur les 
biens immobiliers/ 142,417,702         70,659,356        134,228,399     50% 190%
Fines and Penalities/Amandes 
diverses 14,617,688           10,476,544        15,490,997        72% 148%
Attestatios divers 84,034,738        50,743,793        60%
Autres Recettes 834,995,031         934,537,329     858,473,472     111% 92%
Location shopping center 13,504,450        61,292,822        454%
Impots sur les revenus 
locatifs/Rental Income Tax 251,050,327         254,466,472     800,844,180     101% 315%
Location parcelle/Land Revenue 157,661,146         94,710,410        161,788,378     60% 171%
frais de mutation 36,076,190        392,200              1%
Titres de propriete 1,945,337          17,656,480        908%
Inscription hypothecaire 202,000              510,000              252%
Expertise 200,000              
Panneaux publicitaire/Bill 
Board Tax 90,571,915           25,346,707        62,352,524        28% 246%
Patente/Trading licence 369,189,075         400,822,901     396,229,652     108% 99%
Frais de Notaire 200,295,735     139,432,223     70%
Autorisation de batir 31,725,076           5,235,989          15,246,020        17% 291%
Taxes de marche/Markets fees 28,931,087           76,801,366        72,131,390        265% 94%
 frais administratif 29,779,930           3,686,566          1,469,500          12% 40%
autre revenus 7,681,900          7,713,800          100%
TOTAL 1,950,938,977     2,220,483,990  2,796,195,830  113% 126%  
Source: Nyarugenge District finance office  
 
The degree to which Kigali’s revenue growth was driven by non-fiscal revenue 
sources is illustrated by Figure 7.9, which pertains to Gasabo district from 2006-
2008. Kicukiro District statistics from 2007 also indicate that 77% of local revenue 
was from non-fiscal sources and only 23% from fiscal ones.
606
 Given that revenue 
decentralisation is meant to improve government accountability by bringing certain 
taxes within the purview of local authorities (Mahon 2009; Bird 2010), particularly 
important are taxes (i.e. fiscal revenues) that are visible, direct and broad based 
(Rakner and Gloppen 2002). Little of the revenue on which Kigali’s districts 
depended in the late 2000s was of this variety. It is therefore important to note that 
that while local authorities were relatively effective at raising revenues in general, 
                                                          
606
 Fiscal revenues refer to the three decentralised taxes and non-fiscal to everything else, although 
depending on the District and the source, the category of ‘fiscal’ revenues sometimes also includes 
rent on plots (Interview with district finance officer, 10.12.09; various district revenue documents). 
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effectiveness was limited with respect to some of the instruments that were 
potentially more sustainable and associated with accountability. 
 
Figure 7.9: Tax versus non-tax revenues, Gasabo District 2006-2008 
 
Source: compiled from data collected from Gasabo District finance office  
 
Having said this, trading licenses (TLs) are generally thought of both as proper taxes 
and appropriate for decentralising, and these were being implemented with 
remarkable effectiveness. Donors considered the level of registration of local 
businesses for TLs ‘very impressive’,607 and 85-95% of businesses were reportedly 
paying this tax.608 This performance was related to the drive to formalise Kigali 
discussed in Chapter Five, as was the relatively small contribution of market fees 
evident in Figure 7.8 and Table 7.4. High levels of small business registration 
reflected the deep commitment to regulation evident throughout all the chapters 
so far, as well as streamlined relations between politicians and bureaucrats and 
between different tiers of government. As one official noted, ‘it is very easy to trap 
everybody here’ with regard to TLs because of the systems in place and good 
information sharing between central and local government.609 Clearly, however, the 
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 Interview with donor representative, 03.02.10. 
608
 Interview with government decentralisation official, 04.02.10; interview with local research 
organisation, 08.02.10. 
609
 Interview with George Byamukama, 23.11.09. 
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government concertedly focused its effort on registering businesses for taxation 
relative to registering taxpayers in other ways, as reflected in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.5: Registered local taxpayers, Nyarugenge District, 2008 
RENTAL 
INCOME TAX TRADING LICENCE PROPERTY TAX LAND RENT BILLBOARD
626 1,000 8 17
1 38 0 3
5 209 2 25 8
573 1,885 5 188
3 135 0 0 0
518 3,531 96 980 27
554 388 10 49
463 753 42 1,304 0
835 7,103 436 1,170
445 1,699 62 33 0
4,023 16,741 661 3,769 35  
Source: Nyarugenge District finance office 
 
It is arguably because TLs were a regressive tax impacting disproportionately on the 
urban poor that they were so effectively implemented. The deep knowledge of 
ordinary people’s lives on the part of local authorities in Rwanda was noted in 
earlier chapters, and is widely documented (Straus 2006; Ingelaere 2011; Purdeková 
2011). This has clear implications for taxation; as one source noted, compliance was 
a ‘must’ in relation to TLs because ‘you can’t not be known by the District’.610 TL 
payments to the district often constituted the only proper tax that urban-dwellers 
paid at all; many had not been paying taxes to the RRA, though this was changing.611 
It was widely agreed among donors and domestic civil society groups alike that 
trading licenses were disproportionately high for small businesses: there was ‘not 
much difference between what the big fish and small businesses pay.’612 The 
simplistic categorisation of businesses under the system meant, for example, that 
                                                          
610
 Interview with local research organisation 08.02.10. 
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 Interview with donor representative, 03.02.10; Interview with Rwandan civil society 
representative, 11.12.09. 
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someone operating a small hotel or B&B paid the same for their licence as the 
biggest 5 star international hotel in the city.613  
 
When combined with increasing pressure to register for the RRA, to which small 
businesses were often over-paying due to miscalculations and failure to incorporate 
their TL payments as an expense, the payments could be crippling.614 Moreover, the 
penalties for TL non-payment described in section 7.3 were strictly enforced.615 
Some sources went so far as to argue that that taxation was ‘killing the economy’ in 
the city.616 Significant too in assessing the overall burden was the fact that everyone 
was required to pay fees to the umudugudu – the lowest level of government – for 
services such as cleaning, waste collection and security, which never progressed up 
the governmental system further than the Sector level and therefore did not appear 
in District budget statistics.617 Payments for cleaning were around RWF 1000-2000 
per month, with crude efforts to match the amount paid with the income of 
residents,618 while local security fees were up to RWF 5,000 depending on the city 
neighbourhood.619 These were not formal taxes at all, often being collected after 
the monthly umudugudu meeting620 by local leaders (who were allegedly always 
RPF members).621  
 
A final problem with trading licenses is that they had clear limitations for further 
augmenting local revenues. The fact that TLs performed so consistently year-on-
year (see Table 7.4) and that registration of businesses for the purposes of levying 
TLs was almost ‘saturated’ by the late 2000s indicates this; there was little potential 
for trading licence revenues to increase further except in accordance with economic 
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 Informal conversation with a researcher, 02.02.10; also see Purdeková (2011). There were no 
clear accountability mechanisms regarding expenditure of these payments. One resident of a lower-
income neighbourhood in Kigali emphasised that people generally did not demand to know exactly 
what these payments were being used for. (Interview with Kigali resident A, 05.02.10). 
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growth. Property tax (PT) and rental income tax (RIT), on the other hand, had 
enormous, largely untapped potential to generate far more local revenue than they 
were generating by the end of the decade.  
 
7.6   Kigali’s property and rental income taxes: elite resistance and missed 
opportunities 
 
In sharp contrast to the situation with TLs, very few Kigali residents were registered 
for PT and RIT. Table 7.5 demonstrates that even one politician’s estimate of 10-
20%622 is likely to be a serious over-estimation as far as PT is concerned. In 2008 
only 661 properties were registered for PT in Nyarugenge District, which contained 
approximately 30,000.623 One government source estimated that only around a 
thousand people were registered for PT in the whole city:624 less than 1% of the 
number registered for Kampala (prior to the owner-occupier exemption), a city at 
most twice Kigali’s size. In large part this was because PT applied only to 
freeholders, and only around 2% of plots in Kigali were held in freehold by the end 
of the decade.625 Yet the above figures suggest that even among these the majority 
were not registered for PT.626 This may partly be because, as an investment 
incentive, properties over three storeys high paid no PT at all.627 
 
Aside from the problems of a PT system that included so few properties in the tax 
base, there were serious problems regarding the valuation ratio for those few 
taxable properties. Valuation was completely delinked from the property market,628 
being determined by size and materials – a method professional valuers in Uganda 
(and elsewhere) considered the least appropriate available for the purposes of PT. 
Proximity to the city centre, access to services and desirability of the 
neighbourhood were rendered irrelevant. Moreover, there was reason to believe 
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 Interview with District politician, 01.12.09. 
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 Interview with donor representatives, 03.02.10. 
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that very little property valuation for tax purposes was actually happening. The only 
professionals in Rwanda were trained to value property for expropriation, alongside 
the demolitions discussed in Chapter Four.629 Four such companies existed in 2009, 
all focusing on valuation for expropriation. One valuer noted that he had never 
been approached regarding valuation for the purposes of property taxation.630 
Listed values were based not contemporary market-based systems as in Kampala, 
but on ‘bricks-and-mortar’ valuations from as long ago as the 1960s and 1970s (with 
owners annually paying 0.2% of this value in tax), because in most cases the houses 
were only valued once, when they were built.631 Meanwhile in new neighbourhoods 
such as Nyarutarama, where large numbers of upmarket properties emerged after 
1994, owners were supposed in theory to value the house themselves and have the 
value approved by an engineer, which – even if it was taking place – hardly 
constitutes a robust system of valuation.632 
 
Consequently PT was one of the most insignificant revenues sources in Kigali, as 
evidenced by Figure 7.8. Table 7.6 shows how it constituted an average of just 3% of 
local revenues in Kigali in 2008-9. Yet the potential of the tax was enormous, 
particularly in the context of the construction boom in the city. One expert source 
suggested that in somewhere like Kigali PT could in theory amount to as much as 5-
6% of GDP.633 Instead, in 2008 the approximate amount of PT collected in all three 
of Kigali’s Districts combined was 0.009% of national (nominal) GDP. Given that no 
property tax at all is collected in most of Rwanda’s districts (which have almost no 
freehold titles), Rwanda’s total PT mobilisation as a share of GDP is probably not 
much higher. Even in Kampala, PT generation amounted to 0.03% of Uganda’s GDP. 
Put differently, in 2008 PT was a mere $0.4 per capita in Kigali, while it was $3 per 
capita in Kampala, despite all of the efforts to cripple PT collection in the latter.  
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 Interview with government decentralisation official, 04.02.10. 
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 Interview with Rwandese property valuer, 16.12.09. 
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 Interview with government decentralisation official, 04.02.10. 
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 Interview with government decentralisation official, 04.02.10. 
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Table 7.6: Property tax in Kigali relative to other decentralised taxes and total 
local revenues 
 
Local revenue source Gasabo  (2008) Nyarugenge (2008) 
Kicukiro  
(Jan-Sep 2009) 
PROPERTY TAX 90,612,553 70,659,356 29,993,237 
RENTAL INCOME TAX 277,968,564 254,466,472 112,076,628 
TRADING LICENSE TAX 255,979,414 400,822,901 156,304,039 
Subtotal (3 decentralised 
taxes) 
624,560,531 725,948,729 298,373,904 
Property tax as % of 3 
decentralised taxes  
14% 10% 10% 
RENT ON PLOTS 757,818,297 138,784,924 351,897,060 
FEES and OTHER (e.g. sale 
of assets)  
922,816,057 1,356,365,335 1,059,574,283 
TOTAL 2,305,194,885 2,221,098,988 1,709,845,247  
Property tax as % of all 
locally-generated revenue 
4% 3% 2% 
Source: data gathered from Kigali’s three district finance offices 
 
A problem with framing this poor PT performance in terms of ineffectiveness (as 
defined in this study) is that it was only partially due to poor enforcement: the 
formal framework itself was so problematic that even if effectively enforced it 
would yield low revenues. However, government policy had for some time been to 
develop an improved system of property taxation in accordance with the 
decentralisation framework, which placed great emphasis on this tax. Several 
donors had been advising on how to achieve this for over a decade.634 Yet there was 
no evidence of this being implemented by 2010, and independent sources remained 
sceptical that any progress was taking place, noting that moves toward an adequate 
registry of properties and functional system of valuation simply were not 
happening. One advisor claimed he had first talked to the government about 
developing a functional system in 1997, and despite enthusiasm on the part of 
ministers found that by 2003 there had been no progress at all on the issue.635 A 
new PT law was drafted in 2006, but subsequently brushed under the carpet.636 
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 Interviews with various donor representatives and foreign advisers, Kigali, November 2009-
February 2010.  
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 Interview with taxation adviser A, 26.11.09. 
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 Interview with donor representatives, Kigali, 03.02.10. 
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Since then repeated discussions had amounted to nothing by 2009, apart from the 
possibility of a new law in the future. Given the speed with which the government 
had implemented policy on many other issues, this raised questions for some 
observers about the government’s commitment on this issue.637  
 
This stalling was a cause for concern because setting up a reliable fiscal cadastre is 
immensely challenging and was likely to become more difficult over time, given the 
rate of urban growth. This was particularly pertinent because the land tenure 
regularisation (LTR) programme underway from 2009 provided a window of 
opportunity to register properties for taxation: regularising plots and allocating land 
titles could be combined with registration and valuation of real estate for PT 
purposes.638 The government, however, was concerned that people might be 
discouraged from participating in the LTR if they knew their properties were being 
valued for taxation.639  The pilot phase confirmed that survey respondents were 
worried higher rates of tax might emerge from the process (Sagashya and English 
2009: 30). Consequently, despite a very impressive land regularisation programme, 
there was no cadastre of ‘real property’ being developed that would allow the tax 
to be simply ‘switched on’ at a later stage. Behind all this was, some observers 
believe, a deeper political resistance to developing the tax.640 
 
Alongside facilitating domestic elites to reap rewards from urban property, the 
weaknesses of PT could be considered to be an investment incentive. Many of the 
incentives the government had put in place in its drive to attract international 
investors related to tax; perhaps too many – an estimated 25% of total government 
revenue was foregone each year through tax incentives (ActionAid 2011: 6). Weak 
property taxation could be seen, paradoxically, as effective vis-à-vis the goal of 
                                                          
637
 Interviews with various donor representatives and foreign advisers, Kigali, November 2009-
February 2010. 
638
 Interview with taxation adviser A, 26.11.09. The LTR progress was taking place with impressive 
speed; while in February 2010 only 18,000 titles (mainly leasehold) had been issued on Rwanda’s 10 
million plots, by November 2011 a million such titles had been issued and the process was ongoing 
(Interview with land official, 09.12.11). 
639
 Interview with government advisers, 23.11.09; interview with officials at the National Land 
Centre, 03.12.09. 
640
 Interviews with revenue advisers, November 2009. 
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attracting investors and part of a ‘pro-growth’ rather than ‘pro-revenue’ approach 
to taxation (Di John 2010). However, there was no evidence of any strategic 
thinking with regard to the influence of property tax on investment, and it was 
unlikely to have had much impact given that even the substantial and highly-
publicised tax incentives offered by the Rwanda Development Board had limited 
impact on investor choices (ActionAid 2011: 39). In any case, for the purposes of 
this study the tax should be judged not in relation to other outcomes (intended or 
otherwise) but in relation to the implementation of stated fiscal policy, and on this 
count it can hardly be considered effective.  
 
The rental income tax (RIT) was subject to some similar problems. Unlike PT, RIT 
grew substantially as a revenue source, particularly towards the end of the decade, 
as is evident from some of the above tables and figures. However, this obscures 
both the much greater potential earnings from rental income and the opportunity 
cost of decentralising this tax. The decentralisation of RIT in itself caused a great 
deal of controversy. One advisor on tax issues believed that the decision to tax rent 
at the local level was unique worldwide.641 In most countries property rental 
generates vast amounts of taxable income, which is always notoriously difficult to 
register and collect. Rental incomes can push people into higher overall tax brackets 
leading them to incur higher marginal rates, but can quite easily be kept relatively 
invisible in order to avoid this. Substantial bureaucratic capacity is needed to collect 
such taxes effectively.  
 
The decision to decentralise rental income in Rwanda therefore effectively meant 
removing it from the remit of the RRA (with its relatively high and growing levels of 
capacity) and transferring it to districts struggling with basic functions. This is not to 
say that the RRA was collecting RIT effectively prior to decentralisation; in fact it 
was not, but it was focusing its capacity-building on other forms of taxation at the 
time and was only in its early stages of development (RoR 2009a: 14-15). A report 
on the relative performance of RTI before and after it was decentralised was 
entirely inconclusive (RoR 2009a), and there was considerable dispute between the 
                                                          
641
 Interview with taxation adviser B, 01.12.09. 
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government and donors (and among donors themselves) about whether the tax 
should be returned to the RRA.642 Some advisers, however, strongly believed that 
the decision to decentralise RIT was a grave mistake, albeit one that served 
property-owning elites well: it kept them out of higher RRA tax brackets and placed 
the burden of taxing these rents on District authorities not capable of fully 
enforcing a tax of this nature.643 While Table 7.5 indicates much higher registration 
for RIT than PT (probably both because of the restriction of PT to properties on 
freehold plots and the involvement of the RRA in earlier stages of registering people 
for RIT), the relatively low figures for both these taxes reflects the limited reach of 
the local state when it comes to exploiting property-related revenues. This limited 
reach contrasts markedly with the situation regarding most aspects of local socio-
economic life, including the almost total capture of trading licences. 
 
The decentralisation of RIT involved distinguishing ‘rental’ from other forms of 
business income still taxed nationally by the RRA (a distinction that did not exist 
between 1964, when income tax was created, and decentralisation (RoR 2009a: 14). 
Observers believed, however, that many people rented out multiple properties as a 
business, but were not taxed by the RRA on the basis that these earnings 
constituted ‘rental’ incomes. It was common for the enormous houses in Kigali 
proliferating throughout the decade to be let (often to expatriates) at prices ranging 
from $2-3,000 to $7,000 per month and sometimes more: one observer spoke of a 
house with a monthly rent of $12,000.644 Much of this was thought to be paid 
offshore, and even if paid locally only a small proportion was being tapped by the 
Districts.645 The vast majority of landlords were not declaring themselves: in 2007, 
the government identified around 27,000 rental properties in Nyarugenge District, 
but only 500 people had declared themselves to be receiving rent (RoR 2009a: 25). 
                                                          
642
 Interview with various donor representatives, November 2009-February 2010. 
643
 Interview with taxation advisers, 26.11.09 and 01.12.09. One suggested that the tax was 
fundamentally unworkable at the District level, and that its limitations in this regard enabled the 
government to limit the amount of real fiscal decentralisation taking place, keeping districts 
dependent on the centre. 
644
 Interview with taxation adviser B, 01.12.09. 
645
 Interview with taxation adviser B, 05.02.10. 
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While some landlords probably owned multiple properties, it is highly unlikely this 
figure reflected the actual number of people earning rental incomes. 
 
Viewed in this light the approximately $3m collected from RIT city-wide in 2009, 
while an impressive increase from $1.3m in 2008, was nowhere near the potential 
in this burgeoning rental market.646 As a DFID report noted in 2010, ‘the most 
important single source of untapped revenues in the country is rental incomes from 
ownership of urban commercial and residential property, above all in Kigali’ (DFID 
2010: 15). The consequence was a distinctly regressive local tax regime: like 
property tax but unlike trading licences, RIT was a tax with immense potential to 
garner resources from Kigali’s wealthy elites. This potential strength was also its 
Achilles’ heel. Thus the only one of the three decentralised taxes performing well 
relative to potential (TLs) impacted most on the poor and least on the propertied 
classes.  
 
The links between the PT and RIT problems merit emphasis. One source claimed 
that ‘every single politician, parliamentarian and military person here has property 
that they rent out’.647 As both the owners and landlords they would be subject to 
both these taxes, which presented a double opportunity for progressive revenue 
mobilisation if property owners were properly registered.648 For the same reasons 
there was a double motivation for ‘passive resistance’649 on the part of elites with 
interests in property. Consequently, two great opportunities were arguably being 
missed: developing proper capacity to administer rental incomes nationally, and 
developing a local property tax system worth the name. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
646
 Interview with taxation advisers, 26.11.09 and 01.12.09. 
647
 Interview with CoK official, 05.02.10. 
648
 Interview with taxation adviser A, 26.11.09. 
649
 Interview with taxation adviser B, 01.12.09. 
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Figure 7.10: Rwandan investment projects by sector (foreign and domestic) 2000-
2010  
 
 
Source: ActionAid (2011: 32) 
 
Analysis of the differential effectiveness of local taxes suggests that property was 
effectively acting as a major taxation ‘loophole’ for elites, an important 
counterpoint to the narrative of RRA effectiveness and relative progressiveness 
(DFID 2010). It also highlights that as long as this loophole persisted, there were 
incentives for elites seeking lucrative investments to pour resources into high-end 
residential property rather than other forms of investment. For the most part, this 
was at least happening in accordance with planning regulations, as Chapter Four 
illustrated; however, the developmental consequences were questionable if 
powerful informal incentives to invest in residential property counteracted 
government efforts to incentivise more productive forms of investment. Figure 7.10 
illustrates the construction boom in the second half of the decade, with investment 
in industry and services decreasing over the same period. This was clearly driven 
largely by domestic investment: table 7.7 illustrates how 73% of registered 
investment from the top ten domestic investors in 2006-10 was in property/real 
estate or construction, with few focusing on government priority sectors such as 
ICT, finance and other services. In contrast, the largest foreign investments were in 
energy, finance and tourism (ActionAid 2011: 30). 
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Table 7.7: Leading registered domestic investors in Rwanda, 2006-2010 
(investment over 10bn RWF) 
 
Company Sector Investment (RWF)
Rwanda Energy Company Energy 58,297,398,850
EPCHER Agribusiness 14,822,527,500
Kigali Limousine VIP Tours Travel Transport 142,126,375,786
Rwanda Free Zone Company Ltd Construction 36,978,461,800
Ultimate Concepts LTD Real Estate 11,660,000,000
Rwanda Investment Group/KIP Finance 27,763,979,100
CIMERWA Construction Manufacturing 30,800,000,000
Real Contract Property 227,327,955,620
Market Shopping Centre Property 12,028,000,000
Caisse Social/Kagugu Project Real Estate 17,400,000,000
4F Networks ICT 11,600,000,000
 
Source: based on ActionAid (2011: 31) 
 
Many ‘high-end’ properties were unoccupied either permanently or most of the 
time,650 suggesting a cycle of property over-development by, and under-taxation of, 
domestic elites in Kigali by the late 2000s. The greater the number of such 
properties, the more determined the likely resistance to effective property and 
rental income taxation. Moreover, the rapid pace of decentralisation was arguably 
playing a role in this dynamic. Plans to further decentralise the collection of RIT to 
the sector level, where capacity was extremely low, led some observers to 
speculate that the excessive and hasty nature of the decentralisation of this tax 
played a functional role in relation to protecting property rents.651  
 
Conclusions 
 
A comparative analysis of local taxation in Kampala and Kigali presents a complex 
picture, in which the wide variance in effectiveness between different taxes within 
each city illuminates the political economy of their development. It is clear that in 
general terms capacity was higher in Kampala. The fact that administratively-
intensive taxes such as graduated tax and property tax were well-established, and 
paid by a considerable proportion of the city population (before they were 
abolished or interfered with), is testament to this. Yet if the variance in local 
                                                          
650
 Interview with urban infrastructure engineer, 06.12.11. 
651
 Interview with taxation adviser A, 26.11.09. 
  
 277
capacity was fairly straightforward, the picture with regard to effectiveness was 
much less so, as this chapter has shown through a compositional disaggregation of 
urban local revenues.  
 
Compared to issues examined in previous chapters, state effectiveness in Kigali was 
very patchy. It was very high regarding trading licenses, even though this very 
effectiveness may have been problematic regarding other economic outcomes. For 
small urban businesses the popular Rwandan saying ‘you are born free, but you will 
be taxed to death’652 was probably particularly pertinent. Licenses, combined with 
the RRA’s tax of 4% of total turnover for small non-farm businesses not yet able to 
register for corporate profit tax (ActionAid 2011), could be crippling, in part 
accounting for the 80% failure rate for start-ups each year.653 All this suggests, 
however, that the state’s ‘infrastructural power’ facilitated impressive performance 
on this tax despite low capacity; taxation does after all depend on information 
about local activities and incomes, which previous chapters have shown to be high 
in Kigali. 
 
However, this infrastructural power was not brought to bear on several potentially 
more lucrative taxes. As government officials acknowledged, the real problem was 
‘with the big taxpayers’,654 notwithstanding their contribution to the RRA at the 
national level. There is a jarring contrast between the everyday payments made by 
ordinary residents for cleaning and security, on the one hand, and an expatriate 
resident’s comment that local authorities came to assess his landlord’s situation for 
RIT just ‘once in five years’, on the other.655 The limits of local revenue effectiveness 
were ultimately due to the role of property in the political bargain on which RPF 
dominance in Kigali rested. Levi’s perspective is helpful here:  
 
‘The fact that rulers often refrain from extracting the greatest amount of revenue 
they could in principle extract from the population does not mean they are 
refraining from maximising behaviour. Rulers refrain from extraction primarily 
because of the constraints to which they are subject.’ (Levi 1988: 4) 
                                                          
652
 Interview with urban infrastructure engineer, 06.12.11. 
653
 Interview with civil society organisation representative, 09.12.11.  
654
 Interview with government decentralisation official, 04.02.10. 
655
 Interview with expatriate resident, 04.02.10. 
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It is likely that for the RPF government the benefits of ineffective property and 
rental income tax systems outweighed the costs; these ‘loopholes’ were strategic 
and, to a certain extent, deliberate. Despite this, judged against the fiscal 
decentralisation policy in which property and rental income tax were accorded key 
roles, the state was ineffective. The possible political benefits of ineffective 
implementation do not detract from this fact; they merely help to explain why it 
was the case. 
 
In contrast with the evidence presented in previous chapters, then, the Rwandan 
government’s policy commitment to property-based taxes lacked credibility. The 
evidence here also serves as a reminder that the Rwandan state itself was not 
wholly ‘autonomous’; there is little doubt that ‘particularistic pressures’ impeded 
implementation, even if the range of such pressures was narrower than in Kampala. 
The nature of political and economic bargains differed substantially between the 
two cities. While the state in Kigali was constrained by property-owning urban 
elites, in Kampala political bargaining in relation to taxation reflected a tendency to 
pander not only to elites but also to urban popular groups such as transport 
workers, market traders and owner-occupiers in city slums. The shift in Kampala 
from graduated tax to local service tax illustrates well the way in which politicians – 
and particularly Museveni – embraced informality as a populist tactic. Informal 
actors were deliberately exempted from the new tax, while in Kigali there were 
concerted efforts to tax them. It could likewise be argued that the NRM 
government’s aversion to direct taxes - which were lower as a proportion of total 
tax than anywhere else in East Africa at 26% compared to Rwanda’s 37% (Di John 
2010: 8) – reflected its concern not to alienate directly any constituency. 
 
In both cities, the credibility of policy commitments was thrown into question 
through the decentralised taxation issue. Smoke’s observation that ‘central 
agencies hostile to decentralization can use poor local performance as an excuse for 
keeping the services centralised’ (2001: 21) is highly pertinent in this respect. It 
reflects the opinion of some observers in Kigali about possible long-term reasons for 
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pushing taxes to lower levels. Meanwhile Museveni’s reversals of decentralisation 
involved attacks on the corruption and inefficiency of the local authority structures 
he helped to create. Whatever each government’s strategic aims in this respect, 
some of their activities regarding local revenue were undermining local state 
credibility, legitimacy and capacity itself. This is hardly surprising in relation to the 
Ugandan case, but for Kigali is a new finding, and illuminating in relation to both the 
political economy of its physical development and the underlying settlement behind 
it. 
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Chapter Eight 
Beyond state capacity: state effectiveness and Africa’s urban future 
 
This thesis set out to explain why, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the 
state was more effective at implementing and enforcing urban development 
policies and regulations in Kigali than Kampala. Addressing this has involved 
comparison on multiple scales: while the primary units of analysis have been cities, 
cross-national comparison of cities is problematic without factoring in differences at 
the level of the central state, and due to the size of cities, more local dynamics have 
necessarily also been compared. A multi-scalar approach adds value at both ends of 
the scale, because exploring the local ramifications of national politics greatly 
enhances our understanding of how macro and micro level processes interact (Tilly 
1984: 112). The task of this concluding chapter is to unpack this multi-dimensional 
comparison, assess its explanatory power and distil its key insights.  
 
The comparison, to elaborate further on Tilly’s framework, has been ‘individualising’ 
and ‘variation-finding’ as opposed to a ‘universalising’. It bucks  a common trend in 
comparative political and economic research on Africa whereby researchers seek 
generalisations about the continent and its problems rather than highlighting 
differences and their implications (Bayart 1993b; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Bates 
2008; Collier 2008). A focus on variation does not, however, mean the findings bear 
no relevance to other states and cities facing similar challenges. In fact, close 
attention to causal mechanisms in divergent cases allows for insights that are 
generalisable to the level of theory (Yin 1994; George and Bennett 2005), enabling 
the further development of theoretical propositions with potentially broad 
applicability. With this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to draw 
conclusions about the causal dynamics and processes underpinning differential 
state effectiveness in these specific cases, and second, to refocus on the broader 
question of what the findings imply about the present and future challenges of 
governing rapidly-growing cities in Africa and beyond. 
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The chapter is arranged as follows. The first section examines some important 
‘headlines’, presenting a stylised analysis of the two cases through four heuristic 
binaries induced from the preceding chapters, and bringing key underlying issues 
systematically into comparative focus for the first time. The second section looks 
more closely at some causal processes in order to reach more generalisable 
conclusions, revisiting and refining the theoretical propositions about state 
effectiveness presented in Chapter Two. A third section abstracts further from the 
case material to explore how political bargaining impacts upon the relative 
congruence of formal and informal institutions, a critical aspect of state 
effectiveness. The fourth and final section broadens out to examine the implications 
of the foregoing analysis for cities and states in the developing world and especially 
Africa. Finally, some reflections on future avenues of research are presented. 
 
8.1     A stylised comparative analysis through four binary oppositions 
 
When comparing two divergent cases it is difficult to avoid thinking in binary 
oppositions. Social science has often hinged on a binary approach to questions of 
social change and diversity, as reflected in the nineteenth-century preoccupation 
with social transformation as a ‘contest’ between order and disorder (Tilly 1984: 
50). Yielding to this impulse, this section analyses the divergence observed in 
Kampala and Kigali through four stylised binary oppositions, facilitating a 
restatement of key themes in the thesis in light of the empirical material in 
Chapters Four to Seven. These binaries are as follows: i) autocracy and democracy; 
ii) developmentalism and populism; iii) state and society; and iv) centralism and 
decentralisation. 
 
Running through all four of the following sub-sections, albeit often implicitly, is a 
concern with structure and agency. This reflects a very real divide in the way the 
politics of these countries is understood, from concerns about the inability of 
ordinary Rwandese people to exercise agency (Gready 2011; Ingelaere 2011; 
Longman 2011), and counter-perspectives to this narrative (Clark 2010a), to the use 
of history and social structures by both the RPF and NRM to justify certain kinds of 
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policies (Pottier 2002; Carbone 2008). Some observers were also preoccupied with 
the importance of Museveni and Kagame’s personal qualities and motivations as 
leaders. Andrew Mwenda, for example, believed that many of Uganda’s 
contemporary problems related to Museveni ‘as an individual, his personality and 
psychology’,656 while Tripp argues that Uganda’s difficulties ‘are not primarily the 
result of the moral failings of an individual or even of a group of leaders; rather they 
are the product of the systemic and institutionalized features of semiauthoritarian 
rule’ (Tripp 2010: 5). The position taken here is that structural characteristics of the 
two societies are deeply important, but not all individuals would be as adept at 
manipulating these opportunities and constraints as Museveni and Kagame proved 
to be. In this respect they have both been highly effective leaders, but whether they 
have made their states effective along the way is another matter entirely.  
 
Democracy and autocracy  
 
‘We call it a positive dictatorship.’  
(Rwandan local government official, February 2009) 
 
The question of whether and how regime type might affect state effectiveness 
(raised in Chapter Two) merits further consideration. Neither Uganda nor Rwanda 
was fully democratic at the time of research. Elections of various kinds took place in 
both states but few would argue that democracy had achieved much substantive 
depth in either. Tripp (2010) classes both as ‘semiauthoritarian’. Despite this, 
according to assessments by Freedom House657 and Polity IV,658 towards the end of 
the decade Rwanda fell closer to the authoritarian end of the spectrum than 
Uganda. Meanwhile Diamond (1999: 280) classes Uganda as a ‘pseudo-democracy’ 
but Rwanda as an ‘authoritarian regime’.  
 
If the defining feature of semiauthoritarianism is ‘constant tension’ between forces 
trying to make democratic institutions a reality and an ‘authoritarian core’ pulling in 
                                                          
656
 Interview with Andrew Mwenda, 20.01.10. 
657
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2009; accessed 24.03.12. 
658
 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm; accessed 24.03.12. 
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the other direction (Tripp 2010: 5),  these constraints were more evident in 
Kampala than Kigali. The role of opposition parties and frequent recourse to the 
courts were testament to this. Chapters Five, Six and Seven also highlighted the role 
that the electoral cycle played in stimulating political interventions that impeded 
policy implementation, something consistent with research on the ‘political 
business cycle’ in young democracies (Block 2002; Keefer and Khemani 2005). The 
relative ease with which urban interest groups could find patrons to ‘run to’ with 
their grievances in Kampala reflected a form of oppositional politics unknown in 
Kigali. After 2005, multiparty politics both nationally and locally was central to the 
way in which bargaining between politicians, bureaucrats and urban constituents 
impacted on (in)effective policy implementation. In Kigali, meanwhile, local 
campaigning by opposition parties was de facto off limits even though formal 
restrictions were lifted in 2007, as noted in Chapter Three. Even those working for 
the state would sometimes attribute their successes to ‘positive dictatorship’. 
 
The two cases were therefore in different places on the spectrum of democracy-
autocracy, and this did make a difference. Yet it is far from being a sufficient 
explanation for differential effectiveness. Chapters Three and Five argued that 
differing degrees of authoritarianism can be at best a partial explanation for 
differential effectiveness. Museveni frequently exhibited highly autocratic 
behaviour, arbitrarily overturning laws and reversing policies with no consultation. 
Even according to the measures of Freedom House or Polity IV, the difference in 
degree of authoritarianism was not of sufficient magnitude to explain such 
diverging outcomes. Elections played a more significant role in political discourse in 
Kampala than in Kigali, but were routinely manipulated and rarely free and fair 
(Gloppen et al. 2006; Kobusingye 2010); indeed tactical use of elections was 
arguably part of authoritarianism in Uganda. In the terms introduced by Levitsky 
and Way, Uganda is closer to ‘competitive authoritarianism’ while Rwanda looked 
more like a ‘façade electoral regime’ (Levitsky and Way 2002: 325). It is therefore 
differences in the form of authoritarianism, relating to the more fragmented 
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political terrain and different strategies of political bargaining in Uganda vis-à-vis 
Rwanda, with which we should be most concerned.659 
  
Populism and developmentalism   
 
'We know that the last man is the president. Only he can help us.'  
(Boda-boda driver, October 2009) 
 
For the purposes of analysing state effectiveness in these two cases, a conceptual 
dichotomy can be made between populism and developmentalism. These are not 
usually juxtaposed as opposites, and ‘developmental’ rule is commonly contrasted 
with ‘predatory’ forms of rule (North 1981; Goldsmith 2004). The distinction made 
here between populism and developmentalism is, however, not so much intended 
to describe outcomes as to analyse different strategies of securing popular support 
observed in the empirical chapters.  
 
Museveni’s ‘personalisation’ of power is well-documented (Mwenda 2007; Carbone 
2008; Tripp 2010) and was unmistakeable in relation to city politics, as the above 
quote from a boda-boda driver illustrates. Chapters Four-Seven described 
numerous populist interventions (as defined in Chapter Two) both by him and by 
other leaders in Kampala (such as Mayor Ssebaggala), which tactically bypassed KCC 
and other state organisations. Moreover, these interventions represented attempts 
to broaden urban support through classic populist tactics involving ‘antielite 
rhetoric’ and recourse in ‘the distinction of friend versus foe’ (Weyland 2001: 11). 
Whether shielding boda-boda drivers from the regulating efforts of KCC or siding 
with market traders against ‘tycoons’ buying up marketplace leases, political 
interventions often followed the logic of promising ‘to protect the people from a 
pernicious enemy’ (Weyland 2001: 11). Critically here, this enemy was often 
                                                          
659
 Lambright also finds that whether or not opposition parties controlled a local authority had only 
limited power to explain central interventions that crippled the local state, noting that ‘Museveni’s 
government undermines service delivery in Uganda’s urban councils, whether dominated by 
opposition or ruling party’ (Lambright 2012: 7). 
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construed as being the local state itself. This has obvious implications for state 
effectiveness.  
 
In Kigali, by contrast, embedded in the country’s history and the RPF’s role in it 
were clear disincentives to employing this kind of populism. Invoking ‘anti-elite 
rhetoric’ – or worse still ‘the distinction between friend and foe’ – was hardly a 
viable political strategy given the history, ethnic composition and limited social base 
of the government. Without recourse these populist tactics, securing support for (or 
acquiescence to) RPF rule was perceived as depending on the provision of public 
goods, not least security, as well as the promise of continued improvements in 
quality of life. There were therefore clear incentives to adopt a ‘developmentalist’ 
orientation. While populist interventions deliberately undermine state institutions 
and organisations, developmentalist ones generally depend on working through the 
state and supporting its institutions and organisations in order to succeed.  
 
Drawing a contrast between this developmentalist orientation and Museveni’s 
populist interventions in Kampala is not to imply that Kagame did not intervene in 
Kigali; on the contrary, he maintained regular contact with city mayors and officials 
and allegedly surveyed city development projects weekly, either with or without the 
Mayor.660 The point is that more often than not this was to check formal rules were 
being enforced, rather than to undermine them. The RPF’s political strategy 
required the promotion of effectively-functioning state machinery, without which 
the delivery of developmental goals and protection of long-term investments would 
be jeopardised.661 The government’s determination to work through the state, 
building up and (for the most part) adhering to legal and regulatory frameworks to 
deliver on its promise to effect long-term developmental change in Kigali, was 
palpable in relation to the issues covered in Chapters Four, Five and Six.  
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 Interview with Bruno Rangira, 26.11.09. 
661
 Developmentalism is often associated with long time horizons (Olson 1993; Goldsmith 2004; 
Kelsall 2011). A developmentalist strategy for securing political legitimacy thus heightens the 
importance of a longer time-frame, which in Rwanda is reflected in seven-year electoral terms and 
tightly controlled political space that militates against democratic regime change in the near future. 
This longer time frame has arguably facilitated the kind of long-termist rent management that has 
been considered central to ‘developmental patrimonialism’ (Kelsall et al. 2010; Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi 2011; Kelsall 2011).  
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The motivations for a state-driven developmentalist strategy were reminiscent of 
East Asian ‘developmental states’, in the sense that developmental objectives were 
politically-driven (Leftwich 2008a: 12). As in the East Asian experience, there was a 
major perceived external threat (from rebel forces in the DRC), limited natural 
resources, and a relatively cohesive core elite (Doner et al. 2005; Leftwich 2008a).662 
However, ‘developmental states’ are generally defined retrospectively in relation to 
outcomes, and whether or not Rwanda will ever qualify as one is not the issue 
here.663 The point is that certain conditions motivated a developmentalist 
orientation, which fed into a commitment to making the state effective. This 
distinction between populist and developmentalist political strategies is helpful with 
respect to the agency of leaders in each case and how they responded to 
circumstances. However, to understand effective implementation we need also to 
look beyond leaders’ agency, at the broader socio-economic context.  
 
State and society 
 
‘I am made of hard stuff that can stand up to anything lethal, like the state.’  
(Kampala Lord Mayor Erias Lukwago, August 2011)
664
 
 
 
In the main, assessing state capacity requires only studying the state. 
Understanding state effectiveness, however, necessitates attention to the social 
groups affected by particular policies and their relationships to state actors as they 
have evolved over time. Notwithstanding problems with the very idea of society 
(Mann 1984; Tilly 1984), we can explore the dynamics between state actors and 
particular ‘social forces’ (Migdal et al. 1994). The range and relative strength of 
social forces in each of the case studies is itself significant, especially given that 
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 This is not to say the elite is entirely cohesive; important factions do exist within the government 
that are often overlooked (Clark 2010a; 2010b).  
663
 Some authors have hinted at this (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011; Kelsall 2011). However, while 
the analysis presented in this study affirms both a developmentalist orientation in government and a 
relatively effective state, this does not guarantee developmental transition. The developmentalist 
orientation was accompanied by such strong concerns for security and control over political space 
that some aspects of development – not to mention political stability – might potentially be 
undermined. As such future ‘developmental state’ status is far from assured.  
664
 Cited in ‘I’m the true Kampala boss, says Lukwago’, The Observer, 14.08.11. 
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many particularly effective states in recent history emerged in contexts with 
relatively few powerful and independent socio-economic interests in society 
(Leftwich 2008a: 14). 
 
The discussion of transport associations in Chapter Six is particularly revealing in 
terms of state-society relations in Kampala. UTODA illustrates how a powerful non-
state organisation was able to seriously erode the effectiveness of the state in 
Kampala, and highlights a paradox that underscores the importance of 
distinguishing between state and government. Despite (or because of) the ‘double 
bind’ between UTODA and the NRM government – whereby politicians owned 
many matatus but the matatu organisation also had leverage over government due 
to its capacity for social mobilisation – many state organisations (especially KCC) 
were on the ‘low bargaining side’ in their dealings with UTODA. Similar dynamics 
were apparent in Chapter Four regarding the influence of property developers, and 
all the empirical chapters bear witness to the idea of ‘untouchable’ social groups in 
Kampala at both ends of the socio-economic spectrum. On this level, the Ugandan 
case appears to reflect the dynamics of ‘strong society, weak state’ described by 
Migdal (1988). As the above quote from Erias Lukwago indicates, politicians in 
power often even pitted themselves on the side of society vis-à-vis the state. 
 
Influential social forces were not entirely absent in Kigali; but those with the 
potential to have a serious impact on state effectiveness were limited to elites, and 
even these only did so in relation to certain fields of activity: namely property-
related taxation. Unlike in Kampala, elite social forces could not easily compromise 
state organisations regarding, for example, construction and land use regulations or 
efforts to reform urban transportation. The situation regarding local taxation was 
exceptional in that it demonstrated elite leverage beyond that which was 
channelled through the state. Here elite social forces stalled something already 
written into law; in most aspects of the Rwandan case this did not happen because 
elite interests were either synonymous with the state agenda (having fed directly 
into it), or were overridden by it.  The ‘glue’ that kept the state agenda tightly 
aligned with elite agendas most of the time was the RPF, a political organisation 
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with an elite monopoly. The power of RPF discipline meant that even when elites 
obstructed local tax policies it was through ‘passive resistance’665 without overt 
breaking of ranks, criticism or recriminations by state actors.  The bargaining power 
of social forces among the urban poor, meanwhile, has been shown by all the 
empirical chapters to be low in Kigali. Ordinary urban social groups rarely mobilised 
in ways beyond those circumscribed by the RPF/state, which had almost total 
dominance of processes of political and social organisation.666 
 
However, even in Kampala, where popular social organisation overtly independent 
of the state was much more prominent, state actors were in reality deeply 
implicated. The manipulative interference in boda-boda organisations and 
stimulation of division among market associations illustrates this. Circumspection is 
therefore required regarding the ‘strength’ of Kampala’s social forces in their own 
right; the NRM’s hand was usually evident, albeit in more complex and 
contradictory ways than the RPF’s in Kigali. Indeed, actively stoking social forces was 
part of the NRM government’s political strategy in response to the already 
fragmentary nature of urban society in religious, ethnic and party political terms. 
Creating a ‘minimum winning coalition’ in this diverse, divided society has been an 
enduring problem for Ugandan leaders since independence (Kasfir 1976, Lindemann 
2010; Tripp 2010). The way political bargaining evolved over time in Uganda, even 
within the NRM period, reflects a dialectical dynamic between organic social change 
and government strategies and tactics. Social and organisational fragmentation 
existed in a cumulative cycle of causation with populist interventions to manipulate 
and benefit from that fragmentation; an echo of Migdal’s observation that ‘a 
society fragmented in social control affects the character of the state, which, in 
turn, reinforces the fragmentation of the society’ (Migdal 2001: 93). Social forces 
therefore could not easily organise independently of the state, because government 
politicians – who constitute part of the state – were constantly manipulating them.  
                                                          
665
 Interview with taxation adviser B, 01.12.09. 
666
 Note that highlighting the dominant role of the state in social and political mobilisation is not the 
same as saying that Rwandan people actually lacked any agency within activities circumscribed by 
the state, a point made in Chapter Five and also in Goodfellow (2011), and which is also made 
forcefully in relation to gacaca courts by Clark (2010a). 
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Another way of thinking about differential relationships between state and society 
in the two cases relates to the dynamic between state and market. Uganda’s 
government allowed the market freer rein in Kampala as part of its political 
strategy; hence Museveni’s embracing of actors within the informal economy as a 
populist tactic, evident in Chapters Five to Seven. For example, a class of boda-boda 
drivers was initially cultivated as a ‘market-based’ solution to unemployment, also 
bringing them into Museveni’s fold as clients. Informal economic actors were 
empowered in ways that undermined state organisations and institutions designed 
to regulate and control them. State effectiveness was therefore sacrificed at the 
altar of informality, to the extent that it was increasingly difficult for the state to 
claw back control when efforts were made to do so. While the authorities in Kigali 
worked closely with the nascent private sector (for example in relation to urban 
transport), private actors were relatively heavily regulated and market forces kept 
within tight bounds. As an official who had worked for both KCC and CoK noted: ‘[In 
Kigali] the rules and regulations are followed because the players are less and 
weaker […] In Kampala individual players have more economic muscle […] there are 
more private interests influencing and manipulating government.’667 
 
Limiting the scope of social and private sector forces was both a way of facilitating 
swift implementation of a state-driven development agenda and keeping Rwanda 
safe for RPF rule. As the pre-eminent social division in Rwandan society was 
between Hutu and Tutsi, in post-genocide Rwanda the RPF was very wary of actively 
stoking social division in the manner favoured by the NRM. This accounts for the 
Rwandan’s preference for ‘façade democracy’ over ‘competitive authoritarianism’. 
The government’s desire to render society fully legible668 precluded the kinds of 
divisive social manipulation that Ugandan state actors engaged in for economic and 
political gain.  
 
 
 
                                                          
667
 Interview with director of parastatal organisation, 18.11.09. 
668
 In the sense used by Scott (1998). 
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Centralism and decentralisation  
 
‘We interfere very well.’ 
(Interview with Adolf Mwesigye, Ugandan Minister of Local government, 27.01.10) 
 
Related to the dynamics discussed above, central-local state relations and 
decentralisation itself also played very different roles in the two cases. As noted in 
Chapter Three, for the NRM decentralisation in rural areas functioned as means of 
retaining most of their power by relinquishing some of it; a classic political strategy 
noted by Prud’homme (1995). The proliferation of units of government increased 
scope for the state to be used as a disaggregated site of contestation, creating a 
safety valve. Yet in Kampala, too, which was not only extremely diverse but a site of 
strong support for the opposition, decentralisation fulfilled political functions by 
fragmenting the state even within the city limits. As earlier chapters demonstrated, 
the diversity of government agencies in Kampala enabled political actors to strike 
bargains with socio-economic groups ‘protecting’ them from other arms of the state 
in exchange for support. One state agency or actor would portray itself as a source 
of redress by tactically intervening when another could be painted as a source of 
grievance.  
 
In Rwanda, the previously highly centralised nature of the state was barely dented 
by its decentralisation programme, but this does not mean that decentralisation 
was inconsequential. In fact, the changes to formal governance structures described 
in Chapters Three and Seven had important implications, including for Kigali. 
Accountability ran predominantly in the upward direction through institutions such 
as imihigo performance contracts, limiting political devolution; yet the programme 
did deconcentrate important state functions and delegate major responsibilities. 
These changes likely rendered the state more effective and streamlined in certain 
ways. For example, the delegation of certain functions was clear and credible 
enough that a District Mayor, Claudine Nyiniwagaga, could stand up to a national 
minister on an issue of planning enforcement (see Chapter Four). Her accountability 
upwards to the City of Kigali and Ministry of Infrastructure was critical here; vertical 
lines of accountability guiding her actions through the decentralisation framework 
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were sufficiently institutionalised to overcome any ‘diagonal’ pressure to defer to 
the prime minister, who despite being far senior to her had no formal authority 
over urban development control. The decentralisation programme thus 
paradoxically helped strengthen vertical structures of centralism. Also significant is 
the fact that the CoK was effectively part of central government after 2006 (see 
Chapter Three), rendering it a site of centralised patronage through jobs for key 
cadres. 
 
Despite this difference between the two cases, it would be misleading to attribute 
the Ugandan state’s relative ineffectiveness to decentralisation itself. It was not 
decentralisation so much as the partial, compromised nature of it that obstructed 
effectiveness in Kampala so severely. This reflected a more general trend towards 
recentralisation in Uganda (Tumushabe et al. 2010; Lambright 2011). In Kampala, 
having created multiple state agencies, politicians in Uganda subsequently engaged 
in systematic weakening of them; a common strategy of political survival (Migdal 
2001: 83). The partial and politicised nature of decentralisation in Kampala meant 
that neither the local state’s upward accountability nor its downward accountability 
functioned effectively. In Kigali, upward accountability was streamlined but 
downward accountability limited. This rendered the state very effective in its 
regulatory and law-enforcing capacities, but may also account for why in matters 
requiring a higher level of responsiveness to local needs it was often less effective. 
The deficit of marketplaces accessible to the poor (Chapter Five) and transport 
options serving their needs (Chapter Six) illustrate this point.  
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
The above discussion presents a stylised analysis of some of the central reasons that 
the Rwandan state was more effective than the Uganda’s in relation to urban policy 
issues in 2000-2010. Differing forms of authoritarianism, embodied in 
developmentalist and populist strategies respectively, combined with urban social 
forces of varying strengths that were entangled with the state in different ways in 
the two cases. This caused differential instrumentalisation of central-local 
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intergovernmental relations. The task now is to abstract from this to achieve 
theoretical generalisation by looking more closely at particular causal mechanisms. 
In accordance with theory-guided process-tracing, causal processes are examined 
through the analytical prism presented previously in Chapter Two.  
 
8.2    Tracing the politics of effectiveness: five theoretical propositions revisited 
 
This section assesses the degree to which ‘causal processes observations’ (Mahoney 
2010: 124)  from the empirical chapters provide support for  the earlier theoretical 
propositions about state effectiveness. In looking at processes and mechanisms it 
posits deeper explanations about why the different political strategies noted in the 
previous section prevailed in each case.  Following Elster, however, it makes no 
pretence of being able to ‘formulate general-law-like regularities about human 
behaviour’, concentrating instead ‘on specifying small and medium-sized 
mechanisms for human action and interaction’ (Elster 1989: viii). 
 
There is little evidence that bureaucratic capacity as defined in this study played a 
major role in the divergence in effectiveness. Due to difficulties in measuring 
capacity in aggregate, it is difficult to determine the precise difference in capacity 
between the two cases in the period being researched. As noted in Chapter Three, 
Kigali’s city government had a slightly higher number of staff relative to the city 
population at the end of the decade. It also collected slightly more tax per capita in 
the late 2000s as described in Chapter Seven. However, the amount of tax collected 
is here considered an imperfect measure of capacity; as the previous chapter 
demonstrated, effective tax collection in these cases was as much about public 
compliance and the absence of political interference as bureaucratic capacity. In 
fact, in Kampala the state had the capacity to collect property taxes from over twice 
as many properties as it actually did after 2006. The bureaucratic foundations in 
terms of valuing and listing properties had been laid to a much greater extent than 
in Kigali, and if the local state had been allowed to collect to its full capacity, the tax 
take would probably also have been higher.  
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Moreover, a range of other indicators suggest the Ugandan state possessed greater 
capacity. As noted previously, Uganda had a much higher number of civil servants 
per capita for several decades leading up to the millennium (Mkandawire 2010) and 
superior education indicators for much of the decade 2000-2010. While Rwanda 
began to surpass Uganda on many educational indicators by the late 2000s, this 
happened too late to have an impact on bureaucratic competence in the period of 
consideration, and at this point should rather be thought of as an outcome of state 
effectiveness rather than a contributor to it. Another popular (though problematic) 
measure of state capacity is income per capita (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 
2005). On this count, Uganda remained consistently slightly ahead of Rwanda for 
the whole decade 2000-2010, both in terms of GDP per capita in constant US$ and 
GNI per capita (PPP).669  
 
Uganda also had a higher degree of institutional continuity through its many years 
of turmoil, as indicated in Chapter Three. More anecdotally, Kampala’s incoming 
City Director in 2011 described her ‘amazement’ at KCC’s technical capacities given 
how ineffectively they had been used,670 and other sources also affirm the high level 
of education of KCC staff (Stelman 2012: 14) and the much higher ‘intellectual 
competences and institutional potential’ in Uganda relative to Rwanda.671 This is 
not to deny that the local state in Kampala (and indeed the national state) suffered 
crippling deficits of capacity; it clearly did, and political interventions often 
exacerbated them.672 Despite this, however, on balance it seems that the capacity 
of the Rwandan state was probably even lower. Proposition one that states will be 
more effective at implementing policies and regulations the greater their 
bureaucratic capacity, is therefore not supported by the research into the policy 
issues in question.  
                                                          
669
 World Bank World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; accessed 
10.06.12. 
670
 Interview with Jennifer Musisi, NTV Uganda: 'Kampala CEO halts contracts', 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDSHn7Jh_4w, 27.05.11; accessed 11.03.12. 
671
 Interview with Andrew Mwenda, 20.01.10. 
672
 Earlier chapters showed how the politically-driven under-collection of tax reduced available 
resources for Kampala’s Divisions to hire planning and building inspection staff, which hindered 
capacity to deliver on those activities. In a reversal of the above point about Kigali, reduced capacity 
can therefore be seen as a consequence of state ineffectiveness as much as a cause of it.   
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Regarding autonomy, the political interventions impeding state effectiveness in 
Kampala could often be linked to the NRM’s deep entanglement with sectors such 
as matatus and boda-bodas since they first emerged, and more recently with 
market traders as well. NRM politicians actively sought to destabilise associational 
life among boda-bodas for political gain, most notably through the Kuboka debacle 
and the stirring up of resistance to KCC’s sticker tax scheme. These actions rendered 
KCC increasingly impotent in its efforts to bring some order to the sector later on. 
The drivers, like market vendors, were generally grateful for Museveni’s 
interventions, in which he portrayed KCC as the would-be regulator and himself as 
the heroic saviour from an intervening state. In this way the political arm of the 
state created expectations among various sectors that exacerbated the difficulties 
faced subsequently by the technical arm in terms of enforcement.  
 
In Kigali, the RPF was deeply involved in the same economic sectors, but in a very 
different way. It was more autonomous in that it did not pander to the complaints 
of market traders or taxi-moto drivers, for example; indeed it only loosened its 
outright ban on the latter because of its concerns for other interests (relative to 
which it was less autonomous) such as bankers and middle class commuters. Many 
of the incidents discussed in Chapter Four through which state agents in the two 
cities dealt with planning and illegal construction can also be seen as indicating 
relatively greater state autonomy vis-à-vis certain groups in Kigali than Kampala. 
Causal process observations throughout the thesis thus provide some support for 
proposition two, that states will be more effective at implementing particular 
policies and regulations the more autonomous they are vis-à-vis interest groups that 
may be negatively affected by those policies and regulations. However, autonomy 
relative to certain sectors does not equate to ‘state autonomy’ in its idealised form; 
property and rental taxation in Kigali starkly illustrate the lack of the Rwandan 
state’s autonomy vis-à-vis other groups. A second caveat is that if we accept the 
need to disaggregate the state – and research on Kampala especially shows how 
important this is – then different parts of the state may also have differing degrees 
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of autonomy from various groups. These complications render autonomy a concept 
with only limited analytical purchase.  
 
The issues of credibility and legitimacy can be clearly traced in the comparative 
narrative, and are closely linked. In Kampala, causal processes observed in all the 
empirical chapters indicate how important the low credibility of government 
commitments was in terms of inhibiting effective implementation. City officials 
lamented scarce resources and central government intervention, which meant they 
themselves did not believe policies would be implemented, something that fostered 
corruption and negligence. Meanwhile that very corruption and negligence was 
used to justify government interventions to overturn decisions and actions by other 
arms of the state,673 leading to a vicious cycle of low credibility and ineffectiveness. 
The more that politicians intervened and rendered regulations impotent, the more 
their legitimacy was bound to direct, populist engagement rather than state 
performance, and the less credible policy commitments were. In relation to local 
tax, for example, central government legitimacy in Uganda became associated with 
the active undermining of local tax policies. The dwindling credibility of policy and 
regulatory commitments meant that frontline state actors tasked with enforcing 
them would either turn a blind eye to contraventions or, during one the sporadic 
‘crackdowns’, merely take bribes and the release the culprits, knowing that 
politicians cared little about enforcement. 
 
In Rwanda, commitments on many urban regulatory issues were much more 
credible because the RPF government’s legitimacy hinged on providing security and 
order, such that it would only tolerate activities that contributed to socio-economic 
legibility rather than undermining it. This made issues concerning urban planning 
and development control credible priorities on security grounds. Because the RPA 
was composed of large numbers of (mostly Tutsi and foreign-born or raised) 
refugees, and it did not socially embed itself during wartime as many guerrilla 
movements (including the NRA) have done (Prunier 1983; Mamdani 2001; 
Mkandawire 2002; Kasfir 2005), it came to power with limited social legitimacy. The 
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 Interviews with Alice Muwanguzi, 25.09.09; Isa Gumonye, 08.10.09; Patrick Mutabwire, 12.02.09. 
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RPF’s primary source of legitimacy thus became halting the genocide and restoring 
order (Reyntjens 2004).674 As political space narrowed (Straus and Waldorf 2011), 
potentially undermining legitimacy in other ways, the seriousness of its vision for 
Rwanda’s development and continued security became even more central to its 
continuing legitimacy over time, further underlining the motivational credibility of 
policy commitments. Urban workers recognised that the regulation of the informal 
economy was about ‘solidarity and security’, noting that high levels of organisation 
were intended to ‘fight the thought’ of war and conflict; beliefs that positively 
impacted on their compliance.675 With compliance to rules increasingly the norm, 
any form of malpractice among government officials could cause them to lose their 
jobs or worse, leading them to take enforcement very seriously.676   
 
All this provides strong support for proposition three, that states will be more 
effective where government commitments are motivationally credible both to the 
social actors affected by them and the state officials supposed to implement them. It 
also supports proposition four, that states will be more effective where the sources 
of their legitimacy relate to state effectiveness itself, as opposed to clientelism or 
other bases of legitimacy. This proposition could even be expanded, invoking again 
the distinction between state and government, to say that when the government 
has relatively easy recourse to clientelism as a source of legitimacy (as in Uganda) it 
can withstand the declining legitimacy of the state that occurs when clientelism 
undermines state public goods provision. In contrast, when the government’s 
sources of legitimacy are highly tenuous (as in Rwanda) it has much stronger 
incentives to augment its legitimacy through making the state more effective (and 
thus more legitimate). These trajectories are to a considerable degree path 
dependent in the sense that they become self-reinforcing. 
 
                                                          
674
 Also arguably important to the state legitimacy has been the pursuit of justice and reconciliation 
through gacaca, though this is much more contested and controversial and may have fuelled 
resentment towards the state among some people while increasing legitimacy among others; see 
Clark 2010a). 
675
 Informal conversation with taxi-moto drivers, November-December 2009. 
676
 Various interviews with city officials, November-December 2009. 
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The fifth proposition about social power is also important, particularly because any 
discussion of state-society relations in Rwanda is incomplete without reference to 
its unusually hierarchical and centralised power relations. It is significant that there 
was very little protest and resistance from market traders, displaced evictees or 
taxi-moto or disadvantaged by regulation, in sharp contrast to the situation in 
Kampala. Whether or not there were high levels of ‘internal rebellion’ (Scott 1990) 
among these urban social groups, causal process observations from the Kigali case 
indicate higher levels of quasi-voluntary compliance. The long-standing practices of 
state-sponsored community activity in which the majority of the population 
partook, allowing for regular ‘sensitisation’ and local knowledge-sharing, played 
critical roles in affecting the overt responses of social actors to state policy.  
 
The point, therefore, is that not only coercive power was involved in generating 
compliance in Rwanda; indeed, ‘it is simply impossible for a state to achieve 
tractability by relying exclusively on its judges and jailers’ (Migdal 1997: 223). There 
is thus strong support for proposition five, that states will be more effective where 
they have a greater degree of infrastructural power.  It is not clear that this form of 
power was totally absent in Uganda. Some arms of the state reached fairly deeply 
into society in Kampala too, as demonstrated in the above section on state-society 
relations and evidenced, for example, in the way that both matatus and boda-bodas 
were used as tools for surveillance in the wake of civil war.677 However, the 
pervasive lack of knowledge among state actors about exactly what was going on in 
the marketplace or transport sectors at large contrasted sharply with Kigali, 
suggesting infrastructural power was considerably shallower. 
 
The foregoing analysis is not intended to suggest that any of these causal 
propositions are either necessary or sufficient in and of themselves. A feature of 
qualitative research into causal mechanisms is that it can highlight ways in which a 
cause ‘works together in combination with other causes to produce an outcome’ 
(Mahoney 2008: 418). Figures 8.1a and 8.1b illustrate some of the dynamics of 
interaction between these causal propositions. An explanation of the high level of 
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 Interview with former local politician, 29.09.09. 
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effectiveness in Kigali that focused, for example, on either historical power 
dynamics or RPF sources of legitimacy alone would be partial and unable to account 
fully for the causal mechanisms observed. Process-tracing of the kind undertaken in 
this study thus facilitates not only the exploration of multiple paths of causality but 
also the feedback loops and path dependencies at play in the causal process (Büthe 
2002; Falleti 2006). 
 
Figure 8.1a: The interplay of causal mechanisms in Kampala  
  
 
Figure 8.1b: The interplay of causal mechanisms in Kigali  
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Too much attention has been given to bureaucratic capacity in most approaches to 
state effectiveness, at the expense of political factors and state-society dynamics. 
Many ‘capacity-building’ efforts in developing countries are failing to produce 
results, not only because of failures to address organisational dynamics and 
incentives within state agencies (Therkildsen and Tidemand 2007; Crook 2010) but 
also because of wider political factors that undermine effectiveness even as 
particular capacities are being built. This section has highlighted the importance of a 
government’s ability and motivation to draw on particular political resources 
(Thomas and Grindle 1990), as well as the incentives for social actors to comply with 
regulations and state functionaries to enforce them. Particularly relevant are 
sources of government legitimacy as they evolve over time, and how these interact 
with policy credibility and infrastructural power to influence the behaviour of state 
and non-state actors alike. The variation in all these factors shapes the nature of the 
political bargaining environment in which agents act. The next section abstracts 
further from the case material to discuss how political bargaining, conditioned by 
these factors, impacts on institutional development.  
 
8.3    Political bargaining, intervention and institutional congruence 
 
The analysis in the preceding sections suggests that whether policies and 
regulations were implemented and enforced depended to a large degree on the 
nature of the explicit pacts and unspoken, implicit understandings between 
politicians and other social actors, including bureaucrats, economic elites and urban 
informal workers. In other words, the nature of political bargaining was central to 
the degree of effectiveness. As Chapter Two indicated, bargaining in the literal 
sense is difficult to observe. In this thesis the idea of bargaining has therefore been 
operationalised through the proxy of observable interventions by political agents 
the interaction between these and the responses of social actors in terms of 
compliance, negotiation and resistance. This section highlights one of the most 
important mechanisms through which such bargaining impacted on state 
effectiveness: the extent to which it furthered institutional congruence (made 
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formal and informal institutions accord with rather than contradict one another). 
Reframing the main findings of the thesis in this way helps further to distil their 
generalisable theoretical implications. 
 
As noted in Chapter Two, institutional theory has explicitly highlighted the 
importance of informal norms for backing up laws and regulations to make them 
effective (Hodgson 2006; Khan 2010). What this thesis contributes is some potential 
reasons as to why relative convergence or divergence between formal and informal 
institutions occurs. Khan notes that informal institutions are essential in developing 
countries because they are ‘the only feasible mechanism for sustaining economic 
benefits for powerful groups who would otherwise have lost out’ (Khan 2010: 26). 
This, however, does not explain why in some contexts there is a great effort on the 
part of elites to shape formal and informal rules to be more congruent with one 
another and thereby bring benefits they reap from informal institutions within the 
purview of the formal ones; something that (whether deliberately or as a side-
effect) renders the state more effective.  
 
The question of institutional congruence has been implicit throughout. The NRM 
and RPF were both eminently successful political organisations, and both had 
interests bound up in the major urban sectors of property, trade and transport. Yet 
the success of the NRM in terms of achieving and maintaining political domination 
was consistently achieved through informal institutions and bargaining at the 
expense of state effectiveness.  Meanwhile in Rwanda, the RPF achieved its ends 
largely by making the formal institutions of the state more effective through 
informal supports. Why these strategies so substantially differed boils in large part 
down to underlying political priorities. As Leftwich notes, the more that informal 
institutional arrangements, values and norms complement and merge with formal 
ones, ‘the more stable, consistent and predictable the politics are likely to be’ 
(Leftwich 2008a: 8). The degree to which consistency and predictability were valued 
by elites is therefore critical.  
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A few examples from the empirical chapters illustrate this. Chapter Four showed 
how despite its very strong legal status, organisations such as Uganda’s 
environmental regulator NEMA were impotent due to collusion between economic 
and political elites. The net result was that ‘men with guns’ were employed in 
support of informal rules against formal ones, with the latter serving more as tools 
for leveraging bribes than guiding principles for behaviour. In Kigali, where elite 
interests in urban development projects were equally pronounced, REMA was used 
for intervening to enforce formal rules that were layered onto existing informal 
power relations. Empowering REMA played into the RPF’s broader agenda of 
legibility, control of urban space and international environmental credibility, the net 
benefits of which outweighed regulatory cost to individual elites. Elevating informal 
institutions above the formal ones in relation to land use may well have created 
ample opportunities for individual enrichment, as in Kampala; yet it also involved a 
degree of risk not palatable to the government. The risk of formal rules losing their 
credibility was considered to be very serious in Kigali. The Gasabo District Mayor’s 
assertion of the importance of not creating precedent for the application of building 
permits after illegal construction had already begun was typical of how the RPF 
sought to limit the power of informal institutions to usurp formal ones through fait 
accompli.  
 
Even when political intervention appeared rather similar on the surface in the two 
cities, different processes were actually at play. For example, ‘spies’ and state 
security agents were pervasive in the transport sectors in both cities, yet this 
resulted in opposite outcomes in terms of institutional congruence. Again this 
relates to differences in the deeper purpose of intervention in those sectors. Both 
governments sought to manipulate social groups to maintain control (as 
governments generally do). However, the overriding priority of the Rwandan 
government was to securitise contemporary Kigali and to know it in great detail, 
knowledge being critical to its infrastructural power; thus the engagement of 
security agents was geared towards these ends, which were well-matched with 
formal institutions of regulation. In Kampala, the greater priority was to maintain 
clientelistic relationships and render impotent a city government dominated by the 
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opposition; ‘spies’ were thus used to destabilise and mobilise as much as ‘know’ 
and securitise. This resulted in informal norms of state-society engagement in 
Kampala that undermined the formal ones.   Activating the formal rules sporadically 
through ‘crackdowns’ in Kampala caused further social instability, an outcome to 
which the RPF was highly averse.  
 
Even if the Ugandan government were similarly motivated to bring informal 
institutions in line with formal ones – and at times, there were indications of 
increased commitment to do so678 - this was rendered very difficult because of the 
path-dependent or institutionally ‘sticky’ nature of established practices. In Kigali 
social mechanisms informally incentivised compliance to formal rules, while in 
Kampala they did the opposite, with political interactions that contradicted state 
policy having become ‘like a tradition’.679 Drawing on the analysis in section 8.2, we 
can summarise this point about institutional congruence as follows: the Rwandan 
government had the motivation to match informal with formal institutions because 
of its particular sources of legitimacy and its need for commitments to appear 
motivationally credible, and it had the ability to do so because of deeper 
infrastructural power and greater autonomy relative to key sectors of society.680 
These factors together meant the government could and did conceive of the 
institutional system in its entirety – including how formal and informal rules relate – 
as a target for major streamlining and consolidation.  
 
This analysis highlights the inadequacy of efforts to capture the ‘level of 
institutionalisation’ in a given context without due attention to both formal and 
informal institutions, and builds on the work of Helmke and Levitsky (2004) in 
investigating the relative congruence or disjuncture between the two. Huntington 
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 This was particularly evident in 2011-12, after the main period of research was completed. See 
epilogue.  
679
 Interview with local politician, 06.01.10. 
680
 Ironically, some of these same factors meant that regarding policies on government 
responsiveness (e.g. in relation to aspects of the decentralisation programme), formal-informal 
institutional congruence was relatively low: ingrained informal norms of behaviour predicated on 
upward accountability militated against such policies rather than supporting them.  However, as 
noted in Chapter Two (footnote 27), policies pertaining to responsiveness are a distinct category 
requiring separate analysis.  
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(1968) argued that societies were more institutionalised the more their 
organisations were a) adaptable (versus rigid); b) complex (versus simple); c) 
autonomous (versus subordinate to other interest groups) and d) coherent (versus 
disunified). This, however, does not adequately capture the critical difference 
between state organisation in Uganda and Rwanda; the former is arguably more 
adaptable and complex, while the latter is more autonomous and coherent. Thus 
while on balance these two cases might score about equally in terms of some 
aggregate level of institutionalisation, conventional approaches tell us little about 
the type of institutionalisation and the interaction between formal and informal, 
which is critical for state effectiveness.  
 
In concluding this section it is important to note that the observed differences 
between the two cases were inevitably limited to particular fields of activity, with 
an emphasis on implementing laws, collecting taxes and enforcing regulations 
relating to urban spatial development and economic activity. This thesis has not 
provided evidence of the relative effectiveness of these two states in other spheres 
of policy. There is, however, reason to believe that in relation to certain other 
aspects of development similar divergences between the two countries are evident, 
including in rural areas – and for broadly similar reasons. In particular, work on both 
maternal health (Chambers 2012; ODI 2012) and access to safe water provision 
(Golooba-Mutebi 2012) hints at similar causal factors to those raised in this thesis 
by highlighting the importance of policy coherence and ‘institutional resources’ in 
accounting for relative success in Rwanda. As such, it seems likely that the 
theoretical insights from this study regarding the drivers of state effectiveness in 
Rwanda apply well beyond the sectors studied empirically here. 
 
8.4
 
   Implications for the urban challenge in Africa  
 
As noted at the start of this chapter, this thesis has not only been a comparison of 
states but of cities. These two units are not mutually exclusive; states exist at 
multiple scales, with the city scale was particularly pertinent to the divergence 
explored. Moreover, by considering state effectiveness in relation to concrete issues 
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with local ramifications, this approach has enabled consideration of the interaction 
between different tiers of the state as well as between the political and 
bureaucratic arms of the state. Refocusing now on the city as a socio-economic and 
political space, this section addresses the question of what this thesis contributes to 
the study of cities in the developing world and explains why the issues it raises are 
so important for Africa in particular. 
 
When studying the relationship between states and capital cities in the developing 
world, certain reigning assumptions need to be overcome. Migdal, for example, 
asserts that that studying local politics is important because at the local level ‘a web 
of unexpected state-society relations results – unexpected, at least, for those who 
have observed only the politics of the capital city’ (Migdal 2001: 89). This betrays a 
misguided assumption that capital cities are necessarily places in which state-
society relations are straightforward. It also misses the point that the capital city is 
itself a local place. The tendency to conflate the capital city and the national is 
unsurprising given that capitals are often seen to ‘contain’ sovereignty; and as this 
thesis has shown, it is difficult to disentangle national and urban-level political 
bargaining in these contexts. However, this does not mean that the city should be 
disregarded as a locale. The fact that capital cities are central to national politics 
means we should be all the more concerned with local and meso-level dynamics 
within them, which are as full of unexpected state-society dynamics as rural areas 
(if not more so). These are important not only in terms of how they rebound back 
into national politics, but because cities are spaces in which people live and work 
that merit analysis in their own right as much as anywhere else – especially given 
urbanisation and rapid urban growth.   
 
There is therefore a need to devote more attention not only to how cities function 
in particular states, but how states function in cities, especially now that the world 
is predominantly urban. The tipping point into a majority urban world is thought to 
have occurred in 2007 (Beall and Fox 2009), and while Africa is still the most rural 
continent, this is changing and the continent faces huge demographic challenges 
that will primarily impact on cities (Dyson 2010). Debates persist over the exact 
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pace of Africa’s urbanisation (Potts 2009; Fox 2012; Potts 2012), but there is little 
doubt that urban growth – the increase in absolute numbers of people living in 
cities and towns – is proceeding extraordinarily fast on the continent (Fox 2012) and 
nowhere more so than in East Africa (UNPD 2009; UN-HABITAT 2011). In the 
context of widespread poverty, little industry or formal sector work, and the 
proliferation of slums across the continent (Davis 2006, Pieterse 2008; Beall and Fox 
2009), this poses profound challenges for government and state-society relations, 
which are under ever-increasing strain. Concerns about rising urban violence, 
whether in the form of crime, violent protest or other forms of ‘civic conflict’, are 
justified against this backdrop (Beall and Fox 2011; Beall et al. 2011; Fox and 
Hoelscher 2012). All these developments render the urban question, and the role of 
the state in engaging with it, a critical contemporary development issue.  
 
Yet as Chapter One highlighted, there has been something of a political deficit in the 
study of cities in developing countries. Approaches to ‘urban governance’ have 
often assumed depoliticised co-operation in the interests of service delivery, while 
community-based approaches focused on participation tend to romanticise 
community relations and under-theorise conflict and power (Cleaver 2001). Some of 
the more politically-engaged literature on city futures is taking important steps in 
rethinking approaches to the deepening of democracy in cities, and there has been 
a refocusing on the state as a site of struggle for democratic access (Appadurai 
2001; Fung and Wright 2003b; Pieterse 2008). However, much of the urbanist 
literature is still characterised by debates between pro and anti-‘neoliberal’ 
approaches focused on whether to have more or less government at the expense of 
analysis of the outcomes of different forms of government involvement (Parnell and 
Robinson 2013 forthcoming). 
 
Other dominant discourses in contemporary urban theory, centring on normative 
propositions around the ‘right to the city’ and the ‘good city’ (Harvey 2003; Amin 
2006), are problematised by the research and analysis presented in this thesis. 
Kigali, for example, is a city in which improvements to services and many aspects of 
state performance have not necessarily been accompanied by the enhancement of 
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rights and broadened access to the state (or indeed the city). Its experience is 
important and yields both positive and negative lessons, but cannot be comfortably 
accommodated by the dominant perspectives on urban development. Significant 
too is the experience of Kampala, where access to the state and participation in 
urban governance has been considerably greater but has largely occurred through 
informal mechanisms. The most significant forms of participation in politics were 
largely ‘parallel’ in nature, whether through rioting in marketplaces to win 
concessions or pleading directly to the President. Despite helping some groups 
protect their livelihoods, there has been little to show by way of improved urban 
services or progress towards ‘the good city’ as a consequence of these 
engagements.  
 
Some urban theorists now acknowledge that ‘it may be the limits to state capacity 
that provide the most fruitful opportunities for understanding poverty and 
inequality in Southern cities’ (Parnell and Robinson 2013 forthcoming: 18). This 
thesis pushes forward on this agenda, not least by highlighting ways in which the 
limits to state effectiveness extend far beyond limits to capacity and need to be 
understood from state-society relations rather than narrowly statist perspective. It 
is not satisfactory that those concerned with urban rights and participation focus on 
community and society, while those concerned with states reify their capacities and 
treat them as disconnected from societal dynamics. Neither state effectiveness nor 
normative visions for city futures can fully be understood without an understanding 
of the ways in which the state and social forces are entangled. The challenge from 
an academic/theoretical perspective is to better integrate insights on the state with 
insights on urban social forces, and to innovate methodologically and theoretically 
in order to better understand and address dilemmas of an increasingly urban future 
in the developing world.  
 
As well as aiming to further this end, this study has hopefully made three more 
specific contributions to urban scholarship. The first is to issue a reminder that 
asserting the ‘right to the city’ could be counter-productive without a sound 
analysis of the actually existing politics of the city. It was politics and not rights that 
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guided urban development in the cities studied here. Even if a politics of rights is to 
develop and exert influence in cities in Africa, this needs to be understood in 
relation to a city’s existing politics of interests; its political economy. Without 
understanding the latter we cannot fully grasp the meaning or assess the likely 
consequences of the former in a given context. Second, this study should serve to 
highlight the importance of a multi-scalar approach to studying urban politics in 
developing countries. As Purcell (2006) has argued, the focus on the ‘right to the 
city’ and much scholarship on urban democracy and urban citizenship has been 
vulnerable to the ‘local trap’, going too far in privileging the local scale at the 
expense of others. As is very clear from this study, with respect to capital or ‘core’ 
cities at least, the direct engagements of other tiers of government in the city are of 
enormous consequence even when many functions are decentralised.  
 
Finally, this thesis emphasises that understanding the politics of cities in the least 
developed parts of the world cannot be achieved through theoretical models of 
urban politics that evolved from studying cities in the already developed world. This 
is basically all that conventional political science has to offer: urban political science 
tends to assume both relatively independent and formally institutionalised 
organisations in civil society and relatively self-contained spheres of politics at the 
urban scale – precisely what this study has shown to be lacking in the African cities 
in question. Meanwhile, the Development Studies literature has all too often 
associated the urban with the national, the formal, and the elite, rather than 
framing it as an important space of socio-political development in its own right. 
Instead of ‘urban regime theory’, then, what is needed is urban political bargaining 
analysis that disaggregates the state and systematically analyses the linkages 
between popular and elite social forces and different elements of the state. This 
requires explicit attention to both formal and informal institutions, the degree to 
which these overlap and the processes through which they are acted on and 
reconstituted. Only with an understanding of these can we engage with questions 
about the likely outcome of policies, plans, and broader normative agendas in a 
given urban context.  
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A final word and avenues for future research 
 
The finding that differential effectiveness in addressing certain urban challenges has 
relatively little to do with state capacity throws up challenges for development 
theory and policy. Above all, the analysis presented here suggests that 
understanding the capability of states to cope with present and impending urban 
growth will require attention to far more than qualities endogenous to the state 
itself. It necessitates paying close attention to the political resources available to 
governments and the incentives for enforcement and compliance affecting state 
actors and urban social groups respectively. Moreover, only by understanding 
processes of bargaining between social forces and a disaggregated state, and how 
these impact upon institutional congruence, can we predict the likely outcome of 
attempts to implement policies, laws or regulations in the dense institutional and 
organisational environment of major cities. This merits emphasis because the belief 
that getting the policies or (formal) institutions right will spur developmental 
progress pervades development practice and, in some cases, development theory. 
This misguided assumption is not affordable given the scale of the challenges 
involved.  
 
Governing the process of urban growth in Africa is surely desirable given the 
consequences of decades of ‘laissez-faire’ urbanisation. However, neither case 
study examined here provides a model for how to do this in a way that mitigates 
the worst externalities of rapid urban growth while also effectively providing for 
sustainable urban livelihoods at scale. Moreover, neither provided particularly 
positive examples of political processes that allowed for demands to be made on 
the state through effective formal channels. Much more research is therefore 
needed to reveal the conditions under which the realisation of a broader range of 
normative urban goods is possible. Two broad avenues for further research are 
suggested below.  
 
The first would involve research into the conditions under which states are effective 
regarding a broader range of urban development objectives than it has been 
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possible to explore here. Some particular aspects of this agenda could build directly 
on this project; for example, the analysis of cases in which urban property-related 
taxes are effectively collected and urban tax regimes are relatively progressive 
would be extremely valuable. Cases where the urban informal economy has been 
formalised in ways that have demonstrably created sustainable employment 
opportunities and lifted urban-dwellers out of poverty also merit further research. 
Building on the wealth of scholarship on effective industrialisation in recent decades 
in other parts of the developing world, research is required into contemporary 
developing countries where, despite the constraints of twenty-first century 
globalisation, formal sector jobs have been created in ways that effectively absorb 
burgeoning urban populations. In addition to these issues, differential state 
effectiveness in the provision of health and education services in major cities would 
be extremely valuable. 
 
A second avenue would involve complementing research on the politics of state 
effectiveness, such as that contained here, with research on the politics of state 
responsiveness. As noted several times in the thesis, these are distinct normative 
goods, both of which are required for building states that not only can but do 
deliver developmental outcomes that reach broad populations. Understanding the 
relationship between effectiveness on the one hand, and responsiveness and 
accountability on the other is itself a valuable object of inquiry. More research is 
needed on cases where the effective delivery of key urban public goods has actually 
been an outcome of responsiveness to social forces channelled through 
accountable formal institutions. The Kigali case here has demonstrated that 
effectiveness without much responsiveness and downward accountability is 
achievable in relation to a range of goals in specified time periods when the political 
conditions are right. However, there is no guarantee under these conditions that 
states will become the all-round developmental organisations needed to meet the 
urban challenge in its entirety. Future research therefore needs to investigate the 
political conditions under which states in contemporary African cities become 
responsive and effective simultaneously.  
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Epilogue: December 2011
681
 
 
Kampala has reached a turning point of sorts. The passing of the Kampala Capital 
City Act at the end of 2010 means that central government intervention in the city is 
no longer sporadic and informal; the city government has been thoroughly 
recentralised. Museveni, who won a fifth term in February 2011, has appointed an 
Executive Director for Kampala – Jennifer Musisi – who is accountable directly to 
him and wields far more power than Erias Lukwago, the new Lord Mayor. Transfers 
to the city government for roads have more or less doubled; street lights have been 
installed in parts of the city. Moreover, Musisi has instituted a ban on street 
vendors in the CBD, and several buildings in contravention of regulations have been 
demolished. In early December 2011, Musisi and her team took a trip to Kigali, 
where I accompanied them on a city tour organised by their Rwandan counterparts. 
Back in Kampala the following week, she is reflecting on the importance of 
sensitisation.  
 
Musisi’s achievements thus far represent the easy part. UTODA remains 
unassailable, and the latest attempt to terminate its contract to run the taxi parks 
has resulted in a court process running at three months, with no end in sight. As a 
consequence of her efforts to rein in the organisation, Musisi has received death 
threats. Moreover, although in May 2010 a $33 million contract was signed to bring 
in 522 buses from China and transform the entire public transport system, just 
months before they were to arrive the Ugandan Parliament stopped the deal on the 
grounds that ‘there was a fault within the procurement procedure’. Boda-bodas 
remain beyond the state’s formal purview; the marketplace wrangles continue. 
Musisi is locked in a constant political battle with Lukwago, who claims to be 
marginalised in unconstitutional ways, while she claims that she is empowered to 
act without the support of politicians, and largely disregards them. ‘We need to 
establish the credibility of the institution’, Musisi says of the new Kampala Capital 
City Authority; ‘without credibility, we can have no enforcement’. Nevertheless, the 
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 This is based primarily on a return trip to the two cities in December 2011. 
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confusion and overlapping of roles at city level is widely considered as being even 
worse than before.   
 
There are also new problems impeding policy implementation. The clampdown on 
corruption under Musisi has heightened concerns to follow legal procedures, 
particularly regarding procurement, but the laws are so complex and opaque that it 
takes months to even acquire basic materials needed to address crucial 
infrastructure problems, much to her own frustration. Thus, while the relative 
power of city politicians vis-à-vis bureaucrats has substantially diminished, a new 
layer of obstacles has been exposed in terms of arduous legal procedures and 
blurred accountability. Museveni is supportive of Musisi ‘but there is only so much 
he can do – once something gets into the system, the system stalls it in various 
ways.’ Meanwhile politicians are quarrelling ever more fiercely with the technical 
staff who now increasingly appear to be their masters.682 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
In Kigali, the finishing touches to infrastructure for the new CBD on the former site 
of Ubumwe slum, now laced with asphalt roads and dotted with roundabouts, are 
being put in place as Musisi and her team survey the site with envy.  Urban planning 
and development control are being taken as seriously as ever; the CoK planning 
office has considerably expanded. The transition to a more modern bus transport is 
proceeding effectively, with numbers of private buses having substantially 
increased; taxi-motos remain tightly-regulated as ever, a new rule about having to 
wear ‘hygeine-friendly helmets’ being added to their list of regulations in 2011.  
 
The future remains uncertain. As yet, nothing new has actually been built in the 
new CBD; the plots have all allegedly been sold, but different sources provide 
diverging responses regarding how much investment is actually forthcoming. 
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 Sources include: interview with Jennifer Musisi, Executive Director of Kampala Capital City 
Authority, 12.12.11; interview with Dr. Ian Clarke, Makindye Division Chairman, 12.12.11; interview 
with Erias Lukwago, Lord Mayor of Kampala, 15.12.11; The Independent 05.04.11; Daily Monitor 
22.08.11. 
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Indeed, concern about investment – the word on which so much government 
strategy depends – hangs in the air in Kigali. Many expatriates left around the time 
of 2010’s controversial elections, uncomfortable with the suppression of 
opposition, and have not returned. While most were NGO and donor agency 
workers, fewer wealthy expatriates means less demand for the kinds of goods and 
services many investors were providing in Kigali. The financial crisis and flight of 
Libyan investment has also taken its toll, and some sources say that a number of 
restaurants and hotels have closed. Foreigners seeking to invest frequently express 
annoyance that domestic investors are given preferential treatment over foreign 
ones in reality, despite the many incentives the government is promoting to attract 
international investment. Some are losing patience with the mixed messages they 
receive from state authorities. Construction is still booming, but the fact that the 
only major projects are fuelled by a few key domestic elites is increasingly apparent.  
 
Meanwhile, decentralisation is proceeding into its third phase, and retains its 
paradoxical centralising overtones. Various responsibilities are being pushed down 
to the sector level, but revenue inspection and administration are moving up from 
District level to that of the City, virtually an arm of central government. Officials 
speak of the 'decentralisation of sensitisation’. There was no sign of any weakening 
of resolve on issues such as land tenure regularisation, which is proceeding apace, 
and urban environmental protection. Property taxation remains on the agenda – 
but has progressed no further. ‘We see it as one of many taxes’, notes the new 
Mayor Ndayisaba, adding: ‘but we don’t want to tax our people to death!’. In all, 
the contradictions and tensions underpinning a mostly effective state in its 
engagement with urban issues are more palpable than ever.683  
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 Sources include: interviews with RDB official and local revenue official, 06.12.11; interviews with 
residents and foreign investors, 04-10.12.11; observation and conversations during official city tour; 
conversation with Mayor Ndayisaba, 07.12.11. 
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Appendix 1: Complete interview list 
 
Note that some interviewees have been anonymised. A list with the actual names of all 
interviewees will be provided at the thesis examination for verification. In the thesis text 
itself, the interviewee descriptors given below are used for the anonymised interviewees.  
 
For interviewees that have not been anonymised, the name and full job descriptions are 
used in the thesis text only the first time a source is cited. Thereafter, just the name and 
date are used.  
 
Interviews are listed in chronological order, first for Kampala, and then for Kigali. All 
interviews took place in the two cities.  
 
A: KAMPALA 
 
Initial exploratory trip, January-February 2009: 
 
No. Interviewee Job title Date 
1 
Dr Assumpta Nagenda-
Musana 
Lecture in Architecture/Urban 
Planning 02/02/09 
2 Jens-Peter Dyrbak Governance Adviser, DFID 03/02/09 
3 
Independent planning 
consultant   04/02/09 
4 Savio Carvalho Country Director, Oxfam Uganda 04/02/09 
5 Richard Kabuuka Principal Economist, KCC 05/02/09 
6 
Land expert/civil society 
representative   05/02/09 
7 Local government official   06/02/09 
8 Adam Babale 
Director, Local Government Finance 
Commission 06/02/09 
9 Dr. Shuaib Lwasa 
Lead researcher on Kampala Focus 
Cities project  10/02/09 
10 John Bihangana 
Head of Uganda Urban Local 
Authorities Association 10/02/09 
11 Dr Stephen Mukiibi 
Head of Architecture/Urban Planning 
Department 10/02/09 
12 Town planner   11/02/09 
13 Ex-planning official   11/02/09 
14 Frederick Omolo-Okalebo 
PhD student researching history of 
urban planning in Kampala  11/02/09 
15 Gordon Mwesigye 
Former Town Clerk (now official at 
Uganda Human Rights Commission) 11/02/09 
16 Florence Namayanja Kampala Deputy Mayor 12/02/09 
17 Patrick Mutabwire Commissioner, Local Government 12/02/09 
18 Urban Tibamanya Minister for Urban Development 13/02/09 
19 David Mpanga 
Buganda Minister for Research (and 
Lawyer) 13/02/09 
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Interviews between September 2009 and January 2010: 
 
No. Interviewee Job title Date 
20 
Independent planning 
consultant   18/09/09 
21 Bonnie Nsambu Transport Engineer, KCC 21/09/09 
22 Musujja Bakka Head of Finance, KCC 22/09/09 
23 Local official 22/09/09 
24 Sabiti Makara Lecturer in Political Science  23/09/09 
25 Adam Babale 
Principal Economist, Local Govt 
Finance Commission 24/09/09 
26 Abraham Byandala 
MP (NRM) who sits on Works 
Committee, and former City Engineer 24/09/09 
27 Alice Muwanguzi 
Resident District Commissioner, 
Kampala District  25/09/09 
28 
Ugandan transport 
Consultant   25/09/09 
29 Richard Bamwira Revenue Officer, Central Division 28/09/09 
30 Godfrey Nyaakana Chairman, Central Division (NRM) 28/09/09 
31 Former local politician  29/09/09 
32 Boda-boda driver A   
33 
Chairman of a civic 
organisation   30/09/09 
34 Mr Ndyomugyeni 
Chairman, UTODA (matatu 
association) 30/09/09 
35 UTODA Security Officer 30/09/09 
36 Local official 01/10/09 
37 
Boda-boda Chairman for 
Kawempe Division   01/10/09 
38 Planning official   05/10/09 
39 
Titus Odongiu/ Godfrey 
Owor 
Trade development officers, Central 
Division 05/10/09 
40 Florence Namayanja Deputy Mayor 06/10/09 
41 NAFEBO Chairman 
Chairman, NAFEBO (Boda-boda 
association)  06/10/09 
42 
Public Relations Officer, 
NAFEBO 06/10/09 
43 Building inspector   07/10/09 
44 Isa Gumonye 
Principal Urban Officer, Ministry of 
Local Government 08/10/09 
45 Erias Lukwago 
MP, Kampala Central Division (DP), 
and legal advisor to DP 12/10/09 
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46 Physical planning official   13/10/09 
47 Hussein Kyanjo MP for Makindye Division (DP) 13/10/09 
48 Patrick Kayongo 
Chairman, Owino Market Association 
(SLOA) 13/10/09 
49 David Mpanga 
Buganda Minister for Research and 
Lawyer 13/10/09 
50 Nabilah Sempala 
Woman MP, Kampala (Forum for 
Democratic Change) 13/10/09 
51 Boda-boda driver B 14/10/09 
52 Savino Katsigaire 
Director of Physical Planning and 
Urban Development 14/10/09 
53 Henry Kizito Property Tax, Central Division 15/10/09 
54 Tony Kyeemba Economist, Kawempe Division 15/10/09 
55 Grace Binaisa Head of revenue, Kawempe Division 15/10/09 
56 Nasser Sebaggala Mayor of Kampala 15/10/09 
57 
Vincent Katungi and 
Godfrey Kisseka City Law officers, KCC 16/10/09 
58 Balaam Muheebwa 
Acting Commissioner for Domestic 
Taxes, URA 04/01/10 
59 Beti Kamya 
MP, Rubaga North and Founder, 
Uganda Federal Alliance 05/01/10 
60 Local finance official B   05/01/10 
61 Local politician 06/01/10 
62 Vincent Katungi Principal City Law Officer 07/01/10 
63 
Aidiah Kivimbi and 
Godfrey Owor 
Trade Development Officers (KCC and 
Central) 07/01/10 
64 
Kampala bus company 
(A) director   07/01/10 
65 Aisha Kabira Land Registration Officer 08/01/10 
66 Property valuer A   11/01/10 
67 Betty Nambooze 
Spokesperson, Democratic Party, and 
Minister for Civic Education, Buganda 
Kingdom 12/01/10 
68 Vendors at Owino market 13/01/10 
69 Latif Ssebaggala MP, Kawempe North (DP) 13/01/10 
70 local finance official A   13/01/10 
71 Property valuer B   14/01/10 
72 
Haji Nasser Kibirige 
Takuba Chairman, Kawempe Division (DP) 15/01/10 
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73 Sarah Kulatwa Basangwa 
Acting Commisioner for Land 
Registration 18/01/10 
74 Kisekka market vendors   18/01/10 
75 Joseph Kanyonyore Principal Land Officer, KCC 19/01/10 
76 Building inspector 19/01/10 
77 Andrew Mwenda 
Journalist and Editor, Indpendent 
Magazine 20/01/10 
78 Savino Katsigaire 
Director of Physical Planning and 
Urban development 20/01/10 
79 
Kampala bus company (B) 
director   21/01/10 
80 
Christina Kakeeto and 
Humphrey Ichumar  
Real Estate investment, National 
Social Security Foundation 21/01/10 
81 Esau KCC property valuer 21/01/10 
82 Robert Opiyo Registrar of Land Titles, KCC 22/01/10 
83 Local finance official A   22/01/10 
84 Adrine Namara District Labour Officer 25/01/10 
85 Local finance official C   25/01/10 
86 David Tamale Kiggundu 
Project Co-ordinator, Kampala 
Institutional and Infrastructure 
Development Program 27/01/10 
87 Adolf Mwesigye Minister of Local Government (NRM) 27/01/10 
88 Judge 27/01/10 
89 Vincent Byandaimira 
Commissioner, Land Use Regulation 
and Compliance 28/01/10 
 
In addition to the above interviews, I conducted around 25 informal conversations with 
boda-boda drivers, whose names I did not take and I do not identify individually. These 
were generally around 5-10 minutes in length. 
 
 
Interviews on return trip in December 2011: 
 
No. Interviewee Job title Date 
90 Taxi driver   11/12/11 
91 Ian Clarke 
Chairman of Makindye Division 
(Independent) 12/12/11 
92 Jennifer Musisi 
Executive Director, Kampala Capital 
City Authority 12/12/11 
93 Dan Kyambadde 
Director of Treasury, Kampala Capital 
City Authority 13/12/11 
94 Raphael Magyezi MP (NRM) 14/12/11 
95 Charles Peter Mayiga 
Lawyer and Buganda Minister of 
Information 14/12/11 
96 George Agaba 
Director, Physical Planning, Kampala 
Capital City Authority 14/12/11 
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97 
Independent planning 
consultant   14/12/11 
98 Ken Lukyamuzi 
MP and President of the Conservative 
Party 15/12/11 
99 Bonnie Nsambu Transport Engineer 15/12/11 
100 Erias Lukwago Lord Mayor of Kampala 15/12/11 
101 Samuel Ali Accountant, KCCA 15/12/11 
 
 
B: KIGALI  
 
Interviews on initial exploratory trip in February 2009: 
 
This trip was funded by the Crisis States Research Centre at the LSE, for whom I was 
contracted to co-author a 'City Profile' of Kigali in accordance with a specific list of criteria. 
Consequently most interviewees on this trip were within state organisations, and 
particularly the City of Kigali authorities. I used the interviews on this trip both for the 
purposes of gathering data for the profile and establishing the foundations for my own 
research framework on subsequent trips. 
 
No. Interviewee Job title Date 
101 Dieudonne Nkulikiyinka Director General, City of Kigali 16/02/09 
102 Emile Ntabara General Accountant, City of Kigali 16/02/09 
103 Innocent Niyonsaba 
Executive Director, RNIS Surveys. 
Rwanda National Institute of 
Statistics 16/02/09 
104 Local women's council official   16/02/09 
105 
Independent Rwandese 
development consultant   17/02/09 
106 Benon Executive Secretary, City of Kigali  17/02/09 
107 Rueben Ahimbisibwe 
Director of Inspection, City of 
Kigali 17/02/09 
108 David Nyanshaija 
Director of Social and Political 
Affairs, City of Kigali 17/02/09 
109 Lilliane Uwanziga Director of Land Use, City of Kigali  18/02/09 
110 Fred Mufulukye 
Director of Good Governance and 
Political Parties, MINALOC 19/02/09 
111 Fidel Ngendahayo Topographer 19/02/09 
112 Development consultant   19/02/09 
113 Fabrice Mucumankiko Land Officer, Gasabo District 20/02/09 
114 Theophile Mudenge 
 COPE project coordinator, 
Africare (NGO) 20/02/09 
115 
Joseph Baricacko and Julien 
Bucyabahiga 
United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa  23/02/09 
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116 Amil 
Infrastructure Adviser, Ministry of 
Infrastructure 23/02/09 
117 NGO officer   23/02/09 
118 Tom Wheeler 
Infrastructure Adviser, City of 
Kigali 24/02/09 
119 Official at National Land Centre   24/02/09 
120 Eric Ntagengerwa Land surveyor 24/02/09 
121 UN representative   25/02/09 
122 Alice Ankur Country Director, Oxfam GB 25/02/09 
123 Jeremy Armon Governance Adviser, DFID 27/02/09 
124 Paul Jules Ndamage Mayor of Kicukiro 27/02/09 
125 Jeanne D'Arc Gakuba Vice Mayor, City of Kigali 27/02/12 
126 Jean-Luc Plannning Officer 27/02/09 
127 Jean-Claude Uwizeyemungu 
Business Development Services 
Coordinator 27/02/09 
 
 
Interviews between November 2009 and February 2010: 
 
No. Interviewee Job title Date 
128 Rwandese researcher   18/11/2009 
129 
Director of parastatal 
organisation   18/11/2009 
130 
Independent Rwandese 
development consultant   19/11/2009 
131 UN representative   19/11/2009 
132 
Celestin Bumbakare/ George 
Byamukama 
Commissioner, Domestic Taxes 
and Decentralised Taxation 
Officer, RRA 23/11/2009 
133 Bari Mahabubul Transport Infrastructure, MINIFRA 23/11/2009 
134 Government advisers   23/11/2009 
135 John Karera Finance and HR, City of Kigali 24/11/2009 
136 
Christopher and Richard 
Mushabe 
Decentralised Finance, 
MINECOFIN 24/11/2009 
137 Rueben Ahimbisibwe Infrastructure, City of Kigali 25/11/2009 
138 Foreign investor A   25/11/2009 
139 Bruno Rangira PR and media, City of Kigali 26/11/2009 
140 
Foreign consultant/taxation 
adviser A   26/11/2009 
141 Justine Kayiraba Urban planning, City of Kigali 27/11/2009 
142 Martha  City of Kigali Archivist 27/11/2009 
143 Charles Rusimbi 
Inspector,Youth and Education, 
City of Kigali 27/11/2009 
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144 Philippe Munyaruyenzi 
Project co-ordinator, Railways and 
Airport, MININFRA 01/12/2009 
145 District politician 01/12/2009 
146 Taxation adviser B   01/12/2009 
147 Rueben Ahimbisibwe 
Infrastructure, City of Kigali 
(formerly Building Inspector) 02/12/2009 
148 
Albert Mwanafuzi & Emmanuel 
Gasana 
Economic Development City of 
Kigali, and EDPRS support 03/12/2009 
149 Didier Sagashya 
Deputy Director General, National 
Land Centre  03/12/2009 
150 Emmanuel Nkurunziza 
Director General, National Land 
Centre 03/12/2009 
151 
Surbana planning team and City 
of Kigali planners Urban planners 04/12/2009 
152 ahmoud Ntirenganya M&E and Research, City of Kigali 04/12/2009 
153 Foreign investor A   05/12/2009 
154 Djoko Prihanto 
International Urban Planning 
Adviser, Surbana  06/12/2009 
155 Dieudonne Nteziyaremye 
ASSETAMORAWA (Taxi-moto 
association) president 07/12/2009 
156 
ASSETAMORAWA (taxi-moto) 
security officer   07/12/2009 
157 Foreign investor B   07/12/2009 
158 Asaba 
Rwanda Utilities Regulatory 
Authority 08/12/2009 
159 Local researcher   08/12/2009 
160 Innocente Murasi 
Rwanda Association of Local 
Government Authorities  08/12/2009 
161 Alex Ruzibukira Rwanda Development Board 08/12/2009 
162 Wenceslas Niyibizi Fiscal Decentralisation, MINALOC 08/12/2009 
163 Babas Edson Building Inspector, Nyarugenge 09/12/2009 
164 Jean-Claude Rulangwa Transport Offical, City of Kigali 09/12/2009 
165 Vincent Karega Minister of Infrastructure 09/12/2009 
166 District finance officer   10/12/2009 
167 Former CoK official    10/12/2009 
168 Foreign expert   11/12/2009 
169 Pastor/investor in land 11/12/2009 
170 
Rwandan civil society 
representative    11/12/2009 
171 
Brick manufacturer and land 
broker    11/12/2009 
172 World Bank Official  14/12/2009 
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173 
Colonel 'Dodo' Twahirwa (and 
ATRACO Security Officer) 
ATRACO (Matatu Association) 
Chairman and security officer 15/12/2009 
174 Claudine Nyinawagaga Former Mayor of Gasabo District 15/12/2009 
175 Deo-Marcel Niyungeko 
World Bank, Projet 
D’Infrastructures et de Gestion 
Urbaine 16/12/2009 
176 Rwandese property valuer   16/12/2009 
177 Elias Baingana Director of National Budget 16/12/2009 
178 
Local leader and Batsinda 
resident A   17/12/2009 
179 Batsinda resident B   17/12/2009 
180 Batsinda resident C   17/12/2009 
181 Community leader A   17/12/2009 
182 Innocent Security officer, Kimironko market 29/01/2010 
183 Market vendors 
Market vendors, Kimironko 
Market 29/01/2010 
184 Official, Caisse Sociale Rwanda   02/02/2010 
185 Researcher   02/02/2010 
186 
Independent Rwandese 
Journalist   02/02/2010 
187 Donor representatives   03/02/2010 
188 
Government decentralisation 
official    04/02/2010 
189 Camille and Sow Omar 
Urbanism and Habitat section, 
MININFRA 03/02/2010 
190 Expatriate resident   04/02/2010 
191 CoK offical    05/02/2010 
192 Camille Urban Planning, City of Kigali 05/02/2010 
193 Kigali resident     
194 Local research organisation    08/02/2010 
195 Local trade supervisor 08/02/2010 
196 Street hawker   08/02/2010 
197 Former detainee at Kwa Kabuga   08/02/2010 
198 Dennis Rugege 
Environmental Compliance Officer, 
REMA 10/02/2010 
199 Emmanuel Kayinamura 
Former Director of Finance, Kigali 
Veterans Co-Operative Society 10/02/2010 
200 Jean-Claude Rulangwa Transport Officer, City of Kigali 11/02/2010 
201 Joseph Bahenda 
Infrastructure official, Urban 
Infrastructure and City 
Management Project 11/02/2010 
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202 Alphonse Nyizeyimana Vice Mayor for Economic Affairs 11/02/2010 
203 Rose Kabuye President's Chief of Protocol 12/02/2010 
204 Kigali bus company director   12/02/2010 
205 Government adviser   14/02/2010 
 
In addition to these interviews I conducted informal conversations with around 15 taxi-
moto drivers, whose names I did not take and I do not identify individually. These were 
generally around 5-10 minutes in length. 
 
 
Interviews on return trip in December 2011: 
 
No. Interviewee Job title Date 
206 Kigali resident B 04/12/2011 
207 Local revenue official, CoK 06/12/2011 
208 Infrastructure Engineer, CoK 06/12/2011 
209 Celestin Bumbakare Commissioner, Domestic Taxes 06/12/2011 
210 Benon 
Offical, Rwanda Development 
Board 07/12/2011 
211 Land official   09/12/2011 
212 
Civil society organisation 
representative   09/12/2011 
213 Foreign investors   10/12/2011 
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Appendix 2: Additional methodological considerations 
 
 
 
A: Question/method framework used to help guide field research September 2009-February 2010  
(Developed based on suggested method in Mason (2002) and drawing on initial insights from trip in January-February 2009) 
 
The below table was drawn up in advance of my second (and longest) fieldwork trip to the region. It was used to help guide the field research process by 
breaking the main thesis question down into a series of topic-based questions and sub-questions, and considering the most appropriate methods and data 
sources to match to each question. It proved useful in facilitating the selection of interviewees, ensuring triangulation of sources for each issue under 
consideration and assessing potential challenges. Not all of the proposed data sources were accessible; some also proved to be more important than others 
as the research proceeded and underlying causes of differential effectiveness became more apparent. Sources that were not explicitly foregrounded below 
but emerged during the fieldwork as being important and useful were of course also consulted. These included, for example, minutes of council committee 
meetings and interviews with property valuation professionals, donors, foreign investors, lawyers and journalists. I found Mason’s (2002) emphasis on 
continually asking oneself ‘difficult questions’ throughout the research process about the emergent findings, and the challenges they presented to initial 
assumptions and research design, to be very useful.  
 
This guiding framework is included here to demonstrate the iterative process through which the research proceeded, and has only been slightly adjusted 
from the original plan to remove errors and a few specific issues that I decided early in the fieldwork were not sufficiently relevant to pursue. In addition to 
the research outlined below on the four specific topics identified on my initial field trip (urban transport; petty trade; land use and construction regulation; 
and local state revenue), a broader contextualising research agenda was pursued in each city to establish the general parameters of decentralisation, urban 
planning, local politics and central-local relations (some of which is referred to Appendix 2C on basic indicators). 
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1. Urban transportation and petty trade 
Research questions Data sources and methods Justification Practicalities (e.g. resources, 
access) 
Ethical issues/ risk 
 
OVERARCHING 
QUESTION: 
 
Why has the state been 
able to regulate a) urban 
transportation and b) 
urban marketplaces 
more effectively in Kigali 
than Kampala?  
 
 
Establishing evidence of dependent variable 
(effectiveness of regulation):  
- legal status and regulations pertaining to urban 
public transport and market trade (legislation, 
local ordinances) 
- evidence of actual regulation (interviews with 
KCC/CoK staff and transport/marketplace 
associations, observation, newspaper articles) 
 
Researching causes and causal processes: 
- Interviews with bureaucrats and politicians to 
assess regulatory capacity and identify main 
constraints 
- Investigation of party affiliations of urban 
associations (interviews, documentary research) 
- Analysis of types of intervention by state actors; 
overlap of interests between urban associations 
and politicians; role of police and other law 
enforcers (interviews with wide range of sources, 
archive/web/news research on key individuals) 
- Interviews to explore attitudes of transport 
workers and market traders towards regulations 
and laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effectiveness of 
regulation should be fairly 
straightforward to establish 
through matching policies, 
laws and regulations with 
interviews and observation.  
 
 
 
The question of why laws and 
regulations are or are not 
effectively regulated needs to 
be pursued from a wide range 
of perspectives due to bias in 
responses. A number of 
approaches are outlined in 
relation to more specific 
questions below. 
 
Need to get access to 
government resources to look 
at documents pertaining to 
regulation of these sectors 
over time. 
 
News archives may be 
important; consult newspaper 
archive in Makerere Institute 
of Social Research (MISR). 
 
Access to urban associations 
and political elites should not 
be too hard in Uganda but 
access to some sources may 
be more difficult in Rwanda. 
 
There is reason to 
believe that transport 
associations in Uganda 
may be involved in 
covert security 
activities, and certain 
issues pertaining to 
interests in the sector 
may be difficult to 
penetrate.  
 
The transport sector 
may have historically 
played a role in security 
/insecurity in both 
countries; this may be a 
controversial issue. 
 
 
 
More below 
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Urban transportation and petty trade SUB- QUESTIONS 
Research questions Data sources and methods Justification Practicalities (e.g. resources, 
access) 
Ethical issues/ risk 
 
How was the regulation 
of these sectors achieved 
historically?  
 
 
- Interviews with politicians and technocrats 
(national/KCC/CoK/District and City Division) 
- Government archive material/legislation 
- News archives 
- Studies in MISR library (especially for Uganda) 
- Interviews with urban associations 
 
 
Through interviewing I may 
also be able to establish 
whether there is further  
archive material available. 
  
Due to the relative lack of 
continuity of government staff 
(especially in Rwanda) sources 
such as news and archival 
evidence may be important. 
 
Access to Makerere University 
library will be a useful 
resource.  
 
Many staff at KCC have been 
previously interviewed and 
this can be built upon. 
 
Various letters may be 
needed to access particular 
government offices  
 
 
 
What is the relationship 
(both formal and 
informal) between urban 
associations 
representing the 
interests of these sectors 
and the state at different 
levels? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Interviews with both the higher and lower tiers 
(elite and ‘trenches) of urban associations in the 
transportation and market trading sectors  
- Political elite interviews 
- Analysis of decentralisation policy 
- Newspapers and other media 
  
 
It may be difficult to get to the 
bottom of some of these 
issues but the best I can do is 
to speak to as wide a range of 
sources as possible from both 
the state/associational ends 
and use any evidence about 
financial links that are 
available to public. 
 
These urban associations are 
prominent (in Uganda at 
least) and very active so 
should not be difficult to 
access.  
 
Speaking to workers in these 
sectors may at times require a 
translator/research support 
(especially in Rwanda) – this 
should not be too difficult or 
expensive to manage for short 
time periods. 
 
 
These urban 
associations are 
politically sensitive 
issues due to links with 
politicians and parties. 
Need to assess risks of 
researching links 
between transport 
organisation and 
politicians. 
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Urban transportation and petty trade SUB- QUESTIONS 
Research questions Data sources and methods Justification Practicalities (e.g. resources, 
access) 
Ethical issues/ risk 
 
What are the interests of 
the various tiers of the 
state in effectively 
regulating these sectors 
or not?  
 
What are the interests of 
people working in these 
sectors in being 
regulated or not?  
 
- Political elite interviews (down to sector/division 
level) 
- Urban association interviews (elite and 
‘trenches’) 
- Historical analysis of sectors 
(literature/legislation/news archives) 
 
(see also basic indicators below) 
 
As above 
 
As above 
 
As above 
 
It may be important to 
protect the identities of 
informal workers 
interviewed about 
these issues. 
 
What is the legal status 
of these activities and 
how has it changed over 
time? 
 
 
- Legislation and policy documents 
- Analysis of literature and discourses on informal 
economic activity in the two cities 
- Interviews 
- Archival studies 
 
(see also basic indicators below) 
 
 
Archives and literature may 
be particularly important to 
get a sense of some of these 
issues in Rwanda before 1994. 
 
Need to find out how to 
access key pieces of 
legislation relating to 
regulation/legality of relevant 
urban economic activities. 
 
There may be some 
difficulties involved in 
researching 
legal/regulatory issues 
pertaining to these 
sectors under previous 
regimes. 
 
 
What has been the fate 
of attempts by the state 
to regulate these 
sectors? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Literature and Makerere studies 
- Newspaper archives 
- Interviews (KCC, national government, urban 
associations, former planners and politicians) 
- ‘Episodic’ interviewing focused on ‘critical 
events’ (e.g. marketplace riots, public unrest at 
the enforcement of new rules, events around 
election times) 
 
 
There may be Makerere 
studies on these issues and 
there will certainly be media 
coverage. 
 
Ex-planners and local 
politicians ‘in exile’ are often 
useful sources on these 
issues. 
 
News archives and academic 
studies 
 
I should be able to access 
some ex-politicians/planners 
through existing contacts.  
 
 
Need to be wary of 
political agendas and 
vendettas in relation to 
all these issues that 
influence people’s 
accounts, as well as 
possible fears of 
speaking out 
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Urban transportation and petty trade SUB- QUESTIONS 
Research questions Data sources and methods Justification Practicalities (e.g. resources, 
access) 
Ethical issues/ risk 
 
What has been the role 
of different political 
parties in these sectors?  
 
 
- Urban association interviews (elite and 
‘trenches) 
- Newspapers  
- Political party interviews 
 
 
(see also basic indicators below) 
 
There are less likely to be 
Makerere or other studies on 
this issue, due to newness of 
pol party competition in 
Uganda. 
 
New links may currently be 
being forged between certain 
sectors and opposition parties 
and this should be explored. 
 
Accessing opposition parties 
in Rwanda may be difficult 
and many do not have 
permanent offices. 
 
 
Political party system very 
open in Uganda so should 
pose no problems, but they 
are harder to track down in 
Rwanda.  
 
Difficulties in 
researching political 
parties in Rwanda  
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2. Land use and construction  
Research questions Data sources and methods Justification Practicalities (e.g. resources, 
access) 
Ethical issues/ risk 
 
 
OVERARCHING 
QUESTION: 
 
Why is the enforcement 
of land use and 
construction regulations 
so much weaker in 
Kampala than Kigali?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Establishing evidence of dependent variable 
(effective/ineffective regulation): 
- Analysis of regulatory framework (legislation, 
regulations, urban ordinances and  urban plans)  
- Interviews with planners, former planners and 
other city technocrats to assess regulatory 
capacity and identify main constraints 
- Interviews with people from construction 
industry about their sense of the importance of 
regulation and compliance to it 
- Government records 
- Newspaper archives 
 
Researching causes and causal processes: 
- Interviews with above sources 
- Analysis of what particular aspects of 
regulations/ master plans have been acted on 
first, and whose interests they most affect 
- Analysis of particular property developers and 
their political linkages (newspaper archives/web 
research on key individuals and company 
histories) 
 
 
Based on findings from 
previous trip, establishing 
evidence of differential 
outcomes should again be 
fairly straightforward to 
establish from these sources. 
 
Establishing causes will 
involve interviewing a wide 
range of sources to 
corroborate allegations about 
why regulations are not 
enforced for particular 
developers 
 
 
 
Need to identify all the 
relevant people involved in 
construction regulation and 
exactly what they do.  
 
Elite interests are 
closely bound up with 
property development 
and the deals between 
developers and state 
officials/politicians may 
be difficult to 
penetrate. 
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Land use and construction SUB-QUESTIONS 
Research questions Data sources and methods Justification Practicalities (e.g. resources, 
access) 
Ethical issues/ risk 
 
What proportion of the 
buildings in each city 
conform to regulations?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Statistics from relevant departments at KCC/CoK 
(or sub-city division/districts) 
- Interviews with enforcers/inspectors about the 
kinds of property that contravene regulations 
most frequently/systematically 
 
 
(see also basic indicators below) 
 
 
This is important for 
establishing the independent 
variable.  
 
If possible it would be good to 
get this information broken 
down in terms of zoning (e.g. 
industrial, civic, commercial 
etc) and in relation to 
different areas of the city (e.g. 
high income residential, low 
income).  
 
 
 
What is the nature of 
laws and regulations? 
When were they devised, 
by whom and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Interviews with KCC, town planners,  
- land use/regulatory legislation and regulations 
- Interviews with those affected by regulations 
- Particular focus on the nature of 
similarity/difference between rules and 
regulations in the two cities.  
 
 
 
This will be important as there 
is often a very dense 
legal/regulatory framework 
on these issues. Getting a 
detailed picture of this will 
help in understanding the 
main aims of regulating 
construction are in each case. 
 
The nature of similarity/ 
difference between the two 
cases is also very important 
for assessing differential 
implementation.  
 
 
As above 
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What is the relationship 
between ownership of 
major buildings and 
compliance to 
regulations? 
 
- Interviews (perhaps especially with non-
governmental sources) 
- Newspapers (also journalist interviews) 
- Public records/property registers 
- Historical/political analysis of property 
developers based on available sources 
 
 
Understanding something 
about who owns particular 
buildings and how this relates 
to compliance may be critical 
to analysing effectiveness. 
 
  
Ownership of buildings 
often a sensitive issue; 
evidence may be patchy 
and anecdotal. 
 
 
3. Local revenue 
Research questions Data sources and methods Justification Practicalities (e.g. resources, 
access) 
Ethical issues/ risk 
 
OVERARCHING 
QUESTION: 
 
Why has the Rwandan 
state been more 
effective at local revenue 
generation in Kigali than 
the Ugandan state has in 
Kampala? 
 
Establishing evidence of dependent variable 
(raising local taxes effectively): 
- Decentralisation and taxation policies and laws  
- Documentation of tax collected (types, amounts, 
changes over time) 
- Interviews (national, city and sub-city levels) 
 
Researching causes and causal processes: 
- Interviews (technocrats and politicians at city 
level and ministries of local government/finance) 
to assess taxation capacity and identify main 
constraints 
- Analysis of types of property in the city and 
some profiling of property ownership if possible  
- Analysis of problems inherent in decentralisation 
frameworks 
- Role of national taxes relative to local ones; 
involvement (if any) of donors in taxation issues  
- See also basic indicators 
 
Need to look at questions of 
both capacity for tax 
collection and motivation to 
collect local taxes;  hence a 
combination of methods is 
necessary. 
 
Some of this information has 
already been acquired for 
both cities on previous trip. 
Most of the rest should not be 
hard to achieve from 
KCC/CoK, except perhaps for 
information on who owns 
large amounts of property 
and what their affiliations are.  
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Local revenue SUB-QUESTIONS 
Research questions Data sources and methods Justification Practicalities (e.g. resources, 
access) 
Ethical issues/ risk 
 
What kind of taxes are 
collected locally, what 
proportion of the city 
budget are these?  
 
 
- Analysis of revenue data from local governments 
- Interviews (local and bureaucrats and politicians; 
ministries of finance and economic planning; 
ministries of local government) to find out what 
local taxes are decentralised and why? How has 
this changed in life of the administration so far? 
 
 
The systems of local revenue 
collection may be developing 
and in flux; looking a policy 
documents and revenue data 
is unlikely to be enough to get 
to the bottom of these issues. 
 
Local revenue data, which 
may be collected at city or 
sub-city (district, division) 
level.  
 
Different units of local 
government may use 
different record-
keeping /IT systems 
even within same city 
 
Do different levels/tiers 
of the state collaborate 
or conflict in relation to 
local taxation?  
 
  
- Interviews with local revenue/finance people but 
also national revenue authorities (RRA/URA) 
- Analysis of laws and policies pertaining to fiscal 
decentralisation  
- existing studies/literature on decentralisation 
 
 
Perspectives from both local 
and national government 
must be sought, especially 
given the hostility in Kampala 
between local and national 
state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What kind of local taxes 
are collected more 
effectively in each case, 
and why? 
 
 
- Detailed analysis of revenue data  
- Interviews as above 
- Newspaper analysis around particular 
issues/controversies about local tax  
- Interviews with urban taxpayers/associations 
about taxation and other payments made to state 
actors (perhaps informal) 
- Interviews with property values and people in 
charge of property/land registries 
 
 
In addition to questions of 
state capacity, the power 
dynamics underlying taxation 
and compliance require 
investigation through a range 
of sources.  
  
Tax is a highly political 
issue and it may be 
difficult to penetrate 
some of these issues as 
elites have major stake. 
 
Issues of extortion may 
come up and prove 
controversial 
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B: A note on interviewing  
 
Semi-structured interviewing was the predominant research method in the period of 
fieldwork, as indicated in Chapter Two and above. Given the focus on four distinct fields of 
urban development and the need to triangulate from multiple sources in relation to each of 
these, a standardised interview or survey format was not considered appropriate. Drawing 
on the framework above and the relevant parts of the list of basic indicators below (as well 
as issues that emerged in the course of fieldwork and through the process of snowball 
sampling of interviewees), tailored lists of guiding questions were drawn up for each 
individual interviewee. The openness of the semi-structured approach allowed for me to 
draw out detail on particular events and episodes raised by interviewees, as well as their 
thoughts and personal reflections on the issues I raised. At times I conducted interviews 
with people in small groups, especially in the case of market vendors based at particular 
city markets.  
 
Interviewing throws up many challenges, particularly when attempting to compare two 
cases with different political, cultural and linguistic issues that can impinge on the interview 
process. Certain issues that were originally considered in the research framework were 
subsequently dropped because of difficulties in one or other case that impeded 
comparison. For example, research into the ethnic composition of workers in the transport 
and petty trade sectors was largely abandoned due to the extreme difficulty of researching 
issues of ethnicity in Rwanda, where various laws limit the ways in which ethnic identity can 
be discussed and strong cultural norms militate against discussing the role ethnicity plays in 
contemporary Rwandan society.   
 
More significant in terms of the overall comparability of the interview experience in the 
two cities was the frequent preference on the part of interviewees in Rwanda relative to 
Uganda for not having their interviews recorded using an electronic device. It became 
apparent during my first short field trip that most Rwandese interviewees (other than those 
in positions of high authority) did not want to be recorded. Consequently I adjusted my 
approach to interviewing and began to take extremely detailed hand-written notes in all 
interviews in both Uganda and Rwanda, sometimes even pausing to note down short 
quotations verbatim. In this way I avoided an excessive imbalance in the form of data I 
would later be analysing to compare the two cities. While in Uganda I continued to record a 
large number of interviews (as in Rwanda where the interviewee permitted), I used this 
primarily as back-up and to extract the occasional verbatim quotation at greater length, 
rather than transcribing these interviews in full. 
 
The issue of language also had implications. Notwithstanding its recent adoption of English 
as an official language, Rwanda’s Francophone history and the fact that it has a unifying 
national language in the form of Kinyarwanda meant that, outside of the higher rungs of 
the state or civic associations, some interviewees did not speak English. In cases where they 
spoke French, my own grasp of the language was sufficient to conduct a few short 
interviews (for example with market traders or taxi-moto drivers). In cases where I 
interviewed people who spoke neither French nor English (as in the case of evictees from 
urban slums or local community leaders on the periphery of the city), I used a local research 
assistant to translate from Kinyarwanda. However, given the focus of my research on Kigali 
itself and the nature of most of my interviewees, this was quite rare and the majority of 
respondents spoke English to a reasonable standard. In Kampala, though I had a local 
research assistant on my first short trip, translation was largely unnecessary even among 
groups such as boda-boda drivers and urban market traders, most of whom spoke some 
English.  
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As a single researcher with a limited time period and limited resources, there were 
inevitably issues of scope in terms of what I could achieve through interviews. An 
investigation into these issues on a grander scale might also benefit from surveys of 
informal workers and state bureaucrats to complement the qualitative analysis provided. 
However, this was clearly beyond what I could achieve as a lone researcher and also was 
not necessary for the project as it had been designed: I was neither testing a given 
hypothesis nor seeking to make a definitive statement requiring quantification (e.g. that the 
majority of petty traders paid bribes or that a certain percentage of boda-boda drivers 
supported Museveni). A broader range of interviewees would of course have provided 
further material to feed into the analysis, but within the confines of what was possible I 
went to great lengths to interview a diversity of sources both within and outside the state. I 
was also able to supplement interviews by listening in on processes such as the meeting of 
the City Council and Parliamentary Committees in Uganda, as well as observing community 
interaction through activities such as Umuganda, the monthly community works day in 
Rwanda.  
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C: Basic indicators for comparison 
 
As with appendix 2A, this list was drawn up in advance of my second fieldwork trip to 
Kampala and Kigali between September 2009 and February 2010 with the aim of gathering 
a set of basic indicators that could be directly compared between the two cities, to 
complement the more detailed narratives of the sectors under consideration in each city. 
Again, it was not possible to get all the data outlined below for both cities, but sufficient 
amounts were obtained to facilitate comparison on each issue. The below lists were 
important for guiding individual-tailored semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 2B 
above). 
 
 
1) Urban public transport 
 
• Number of matatus/motorcycle-taxis in city (and change over time) 
• General profile of ownership of matatus/motorcycle taxis 
• Transport fares 
• Earnings of drivers 
• Explicit political affiliation of owners (donations to parties, party membership) 
• Political links/inclinations of drivers  
• Historical origin of associational groups  
• Proportion of earnings paid in tax (if any) 
• Nature of informal payments made to patrons (if any) 
• Total economic product of sector/sectoral product as share of GDP 
• Involvement of associations in key ‘critical events’ (riots, protests) 
• Nature of key regulations pertaining to the sector 
• Entity/entities responsible for enforcing regulations 
• Timing of major structural changes – liberalisation, important legislation 
• Specific clauses of main pieces of legislation that are often breached 
• Extent to which urban associations were involved in design of regulations 
  
2) Marketplace governance 
 
• Number of city markets (and if possible stalls and vendors) 
• Main market trader associations (and nature /political affiliation of leadership) 
• Ownership of land on which markets are based 
• Market fees/dues and how they are calculated  
• Agency responsible for fee collection 
• Accounts of ‘critical events’ relating to markets – demonstrations, riots, major 
changes in ownership 
• Legal status of workers in sector 
• Broad ethnic/regional/gender composition of vendors in different markets/vendors 
selling particular goods 
• Timing of major structural changes – shifts in market ownership, important 
legislation 
• Specific clauses of main legislation are often breached 
• Extent to which urban associations were involved in design of regulations  
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3) Urban taxation 
 
• Types of tax collected locally 
• Amount of tax and local taxation as percentage of city budget, and changes over 
time  
• Levels of taxation relative to central government transfers, and changes over time  
• Level of compliance in tax payments (% of relevant population if possible)  
• Political entity that sets local tax rates 
• Institutional framework for tax collection under decentralisation 
• Specific nature of transport taxes 
• Specific nature of market taxes 
• Specific nature of property taxes  
• Timing of  major changes in local tax regime/significant legislation 
• Agencies responsible for the collection of different taxes 
• Specific clauses of main legislation that are often breached 
 
4) Construction regulation 
 
• Institutional framework for allocating permits  
• Number of building permits allocated 
• Percentage of buildings that comply to regulations 
• Nature of main building regulations (number of storeys, provision for parking, 
zoning laws) 
• Relationship between master/structure plan and regulatory framework 
• Main laws and regulations pertaining to expropriation/‘compulsory acquisition’ of 
land by the state for urban development projects 
• Political entity that sets regulations 
• Entity responsible for enforcing regulations 
• Nature of penalties for breach of regulations 
• Timing of major changes in planning regimes/significant legislation 
• Specific clauses of main regulation that are often breached 
 
5) General indicators pertaining to local politics, law enforcement and central-local 
state relations 
 
• Most significant changes initiated by decentralisation programme (with dates) 
• Most significant changes initiated by land reform (with dates) 
• Number of permanent local government staff in the city government (including 
sub-city tiers)   
• Number of policemen/law enforcers in city and observations of presence/activity of 
law enforcers and military actors in the city 
• Evidence of policy measures on the sectors in question that have been 
implemented despite sustained unpopularity among the population or with donors 
• Political parties with a significant presence in the city 
• Political affiliation of mayors and district/division chairpersons 
• Character and regularity of meetings between higher and lower tiers of 
government (i.e. mechanics of decentralisation in action)  
• Nature of any formally institutionalised relations between state agencies and urban 
associations (e.g. of transport and market traders)  
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Appendix 3: Legal and policy frameworks for urban development control 
 
A. KAMPALA 
 
The framework for planning and development control in Uganda was rooted in several key 
pieces of legislation, some of which dated from the colonial/early independence periods 
but the majority having been generated under the NRM in the 1990s and 2000s. In some 
cases the relevant laws were those explicitly pertaining to land (discussed in Chapter 
Three), in as much as they codified issues relating to land tenure, land use (sometimes 
termed ‘user purpose’), and the degree to which the specified land use could be changed 
when land ownership changed hands. The NRM government brought in legislation 
impacting on urban planning and development sporadically and gradually, with the 
resulting framework being a mixture of old and new as well as national laws and local 
ordinances.  
 
The Town and Country Planning Act of 1951 (revised in 1964) was one of the critical legal 
instruments aimed at guiding urban development after independence. Section 9 of the Act 
specifies that the Planning Committee of any given district is the District Council, which in 
the case of Kampala meant Kampala City Council itself; and Section 14 outlines the 
responsibilities of the Committee in relation to the execution and enforcement of outline 
planning schemes. Under these rules KCC was empowered to declare any land in Kampala a 
planning area and, moreover, under Sections 16-17 of the Act it was granted rights of 
‘compulsory acquisition’ to acquire land for certain purposes such as roads, markets and 
public gardens. It therefore possessed legal powers to expropriate land for urban 
development projects. The Act also established the nine-member Town and Country 
Planning Board, whose role was to approve detailed plans throughout the country. 
 
While operational between 1964 and 2010, this Act has now been effectively been repealed 
by the passing of the Physical Planning Bill (2008) in February 2010. The main purposes of 
this Bill were to update the Town and Country Planning Act in light of decentralisation, to 
harmonise planning legislation with the constitution and other laws that impact on land 
and planning, and to officially make the entire country a planning area rather than just the 
towns and municipalities. The Bill replaces the Town and Country Planning Board with the 
National Physical Planning Board, also composed of nine members, who are appointed by 
the Minister in charge of physical planning. The Bill empowers committees and various 
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levels of local government ‘to prohibit or control the use and development of land and 
buildings in the interests of the proper and orderly development of its area’ and to ‘ensure 
the proper execution and implementation of approved local physical development plans’ 
(Physical Planning Bill, Article 33). If development permission is refused for any reason, the 
local physical planning committee is obliged to notify the applicant within 30 days (Physical 
Planning Bill, Article 39). The new Bill is also intended updated and enhanced penalties for 
non-compliance to planning and regulatory rules. 
 
Having been only just passed in 2010, this piece of legislation cannot be used as a 
benchmark by which to judge standards of planning and regulation during the decade 2000-
2010. However, it is worth mentioning if only to highlight that in many respects it simply 
restates provisions that that existed under the Town and Country Planning Act. The 
institutional framework for planning and regulation specified in the Bill is largely unchanged 
from that which has existed since independence, especially in relation to cities; the main 
innovation of the Bill was that it declared the entire country a planning area rather than just 
the urban areas, which made little difference for Kampala.  
 
Other laws came into being in the NRM period with implications for urban planning and 
development regulation. In addition to the Constitution of 1995, which specifies the roles 
of District Councils in broad terms, the Local Government Act (1997) was among the more 
important pieces of legislation. This specifies in detail the roles of different levels of 
government in accordance with Uganda’s decentralisation policy, specifying that a city is 
equivalent to a district in terms of the decentralisation framework, and a city division – of 
which there are five in Kampala – is functionally equivalent to a municipality.
1
 In 
accordance with these distinctions, the roles of the elected and appointed leaders at city 
level are also specified in this Act, albeit with considerable overlaps (see Chapter Three). 
Under decentralisation, KCC is ultimately responsible for planning decisions, while the 
Divisions are seen as implementers, particularly with regard to enforcing regulations.2 The 
Land Act (1998) is also significant in that it set out the specific roles of the District Land 
Boards with respect to granting rights over land and therefore lays the foundations for 
decentralised institutions of land use planning.  
 
                                                          
1
 Note that in administrative terms, Kampala is the only ‘city’ in Uganda, with other small cities being 
designated ‘municipalities’. According to the LGA, Uganda has one City, 13 Municipal Councils and 
103 Town Councils. Kampala is therefore unusual in that it is both a District and a City. 
2
 Interview with KCC Town Planner 13.10.09. 
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Zoning and other land use regulations were embedded the Master Plan (see below) before 
being repackaged as appendices to the Physical Planning Bill, but some fundamental 
construction regulations were also codified in the Public Health Act – another product of 
the early independence period, dating from 1969 – which specifies that local authorities are 
obliged to prevent the construction and occupation of unsafe and unsanitary buildings 
(Public Health Act, Sections 54-67). The Act also stipulates that any contravention of 
building regulations ‘may by notice require the owner to either pull down or remove the 
work or…effect the alterations in the work as may be necessary to make it comply with the 
rules.’ (Ibid: 72). At the time of writing, there was a new Building Control Bill in the 
pipeline, waiting to go before parliament, the main purpose of which was to review and 
update the Public Health Act, particularly with respect to fees and penalties.
3
 Rules 
pertaining specifically to land use in the wetlands are embodied in the National 
Environment Statute (1995). The enforcement of these was specified as a decentralised 
function that sits with Districts (in this case KCC). More generally, the procedures for 
applying for permits and going about constructing legitimately were also laid out in city 
ordinances and other KCC publications.4 
 
Another hugely important piece of legislation was passed in 2010 in the form of the 
Kampala Capital City Act. This was an attempt to fulfil the promise of Article 5 of the 
Constitution, in other words it aimed to ‘provide for the administration and development of 
Kampala city by the central government’ (Kampala Capital City Act, Article 1). The Act 
allowed for the creation of the Kampala Capital City Authority accountable directly to 
President Museveni, which subsequently came into being in 2011 (see Epilogue). In terms 
of planning, the original Kampala Capital City Bill would have ushered in substantial change 
because it proposed the creation of a new, hugely-expanded metropolitan planning area 
that included not only the present Kampala District but large parts of the neighbouring 
districts of Mpigi, Wakiso and Mukono. This, however, was one of the aspects of the Bill 
that was dropped, due to extreme opposition.5 As the Act was not in force during the 
period on which this thesis focuses (2000-2010), it is not considered in any more detail 
here. 
 
                                                          
3
 Interview with KCC Chief Town Planner, 30.09.09. 
4
 E.g. ‘How to put up a safe building’ (no date), Infoseries 2, Kampala City Council. 
5
 ‘House passes Kampala takeover bill’ The New Vision, 03.11.10.  
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The legal framework aside, in its relatively short history a number of Master Plans have 
been developed for Kampala, both during and after the colonial period. Colonial Master 
Plans were introduced in 1912, 1919, 1930 and 1951 (the latter corresponding with the first 
iteration of the Town and Country Planning Act). In the immediate wake of independence, 
UN-sponsored plans were introduced in 1963 and 1966, both of which remained merely as 
paper proposals. The first post-colonial Master Plan to be actually adopted came under Idi 
Amin in 1972, though this too was little implemented. It was followed by the Kampala 
Structure Plan of 1994, which was developed by the Canadian firm John Van Nostrand 
Associates to operate over a ten year period until 2004.
6
 As of 2010 no new plan had been 
produced and the 1994 plan was still theoretically operational (if still barely implemented, 
as discussed in Chapter Four). A new plan was allegedly in the pipeline with the 
procurement process underway at the time of writing and a shortlist drawn up.
7
 This was 
part of a ten-year World Bank project operational at the time of research, the Kampala 
Institutional and Infrastructure Development Programme. 
 
B. KIGALI 
 
Rwanda’s framework for urban planning and construction regulation evolved in a very 
concentrated time period relative to that in Uganda. Finding little by way of laws to 
regulate urban development when they arrived in power (see Chapter Four), the RPF 
government generated an entirely new framework from 2000 onwards. In that year they 
released the foundational outline for the country’s development, Rwanda Vision 2020 (GoR 
2000). This acknowledged the need for regularly updated master plans for each major 
urban centre the development of urban infrastructures in view of a targeted increase in 
urban population from 12% in the year 2000 to 30% of the total population by 2020. 
However, initially little detailed policy was developed on this issue, which remained 
relatively unaddressed for the next five years until the introduction of a UN-HABITAT/UNDP 
supported programme to support the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA) in the 
development of a national urbanisation policy. This joint UN-GoR agreement noted that 
while ‘the Government’s objective is to develop strategies to attract the rural population 
into improved urban centres…currently there are no policies in Rwanda guiding the urban 
development and planning sector’ (RoR/UNDP 2005: 3). Even as recently as 2005, then, 
                                                          
6
 Interview with Frederick Omolo-Okalebo, PhD student in urban planning, Makerere University, 
11.02.09. 
7
 Interview with Savino Katsigaire, Director of Physical Planning, Ministry of Lands, Housing and 
Urban Development, 20.01.10  
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there was ‘minimum or no control of the dynamic urban growth, and a ‘lack of urban 
planning and management tools’ (ibid). The UN-supported proposal was both to develop a 
National Urban Policy (including urban planning and construction standards) and provide 
institutional capacity-building for national and local institutions in charge of the urban 
sector.  
 
Meanwhile, since 2001 country-wide governance structures had been adapted in 
accordance with the National Decentralisation Policy, which like Vision 2020 recognised 
the need for planned urbanisation and outlined a framework in which urban centres of 
200,000 people or more would be administratively classified as cities. The policy set out the 
powers to be devolved to urban local governments under the decentralisation programme, 
which included powers over urban planning, land use planning and plot allocation, control 
over developments, marketplaces and a range of service delivery and environmental 
management responsibilities (RoR 2001: 28). As in Uganda, even by 2010 the capital was 
the only urban centre large enough to qualify for city status. In 2006, as part of the 
implementation of the Decentralisation Policy, the roles and responsibilities of City of Kigali 
(CoK) and the three districts of which it is composed were legally codified under the Kigali 
City Law (Law No. 10/2006 ‘determining the structure, organisation and functioning of the 
City of Kigali’). This law specifies that, among other things, the CoK is responsible for 
preparing a master plan for the city; co-ordinating the activities specified in the strategic 
plans of the three districts that comprise Kigali; co-ordinating the developmental activities 
of the three districts and following up the implementation of national policy in these 
districts (Law No. 10/2006, Article 11).  
 
Article 73 of the above law states how the Chairperson (synonymous with the Mayor) of 
Kigali will ‘represent the State at the level of the City of Kigali’ and be responsible for 
administering the city ‘in accordance with the laws and regulations’. Ultimately, with the 
passing of this law, the CoK – which had already existed as a decentralised entity since the 
first round of decentralisation in 20018 – was re-established as a deconcentrated arm of the 
central state at the city level, as discussed in Chapter Three. The city mayor was personally 
tasked with ‘controlling human settlement to ensure effective observance of the law 
relating to the implementation of the master plan of the City of Kigali’ (ibid, Article 73). 
District mayors, meanwhile were empowered  to ‘allocate land plots, granting of building 
                                                          
8
 A 2001 law determining the structure, organisation and functioning of the City of Kigali had already 
been passed, but the 2006 Law overrode this.  
APPENDIX 3 
 
 363
authorization, land titles… monitoring whether the construction of the house is in 
accordance with its master plan’ (Ibid: Article 176). In other words, while the city level of 
administration was responsible overall for planning, the three Kigali districts were tasked 
with implementing construction and land use regulations (see Chapter Four for a discussion 
of these distinctions).  
 
In terms of laws pertaining to land, Rwanda’s 2004 National Land Policy was rapidly 
followed by the Organic Land Law in 2005 (Law No. 08/2005),
9
 which also has important 
implications for planning and development control, some of which were noted in Chapter 
Three. Thus while the National Urban Policy was still being prepared, two key pieces of 
legislation on land and on the functions and responsibilities of the City of Kigali were passed 
that would also impact on how decisions regarding urban development control are made. 
The National Urban Policy itself appeared under the title of National Urban Housing Policy 
in 2008, though in fact its scope extends far beyond housing; it aims to cover ‘all public 
interventions within the framework of the urbanisation process of Rwanda in order to 
constitute the urban structures at national and provincial level, to improve urban 
management, control development, and the spatial expansion of cities…using effective 
planning tools’ (MININFRA 2008: 2).  
 
The policy proposes a number of actions in relation to supporting city planning, developing 
the regulatory framework for construction and private sector participation, promoting 
secondary urban centres to counterbalance Kigali, promoting ‘grouped settlements’ and 
upgrading informal settlements. It also proposes the establishment of the Rwanda Urban 
Development Bureau. This would have a specific mandate ‘To regulate urban development 
in Rwanda to ensure planned and systemic construction of buildings and structures in 
accordance with standards and norms of building regulations that are in force and in full 
conformity with environmental guidelines’ (MININFRA 2008: Annex 1). The intention is that 
this Bureau, which had not yet come into being at the time of writing, would form a sort of 
one-stop shop for issues of urban planning and development regulation, more or less like 
the Rwanda Development Board or National Land Centre that already existed in the late 
2000s. 
 
                                                          
9
 Organic laws are provided for in the 2003 Constitution, which specifies that that an Organic law 
may not contradict the Constitution, an ordinary law or decree may not contradict an Organic law, 
and a decree may not contradict an ordinary law (Sagashya & English 2009: 5). 
APPENDIX 3 
 
 364
A critical aspect of the framework for planning and development regulation towards the 
end of the decade was the Kigali Conceptual Master Plan, a central tool in the proposed 
realisation of the government’s commitment to planned urbanisation in Vision 2020. 
Previous plans, such as that of 1974, were by and large only concerned with the 
government districts of Kimihurura and Kacyiru as well as residential and commercial 
centre at Kiyovu (RoR 1974). The new plan, led by the American firm Oz Architecture, was 
drawn up on behalf of the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA) in November 2007. It cost 
$1.7m plan to draft (all of which was the GoR’s own money and not foreign aid, according 
to City Council executives),
10
 and was eventually approved by the government in February 
2009, with a very high profile and media fanfare. The plan is ‘conceptual’ in the sense that 
is rather abstract in nature and makes little reference to the current socioeconomic 
characteristics of the city, focusing instead on the physical environment on which it 
proposes to superimpose a new urban form.  A DFID report notes that the plan ‘does not 
make any reference to land markets and land values, household incomes, tenure systems, 
informal settlements characteristics, urban mobility and commuting patterns, and 
implementation guidelines and costs of the proposed planning options’ (DFID 2007: 12).  
 
The Conceptual Master Plan was an initial step in creating a comprehensive urban 
development plan for the whole city; more detailed area plans for particular parts of the 
city were being developed at the time of research by various firms including Oz and the 
Singaporean firm Surbana. The detailed plans for Nyarugenge District (which contains 
Kigali’s commercial and historic core) were unveiled by Surbana in November 2009. Other 
isolated parts of the city such as Gaculiro (proposed as a new ‘satellite’ town north-east of 
the Centre; see Chapter Four) and Rebero Hill (a proposed tourist area in the south of the 
city) had also been planned in some detail as of 2010. 
 
To accompany the new urban policy and the Master Plan, in April 2009 the Ministry of 
Infrastructure released the new Rwanda Building Control Regulations, which were adopted 
by the cabinet in February of the same year and have the force of law. They were explicitly 
based on the standards and specifications as laid out by the British Standards Institution of 
the UK. The 88-page document specifies in detail the procedures for the approval of plans, 
standards for structural design, materials and specified connections to environmental 
infrastructure, health and safety regulations, fees to be paid, and penalties for non-
                                                          
10
 Interview with Director General and Executive Secretary of Kigali, 16.02.09. 
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compliance.  Critically, the rules state that no person shall ‘cause any building to be altered 
or used for a purpose other than the purpose shown on the approved plans of the building’ 
(MININFRA 2009: Section 6.2.1). Thus buildings must not only comply to all the specified 
construction regulations but must also be consistent with the ‘user purpose’ for which they 
were approved, which in turn depend on the zoning regulations for Kigali. Zoning was still 
being undertaken at the time of research in accordance to the detailed area plans discussed 
above, but a preliminary version of the zoning plan was released in September 2009. This 
specified the permissible (and prohibited) uses for land classified for example as low rise or 
high rise residential, neighbourhood level commercial, city level commercial (including 
tourism and recreational), light industrial, general industrial, retail warehouse, agricultural 
and protected area districts.
11
  
 
The Building Control Regulations specify that any person who deviates from approved plans 
commits an offence, if the deviation is such that ‘the building is incapable of being altered 
to comply with the requirements of these regulations, the Committee shall revoke the 
permit for the building operations and serve notice to the owner of the building to 
demolish and remove the building within a specified period’ (MININFRA 2009: Section 
6.2.1). Continued failure to comply with terms of a notice issued will result in a fine or 
imprisonment (ibid: Section 6.2.2). The implementation of processes in these regulations, 
land laws and the master plan is aided by a new document aimed at investors, the Kigali 
City Clients Charter, though this is not legally binding in itself.  
 
The institutional framework for urban development control in Kigali was thus composed of 
a dense and rapidly-evolving web of urban plans, policies, laws and regulations in which 
ultimately the Master Plan was invested with great power. The roles that decentralised 
entities played in accordance with the decentralisation policy and Kigali City Law were in 
some senses subservient to the Master Plan and involve ensuring compliance to it.  
Meanwhile, the new systems of land tenure and framework for land management 
discussed in Chapter Three were incorporated into the Plan and provided additional legal 
backing to its implementation in the ‘public interest’. Finally, in addition to the legal and 
policy frameworks discussed here, there was (as in Kampala) a World Bank-funded project 
focusing on urban infrastructure and management, the Projet D’Infrastructures et de 
Gestion Urbaine, though this came to a close at the end of 2009.  
                                                          
11
 Preliminary zoning document obtained from CoK planning office 
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Appendix 4: Rwanda decentralisation diagrams 
 
4a: Reporting on District Development Plans 
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Source: Acquired from MINALOC, February 2010 
 
4b: Imihigo performance monitoring 
 
 
 
 
Source: Acquired from MINALOC, February 2010 
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4c: Security Reporting 
 
 
 
 
Source: Acquired from MINALOC, February 2010 
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4d: Umuganda reporting 
 
 
 
 
Source: Acquired from MINALOC, February 2010 
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4e: Local taxation monitoring  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Acquired from MINALOC, February 2010 
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